The NYT was able to use its people’s good relations with the Georgian government to get hold of the text of the ceasefire agreement that Sarkozy got the Russians to agree to at 2 a.m. Wednesday. Here it is, in PDF, with the French original bearing handwritten notes representing the Georgian side’s requests for further revisions, which according to this accompanying story by Andrew Kramer Russia had not accepted..
According to Kramer, when Sarkozy made his first stop in Tbilisi earlier this week he and the Georgians agreed to the first four four of the six points listed there. He then went to Moscow, where Putin (and Medvedev?) insisted on adding the last two points. So the six-point version without the phrases added in parentheses is what Moscow agreed to. And then, during Wednesday, yesterday, the Russians used the provision in Point 5 that says, “While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures” to advance further into Georgia, go into the military bases the Georgian forces had abandoned there, to confiscate all the weapons etc.
In the interest of assuring “security”, of course.
Since some of these bases had been built to strict NATO specifications, I imagine the Russians were also extremely interested in many of the things they found there, including computers, security systems, and so on.
But this provision about being able to implement “additional security measures” seems to give them very wide latitude to rush around wherever they please inside Georgia and to suppress any forces there that might oppose them.
(The Russians take as given that all the troops they have in Georgia are “peacekeeping forces.” Just another really horrible example– like the west’s much favored “humanitarian intervention”, or the idea of US troops as “liberators” in Iraq– of the misuse of eirenic language to euphemize what are obviously extremely coercive actions backed up by brute force.)
My reading of Moscow’s decisionmakers is that they most likely won’t, in fact, use the permission that Point Five might, by some readings, appear to give them to take over Tbilisi or other parts of Georgia. But they almost certainly will use their presence inside Georgia to extract the very best political terms they can from Tbilisi.
Charles Krauthammer, in his belligerent column today, warned against the “Finlandization” that he identified as being Russia’s goal in Georgia.
“Finlandization” is the term to describe the arrangement that tiny Finland worked out with Stalin’s Russia in 1947. It gave the Finns broad autonomy (or, a form of bounded “sovereignty”) over its conduct of the entire gamut of domestic affairs, while the Finns agreed that Moscow could exercise a virtual veto over its conduct of foreign affairs.
Wikipedia tells us that,
- After the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, Finland succeeded in retaining democracy and parliamentarism, despite the heavy political pressure on Finland’s foreign and internal affairs by the Soviet Union. Finland’s foreign relations were guided by the doctrine formulated by Juho Kusti Paasikivi, emphasizing the necessity to maintain a good and trusting relationship with the Soviet Union. To this end, Finland signed an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in April 1948. Under this pact, Finland was obliged to resist armed attacks by “Germany or its allies” against Finland, or against the Soviet Union through Finland, and, if necessary, ask for Soviet military aid to do so. At the same time, the agreement recognized Finland’s desire to remain outside great power conflicts, allowing the country to adopt a policy of neutrality during the Cold War. As a consequence, Finland did not participate in the Marshall Plan, and took neutral positions on Soviet overseas initiatives. By keeping very cool relations to NATO, and to western military powers in general, Finland could fend off Soviet preludes for affiliation to the Warsaw Pact…
In US public discourse, Finlandization is generally seen as a form of humiliating appeasement, and something to be avoided at even a very high cost. (Strange, then, that these same westerners have consistently been urging the Palestinians to accept a deal from Israel that gives them terms considerably less favorable than what Finland won from Moscow?)
Within Finland itself, the period of Finlandization is viewed with considerably more nuance than in the US. I’d like to suggest that in Georgia, some arrangement like the one that gave Finns such broad rights of local self-governance– under which they kept their country out of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, used the revenues that they saved by not having to maintain large armies to make considerable advances in their socioeconomic and educational status, and used their neutral diplomatic status to host important east-west gatherings like the 1974 Helsinki Conference– might be considerably better for the country’s people(s) than a descent into further war?
… Anyway, the diplomacy over these issues has still only barely started. First, let’s hope the ceasefire holds.
A “security zone.” Hmmm, where have we heard this before?
Also:
I’d like to suggest that in Georgia, some arrangement like the one that gave Finns such broad rights of local self-governance […] might be considerably better for the country’s people(s) than a descent into further war?
Objectively, that might well be true. On the other hand, the context for this arrangement – i.e., being forced into it by a more powerful neighbor which is able to change the arrangement at will, and keeping one’s “local self-governance” on sufferance – isn’t so good. If the regional hegemon is able to impose a choice between war and “local self-governance,” without the option of independence, then equality between nations is gone and the only remaining question is what form the resulting empire will take. (And this goes as much for Georgia’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as for Russia’s with Georgia.)
As you pointed out, the Palestinians shouldn’t be made to accept this kind of arrangement, so why should the Georgians? Or are you arguing that the Palestinians should accept?
Actually, if the Palestinians are ever offered anything similar to what the Finns got in 1947, I would urge them to snatch it up quickly and rejoice. We all know that, under any conceivable 2-state solution the Palestinian state would be completely demilitarized and prevented from entering into any alliances with states hostile to Israel (enforced neutrality.)
But what the Finns got was Russian respect for their territorial integrity and rights of full internal self-governance and maintaining substantial, free-market economic relations with the rest of the world. What’s not to like? (Especially once you realize that maintaining a military force is a huge burden on finances and manpower… )
For most Israelis, the territorial integrity of the West Bank (in the pre-June 1967 borders) has always, of course, been completely unthinkable, and Sharon and the settler leaders worked hard to keep it so.
For most Israelis, the territorial integrity of the West Bank (in the pre-June 1967 borders) has always, of course, been completely unthinkable
This may be true of the exact 1967 borders, but “most Israelis” have also been open to an arrangement where the Palestinians are compensated for agreed-upon border adjustments with land from within Israel proper. Presumably, any peace treaty would specify that Israel would respect the territorial integrity of Palestine within whatever borders are specified, including the land that is ceded from within the 1949 cease-fire line.
Which really isn’t that dissimilar to the Soviet Union’s relationship with Finland, given that the SU respected Finland’s territorial integrity after taking all of Karelia. The Karelia cession was part of the Paris Peace Treaty that you mentioned in the main post, so the Finns technically agreed to it, but I think it’s fair to say that their agreement was imposed at gunpoint.
I should add that (1) about 400,000 Finnish citizens were expelled from Karelia when the Soviet Union annexed it; (2) the Finnish economy during the postwar years was greatly hampered by the absorption of refugees and the war reparations (which were also part of the Paris treaty); and (3) while political Finlandization is indeed viewed in Finland as a nuanced matter, the Karelia cession isn’t. Hopefully we can avoid (more of) that in any future Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
You know, we speak as if Finlandization is unique to Finland: it’s not. In some ways, it’s also the arrangement that Japan, Canada, and perhaps even UK have with US (certainly true in case of Japan.) I can’t say this arrangement has served Japan poorly–and those who like to talk about “regaining sovereignty” in Japan tend to be semi-reformed or unreformed militarists who view Chosen and Taiwan (yes, I’m deliberately using the old Japanese term for Korea to make a point) much as Fins view Karelia. No country is really “independent.” IMHO, Fins got a pretty good deal where they didn’t reach for more than they could afford and were just feisty enough to protect what they did get.
The use of “Finlandization” as a generic term suggests that it is not, in fact, viewed as unique to Finland.
I’d agree that the term applies to the United States’ relationship with Japan. Maybe the UK’s relationship with Ireland between 1922-36. I’m not so sure about US-Canada or US-UK, though, given that the US has never forced either of them at gunpoint to do anything they didn’t want to do. Your larger point that no country can be completely “independent” is unarguable, but the US-Canadian and US-UK relationships have been more voluntary than not.
Hmmm. Finland, Japan, Georgia – it seems, from these data points at least, that Finlandization tends to happen to countries that lose wars. That probably isn’t surprising since it is a fundamentally unequal relationship. It also involves a lot of refugees, as shown by Karelia, Sakhalin, South Ossetia/Abkhazia during the 1990s and even Ireland after the Civil War. It might serve the Finlandized countries well in the long term, but that’s probably not an intended consequence.
Wikipedia also tells us:
“Self-censorship and excessive Soviet adaptation
However, from the political scene following the post-1968 radicalization, the Soviet adaptation spread to the editors of mass media, sparking strong forms of self-control, self-censorship and pro-Soviet attitudes. Most of the élite of media and politics shifted their attitudes to match the values that the Soviets were thought to favour and approve, developing into a self-imposed Finlandization that often is argued to have exceeded Soviet expectations.[citation needed]
Civil servants, politicians and journalists accepted the practice that, if they cared about their careers, they did not talk about injustices such as the Soviets’ assaults leading to the Winter War, or contemporary Soviet political repressions, such as the fate of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Such discussions were sanitized in the name of maintaining a working relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union.[citation needed]
Only after the ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership in 1985 did mass media in Finland gradually begin to criticize the Soviet Union more.”
Is this a solution you would really want for Palestine, Helena? Or Georgia, for that matter?
Seriously though, putting aside Russian and Georgian thuggery, why shouldn’t South Ossetia and Agkhazia be independent or even part of Russia if that is the wish of their citizens? How about a UN run referendum with a 66% threshold to settle the matter? Then throw in a
few neutral – ie not Russian – UN peacekeepers on the borders?
After which, why shouldn’t Georgia join Nato if that is its wish? Of course if Russia ceased to be perceived as a threat to Georgia it probably wouldn’t want to join Nato.
btw, you might be interested to know that Fox News has been far more Georgian-skeptical than the rest of the US media seems to be. I gather this has something to do with the Georgian government closing down some media outlet there.
Self-censorship and excessive Soviet adaptation […] Is this a solution you would really want for Palestine
I believe the Oslo accords did contain a “non-disparagement” clause under which the parties’ public officials were obligated not to demonize each other and the schools were to educate children for peace. On the other hand, this obligation was reciprocal rather than one-sided, and neither party enforced it very well.
After which, why shouldn’t Georgia join Nato if that is its wish?
Maybe because I don’t want my German son risk his life for some lunatic scheme of a crazed Georgian leader?
NATO is an invitation club where every member has a veto about new members joining.
Whatever Georgia “wishes” doesn’t matter in that regard.
Jonathan,
I don’t know if the Japanese or the Fins were strictly “forced” to adopt their stances (you may accuse of stretching the term “forced” quite a bit and you may be right.) Certainly, they could have chosen to resist clandestinely–like Scharnhorst and old Prussia under Napoleonic domination. They didn’t because they felt reasonably comfortable abiding by the restrictions imposed by the victors–mostly because they weren’t too extreme and they saw nothing they stood to gain by fighting it. One reason I think the term might apply to UK or Canada is that, even though they were supposedly the victors in their defining wars (esp. WW2), they recognized that their roles in the new world order would be as “lieutenants” to the new hegemon (the term was actually used by Churchill in his correspondences with FDR) and oriented their policy accordingly. This is very much in contrast with what the continental Europeans–Schuman, Adenauer, de Gaulle, or Brandt–did.
I agree that the process vis-a-vis US and UK/Canada isn’t quite the same as USSR and Finland or US and Japan…but the parallels that do exist are undeniable, I think.
Morton Abramowitz, who almost certainly knows a lot more about Afghanistan in the 1980s than Charles Krauthammer, reckons that:
Helena, why are you so approving when it is powers like Russia “Finlanding” with Georgia or Syria “Finlanding” with Lebanon – but not when it is the US or Israel Finlanding with other countries or entities?
All are just examples of Bigger Power bullying crap. And yet you defend the one and excoriate the other? Why aren’t you consistent? What are your reasons?
Putin is using the Kosovo analogy for cynical reasons but surely this is an argument that should be grasped, promoted and turned back on him?
Why don’t you support movements for self determination when they have overwhelming support within their communities – wherever or whoever they are?
b – “After which, why shouldn’t Georgia join Nato if that is its wish?
“Maybe because I don’t want my German son risk his life for some lunatic scheme of a crazed Georgian leader?
“NATO is an invitation club where every member has a veto about new members joining.
“Whatever Georgia “wishes” doesn’t matter in that regard.”
“b” – it is perfectly within the rights of Germany to oppose – or accept – Georgia’s admission into Nato.
My point was more that Georgia ought to be able to seek admission into Nato without the fear of Russia or anybody else using military coercian to intimidate it. Do you disagree with that?
b – “After which, why shouldn’t Georgia join Nato if that is its wish?
“Maybe because I don’t want my German son risk his life for some lunatic scheme of a crazed Georgian leader?
“NATO is an invitation club where every member has a veto about new members joining.
“Whatever Georgia “wishes” doesn’t matter in that regard.”
“b” – it is perfectly within the rights of Germany to oppose – or accept – Georgia’s admission into Nato.
My point was more that Georgia ought to be able to seek admission into Nato without the fear of Russia or anybody else using military coercian to intimidate it. Do you disagree with that?
Guys
If Nato doesnt want the Georgians they can always rejoin CSTO (they left in 1999) along with the Iranians entry.
You will all of course enjoy Caroline Glick’s rant that proposes throwing Turkey out of Nato. I am sure they will be welcomed into CSTO with open arms.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1218446173678&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Glick’s rant is particularly amusing and ill-conceived because she fails to make any mention of the fact that Erdogan has been one of the international leaders who have rushed to Georgia to express support for Saak in the past few days…
Ah, but that doesn’t fit into her tightly Manichean, dyadical, “you’re either with us or against us” frame. Her description of life in Turkey under Erdogan is also unrecognizable. (In fact, life in Israel is considerably more theocratic than life in Turkey under the AKP.)
Why does the JP publish this nonsense?
Planet Glick might be rather a fun place to visit, though one might not choose to reside there. If I was a Turk, I’d certainly think about life without NATO, at least — yet perhaps it would not count, Glickwise, if the treacherous ratfinks were to jump ship voluntarily instead of being forced to walk the plank?
Anyhow, Herself says, “As they have moved their countries away from the West, both Putin and Erdogan have managed to maintain good relations with [Rancho Crawford] by going through the motions of supporting its war against terror even as they have both embraced terrorists and their state sponsors.” Has she noticed the implied slight on her ideobuddies’ political I.Q.? Would you want to go krusading with kiddies who cannot make out when they are losin’?
Suppose the lady is basically right about the stupidity of the Party that she sides with. Though very great, this stupidity cannot be entirely unlimited. (Can it?) Beyond a certain point, the main reason why the kiddies cannot work out who is winnin’ and who is not may well be objective rather than subjective: i.e., it may not really much matter whether Global Tourism is making gains at the expense of AEI-GOP-Likúd-Qadíma, or vice versa. An ideologuess like Mme. Glick would naturally prefer to triumph gloriously all across the board and without interruption, but if she cannot obtain that, she would be happier goin’ out with a ¡BANG! to havin’ to spend her golden years in a paltry and meanin’less world from which the whole point of the Kampf aller Kämpfe has somehow silently evaporated. (’Twould serve her right, that would — if you’ll pardon my editorial.)
Of the theorists for Wingnut City, only neocomrade F. Fukuyama has ever seriously worried about the whimper-instead-of-a-bang problem, and he did so before the Glickian or Al Kayduh brand of Kampf really got started.
Among decent political grown-ups, M. Emmanuel Todd predicted something of the whimper sort as early as 1423/2002, in Après l’empire. Extremist Republicans and some of the more demented neo-Muslims will engage in a Grand Huntin’tonian Clash™, no doubt, but meanwhile the real moral (and material) progress of the human race will be going on less spectacularly somewhere else entirely.
But God knows best. Happy days.
La Glick will go bananas when she realises that signing up the Poles to misile defense will expedite the delivery of S-300 Air Defence systems to Isfahan.
This is starting to get a bit like August 1914.
Jonathan Edelstein
where the Palestinians are compensated for agreed-upon border adjustments with land from within Israel proper.
Very laughable argument and thoughts let occupying the land then re-compensating those made homeless from their occupied land? Is this your interpretation of laws Jonathan Edelstein or the law twisted to your loving believe
This is starting to get a bit like August 1914
But the stakes are somewhat higher now:
“Although any proposed reduction is welcome, it is doubtful that survivors—if there were any—of an exchange of 3,200 warheads (the U.S. and Russian numbers projected for 2012), with a destructive power approximately 65,000 times that of the Hiroshima bomb, could detect a difference between the effects of such an exchange and one that would result from the launch of the current U.S. and Russian forces totaling about 12,000 warheads.”
This is a quote from none other than Robert McNamara, U.S. secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968, in an article he wrote in 2005, with the title: Apocalyse Soon
Israel has a real problem over the Ossetian crisis. The US is opening its arms to Cold War II. The images of tanks and armoured personnel carriers are much preferable, as enemy, to the odd jihadi with an RPG. The crisis has a good way to run, during which time Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Iran, are going to be forgotten. This is not going to please Tel Aviv.
Are we to think that AIPAC will consider Iran to be a lost cause (which it is)? Or will Ossetia suddenly subside as a problem, and we hear about Iran as a problem again?
It is quite a difficult job for AIPAC, though I don’t doubt their abilities.