Georgia crisis and the shifting global balance

Another great post from Bernhard of Moon of Alabama on the Georgian crisis, today.
What Bernhard really “gets” about this crisis is the degree to which it reveals the extreme constraints on Washington’s ability to exercise freedom of action– including military action– in parts of the world where, until recently, it felt quite confident of acting freely. The constraints being, as I’ve noted previously, both logistical and political (in terms of the balance of power in world politics, not– at this point– the balance within the US.)
From this perspective, the serried ranks of rightwing commentators who are published so widely in the US MSM suddenly look like (possibly quaint) dinosaurs as they bark out their calls for more “robust” US action against the Russian bear… Max Boot, Richard Holbrooke, and of course– Charles Krauthammer.
I was going to write a quick post here about Krauthammer’s NYT column today. But Bernhard’s commentary on it is even better than what I was going to write. Krauthammer had suggested some “stern”, but still only diplomatic, actions that Washington should take in an attempt to “punish” Moscow. Bernhard pointed out that Moscow has many more potent means of “punishing” the west, should it choose to use them. (Which I highly doubt it does.)
Then, Krauthammer’s “zinger” is a suggestion that Bush send Putin a copy of the movie “Charlie Wilson’s War”– “to remind Vlad of our capacity to make Russia bleed.”
But as Bernhard writes:

    Putin while watching “Charlie Wilson’s War” might indeed get the idea that an occupation force in Afghanistan can be beaten and dislodged by supplying the Taliban with money and anti-air missiles. He may even thank Krauthammer for that fabulous idea.

The fact that Krauthammer had presumably not even thought of this possible consequence of his “suggestion” being put into operation is very revelatory. It reveals, to me, the depth of the guy’s extreme, US-centric self-referentiality and his inability even to imagine that someone else might interpret the world in ways different from him. (So what else is new?)
… But the main aim in all this should certainly not be to urge consideration or use of further risky and escalatory measures. Heck, Saakashvili’s performace last week should stand as a powerful object-lesson against anyone doing that! The aim should be to point once again– since it does still seem needed– to the interdependence of all the world’s peoples, including of all the world’s “big powers,” in the current era.
That’s a lesson that many citizens of the US need to understand a lot more clearly.
Actually, probably most of them do have a fairly strong understanding of it. But they are certainly not helped in their understanding by the wide dissemination given to the views of all those US-uber-alles dinosaurs who still dominate most of the country’s public discourse.
I think we need to underline a few distinctive lessons and principles:

    1. The US currently has little credibility when its leaders present themselves as guardians of “international legitimacy.”
    2. Thorny international political differences cannot be resolved through force— whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Georgia, or elsewhere. And the world’s governments should certainly refrain from attempting to do this, since any use of force anywhere simply perpetuates the idea that using it is an acceptable way to behave while it also, importantly, diverts attention and resources away from the much-needed means of political engagement to the massively expensive means of military combat..
    3. We do, luckily, have many international institutions and mechanisms that can help resolve such problems using nonviolent means and reference to neutral, long-agreed standards of behavior. Those mechanisms should be used and further strengthened, rather than derided or overlooked completely.
    4. The US should be, along with the world’s other governments according to their capacities, part of that effort to restore the UN and the world’s other institutions of multi-lateral problem-solving. But unlike in 1945, the US is currently not in a position to dominate it. (Thanks, George W. Bush!)