Notes from Uganda, Part 1

It is now Saturday.  I arrived here in Kampala Monday morning,
having flown
overnight Sunday from Amsterdam to Nairobi and then connected with the
short flight from there to Entebbe airport.  Entebbe was the site
of a daring and heroic Israeli hostage-rescue operation back in the
1970s.  I don’t recall most of the situational details of that
story…  I think the Israeli commandos had come in from some kind
of side airstrip. 

As the hotel shuttle made the one-hour drive
from Entebbe in
to Kampala Monday, I saw a side airstrip between the
main runway and the shore of Lake Victoria.  Now it seemed to have
become a fairly substantial UN staging area.  There were four
small planes and a couple of helicopters, all with highly visible UN
markings, and then huge rows of shipping containers all around, all
also clearly marked as “UN”.  My understanding is that the UN uses
this area as a support base for many of the humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations it maintains in the region, including UNOMOC in
the nearby areas of eastern DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) and
UNMIS in Southern Sudan.  Perhaps also for some of the
humanitarian aid that UN agencies deliver to the war-torn areas of
northern Uganda itself (more on this, later.)

So this gave me a rather vivid picture of the precarious,
conflict-enveloped situation of Uganda, a mid-size country located
right here in the “heart” of Africa, squeezed between these two massive
and extremely troubled neighboring states, Sudan and the DRC. 
Sudan and DRC are, I thnk, the two largest countries in Africa. 
So large that you can actually travel right across the continent from
its western coast to its eastern coast by passing only through the two
of them.  Or you could, if they had road systems anything up to
the task, which of course they don’t.  Their mutual border is not
long; but then tucked in between them to the south of that mutual
border is Uganda, and tucked in to the north of it is the Central
African Republic.  (Rwanda, a country much smaller than Uganda,
lies to the south of it, and also bordering DRC.)

These “national boundaries” in the heart of Africa were all drawn onto
a map of the continent by representatives of European governments who
met in Berlin in 1884-85.  How on earth did that happen, you may
ask?  Well, that was the heyday of all the European empires. 
Many of them already had colonies and zones of influence along the
coasts of Africa,  but the riches (and strategic value) of the
interior of the continent were becoming both apparent and somewhat
accessible to them.  So to cut down on further fighting over these
ricvhes between themselves, they sat down in Berlin to draw up firm
“borders” between the different areas of Africa that they either
already controlled or hoped to control.  King Leopold of Belgium,
a newcomer to the empire-building scene, was “awarded” Congo at the
conference.  The Brits (who some years earlier had beaten the
French during a historic inter-imperial encounter in El-Fasher, in
Darfur, and had thereby established their control of the entire Nile
River system)  were “awarded” Sudan and Uganda.  The Germans
got Rwanda, the French got Central African Republic and Chad, etc etc…

Nice work if you can get it, eh? (Irony alert.) Dividing up the booty
of somebody else’s entire continent without even consulting them…

All that “history” is still burningly relevant here today, for many,
many reasons….

Continue reading “Notes from Uganda, Part 1”

Is it “helpful” and “appropriate” to seek peace yet?

Spokespersons for the Bush Administration have been doing linguistic gymnastics to explain how the US is both “mourning” the loss of innocent life in Lebanon, but not yet showing any signs of actively pushing for a cease-fire. When asked repeatedly (July 20) about Secretary of State Rice’s plans to travel to the region, her spokesperson Sean McCormack’s evasive replies included this classic double-speak gem:

She wants to go to the region to — when she believes it’s helpful and useful — to help — work on a lasting and durable political solution to end the violence.

Golly whiz. Just when will, or might that have been? Five years ago? Or how about when this latest round of violence first flared up? But no, that’s apparently not what the Administration now has in mind. Instead, according to McCormack,

“You’re not going to see a return to the kind of diplomacy I think that we’ve seen before where you try to negotiate an end to the violence that leaves the parties in place and where you have status quo ante. Whereby groups like Hezbollah can simply regroup, rearm, only to fight again another day and to be able to, as I said before, at a whim, cause violence and instability in the region. I don’t think anybody wants — nobody wants that. Maybe Hezbollah and its backers want that, but certainly I don’t think you’re hearing that from anybody else.”

In short, the US publicly is backing Israel’s position that no cease fire is needed until after Hizbullah is no more. Anybody who thinks differently is castigated as a “backer” of Hizbullah. Earlier this week, Tony Snow darkly dismissed Helen Thomas’ probing questions as “presenting the Hizbullah view,” — all the more demeaning since the 86 year old Thomas is of Lebanese heritage.
America’s Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, was even more blunt in questioning whether a ceasefire would be effective or even possible:

“Any ceasefire is going to have to be accompanied by a qualitative change in the situation…. The simple reflexive action of asking for a ceasefire is not something that is really appropriate in a situation like this. Because you have to know who the parties would be to any cessation of hostilities. How do you get a ceasefire with a terrorist organization? I’m not sure it’s possible.”

With apologies to John Lennon, all John Bolton is saying is give war a chance.

Continue reading “Is it “helpful” and “appropriate” to seek peace yet?”

Is Israel “uniting” Lebanon? & PM Siniora’s appeal

Israel’s ongoing country-wide punishment of Lebanon, we have been told, is meant to convince Lebanon to take-back their country from “the terrorists,” to divide those who want peace with Israel from those who support Hizbullah. As Helena put it here yesterday, Israel’s approach to “dismantling” Hizbullah “seems to be… to put such horrendous military and destructive pressure on the country’s people that they would move to dismantle it themselves.”
Yet the opposite scenario may be materializing. Israel’s “divide and conquer” strategy, to get Lebanon’s population and government to turn against Hizbullah, is, ironically, producing new degrees of unity inside Lebanon – against Israel’s actions.

Continue reading “Is Israel “uniting” Lebanon? & PM Siniora’s appeal”

Chinese Commentary on Iran Nuclear Case

If you’ve only been briefed by American MSM sources about the latest page in the saga over Iran’s nuclear program, you might be thinking that finally, the great powers, including China and the Soviet Union, are now on board with the United States. On July 11, US State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack confidently declared that there were “no divisions” among the “P5+1” countries (the veto wielding UN Security Council members plus Germany) regarding their willingness to move towards “punitive measures” against Iran.
That characterization would be news to China, one of the P5. Today (19 July), the US government’s own “Open Source Center” released a translation of an interesting commentary appearing on Junly 13th in China’s official news agency, Xinhua Domestic Service. I append the document below.
After a rather balanced and positive rendition of key recent developments, the commentary includes striking interpretations of Iran’s ongoing “room for maneuver,” US Ambassador John Bolton’s “desperation” (sic), and a pointed reference to the Russian view that “sanctions at this moment will undermine the positive trend that is emerging.”
As this is, after all, an official Chinese news source, China’s own stance is left as ambiguous and non-committal: China remains opposed to nuclear weapons proliferation, maintains that “the best option is to peacefully settle the Iran nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations,” and hopes that “all concerned” could soon resume talks “on the basis of the package proposal.”
No “slam dunk” here.

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George Will vs. The Weekly Standard

In a wildly confused front-page Washington Post story today (19 July), Michael Abramowitz asserts that President Bush is “facing a new and swiftly building backlash on the right over his handling of foreign affairs.”
Abramowitz claims “conservative intellectuals and commentators” are infuriated by perceived “timidity and confusion about long-standing problems” ranging from Iran to North Korea to Lebanon. Kenneth Adelman tops the cake by accusing President Bush of middle-of-the-road “Kerryism.” By “conservatives,” Abramowitz is mostly referring to “neoconservatives” – no doubt the many who went apoplectic when the Bush Administration recently appeared to shift gears on Iran and even to de-emphasize the “regime change” mantra.
Yet burried within Abramowitz essay is a vague reference to yesterday’s startling WaPo essay by traditional “conservative” columnist George Will. Will argues first that the Administration’s core hope that the democratic “infection” emanating from the democracy imposed on Iraq has, at best, produced democratic movements prone to extremism. He then rejects Secretary Rice’s rejoinder that democatic turmoil and “violence” is unavoidable.

“that argument creates a blind eye: It makes instability, no matter how pandemic or lethal, necessarily a sign of progress. Violence as vindication….”

Yet Will saves his most choice words for attacks on the Administration coming from what he deems to be a radically un-conservative and different direction, one

Continue reading “George Will vs. The Weekly Standard”

Israel-Lebanon: the stakes

I’m in Kampala, Uganda. News is hard to get. But I see from Haaretz that Olmert’s government seems to be stepping up the pace of its military assault against Lebanon:

    Fifty-three Lebanese civilians were killed on Monday in 70 Israel Air Force strikes as the Israel Defense Forces continued its offensive on Lebanon, in an effort to push for the release of two abducted soldiers and to stop Hezbollah from raining rockets on northern Israel.
    By nightfall Monday, 210 Lebanese had been reported killed in the six days of ferocious fighting between Israel and Hezbollah guerrillas.

I saw Olmert on the BBC yesterday– giving a lengthy, live presentation of his big speech to the Knesset outlining the rationale and aims of the war. As I understood what he was saying, it was that he is determined to dismantle Hizbullah completely.
Very hard to do this if– as I suppose– the Israeli government is not, actually, prepared after its previous lengthy experience of occupying Lebanon to send forces into the country to run another lengthy occupation of substantial portions of it. (That earlier one, remember, gave birth to Hizbullah in the first place.)
Another route to “dismantling” Hizbullah, which is the one that the Israeli government seems to be taking, is to put such horrendous military and destructive pressure on the country’s people that they would move to dismantle it themselves. Therefore this battle is very much one about the internal political balance inside Lebanon.
The Israelis tried and notably failed to win a battle of exactly this same type back in 1996. This time, Olmert must be either (1) forgetting the lessons of that battle or (2) calculating that the Lebanese balance was so much changed by the “Beirut Spring” of 2005 that this time he has a chance of winning.
I am not so sure. Lebanese people certainly hate having Israel’s death and destruction rained down on them, and a fair portion of them do apparently see Hizbullah as having helped to trigger this. But still, most of them still clearly see Israel’s response as misdirected and grossly disproportional. So where are the forces in Lebanon that are ready and able actually to take on Hizbullah (whose active supporters, after all, account for more than 40% of the national population)?
Hizbullah “wins” merely by not losing this battle. It also has supply lines through Syria (though under Israeli surveillance.)
Olmert’s rhetoric against Syria’s role represents an attempt to get huge international pressure put on Syria. But in the face of the wanton destructivity of Israel’s military operations, will this pressure be forthcoming?
Depressingly, I don’t see any quick resolution to this war. I don’t see Hizbullah either “destroyed” or (easily) backing down. And certainly I don’t see Israel destroyed or (easily) backing down.
Outsiders should surely be pushing for an immediate ceasefire, that is, an immediate end to the death, destruction, and terror being rained on both sides (though highly asymmetrically). And an immediate launching of a broad new international effort finally to resolve all outstanding strands of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
If such a final resolution is not found, then every few years there will be horrible, anti-humane crises like the present one…
This present maelstrom of violence is particularly depressing and unnecessary, for two reasons:

    (1) The vast majority of the peoples of Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine all want exactly the same thing— which is to be able to live their lives in safe and flourishing communities that are not plagued by war. Olmert’s speech in the Knesset was long on expressing this with regard to the Israeli people but absolutely devoid of any recognition that this is exactly what the majority of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples also want; and
    (2) The outlines of how such a peace might be drawn up are fairly well known by now: Israeli withdrawals from just about all of the lands seized by military force from their neighbors in 1967, and the establishment of full relations of normal peace between Israel and all its nieghbors. If such a peace were indeed built, the support for militant irredentists in the Palestinian, Lebanese, Jewish-Israeli, and other communities of the region would go down to very low and absolutely manageable levels… Most people would be too busy celebrating and building upon the newfound regional peace.

So I just want, in the midst of these dark, dark days, to underscore that there is indeed a way to avoid these repeated plungings into cycles of death and destruction. Let the UN, which was founded on the principle of the urgent need to find nonviolent ways to resolve international conflicts, lead the way.

Netherlands, art, jurisprudence, etc

We’re in Amsterdam at nearly the end of our fabulous summer trip. It was good to start in Venice and end here. Both cities have a lot in common. Not only the reclaimed-from-the-swamps aspect of them– leaving them both laced with such a great network of canals. But also the role each city played back at the beginning of the European Ascendancy.
That was kind of why it felt appropriate for me to be writing in the CSM this week about the European / North Atlantic Ascendancy coming near its end.
On Thursday and Friday, in The Hague, I was able to conduct some really excellent interviews. These were with:

    — the Chief Prosecutor of the new ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo (from Argentina),
    — the Deputy President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, Judge Kevin Parker (from Australia), and
    — one of the judges on the Appeals Bench opf the ICC, Judge Navanethen Pillay (from South Africa.)

I found all of them to be intelligent, very sympathetic people who have evidently thought very deeply about the roles of their respective institutions within the emerging international society. All of them had (I think) previously read the article I had recently in Foreign Policy, which was quite critical of the role of their courts. So honestly, I was prepared for some of them to be a bit defensive and close-mouthed. But they weren’t at all. On the contrary. They all seemed really happy to grapple with the tough issue that I raised in that article; and they all seemed to have thought very deeply about these issues themselves, beforehand. Much more deeply, I would say, than most of the chorus of international court boosters in the western human rights movement, some of whom seem to have little idea about the gravity of very basic rights issues in soecieties reeling from war and atrocity.
So anyway, that was all good– and it provides a great basis for the visit to Uganda, which I’ll embark on tomorrow, from Schipol airport.
… Yesterday, we went to the Rijksmuseum here. I last visited it in 1995, when I came to Amsterdam (and also The Hague) on a short visit with my daughter Lorna, then aged 10, and my father, James Cobban, then aged 85. I think it was the last significant trip we made with JM before he passed away in 1999. He loved Amsterdam! I have great memories of him jumping on and off trams like a teenager, and just drinking everything in. (“What’s that funny smell?” he asked at one point as we walked past some kind of a joint joint. “H’mm, haven’t a clue,” I said, insouciantly.)
Anyway, most of the Rijksmuseum is currently closed for renovation. But what they have open is an unbelievably rich and well-presented collection of just about 200 of their greatest treasures. (It’s also the 400th anniversary of Rembrandt’s birth this year, so Amsterdam is celebrating that, too.)
In the show, they had one room on the theme of “Global Expansion”, which just perfectly showcased the contribution that the Netherlands’ global empire-building activities made to its rise as a prosperous and self-confident European power.
I just get this sense in so many places in Europe now. Especially after I read Hugh Thomas’s masterly history of the global slave trade.
Thursday afternoon,when we were still in The Hague, we went to the Mauritshuis, which has always been one of my very favorite art museums. That is, until I learned from Hugh Thomas that Prince Maurits had made the vast bulk of his fortune purely from the profits of trading in enslaved African persons… Yes, it does affect how I look at the institution– if not, necessarily, at the art within it.
I guess I just came away from those experiences in the Mauritshuis and the Rijksmuseum with this very vivid sense of how much of the European Ascendancy in world affairs had actually been funded and underpinned through imperial rapine, their maintenance of tight control over international trade flows, and the deep involvement of so many European powers in the intercontinental (and particularly transatlantic) transport and trading of millions of enslaved persons.
And meantime, there were all these brutal Dutch (and other) colonial profit-takers and slave-traders commissioning the most wonderful artists back at home in Amsterdam to produce these wonderfully delicate portrayals of the settled and serene domestic life they were able to maintain at home… Hard to all think through. I’m still feeling the dissonance rather viscerally.

The need for a single set of standards

Is there a single set of standards that we apply to the behavior of all actors in the Middle East? I would certainly hope so, since the concept of a single set of standards is a cornerstone of the two important principles of (1) human equality and (2) the rule of law.
In the west, a loud chorus of voices has criticized Hizbullah for having undertaken Wednesday’s operation to capture (presumably) as many Israeli soldiers as possible. I completely agree that that operation constituted (1) something of an infraction of international law, and also (2), in the circumstances, an act of escalation.
In the operation, the Hizbullah leadership did the following:

    — It sent a squad of its paramilitaries across an international armistice line (presumptively, an international border– though the two states have never made peace and only a 57-year-old armistice agreement governs relations between them.)
    — The Hizbullah squad attacked a squad of serving Israeli soldiers, killing three and taking two captive. This was an act of war– and as PM Olmert correctly pointed out, not an act of terrorism (since the victims were not civilians.) This act did not, however, initiate a state of war between the two sides. Rather, it was an infraction of the longstanding armistice agreement between them. The armistice agreement has, of course, been subject to numerous infractions over the past 57 years. The vast majority of these have been perpetrated by Israel, including numerous incursions of longer or shorter duration, and repeated assaults by land, sea, and air, resulting in extremely heavy casualties among (primarily) civilians in Lebanon.

As I noted here yesterday, the government of Israel had numerous options available regarding how it chose to respond to Hizbullah’s infraction. One of those, as stipulated in Art. VII-7 of the 1949 armistice agreement between them, was to submit a formal complaint to the UN’s armistice monitoring commission. (I believe the functions of ILMAC were subsequently taken over by the equally longstanding UN Truce Supervision Organization, which still, I think, has a post along the armistice line, at Naqqura.) Or, Israel could have taken a strong complaint to the UN Security Council.
It chose not to respond in such a de-escalatory, problem-solving way. Instead, it responded in a way that was (1) itself a huge infraction of many aspects of international law and also (2) massively escalatory.
Israel’s response broke international law at both the jus ad bellum level and the jus in bello level. Like Hizbullah, it also ordered its forces to transgress the armistice line and the ceasefire undertakings ensconced in the armistice; and it did so, as we saw, in a very large-scale way. In addition, it did not– as Hizbullah had done up till then– limit its attacks to targets of clearly military status. Rather, as so often in the past, Israeli forces massively targeted civilian infrastructure in an explicit attempt to try to turn the political climate inside Lebanon against Hizbullah. And along the way, of course many tens of Lebanese civilians have lost their lives.
In its follow-up actions, Hizbullah has also launched attacks that have killed Israeli civilians.
In neither of these cases were the civilians in question being directly targeted. But in both cases, the parties have not taken due care to protect the lives of noncombatants. In both cases, too, the parties have targeted civilian infrastructure. (Though “targeting” is a generous term for what most of the Hizbullah rocketeers are actually capable of doing.)
Since the means of attack at Israel’s disposal are– thanks in good part to the aid of my own government– so many times more lethally powerful than those at Hizbullah’s disposal, and since Israel has shown little if any compunction about restricting its use of these weapons to military targets, the number of civilians actually harmed by Israel’s actions has been many times the number actually harmed by Hizbullah.
So indeed, does the world have a single standard by which it judges the actions of these two parties?
A subsidiary question might well arise over the question of “who started it”. We could say that Hizbullah started this particular round. But we should also be aware that Israel has been adamantly refusing to respond to Lebanese demands that it release the three Lebanese nationals whom it has been holding for many years. One of these is Samir Qantar. This Y-net article tells you a little about him.
The article also reminds us that,

    In 2004, Hizbullah and Israel exchanged the bodies of three Israeli soldiers kidnapped in 2000 and an abducted Israeli businessman for the release of 400 Palestinian and 23 Lebanese and Arab prisoners in a German-negotiated deal.

That hostage/bodies exchange was, of course, agreed to by then-PM Ariel Sharon, who was Olmert’s mentor at the time. But now, Olmert says he’s adamantly opposed to any such exchange. (Though there have been many unconfirmed reports of Israeli agents being engaged in indirect negotiations over a possible release.)
Two of the most famous of the Lebanese hostages whom Israel released in that 2004 swap were religious leader Sheikh `Abd al-Karim Obeid and militia leader Mustafa al-Dirani. They had both been gratuitously captured from their homes in Lebanon by the Israeli forces back in the 1980s, in a blatant act of international hostage-taking– and for use simply as “bargaining chips.”
Obeid, we should note, was by no means a combatant. I don’t know if he received anything like the ill-treatment meted out to Dirani. Here is Human Rights Watch’s translation of the complaint Dirani’s lawyers submitted to the Tel Aviv District Court concerning his treatment while in detention. Here are some excerpts from his affidavit:

    4. In addition to being shaken, humiliations, beatings, sleep deprivation and being tied in a crouching position for many hours to the point of his limbs becoming paralyzed – a cruel rape and an act of sodomy were perpetrated against the Plaintiff by a soldier whom the interrogators brought especially for this purpose.
    5. In addition, several days after the Plaintiff was raped by a soldier, the interrogator who was responsible for the rape once again committed a horrifying act of sodomy against the Plaintiff, by inserting a wooden club into the Plaintiff’s anus, causing hemorrhages in his buttocks. The pseudonym of that interrogator was “George”…
    7. In order to humiliate the Plaintiff, the interrogators caused him to remain completely naked for almost the entire duration of the interrogations that they conducted. In order to compound the humiliation of the Plaintiff and to the delight of his interrogators – they also photographed him in this humiliating situation.
    8. At a later stage of the interrogation the Plaintiff was forced to drink large amounts of water and paraffin oil. At that point a diaper was placed around the Plaintiff’s loins in which his bodily wastes collected for several days. There was no response to the pleas of the Plaintiff, who was covered with his discharges, to be allowed to clean himself, and only when the interrogators themselves could no longer stand the stench, only then was the Plaintiff allowed to change the diaper.

(American readers: does this account of how Dirani was reportedly treated back in the 1980s remind you of anything?)
Anyway, my main point here is to note that the Lebanon-Israel cross-border hostage-taking question is by no means a “new” issue that Hizbullah suddenly dreamed up, in order to justify an otherwise unjustifiable cross-border raid. It was part of a very longstanding and still “live” concern in Lebanon.
Would Hizbullah, too, have done better to take this concern to the “proper channels” and tried to get Qantar and his two fellow prisoners released through Security Council action or the force of world public opinion? Absolutely, yes.
But the bigger question here, in my mind, is that all these conflicts have now gone on so long, and have so many very tangled sub-themes and potential triggers for escalation by either side, that surely it is time to get the whole darned conflict between Israel and neighbors finally resolved. That means the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Syrian-Israeli conflict, and the Lebanese-Israeli conflict.
This is indeed do-able. If it is done, basically, on the basis of international law, then nearly all the parties to the conflict know what this is and are ready to go ahead and do such a deal. On the Arab side, all the Arab governments have signed onto the Beirut Declaration of 2002– and the most recent Hamas-Fateh agreement then endorsed all its main points.
The only party that is not basically ready to resolve the conflict on the basis of international law– that is, with Israel withdrawing from just about all of the land it captured in the 1967 war– is that portion of the Israeli public that still clings to the chauvinistic dream of a Jewish Greater Jerusalem that stretches from the Old City just about right down to the Jordan River… an outcome that would be unacceptable to the Palestinians in two major ways: it denies any meaningful Palestinian role or presence in Jerusalem, and it slices a huge wedge out of the West Bank, dividing what remains potentially for use by a Palestinian state into two.
How big is the portion of the Jewish-Israeli public that’s prepared to see their country (and its region) locked forever into cycles of war and violence– simply to indulge the holders of that Jewish Greater Jerusalem dream? I don’t know.
What I do know is that the international community as a whole also has a huge stake in all this. We have a stake in seeing a fair and sustainable outcome to all the remaining dimensions of the Israeli-Arab dispute. But we also have a stake in seeing the principles of international law implemented and strengthened at all levels. That includes in the content of the eventual comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, which should certainly uphold rather than transgress international law.
It also includes in the application of a single standard of judgment to all the acts of violence unleashed in the continuing storm(s) between Israel and its neighbors.
There is another very simple and very important principle at stake here, too. Every single life snuffed out by the violence is equally dear, equally sacred. The lives of civilians, in particular, should all equally receive the concern of the international community

“A bad movie rerun” and international opinion

I’m glad Helena has already focused our attention on Friday’s WaPo essay by David Ignatius. I think it worthy of further comment, particularly to draw out his points about Israel’s endgame and about the role of international opinion.
Yet like Helena, I question several of his assumptions, beginning with his acceptance of the “received wisdom” in Washington that Iran somehow is responsible for all Hezbollah actions. But more on that in a separate essay.
I do appreciate Ignatius’ laconic observation that “you can’t help but feel that this is the rerun of an old movie — one in which the guerrillas and kidnappers end up as the winners.” Just as in 1982 and beyond, Israeli military assaults into Lebanon and Gaza have little chance of earning Israel any meaningful friends within the targeted territories.
Then, Israel invaded Lebanon to “smash” Palestinian terror; in the process, as Yitzak Rabin later ruefully observered, Israel “let the Shia genie out of the bottle” and in the process catalyzed the creation of Hezbollah. What “unintended consequences” will arise this time?

Continue reading ““A bad movie rerun” and international opinion”

And meanwhile, Asia rises (CSM)

By the way, I had this column in the CSM on Thursday.It might seem like a bit of a diversion to have been writing about Asia’s rise; but it’s an important concomitant aspect of everything that’s happening in the world these days.
Anyway, since I was in such an information-poor environment (traveling; no broadband; very few sources of info at all), I realized I needed to do some form of a big-picture think piece. So that was what I did.