One further note about Egypt

I want to clarify regarding this sentence in the IPS piece about Egypt that I filed yesterday… “The arguments the state media made that Egypt should put its own interests first and do nothing that might drag it into a new war with Israel fell on many receptive ears”… I made a deliberate choice to insert that modifier, “many”.
Without any modifier, the impression conveyed would be that the state’s arguments had fallen on ears that were, in general, receptive. The same impression would have been conveyed if I’d used the modifier “most”. I saw no reason to reach that conclusion.
I toyed with the idea of writing “some”, or “a few”; but I think either of those might have under-stated the effect the state’s arguments had. Hence my eventual choice of “many”.
If it sounds very indeterminate, well that’s how it has to be. We honestly cannot know how many Egyptians were swayed by the regime’s arguments, or how many had general predispositions in this direction that were confirmed and/or strengthened by the state’s arguments. Opinion polling and social attitudes research in general are tightly state-controlled, and rarely undertaken, in Egypt…
So let’s leave it at “many”. I certainly don’t want to say “most.” But the effectiveness the state’s arguments achieved during and since the war clearly reached the level of being politically significant.
… Of course, attitudes can also change rapidly in the face of new developments.

6 thoughts on “One further note about Egypt”

  1. The problem is that it seems that your, Helena Cobban’s, ears may be among the “many” that are swayed by Mubarak’s argument that Mubarak is somehow putting “Egypt first” when it allies with the US and Israel contrary to the sensibilities of a vast majority of Egyptians.
    Two things are clear. Mubarak’s primary constituency, the group Mubarak is mostly accountable to, is not Egyptian but American. Americans who are explicitly or implicitly supportive of this relationship bear some responsibility for the oppression of Egyptians this relationship necessitates.

  2. No, I do not believe that Mubarak is putting Egypt’s interests first, and I haven’t written anything to that effect. I know– as he does, even more– who his paymasters are. But as a reporter, it’s my job to report and analyze the phenomena I see, as calmly and objectively as I can.
    Have you been in Egypt recently? Do you have any evidence that challenges my analysis? Evidence, rather than bald assertions and accusations, is what would be most valuable.

  3. OK for “many”. But why keep asking ? If the “entrepreneurial middle class” is “huge”, as you put it, then “Egypt’s Star” will rise even more in Regional Politics.
    Best regards

  4. I have no doubt that Mubarak would try to spin his complicity in the starvation of Gaza as being in Egypt’s interests. If the state media repeats the line often enough, a few may even believe it.
    But clearly, the interests of the U.S./Israel are not the same as Egypt’s, though they may be the same as Mubarak’s as his only goal is to continue ruling over a hostile population.
    And the population has become more hostile than ever. Never in doubt as to whom Mubarak is in thrall, now it is laid bare for even the blind to see.
    As for “avoiding war,” there is no one asking Egypt to fire a single shot. Only to open the Rafah crossing to aid and trade. That is hardly the same as war.
    I’ve read your site often. I think you have great things to say and I have always appreciated your advocacy of the Palestinians, but I greatly disagree with your assessment that Mubarak has been been strengthened by the Gaza war.

  5. Lysander, if you could produce your evidence, that would certainly enrich the discussion. I know mine wasn’t complete. But I drove and walked around the city for long enough, and talked to enough people, to conclude that the regime seems noticeably less on-edge and insecure than it did when I was last there in February 2007. And honestly, after reading news reports about the big pro-Gaza demos etc in the early days of the recent war I wasn’t expecting that.
    I have produced some of the key pieces of my evidence– I could produce more. But those of you who challenge my conclusions owe me and the other JWN readers the courtesy of producing yours.

  6. Ok.
    If you say there exist some Egyptians who support Mubarak’s regime, I will not argue. If you say there are more Egyptians who support the regime than you expected, I will not argue.
    If you say Egypt’s policies during the Gaza war directly strengthened Egypt’s domestic political position, then that is a very strong statement that has to be qualified.
    Egypt maintains its power by removing those who would form an organized opposition to Mubarak from the public sphere. (And torturing them in many cases.) (With the connivance of the nation in which you are a citizen.)
    If when you travel to Egypt, you do not see as much evidence of opposition to Mubarak’s regime as you expected, it is possible the Mubarak’s arguments are working, but it is also possible that the people who would, in a free society, tell you the opposite are not available.
    Maybe a politically significant portion of Egypt’s population believes Egypt is following an Egypt-first policy or maybe not. The results you’ve seen are not necessarily the result of a shift in popular belief.
    To put this another way, possibly some Egyptians have come to believe Egypt is pursuing the correct policies since the Gaza war and that’s what you’ve seen. Just as likely, possibly Egypt has been more effectively stifling opposition ideas and that’s what you’ve seen. It is impossible to tell the two apart anecdotally.
    Polls are released periodically. I doubt we’ll see movement either towards Egypt’s policy of conciliation with Israel or towards Mubarak but until we see a poll, we have basically no information.
    But my issue is that you, Helena, seem to put “Egypt-first” into your own voice. For example you describe Sadat’s initiation of the policy, in your voice, as Egypt-first-ish. I disagree with that assessment. A policy that cannot pass a referendum in Egypt cannot be called Egypt-first.
    Sadat’s policies were Sadat-first, and Mubarak’s policies are Mubarak-first.
    Beyond that, the role Egypt is playing, that you are describing in positive terms, as a fulcrum in the Middle East is not only not “Egypt-first”, but by Egyptian standards is hideously biased towards Israel.
    It is so hideously biased that to keep it in place millions of Egyptians must live under tyranny. An order of magnitude more Egyptians must live under tyranny than the amount of Jews who are this way avoiding living in a majority-Arab country as Hamas calls for.
    It is very disturbing to see Egypt’s foreign policy spoken of approvingly by a Westerner, especially a liberal Westerner.

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