Graham Usher, who’s an experienced and intelligent observer of Palestinian politics, has a fascinating new piece about Hamas up on the MERIP website. It’s called The New Hamas: Between Resistance and Participation.
Usher writes of,
- the strategic turn undertaken by Hamas in the last year. Once the fiercest opponent of the 1993-1994 Oslo agreements — or of any final peace deal that would recognize Israel — Hamas now publicly accepts that it, too, would negotiate with the Jewish state. Once dismissive of PA elections as the illegitimate child of Oslo, Hamas now plans to participate in legislative contests slated for the coming winter. Paradoxically, these convergences in strategic outlook between Hamas and the PA are the reason why the July battles in Gaza could be harbingers of struggles to come.
Hamas, he wrote, owed the rise in popularity that it saw in the past few years,
- not only to the armed resistance its fighters put up against Israel, the collapse of PA police forces and divisions in Fatah sown by Israel’s West Bank and Gaza invasions, and the visceral appeal of its “reprisal” suicide attacks inside Israel. As important was the extensive array of charitable and welfare services that stood in stark contrast to the inefficiency and collapse of the PA ministries. The result, by late 2002, was less a party in opposition to the PA and Fatah than an independent national force bent on establishing “a political, social and military alternative to the existing Palestinian order,” in the words of former PA Culture Minister Ziad Abu Amr.
The issue was what to do with such power. Would Hamas seek the creation of a “new PLO” or a rapprochement with the existing one? Party leaders chose accommodation. There were three reasons compelling them to do so.
The first reason was the new regional order born of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that came in their wake. As one European diplomat with extensive contact with the Palestinian Islamists acknowledged: “Hamas, like Syria, feels the cold wind coming from Baghdad and the new licenses granted to the ‘war on terror.'”
…
The second reason was the unprecedented assault Israel unleashed on the movement following the truce. In seven months, Israel killed Hamas’ main military commander in Gaza, Ibrahim Maqadmeh, Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Rantisi, his successor in Gaza. Israel also tried to assassinate Muhammad Dayf, head of Hamas’ military arm, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Mahmoud Zahhar, now Hamas’ most senior political leader in the Strip. The Israelis sent clear signals to Hamas officials in Damascus like Khalid Mishaal and Musa Abu Marzuq that they too were fair game. In the final stage, sound intelligence, helicopter gunships and death squads proved thorough at wiping out what remained of Hamas’ West Bank military cadre.
The assault was steeled by political and financial sanction…
The third reason was Ariel Sharon’s decision in February 2004 that, in the absence of a Palestinian “peace partner,” Israel would withdraw unilaterally from settlements in Gaza and the northern tip of the West Bank. Publicly, Hamas claims the “flight” as a victory for its strategy of armed resistance. Privately, many in the movement understood that disengagement offered an exit from a “war” that had not only brought overpowering Israeli retaliation but was also wrecking Hamas’ own aspiration to legitimacy and leadership. Disengagement supplied the long-awaited moment when Hamas could cash in the kudos it had earned from resistance and welfare and convert them into political and institutional capital.
Usher wrote that it was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin himself who presented the new platform in the weeks before his assassination in March, 2004:
- It consisted of three positions that, taken together, constituted a strategic turn in the movement’s theory and practice. The first plank was the understanding that Hamas would hold its fire for the duration of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and four northern West Bank settlements, on the condition that the withdrawal is complete (including from the crossing on the Egyptian border). Hamas reaffirmed this pledge in discussions with Abbas in August 2005 on the eve of the withdrawal, and has honored it to date.
The second plank was that, until the withdrawal commenced (or at least until the decision to withdraw was seen to be genuinely irreversible), Hamas would escalate armed resistance in Gaza while curtailing suicide attacks in Israel. This essentially is what occurred in period preceding the Cairo Declaration and subsequently whenever Hamas deemed Israel to be in gross violation of the truce or the PA in breach of understandings reached in Cairo. Usually in concert with other Palestinian militia, Hamas launched high-profile attacks on army outposts and settlements in Gaza and/or rained mortars on Israeli border towns.
The purpose of these escalations was political. They reinforced the regional and Palestinian perception that Israel is leaving Gaza under duress rather than by choice. They demonstrated that Hamas remains a formidable military foe that no domestic or foreign power can quell. They also strengthened Hamas’ hand in its “dialogue” with the PA.
One result of this strategy has been Abbas’ tacit admission that the matter of Hamas’ disarmament will not be broached until after the PA parliamentary elections, now set for January 21, 2006. Another is the acknowledgement by the PA’s new and influential foreign minister, Nasser al-Kidwa, that “dismantling the armed groups is not on the table as long as the occupation exists.”
The third, and most significant, part of Yassin’s new platform stated that Hamas would strive to reach a power-sharing agreement with the PA in any post-withdrawal Palestinian government. In Cairo, this idea boiled down to three prescriptions: a “formula for decision making” pending the parliamentary elections, both in relation to maintaining calm during the withdrawal and in the administration of areas evacuated by Israel in the aftermath; the establishment of a national cross-factional committee mandated to reactivate and redefine PLO institutions to enable Hamas’ “proportional” participation within them; and a commitment by Hamas to participate in all PA elections and on the basis of its representation there to become an integral part of the Palestinian political system, including the PLO’s National Council and executive committee.
Usher writes quite a bit about the successes Hamas registered in the municipal elections held in late 2004 and early 2005. And how Fateh and the Egyptians at that point stepped in and planned for the postponement of the legislative elections from their original July 2005 date until (now) late January 2006.
He also wrote about the Hamas-Fateh fighting that flared in July. He wrote that on that occasion,
- For the first time in a long time, it was [PA head Mahmoud] Abbas and Fatah — and not the Islamists — who had tapped into the popular will. A week after the clashes flared, Fatah and Hamas were reconciled on the basis of understandings no different, no better and no less ambiguous than those agreed upon in Cairo [in March].
Will these understandings hold? Most Palestinian analysts believe Hamas will be true to its word on maintaining calm for “the rest of 2005.” Three events could rupture the calm, however, either during the withdrawal or in the aftermath. One is a rigorous return by Israel to its assassination policy. “Hamas will not start a confrontation,” comments Abu Zuhri. “But, in the face of massive Israeli aggression, neither will we wait for a ‘collective’ PA response any more than would Fatah.”
Another would be a “provocative” Jewish attack on Palestinians to stymie the disengagement, especially on or near Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount compound. The third possible source of disruption would be a PA decision to renege again on the electoral process drawn up in Cairo and now reestablished in Gaza. One of the motives behind Hamas’ martial displays in Gaza is to convey that such a move would be unacceptable.
But what does Hamas want from the electoral process? It does not seek leadership, at least not yet. It seeks hegemony. Hamas quietly accepts that the current balance of power in Palestinian society is accurately reflected in polls showing Fatah with around 40 percent of all parliamentary seats and Hamas with around 30 percent, with the balance being held by independents and other factions. Translated into the outcome of elections, these numbers would not make Hamas the dominant force in Palestinian politics. They could, however, make it the hegemonic force in a majority bloc or a “blocking majority” against Fatah.
But to what end? Sheikh Ahmad Hajj Ali is a member of Hamas’ Shura Council, the supreme decision-making body in the organization. He sketches a future in which a new Hamas, domestic in thrust, consensual in aim, international in reach, emerges gradually from the old one: “Our aim is governance and one can only govern through the institutions of government. If we are the minority in Parliament, we will monitor the ministers on the basis of their performance, not on the basis of their political affiliation. If we are a majority, we will not monopolize power like Fatah. We will share power in a national coalition, a government that represents all the Palestinian people.”
The sheikh continues: “But in all cases our priority now is to address the internal Palestinian situation rather than the confrontation with Israel. We would negotiate with Israel since that is the power that usurped our rights. If negotiations fail, we will call on the world to intervene. If this fails, we will go back to resistance. But if Israel were to agree with our internationally recognized rights — including the refugees’ right of return — the Shura Council would seriously consider recognizing Israel in the interests of world peace.”
That recognition would be new. It is also inevitable, at least if Hamas wants to be the dominant vehicle for Palestinian nationalism and rid itself of the stigma of rejectionism in the eyes of the world. Slowly, painstakingly, but inexorably, Hamas is moving away from its traditional notion that Palestine is an Islamic waqf “from the river to the sea” and even the idea of a long-term armistice (hudna) that would accept the “1967 territories” as a Palestinian proto-state until the forces of Islam are strong enough to recover Palestine “as a whole.” Rather, Hamas is signaling that it accepts Israel as a political reality today and is intimating that it would accept a final agreement with Israel “according to the parameters of the [1991] Madrid conference and UN resolutions,” says Palestinian analyst Khaled Hroub, an authority on the Islamist party.
Such an agreement with Israel, of course, is what Abbas says he seeks. Herein lies the reason why Hamas-PA relations are so tense and why the situation in Gaza is potentially explosive. The struggle between the PA and Hamas is no longer about the disengagement’s significance: it is “the day of victory and the beginning of a new era that was achieved with the blood of our martyrs,” say both Muhammad Dahlan and Mahmoud Zahhar. The struggle is about who will claim the political and electoral franchise from disengagement and who will win the right to lead the Palestinians in the next phase. Will it be Abbas and Dahlan and their strategies of diplomacy and governance? Or will it be Hamas and its legacy of resistance?
I am sure that many people will say that if Hamas’s conditions for participating in negotiations with Israel include Israel’s full recognition of the Palestinian “right of return”, then there is nothing there for the Israelis to talk about. But that was also the position of Fateh and the secular nationalists until quite recently– and it is still the position of much of the Fateh grssroots. So it seems there really may not be that much difference between the actual policies pursued by the two big Palestinian organizations at this point.
Two days ago I noted here that Hamas’s exile-based politburo chief Khaled Mishal said last week that the movement would soon be announcing its readiness to participate in the PA government itself. So there really do not seem to be huge differences on policy between it and Fateh. I think the main differences that we’ll continue to see between them now– and especially if there is NOT in fact any kind of big explosion between Palestinians and Israelis over the months ahead– will be over their levels of organization, discipline, and service delivery, in Gaza but also in the West Bank.
From Usher’s piece it seems clear that Hamas’s level of internal discipline is still not as high as that of, for example, Hizbullah in Lebanon. But still, up to now it’s shown itself to be a lot more disciplined than Fateh.
But wouldn’t it truly be great if we could start to see a robust civilian politics start to be pursued– through totally nonviolent means– inside Palestine? Let’s just hope the Israelis, the Americans, and Egyptians give the Palestinians the space to do this.
I wonder, what kind of media coverage did this get?
Why Palestinians Still Live in Refugee Camps
JES– the Palestinians refugees who still live in camps (which is only a proportion of the whole) do so because they still have large outstanding property claims against Israel and are reluctant to go about setting up new homes before the final disposition of those claims– return of their properties? compensation for them? some combination? compensation on what terms?– has been made.
The piece you quoted from the harshly anti-Palestinian organization “CAMERA” was not impressive. The author wrote:
While the PLO has done its best to keep Palestinians in refugee camps, Israel has done its best to move Palestinians out of the camps and into new homes…
But the most recent evidence of Israel’s amazing “generosity” in this regard that the author could adduce were a couple of old pics of the development of the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood in Gaza– back in 1977!
As it happens, the Palestinians I know who moved into S.R. include some of the most fiercely nationalistic Palestinians anywhere. Perhaps that discouraged Israel from pursuing the project any further? Meantime, successive Israeli governments, but especially Sharon’s, have as we know engaged in the phsyical destruction of many thousands of refugee shelters in Gaza, without providing any alternative housing for those people at all.
In the West Bank, the PA has actually done a (very) few low-income housing projects. But guess what? They always found it extremely difficult indeed to get the building permits that Israel has always– with a brief hiatus 1996-2000– required for these projects. For some reason the Israeli planning authorities always thought the available land should go to the settlers… I can’t imagine why.
All in all, I agree with you that the refugee issue needs to be RESOLVED. After Oslo it was at least on the agenda of the formal negotiating process both leaderships were engaged in. It needs to get back there.
But unilateral moves by Israel are not– in this area or in any other– the way to reach the kind of fair, sustainable final settlement that the world will be happy to endorse. I.e., Israel can’t just dictate everything on its own preferred terms.
The purpose of these escalations was political […] They also strengthened Hamas’ hand in its “dialogue” with the PA.
Although (as you point out later), the escalations can be politically harmful to Hamas if the Palestinian electorate doesn’t want them. If the past few months have taught Hamas anything, it’s that the organization can’t be a one-trick pony.
In Cairo, this idea boiled down to three prescriptions […] to become an integral part of the Palestinian political system, including the PLO’s National Council and executive committee.
This may actually be the most important aspect of any new strategy, because the PLO (unlike the PA) is the internationally recognized representative of all Palestinians everywhere. Thus far, the Islamist groups have avoided joining the PLO or participating in its diplomatic strategy. As a PLO member, Hamas won’t really be able to avoid responsibility for negotiating final-status issues.
Usher writes quite a bit about the successes Hamas registered in the municipal elections held in late 2004 and early 2005.
Although in the university elections – which reflect the mood of the younger activists – Hamas lost heavily during this period, including some universities that it had previously controlled. This means not only that Fatah can tap into the university activists but that when it holds its internal primaries (which Abbas has pledged it will do in order to build democracy within the party), it may be able to field some charismatic young candidates. I’m not sure if Hamas is developing a similar internal selection mechanism or, if it is, whether it can match the depth of Fatah’s farm team.
Hamas quietly accepts that the current balance of power in Palestinian society is accurately reflected in polls showing Fatah with around 40 percent of all parliamentary seats and Hamas with around 30 percent, with the balance being held by independents and other factions. Translated into the outcome of elections, these numbers would not make Hamas the dominant force in Palestinian politics. They could, however, make it the hegemonic force in a majority bloc or a “blocking majority” against Fatah.
This assumes, of course, that the smaller factions would line up with Hamas rather than Fatah. I’m not at all sure this would be true. The Christian seats (I think there are still six of them) will probably be taken by the PFLP, which has a track record in municipal politics of supporting the party in power. Likewise, I don’t think all the secular nationalists will ally with Hamas; they may favor its anti-corruption programs, but (as Mahmoud Darwish recently pointed out) its policies in the Qalqilya municipal government haven’t endeared it to the secularists.
Also, I don’t think it can be taken for granted that Hamas will maintain its current level of support. Abbas will soon have his picture on every construction project in Gaza, and a great many Gazans will have jobs at projects funded by PA-controlled international aid. This could erode Hamas’ support in Gaza, especially if negotiations with Israel start to yield progress. On the other hand, if there isn’t any progress, Hamas might hold steady or pick up support. A good deal depends, as you say, on what Israel does (although I think a lack of positive movement is more likely than any of the catastrophic scenarios you discuss).
I am sure that many people will say that if Hamas’s conditions for participating in negotiations with Israel include Israel’s full recognition of the Palestinian “right of return”, then there is nothing there for the Israelis to talk about.
I’m willing to cut them a little slack in terms of rhetoric, especially since, if serious negotiations get started, “full recognition of the right of return” might turn out to mean any number of things. I’m becoming more and more convinced that a final-status agreement will have to involve Israel “recognizing” that a refugee problem resulted from the 1948 war and that the displaced persons have a moral right to return home, in exchange for the great majority of refugees agreeing to accept financial compensation in lieu of that right. Whether this is “recognition” enough for the Palestinian negotiators will no doubt depend on the amount of progress achieved in other areas.
Helena, I too still hold hopes for Hamas to become a legitimate party, like Hizbullah, and abandon much of it’s military actions. But something feels wrong when you write:
“So it seems there really may not be that much difference between the actual policies pursued by the two big Palestinian organizations…”
So far the PA hasn’t come out with instructional videos for suicide bomb vests loaded up with shrappnel. Like the Head Heeb wrote, I’m willing to cut Hamas some slack in terms of its rhetoric, but this is easier for me (an American Jew) than for an average young Israeli, who may have genuine, legitimate fear.
Before I stop, Jonathan made one other great point about Israel admitting moral responsibility for the ’48 refugee problem. I firmly believe that this is requisite for any final status agreement. I also personally support a general right of return, but I don’t expect to find many Jewish partners in that one.
But reconciliation is a two way street, and while I believe that currenly Israel holds most of the cards in its hand, there will come a time when Hamas must apologise for it’s own role in escalating the conflict among innocent civilians. Palestinians (and hopefully much of the Arab world) will also have to cope with the cancerous Jew-hating that has grown for years. While it hasn’t grown out of a vacuum, and they have legitimate gripes with Israelis and many American Jews, jew-hating (antisemitism, if you prefer), is a cancer in the Arab world.
Sharon has now dealt with HIS extremists…the near future will turn upon how successful Abbas is in dealing with HIS.
Very good Helena! Now, why don’t you try applying the same lofty standards to yourself that you apply to others?
There was nothing to prevent those refugees from setting up new homes, other than physical threats from Fatah (which according to the article were backed up with action). By way of example, many Iraqi Jews still have substantial property claims in Baghdad and Basra. This has not prevented them from “setting up new homes before the final disposition of those claims”. (And believe me, there will be claims!) BTW, I have been in refugee camps, and many there have done a good job of
Jake,
I agree with you that Israel has to accept partial responsibility for the refugee problem. In effect, Israel has already done so, and I don’t think that you will find an Israeli who will deny that there was a toknit dalet or that there was ethnic cleansing, after having this information included in high school texts and publicized widely on the media over a long period of time.
That said, I think that the Palestinians also have to openly start taking responsibility for their actions and failures. They were not feckless victims, and while most were poor and frightened, they did follow a man who was later indicted for war crimes and did carry out ethnic cleansings of their own as early as 1929, as well as participating in the ethnic cleansing of every populated area that the local militias and Arab armies captured in 1947-48.
One other thing. As I suggested earlier, before you hold out such high hopes for Hamas becoming a political party, please take the time to read their Covenant.
BTW, there are some fairly subversive statements between the lines of Graham Usher’s article: that the Palestinians lost the intifada, that at least some of the Hamas attacks on Israel were committed for domestic political reasons, and that targeted killings are an effective way to fight militant groups organized in a cell structure. (The legality of this tactic is another matter, but Usher seems to conclude that it’s effective.)
And there’s a subversive message in there for Israel as well: talk to Hamas, now. All the stuff in the charter about rocks and trees is starting to take second place to practicality, and this is the moment to seize.
Jonathan,
Two things. First, it is interesting to note that Hamas has gone on a domestic campaign to garner support in the West Bank and Gaza. How are they doing it? By comparing the number of martyrs they have produced and the resulting number of Israeli deaths with those of Islamic Jihad and Fatah. It’s that blatant.
Secondly, it’s not just a matter of rocks and trees telling Muslims where the Jews are to kill. The Covenant is a thoroughly reactionary document that defines a fanatical, racist organization. It’s kind of like someone speculating on the chances of the KKK turning into just another political party back in the 1920s. The fact is, if Hamas were to enter the political arena and agree to carry out serious negotiations with Jewish “sons of pigs and monkeys”, it would simply not be the same organization.
As it is, I don’t think that they want to enter politics above the municipal level (where it gives them an effective patronage base).
Adult Personals adult dating service sex dating adult
club erotic personals adult dating online
dating service join free.
adult
personals Adult personals online
personals
adult dating
adult dating sex dating
adult
personalsadult personals sex dating
dating
servicesdating services – adult dating
service
adult dating
serviceadult dating service adult
personals
sex
dating
sex dating adult dating service
sex
dating
sex dating adult personals
personals
personals adult personals
adult sex
dating
adult sex dating adult personals
adult
dating
adult dating
adult dating
online
adult dating online adult personals
online
personals
online personals adult personals
adult dating
serviceadult dating service adult
personals
adult dating
personalsadult dating personals adult
personals
adult dating
adult dating service
adult dating
service
adult dating service
adult dating
onlineadult dating online
adult personals adult personals
adult personals ads adult personals ads
personals ads personals ads
free personals free personals
adult singles adult singles
sex dating sex dating
Adult Personals adult dating service sex dating adult
club erotic personals adult dating online
dating service join free.
adult dating adult dating
personal ads personal ads
sex dating sex dating
Dating Affiliate Program dating affiliate program
adult personals adult personals
adult personals adult personals
free adult personals free adult personals
adult dating adult dating
sex search sex search
personal ads personal ads
adult personal adsadult personal ads
Discount Airfare discount airfare
Discount Hotels discount hotels
Discount Travel discount travel
Discount Cruises discount crusies
Discount Hotel Rooms discount hotel rooms
Discount Car Rentals discount car rentals
Discount Airline Tickets discount airline tickets
Discount Vacations discount vacations
Discounted Airfare discounted airfare
Airfare airfare
online casino online casino blackjack craps poker
Online Pharmacy online pharmacy
Pharmacy pharmacy
generic cialis generic cialis Tadalafil
generic levitra generic levitra Vardenafil
zenegra zenegra Sildenafil Citrate
Sildenafil Citrate Sildenafil Citrate zenegra
finasteride propecia Finasteride propecia generic propecia
proscar proscar FINASTERIDE genreric proscar
tamsulosin tamsulosin flomax generic flomx
Sibutramine Sibutramine meridia generic meridia
Orlistat Orlistat xenical generic xenical cheap xenical
celebrex generic celebrex Celecoxib
Carisoprodol Carisoprodol generic soma
imitrex imitrex SUMATRIPTAN generic imitrex
Metformin Metformin glucophage generic glucophage
actos generic actos PIOGLITAZONE
avandia avandia ROSIGLITAZONE generic avandia
Bupropion Bupropion buy generic zyban online
lipitor lipitor generic lipitor Atorvastatin
pravachol pravachol pravastatin generic pravachol
paxil Buy Paroxetine generic paxil online
generic prozac buy generic prozac fluoxetine online
Sertraline Sertraline generic zoloft buy online
BUPROPION BUPROPION generic wellbutrin Buy online cheap
Allegra Buy Allegra – also generic Alegra FEXOFENADINE
clarinex generic clarinex DESLORATADINE
LORATADINE LORATADINE generic claritin
singulair singulair MONTELUKAST generic singular
zyrtec generic zyrtec CETIRIZINE
CETIRIZINE CETIRIZINE generic zyrtec
AUGMENTIN AUGMENTIN tablets
CIPROFLOXACIN CIPROFLOXACIN generic cipro
CEPHALEXIN CEPHALEXIN genric keflex antibiotic
Suprax Suprax generic suprax CEFIXIME
Valtrex Generic Valtrex VALACYCLOVIR
Azithromycin Azithromycin Generic Zithromax
FLUCONAZOLE FLUCONAZOLE Generic Diflucan
Aciphex Aciphex generic aciphex RABEPRAZOLE
nexium generic nexium ESOMEPRAZOLE
OMEPRAZOLE OMEPRAZOLE generic prilosec
protonix Generic protonix PANTOPRAZOLE
altace Generic altace RAMIPRIL
cozaar Generic cozaar LOSARTAN
plavix Generic plavix CLOPIDOGREL
actonel Generic actonel RISEDRONATE
fosamax Generic fosamax ALENDRONATE
clomid Generic clomid CLOMIPHENE
generic valtrex generic valtrex
valtrex valtrex VALACYCLOVIR
generic zovirax generic zovirax
generic cialis generic cialis Tadalafil
Tadalafil Tadalafil generic cialis
Sibutramine Sibutramine Generic Meridia
Meridia Sibutramine Generic Meridia
finasteride propecia finasteride propecia generic propecia
Celebrex Generic Celebrex Celecoxib
sildenafil sildenafil soft tabs online pharmacy
Cialis Cialis Generic Cialis Tadalafil
autosurf for cash autosurf for cash
Veri nice site!