Here, in no particular order, are some additional resources that I wanted to bookmark:
(1) Two informative, shortish papers on Hizbullah’s war-time decisionmaking and post-war prospects, by Dr. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb of the Lebanese American University, both PDF files: 1 and 2 .
These are published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, which summarizes their findings thus:
- • Hizbollah’s July 12 attack on an Israeli convoy was intended to provoke a prisoner exchange; it was not an Iranian-directed effort to trigger a wider conflict.
• Although prepared for it, Hizbollah did not expect a massive Israeli counter-strike.
• Hizbollah perceives Washington as the engineer of Israel’s current offensive and now views itself as in direct confrontation with the overall U.S. agenda for the region.
• Hizbollah aims to compromise the perception of Israeli military supremacy in the region, with the hope of undermining the stability of Israel itself.
The papers contain a wealth of strong interview material with various Hizbullah leaders (including some I interviewed back in November 2004), but none with Hassan Nasrallah.
(2) The August 2006 (online) edition of Strategic Assessment, which published by the Jaffee Center for Strageic Studies at Tel Aviv University. This entire edition is devoted to the Israel-Hizbullah war, and just about all of the papers in it that I’ve read have been interesting– sometimes substantively, and sometimes because they reveal a certain mindset among the contributors.
It’s evident that the authors were laboring under the disadvantage that they were writing before the war had ended– but most likely, while it was already clear that it was not going well for Israel.
I found these nuggets particularly revealing:
(a) From Ephraim Kam’s paper, The Ayatollah, Hizbollah, and Hassan Nasrallah:
- There is no doubt about Iran’s deep involvement in Hizbollah activity… Nonetheless, there is no need to regard the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers, which led to the current deterioration in Lebanon, as an outgrowth of an Iranian initiative to ease international pressure regarding its nuclear weapons program. Despite its affinity with Iran, Hizbollah is not an Iranian puppet, and the two have not always seen eye to eye over political and operational issues. Hizbollah has its own considerations, which are not only related to its status as an important factor in the Lebanese arena, but also subject to Syrian influence. Therefore, one may assume that the move was, first and foremost, the result of a decision taken by the Hizbollah leadership.
Hassan Nasrallah had good reasons of his own to kidnap the soldiers. He had announced his intention months in advance, and had tried to do so in the past. From his perspective the timing was right for a move of this sort, with the IDF engaged in a major operation in the Gaza Strip and the north at the height of its tourist season. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what great gain Iran would derive from the operation: since the apparent expectation was that Israel’s reaction would be limited, as in the past, the benefit in postponing the preoccupation with the Iranian nuclear issue could also be expected to be limited. Therefore, one may assume that in the current situation, Hizbollah coordinated the kidnapping with Iran at least in a general manner and that Iran gave the organization its blessing, but did not dictate its moves.
(b) And this, from JCSS head Zvi Shtauber, in his wrap-up piece The Crisis in Lebanon: An Interim Assessment:
- The main problem in Lebanon is the absence of a sovereign authority willing and capable of enforcing its rule. This is a highly problematic obstacle because of Lebanon’s sectarian composition and the Shiite majority, and no multinational force can be a proper substitute for such a sovereign authority. Ironically, the departure of the Syrians, who long served as traditional Israeli leverage to restrain Hizbollah, only made matters worse.
Ironic, indeed.
Anyway, enjoy all those as much as you want…