So Pres. Mahmoud Abbas and PM Ismail Haniyeh have finally agreed on the terms for an intra-Palestinian political deal and the formation of a national unity government. About time!
Back in February/March, when I was in Palestine, the Americans and Israelis were doing evrything they could to prevent non-Hamas people from responding positively to the entreaties of the Hamas people that they join such a government. I myself was witness to the sending of a strong threat of “the very worst consequences” by parties inside Israel to one Palestinian pol who had been invited to join a coalition government with a strong Hamas presence.
Well, times have changed (a little.) Maybe there is now hope for some real progress towards self-determination and national indepndence for the Palestinians? I am not holding my breath on this,… But still, if there is some hope for sovereignty, self-rule, and a bit of real relief for even a portion of the Palestinians right now, that’s better than what they currently have.
The news reports say that the new coalition will be based on “the prisoners’ document” issued earlier this year. Here’s what I wrote about that in May.
9/11 article in Tom Paine
TomPaine.com today carries a piece I wrote for them to mark the fifth anniversary of 9/11.
Khatami at Monticello, calls for de-escalation with U.S.
Iran’s former president, Mohammad Khatami, came back to Charlottesville yesterday. His main message while here was that American and Iranian leaders should both find ways to de-escalate the hostility of their rhetoric and to work together to pursue common interests.
This, after saying at a gathering at the University of Virginia (UVA) here Thursday– and also on other stops on his current five-city tour of the US– that “The solution of America’s problem in Iraq can’t be unilateral. It needs the cooperation of the neighbors in the region and of the UN.”
Iran is, of course, one of the weightiest of Iraq’s neighbors.
During his return visit to C’ville yesterday, Khatami was visiting Monticello, the “historic” (by American standards) home of this country’s third president, Thomas Jefferson. After touring Monticello, Khatami and his entourage of some dozen people participated in a 30-person “scholars’ lunch” in the library of the nearby International Center for Jefferson Studies (ICJS), to which I’d been invited. As when he was at UVA on Thursday no-one asked Khatami this time either about Iran’s currently very controversial nuclear program, though I gather that on other stops on his tour he has been asked about it and has expressed his strong support for his country’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear development.
I would not have expected him to say anything different. On the other hand, if I’d gotten a chance to ask him a question at yesterday’s lunch, I might well have asked his views on how he thought the present nuclear-accusation crisis could be de-escalated.
His current tour around the country is anyway very significant since it is the first time such a high-ranking Iranian personality has been allowed to travel round this country since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978. (Iranian officials with business at the UN are allowed to go to New York to conduct that business. But under the UN’s headquarters agreement with the US, such diplomats can be limited by the US to traveling within a tight radius of New York City, and in Iran’s case these restrictions have applied continuously since the revolution.)
On Friday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Pres. Bush had signed off personally on the decision to allow Khatami to tour round the country this time. Here’s what Reuters reported about that:
-
“I was interested to hear what he had to say,” Bush told the Wall Street Journal… “I’m interested in learning more about the Iranian government, how they think, what people think within the government.”
… “My hope is that diplomacy will work in convincing the Iranians to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions. And in order for diplomacy to work, it’s important to hear voices other than [current President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad’s,” Bush added.
The lunch at the ICJS was was tasty and generous, and the library setting extremely gracious. But there were few opportunities for the 15 or so American participants to interact with the visiting Iranians, and no self-introductions so it was hard for us to know who the other Iranians actually were. I’m not sure if Khatami got any time to eat at the table at all! I suspect he ate later, after his entourage had all swept out to a different room in the building where they lingered for quite a while before departing.
I actually did get the chance to sit next to one of the visiting Iranians, who was with the “Interest Section” Iran maintains in Washington under the auspices of the Pakistani embassy. But the circumstances didn’t give us much time to chat.
Amongst the American participants, there were a handful of Iranian-Americans. A couple of these later remarked in particular on the high quality of Khatami’s rhetoric in Persian (as well as on the breadth and intellectual quality of what he said.) These people noted that this time– unlike on Thursday– Khatami was speaking extemporaneously, without any prepared text, which made the rhetorical skill he displayed all the more evident.
Even for myself, having no Persian-language skills, I could appreciate the general sweep and self-confident delivery of his rhetoric. And I thought on a few occasions there, as Khatami’s answers ranged from Pericles to the concept of “the consent of the governed” to basic issues of how political accountability is indeed to be measured, that some other presidents in the world– to name no names– might indeed have a hard time keeping up with such a discussion…
These Iranian-Americans and others at the lunch who know a lot more about Iran than I do expressed the judgment that what Khatami said was, in Iranian terms, extremely daring and might indeed cause some trouble for him once he gets back home. I feel unqualified to make a judgment on that. But I did note that Khatami seemed very seriously to be putting out feelers for the establishment of some form of a continued, broad, popular dialogue between Iranians and Americans as well as, perhaps, of some form of more discreet, “track two” channel of communication with people close to the Bush administration itself.
If the latter is the case, then one would certainly want to know the degree to which “messages” about going ahead with this could be expected to get back to the one place in Teheran where, by all accounts, they would have the most effect, and that is with Iran’s “Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei. As alluded to below, Khatami had several non-trivial differences of opinion with Khamenei during his time as president, 1997-2005. But intriguingly, back in June Kamal Kharrazi, who had been Khatami’s Foreign Minister, was appointed by Khamenei as head of a new body, reporting to him, called the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations…
So who knows where all this might lead? In the hope that it might lead somewhere constructive and– certainly– that it might help to dispel misinformation and de-escalate tensions, I am happy to provide below my best characterization of what was said during the scholars’ luncheon. (Remember, though, that the discussion was all conducted through an interpreter… Also, I’d run three miles earlier in the morning and was incredibly hungry by lunch-time; so yes, I did try to gulp down some mouthfuls of chicken between the times I was taking notes… )
Continue reading “Khatami at Monticello, calls for de-escalation with U.S.”
Planning for June 2007
The early days of June 2007 will see two significant Middle Eastern anniversaries: 25 years since Israel’s June 1982 invasion of Lebanon and 40 years since the beginning of the — still continuing!– Israeli occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, and Golan.
To have to live under the heel of a foreign military occupation for 40 years…. Imagine!
I’ve been trying to find out what kind of events anyone might be planning to mark these two anniversaries. I’ve also been thinking maybe JWN should coordinate some special coverage of these two significant anniversaries, or a transnational online symposium… or something!
Anyway, any information about initiatives already underway, or suggestions for things JWN (or others) could do to mark and reflect on these anniversaries, would be really helpful. We still have nine months to plan for this.
Thanks!
Pres. Mbeki on the need to listen for the voice of peace; humility; possibilities of transformation
Every week, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa write a thoughtful message to his people — and to the world?– which is posted on the ANC website. The message that Mbeki posted there today is extremely thoughtful and inspiring, and definitely worth our reflection.
(Hat-tip to Dominic for signaling this.)
This message has basically two (or three) parts to it, which are loosely connected.. In the first part, he writes about the importance of staying open to hearing a message of peace when it comes– especially from those of our opponents whom sometimes it is very hard to “hear” accurately.
(This part of the message is also of historical importance, for those of us who seek to understand better how it was that the negotiations between the ANC and thr National Party actually got started back then in 1989-1990.)
Mbeki writes:
- At some point during 1989, in Lusaka, I received a message from Professor Willie Esterhuyse that we should meet in London. Accordingly, I informed our then President, the late Oliver Tambo, about this message. I told him that the indication was that Professor Esterhuyse would be bringing a message for the ANC from the apartheid government.
President Tambo told me that one of his recurring nightmares was that one day this government would send us a message indicating its readiness to negotiate an end to the apartheid system, and that we would fail to understand the message and therefore fail to respond to it correctly.
He said that over the centuries, and especially during the apartheid years, a deep gulf of mutual antagonism had developed between especially the African majority and the ruling white minority, especially the Afrikaners. He feared that so deep was this chasm that we had reached a stage such that the two sides would find it difficult even to hear each other.
Hence his recurring nightmare that when the apartheid regime sent a message that it now wanted a genuine peace and an end to white minority rule, we would read this as being nothing but a ruse intended to demobilise us from struggle, with the aim of perpetuating apartheid. Thus as the possibility for a peaceful end to the apartheid system presented itself, we would decide that this was precisely the moment to intensify our just war against this system.
He said that it might very well be that the message communicated by Professor Esterhuyse signified that the apartheid rulers were now ready to engage the ANC in discussions aimed at achieving a genuine peace and an end to white minority rule.
He said that whatever might have been happening at that time, we needed to ensure that we did not make the grievous mistake of failing to hear a message of hope that our enemies might seek to communicate. He therefore authorised that I should proceed to London, listen to what Willie Esterhuyse had to communicate, and report back, which I did.
And indeed Professor Esterhuyse had brought a message that the apartheid regime wanted to talk directly with the ANC leadership in exile. He conveyed the proposals made by the regime to establish direct contact between its representatives and the delegation that would be chosen by the ANC, and other matters relevant to the convening of the first meeting.
President Tambo and other ANC leaders he consulted agreed that we should respond positively to all the suggestions conveyed by Professor Esterhuyse. The first meeting that began our process of negotiations, and therefore the very first meeting between the apartheid government and the ANC, took place in Switzerland. Jacob Zuma and I represented the ANC. The South African government was represented by two senior officials of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Mike Louw and Maritz Spaarwater.
This began a succession of meetings, which addressed the demand repeatedly made by our movement, that for any negotiations to take place, the necessary climate had to be created. Accordingly, by the end of 1989 we had agreed, among others, that Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners would be released, and the ANC, the SACP and all other progressive organisations would be unbanned.
By leaping over the gulf that separated the oppressed from the oppressor, to listen to, hear and understand the words communicated by the oppressor, our movement had managed to avoid transforming Oliver Tambo’s nightmare into reality.
We can indeed say that when the drum of peace was sounded, we did not mistake this for a new summons to the war regiments. I have often wondered what would have happened to our country and people if we had allowed our history so to condition our minds that we failed to hear the message of the oppressor conveyed to us by Professor Esterhuyse!
Thank G-d they did! Thank G-d for Oliver Tambo’s quiet good sense and attentiveness to listening for the message of peace!
The other main part of Mbeki’s latest message is his reflection on an extraordinary event that took place a couple of weeks ago when Adriaan Vlok– who had been Minister for Law and Order during the last, and most repressive, days of the apartheid regime– turned up at the office of Frank Chikane, the director of Mbeki’s office… gave Chikane a Bible… asked if he could wash Chikane’s feet … and then pulled out a bowl and some water out of his bag and proceeded to do so.
To understand this gesture you need to recall the portion of the Bible where Jesus washed his disciples’ feet as a sign of his humility and love for them. You also need to understand what a ferocious, extremely inhumane and oppressive person Vlok had earlier been– throughout a long career in the security forces and in politics, and in his position as Minister in the 1980s and early 1990s.
For his part, Frank Chikane had been a Black pastor in South Africa in those days. But he was active with the pro-ANC grassroots movement, the UDF, and was defrocked from his church for that… Nonetheless, he became secretary-general of the SA Council of Churches– a frequent target of Vlok’s ire and several of his dirty tricks. In the 1980s, Vlok even tried to assassinate Chikane by poisoning a set of clothes with which he was traveling.
Mbeki, in his commentary today, noted that the recent foot-washing action undertaken by the 69-year-old Vlok had aroused some hostile reactions– both from Whites and from Blacks (for different reasons.)
His own commentary on the affair was this:
More on that 237,000-shell artillery bombardment
Today’s HaAretz has an informative article on Israel’s use of artillery, including a new form of “cluster rocket” as well as cluster bombs. It’s by Meron Rapoport.
He writes this:
- Y., a reservist… , fired at least 15 cluster shells. “It was in the last days of the war,” he says. “They gave us orders to fire them. They didn’t tell us where we were firing – if it was at a village or at open terrain. We fired until the forces that requested the shelling asked us to stop.”
Another peculiarity involves the type of shells that were used. The 155-mm. artillery batteries use two types: American-made shells, known in the IDF by the acronym matzrash, and Israeli-made shells, called tze’if. Y. learned that with the Israeli cluster shells, the percentage of duds – i.e., of bombs that essentially became land mines – was lower than that of the American-made ones, and yet they fired only the latter kind. But the major portion of the damage wasn’t done, apparently, by the 155-mm. guns that S. and Y. fired, rather, apparently, by the new MRLS rocket launchers that the IDF used in operations for the first time in the second Lebanon war.
In the late 1990s, the IDF purchased 48 of these launchers from the United States. Each one holds 12 rockets, which act essentially like large cluster bombs. According to the official specifications, each such rocket contains no fewer than 644 tiny bomblets that are supposed to disperse in a 100-meter radius above the target. “Like a soccer field full of bombs,” is how one artillery reservist described it.
Y. says that his battalion commander said that when the IDF Apache helicopter came down near Ramot Naftali, killing its two pilots, one suspicion was that it had been hit by such a rocket that had been fired in the area at the time. It was later determined that this was likely not the cause, but the discussion of such a possibility basically amounted to an official admission that such rockets were indeed being used against southern Lebanon. How many exactly? It’s hard to know. The UN people have no precise data on the breakdown of unexploded ordnance from MRLS rockets, or American or Israeli cluster shells.
[UN humanitarian coordinator for Lebanon David] Shearer says it’s clear that most use of the cluster weapons was made in the final 72 hours of the war. “In the beginning of the war, too, there were reports on the use of cluster bombs,” he says. “But only a few. In the three last days, a tremendous amount of them were fired. It’s also hard to know where they were aimed. The dispersion of the bombs is so wide that even if the original target were outside a populated area, many bombs fell amid the houses.”
Y. and S. [both reservists in the IDF artillery force] confirm this appraisal of events. “In the last 72 hours we fired all the munitions we had, all at the same spot,” says Y. “We didn’t even alter the direction of the gun. Friends of mine in the battalion told me they also fired everything in the last three days – ordinary shells, clusters, whatever they had.”
Rapoport started his piece with more exploration of the situation regarding the targeting of some of the IDF’s artillery:
- S.is a reservist in an artillery battalion, and he is not at ease with what he did during the second Lebanon war. He fired shells [not cluster bomb shells, apparently; but not lollipops either, ~HC], sometimes at a rate of one per minute. He and his fellow soldiers fired 200 shells one night and on other nights, “only” 50 or 80. S. doesn’t know what damage was done by the shells he fired. He didn’t see where they fell. He doesn’t even know exactly where they were aimed. Artillery gunners like him only receive coordinates, numbers, not names of villages. Even those commanding the team or the battery don’t know exactly what they’re firing at.
“Tell me, how do the villages there look? Are they all destroyed?” S. asked me after I told him that I was in contact with UN personnel who were patrolling the villages. What really made something inside S. snap was when his battalion was given an entire village as a target one night. He thinks it was Taibeh, a village in what is called the eastern sector, but he’s not sure. The battalion commander assembled the men and told them that the whole village had been divided into parts and that each team was supposed to “flood” its alloted space – without specific targets, simply to bombard the village.
“I told myself that the people left in that village must be the weaker ones, like in Haifa,” says S. “I felt that we were acting like Hezbollah. Taking houses and turning them into targets. That’s terror. My soul is important to me. When I hug my girlfriend, I want to feel good about myself. And I don’t feel good about what I did in the war. I felt like I really should have tossed my weapon and run away.”
Remember that each one of these artillery shells carries a serious explosive charge. (Remember the size of the artillery shells in the pics of the Israeli girls lining up to “sign” them– they were taller than some of those girls there, I recall.)
Rapoport writes that, “One reservist artillery officer estimated that the Israel Defense Forces fired about 160,000 shells during the recent war.” However, this article in yesterday’s HaAretz reported that IDF officers told a Knesset committee that the number had been around 237,000. Anyway, to put this in perspective, Rapoport notes that in the Yom Kippur, which was a large engagement fought on two fronts– one of them the very broad Sinai front– against the regular armies of two significant Arab states, “the IDF fired less than 100,000 shells.”
He notes that in the recent war Israel also fired “several hundred cluster rockets and cluster bombs” and then tells us more about those, as noted above.
Altogether, this report gives us more info about Israel’s extremely profligate– indeed, quite possibly “indiscriminate”– use of artillery during the war, in general. It adds significant new details to the cluster bombs story. (See also the Aug 17 HRW report on that, and this Sep 5 report from the UN’s IRIN news service.) And it also gives us some hints of where people might look to find info about the chain of command that had authorized and led to these firings and the apparently indiscriminate content of some of those orders. All of which is vital info in this context.
Khatami in Charlottesville, wary of too-rapid US exit from Iraq
So today, I heard the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Sayyed Mohammad Khatami, give
a prepared
lecture
to a small audience at the University of Virginia. I had submitted a question in advance, as we were invited to do. And since only three questions were submitted,
at the end of the lecture they all got asked.
Mine was, “As a neighbor of Iraq’s and someone who cares about the wellbing
of the Iraqi people, do you think it is in their best interests that the
US army stay in Iraq or leave?”
Khatami gave a nuanced answer but soon came to the point: “If you ask
me should the Americans leave tomorrow, I’d say ‘No, don’t do it’.”
The reasoning behind his answer was as follows.
First, he noted that he would give a “personal response” to the question.
“We were very opposed to the US invasion of Iraq,” he said. (He had been
President of Iran at the time, remember.) Then he made a little joke
and said, “Of course, we were not opposed to the fact that they had removed
two of our greatest enemies from the scene! [That would be the Taliban
and Saddam.] But we were opposed to way it was done.”
He continued:
I think for the Americans, going into Iraq was difficult,
but getting out will very tough indeed! What America has done there
has increased terrorism, and maintaining the American presence there is very
expensive for you. But the most horrible thing is the number of civilians
killed there every day.At the time of the invasion, I was still President. I proposed then
that the US should work closely with Iraq’s six neighbors and the UN to find
a solution to the problem of Iraq in the most economical and efficient way
possible. My proposal was accepted by Kofi Annan, by Saudi Arabia–
and by Egypt, whom we had also approached. But the US didn’t accept
our suggestion, and went ahead with its own plan, with the support of the
British government.The result was a transfer of the problem of terrorism from Afghanistan to
Iraq. The terrorists used that occupation there as an excuse to destabilize
Iraq.Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism has risen to unprecedented
levels, in an unexpected way. And meantime, the military occupation
there has cost the US government quite a lot. The liberation of Kuwait
in 1991 was paid for by the Arab governments. But this one is paid
for solely by the US.So we are at a paradox. The occupation must end so there can be peace.
But also, you can’t leave the present Iraqi government at the mercy
of the terrorists.If you ask me should the Americans leave tomorrow, I’d say ‘No, don’t do
it’.The solution of America’s problem in Iraq can’t be unilateral. It needs
the cooperation of the neighbors in the region and of the UN.
He alluded to the fact that this would most likely take some time to organize.
(I would note, for my part, that many people in Iran right now must
be just delighted to have 140,000 US soldiers strung out throughout Iraq
and playing the role of sitting ducks or “hostages to fate” in the event
the US should attack Iran militarily. So why the heck would any Iranian
want the Americans to leave Iraq?)
—————
I’m afraid I don’t have the energy to give a fuller critique of the lecture
right now. Another attendee made notes on the Q&A session, and
underlined the following highlights from Khatami’s answer to the other two
questions:
Continue reading “Khatami in Charlottesville, wary of too-rapid US exit from Iraq”
237,000 artillery shells!
Yes, that is what the IDF has now said that Israel rained on Lebanon in the 33 days of the recent war, according to this HaAretz report…. And then there were all the additional tens of thousands of air-delivered and navy-delivered munitions,
That report also tells us that the direct costs of the war came to 11.2 billion NIS (i.e., shekels), which is $2.56 billion.
(The price of how many lattes there?)
No word yet on how those costs are going to be covered… That news report says lamely that the Knesset Budget Committee “authorized an additional NIS 1.75 billion for the defense establishment, of which NIS 600 million will be used to cover war expenses.”
Also, “MK Avshalom Vilan (Meretz) said that war is an expensive business and asked why no cost-benefit analysis had been done.”
Just a little late to start asking those questions, Mr. Vilan, don’t you think?
During the war, we may recall that Hizbullah launched some 4,000 of its rockets– the vast majority of them the ones that Michael Totten described as “pipsqueakers”– against Israel.
Well, this is a week when many important questions are starting to be asked in Israel… and some are even starting to be answered.
Amos Harel writesin Thursday’s HaAretz:
- Chief of Staff Dan Halutz was yesterday subjected to the harshest criticism he has encountered since the end of the fighting in Lebanon last month. The army’s handling of the confrontation was roundly blasted at a meeting convened by Halutz with dozens of reserve generals at the Israel Defense Forces base at Tzrifin. The gap between the manner in which the chief of staff portrayed the war and the way the reservists saw it, in the words of one participant, “diametrically opposed.” That said, many of the participants said that Halutz appeared to listen intently to the criticism leveled against him.
And Ze’ev Schiff tells us that:
- Two Israel Defense Forces General Staff officers, operations chief Major General Gadi Eisenkut and the Intelligence Division’s head of research, Brigadier General Yossi Beiditz, strongly opposed last month’s decision to launch a broad ground offensive against Hezbollah shortly before the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the war in Lebanon.
The decision to embark on the operation was made on Wednesday, August 9, when it was already clear that the Security Council would vote on a cease-fire resolution soon thereafter. The council in fact passed the resolution at 5 A.M. on Saturday.
Beiditz wrote in a letter to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz that his division believed that the last-minute offensive would not significantly affect the enemy or lead to achievements. Beiditz sent a copy of the letter to Chief of Staff Dan Halutz.
Eisenkut opposed the decision for operational reasons.
Schiff tells us that there has also been disagreement in Israel over the value of the– according to him, repeated– operations to capture the town of Bint Jbeil: “The operation against the town, which IDF forces had to retake several times, led to significant losses.”
… And finally, at the end of a long evening’s reading here, this classic from Defense Minister Amir Peretz: “The aim of the campaign was to create the space for a diplomatic achievement.”
Right, Minister. And if you believe that, then I have a nice piece of real estate in Florida I’d like to sell you. (I.e., you must be extremely stupid and gullible.)
Here’s what the great Quaker peace activist A.J. Muste said: “There is no way to peace. Peace is the way.” Think about it.
Uganda peacemaking news
I have noted with great interest that, in his hosting and mediation of the peace talks for northern Uganda, the vice-president of Souther Sudan, Dr. Riek Machar, has been assisted by a practiced international mediator from Ethiopia called Hizkias Assefa.
When I was teaching at the Summer Peacebuilding Institute of Eastern Mennonite University last year, Dr. Assefa was also on the faculty there. (Though we were all so busy I didn’t get to spend much time with him at all.)
Anyway, I see that the website there at EMU has a little news item with some excerpts from emails Assefa has been sending to colleagues there. Including this, from late August:
- “At this point my energy level has hit rock bottom,” Assefa said. “We had to work at times until 3 a.m. when we were drafting the latest agreement for signature. Although many of us feel it is time for a break, others feel that the momentum that is building in the peace process cannot be allowed to dissipate by taking a break, and we must push on.
“Some political mediations in large scale conflict have come to successful completion with peace agreements that have held,” he said. “One of the big challenges of this process is how the changes that come with the peace process get internalized in the society.
Meanwhile, I’ve just been checking the Kampala Daily Monitor website. They have a couple of interesting items related to the peace effort. One is this one, which is an account/transcript of a radio (or t.v.?) broadcast in which LRA vice-head Vincent Otti participated over a sat-phone. He was in a place called Ri-Kwangba, apparently in one of the two “assembly areas” in which the LRA fighters are supposed to be congregating under the terms of the recent ceasefire agreement.
Otti gives some useful background there about how the LRA earlier this year made the decision to get into the negotiations. He also says that he and LRA chief Joseph Kony will not “come out of the bush” until after the ICC has revoked its indictments against those two and two other LRA leaders. (The fifth indictee having recently been killed.)
Fascinating reading there, altogether, including the discussions among the other participants in the show. (More tomorrow.)
And in this other article, we learn this:
- THE International Criminal Court will not act on “speculation” to revoke the indictments against the top leadership of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army, a spokesman for the Hague-based tribunal said yesterday.
My goodness.
All power to the peacemakers. May their strength hold up.
The budget of the ICC for 2005 was, I believe, some $90 million. Wouldn’t it be great if, instead of going to international lawyers’ salaries and sleek office complexes in The Hague, that sum had been invested in peacebuilding? Wouldn’t it be great if Dr. Assefa and those like him who labor in the vineyards of peacemaking had assured salaries that were as high as those assured to lawyers at the ICC?
Dream on, Helena.
Additional resources on the Israel-Hizbullah war
Here, in no particular order, are some additional resources that I wanted to bookmark:
(1) Two informative, shortish papers on Hizbullah’s war-time decisionmaking and post-war prospects, by Dr. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb of the Lebanese American University, both PDF files: 1 and 2 .
These are published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, which summarizes their findings thus:
- • Hizbollah’s July 12 attack on an Israeli convoy was intended to provoke a prisoner exchange; it was not an Iranian-directed effort to trigger a wider conflict.
• Although prepared for it, Hizbollah did not expect a massive Israeli counter-strike.
• Hizbollah perceives Washington as the engineer of Israel’s current offensive and now views itself as in direct confrontation with the overall U.S. agenda for the region.
• Hizbollah aims to compromise the perception of Israeli military supremacy in the region, with the hope of undermining the stability of Israel itself.
The papers contain a wealth of strong interview material with various Hizbullah leaders (including some I interviewed back in November 2004), but none with Hassan Nasrallah.
(2) The August 2006 (online) edition of Strategic Assessment, which published by the Jaffee Center for Strageic Studies at Tel Aviv University. This entire edition is devoted to the Israel-Hizbullah war, and just about all of the papers in it that I’ve read have been interesting– sometimes substantively, and sometimes because they reveal a certain mindset among the contributors.
It’s evident that the authors were laboring under the disadvantage that they were writing before the war had ended– but most likely, while it was already clear that it was not going well for Israel.
I found these nuggets particularly revealing:
(a) From Ephraim Kam’s paper, The Ayatollah, Hizbollah, and Hassan Nasrallah:
- There is no doubt about Iran’s deep involvement in Hizbollah activity… Nonetheless, there is no need to regard the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers, which led to the current deterioration in Lebanon, as an outgrowth of an Iranian initiative to ease international pressure regarding its nuclear weapons program. Despite its affinity with Iran, Hizbollah is not an Iranian puppet, and the two have not always seen eye to eye over political and operational issues. Hizbollah has its own considerations, which are not only related to its status as an important factor in the Lebanese arena, but also subject to Syrian influence. Therefore, one may assume that the move was, first and foremost, the result of a decision taken by the Hizbollah leadership.
Hassan Nasrallah had good reasons of his own to kidnap the soldiers. He had announced his intention months in advance, and had tried to do so in the past. From his perspective the timing was right for a move of this sort, with the IDF engaged in a major operation in the Gaza Strip and the north at the height of its tourist season. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what great gain Iran would derive from the operation: since the apparent expectation was that Israel’s reaction would be limited, as in the past, the benefit in postponing the preoccupation with the Iranian nuclear issue could also be expected to be limited. Therefore, one may assume that in the current situation, Hizbollah coordinated the kidnapping with Iran at least in a general manner and that Iran gave the organization its blessing, but did not dictate its moves.
(b) And this, from JCSS head Zvi Shtauber, in his wrap-up piece The Crisis in Lebanon: An Interim Assessment:
- The main problem in Lebanon is the absence of a sovereign authority willing and capable of enforcing its rule. This is a highly problematic obstacle because of Lebanon’s sectarian composition and the Shiite majority, and no multinational force can be a proper substitute for such a sovereign authority. Ironically, the departure of the Syrians, who long served as traditional Israeli leverage to restrain Hizbollah, only made matters worse.
Ironic, indeed.
Anyway, enjoy all those as much as you want…