Attentive JWN readers will remember that a while back I was asking some questions about the nature of the Iranian regime’s interests in Iraq. Today, a friend referred me to this March 2005 report from the International Crisis Group (registration required.)
In the Execituve Summary of this document, the ICG analysts write:
- The starting point to understand Iran’s role must be a proper assessment of its interests. These are relatively clear and, for the most part, openly acknowledged. Tehran’s priority is to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat, whether of a military, political or ideological nature, and whether deriving from its failure (its collapse into civil war or the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan with huge implications for Iran’s disaffected Kurdish minority) or success (its consolidation as an alternative democratic or religious model appealing to Iran’s disaffected citizens). Iran consequently is intent on preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity, avoiding all-out instability, encouraging a Shiite-dominated, friendly government, and, importantly, keeping the U.S. preoccupied and at bay. This has entailed a complex three-pronged strategy: encouraging electoral democracy (as a means of producing Shiite rule); promoting a degree of chaos but of a manageable kind (in order to generate protracted but controllable disorder); and investing in a wide array of diverse, often competing Iraqi actors (to minimise risks in any conceivable outcome).
These interests and this strategy, more than a purported attempt to mould Iraq in its own image, explain Iran’s involvement, its intelligence collection, its provision of funds (and possibly weapons), and perhaps its occasional decision to back armed movements. They explain, too, the paradox of Iran’s simultaneous ties to Iraq’s political elite, which is hoping to stabilise the country, to Shiite clerics, who aim to Islamicise it, and to some rebellious political activists or insurgents, bent on fuelling unrest.
Finally, they explain why Iran so far has held back rather than try to undermine any chance of success. But this relatively cautious attitude may not last forever. Above all, it will depend on the nature of relations between Washington and Tehran: so long as these remain unchanged, Iran is likely to view events in Iraq as part of its broader rivalry with — and heightened fears of — the U.S. Highly suspicious of a large U.S. presence on its borders, concerned about Washington’s rhetoric, and fearing its appetite for regime change, Tehran holds in reserve the option of far greater interference to produce far greater instability.
Actually, as I write this, I’m waiting for the ICG website’s slightly byzantine “registration” process to complete… (Does it know I exist? Do I exist? Am I who I say I am? Beats me… ) So I’ll just have to go with the Executive Summary for now.
One of the first things that strikes me is how incredibly similar this description of Iran’s policies toward today’s Iraq is to the set of policies Syria has pursued toward Lebanon over the past 30-plus years.
In both cases, you’ll note, you have a weighty regional power flanked by a less weighty, somewhat “flighty”, and potentially very unstable neighbor with which it has many historic ties and also a historic record of antagonism. The weightier power is in a long-term situation of hostility with one or more key wetsern powers; and these western powers have gotten themselves into a situation of intervening masively in the affairs of the less weighty neighbor
So it’s complex. There are ties of blood and ideology between the two countries concerned, but also strong resentments of blood and ideology. And overlaid onto that is a contest that the weightier local power has with “the west” which involves political stakes that — for that power– is, or seem to be, truly existential.
In the immediate short- and perhaps medium-term, what ensues from Teheran is a classic realist “balancing” policy inside Iraq, as the ICG summary noted. But once the powers-that-be in Teheran judge that balance of power vis-a-vis “the west” has started to tip in their favor–? Who knows?
Well, I’ll wait to post further thoughts on this topic till the ICG’s full-site “registration” process has gone through its mysterious workings. I also have a question out there on an interesting list to which I belong– the “G2K” list– regarding whether opinion inside Iran is actually united around policy toward Iraq, or not… Maybe I’ll get fuirther answers on that one in the days ahead?
Commenter Albert Kwong suggested on JWN ten days or so ago that I ask Dr. Abdel-Aziz Sachedina about this when I see him here in Charlottesville… Well, I did go to the talk Aziz gave here about the Iranian elections; and it was very interesting. (Notes from it temporarily misplaced, I’m afraid.) However, I couldn’t stay through the end of the talk and never got a chance to ask my question on this particular topic. And now I gather Aziz is heading back for Mashhad?
C’est la vie. But anyway, I’m pretty sure some of my other potential sources of information on this will come up with some good information and analysis over the days ahead.
You have to admit, though, it is an interesting set of questions.
