Note to readers: This week I started a new arrangement whereby I shall be cross-posting some JWN posts to “The Notion”, a group blog hosted by the venerable New-York-based mag, “The Nation.” My goal is to disseminate my writing more broadly, and bring some more readers back here to JWN. JWN is still absolutely my primary blog. I’ll be putting a lot more things here than I send over there, and also paying a lot more attention to the comments discussions here than there.
Anyway, I posted an early, ways shorter version of this post over at “The Notion” shortly before noon. (One of their requirements is that my posts there be much shorter than many of my posts here turn out to be… Including the present one.)
So anyway, I’ll see how it goes. I just want to assure stalwart JWN folks that my main place is still right here. (And I far prefer the comments discussions here.)
Several people have recently written fairly glowing accounts of the “brainy”
and essentially anti-inflammatory role the US military’s new command team
in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus and his number two, Lt.-Gen. Ray Odierno
, may bring to their work there. Okay, to be fair, most of these accounts
have centered on Petraeus– who has, I should note, long cultivated his relationship
with the press. Thus, we have had
Juan Cole
: “Petraeus is among the real experts on counter-insurgency, and did
a fine job… when he was in charge of Mosul”; and
Trudy Rubin
: “one of the Army’s smartest and most creative generals”, and many others…
However, very few of these people in Petraeus’s personal cheering section
seem to have dug much deeper– either into Petraeus’s own strategic thought,
as reflected in the
new counter-insurgency manual
he helped write during his latest gig as commander of the army’s “Combined
Arms Center” in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; or into the professional record
of the man who will be in charge of day-to-day operations in Iraq under his
leadership, Ray Odierno
.
A first stab at understanding what Odierno might bring to his new job should
start with the record of his service as commander of the 4th Infantry Division
during its time in Iraq, March 2003 through April 2004. The WaPo’s
Thom Ricks wrote a lot about that at the time, and has included a lot of
information about Odierno in his recent book
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
If you have a copy of the book, then go first to pp. 232-4, and then
to pp.279-91. If you don’t have a copy, you could go to that Amazon.com
link there, and do a “Search inside the book” for either “Odierno” or “H
& I”.
H&I, short for “Harrassment and Interdiction”, was just one of the aggressive
tactics Odierno used in the portion of the Sunni Triangle where the 4th ID
was operating…
On p. 234, Ricks refers to an article Odierno later published in
Field Artillery magazine:
He wrote that he often responded with heavy firepower: “We used
our Paladins [155 millimeter self-propelled howitzer systems] the entire
time we were there,” he said [probably, “wrote”, not “said” ~HC].
“Most nights we fired H&I fires… what I call ‘proactive’ counter-fire.”
His conclusion was that “artillery plays a significant role in counter-insurgency
operations.” That assertion is at odds with the great body of successful
counterinsurgency practice, which holds that firepower should be as restrained
as possible, which is difficult to do with the long-range, indirect fire
of artillery.
It should go without saying that there is no such thing as “counter-“fire
that is “proactive”, i.e., pre-emptive. Basically, what Odierno was
writing about there was a mode of operating inside Iraq that included going
around firing wildly with some pretty heavy artillery pieces simply to “harrass”
and, often pre-emptively, “interdict” any suspected or possibly even quite
imaginary opponents. (Okay, that was just about the same thing
that Bush did in ordering the whole invasion of Iraq, in the first place.
To that extent, we could certainly note the unity of approach between
the commander-in-chief and Ray Odierno, at that time.)
Over the pages that followed that quote, Ricks also writes a lot about the
lethal, esclatory excesses committed by one of the brigade commanders working
under Odierno in the 4th ID, Col. David Hogg. That portion of the book
is worth reading, too.
On p.232-3, Ricks writes of the 4th ID under Odierno,
Again and again, internal Army reports and commanders in iterviews
said that this unit– a heavy armored division, despite its name– used ham-fisted
approaches that may have appeared to pacify its area in the short term, but
in the process alienated large parts of the population.
“The 4th ID was bad,” said one Army intelligence officer who worked with
them. “These guys are looking for a fight,” he remembered thinking.
“I saw so many instances of abuses of civilians, intimidating civilians,
our jaws dropped.”
“Fourth ID fueled the insurgency,” added an Army psychological operations
officer…
“they are going through neighborhoods, knocking on doors at two in the morning
without actionable intelligence,” said a senior officer. “That’s how
you create new insurgents.”
A general who served in Iraq, speaking on background, said flatly, “The 4th
ID– what they did was a crime.”
So here’s my question: Why on earth should we be expected to believe that
Ray Odierno– a man who spent the vast majority of his career rising up inside
the “massive land force” portions of the US Army– has had a complete character/professional
makeover since April 2004, and that he is now going to go into Iraq with
Petraeus and conduct any kind of a “brainy”, culturally and politically sensitive
counter-insurgency campaign?
Especially, if we consider Odierno’s record alongside the content in the
new counter-insurgency
manual
that Petraeus has just helped author along with a Marines general. (Ricks’s
book makes quite clear that at the beginning of the current US-Iraq war,
the US Marines were generally much better at counter-insurgency than the
Army… Mainly because the Marines have always planned to operate in smaller
units and “live with the people” as much as possible, while throughout the
Cold War the Army had become accustomed, in Europe, to operating in very
large unites, with very large weapons, and living in a very large and comfortable
encampments… To that extent, for Petraeus to work on this new manual
with a Marines general iindicates that he was trying, a little belatedly,
to get some of the Marines’ parctices and lessons systeamtized also for the
Army.)
In today’s WaPo, David Ignatius came close to joining the “cheering
Petraeus” gang in
this
column, in which his lead was this:
What makes sense in Iraq? The political debate is becoming
sharply polarized again, as President Bush campaigns for a new “surge” strategy.
But some useful military guideposts can be found in a new field manual of
counterinsurgency warfare prepared by the general who is about to take command
of U.S. forces in Baghdad.
Picking up on the widespread “Petraeus as brainiac” theme, Ignatius
quotes approvingly from the quote– from an anoymous Special Forces officer–
that’s the epigraph at the head of Chapter 1: “”Counterinsurgency is not
just thinking man’s warfare — it is the graduate level of war.”
Ignatius also writes,
My favorite part of the manual, which I suspect Petraeus had a
big hand in drafting, is a section titled “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency
Operations.” The headings give the flavor of these unconventional ideas:
“Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be.”
(Green Zone residents, please note: “If military forces remain in their compounds,
they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the
initiative to the insurgents.”) “Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction.”
“Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.” And this military
version of the Zen riddle: “The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is,
the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted.” (As the host
nation takes control, “Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more
risk to maintain involvement with the people.”)
The abiding lesson of this manual comes in one of Petraeus’s paradoxes,
and it ought to be engraved as the cornerstone of U.S. policy going forward,
regardless of whether there is a troop surge: “The Host Nation Doing Something
Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well.” In making this
point, Petraeus cites the godfather of counterinsurgency warriors, Gen. Creighton
Abrams, who said when he was U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971: ” We can’t
run this thing. . . . They’ve got to run it.”
For my part, I’ve spent some time reading the whole of that crucial, doctrine-defining
first chapter of the manual… And it so happens I have made a few notes
on it, which I shall attach to this post in table form, below.
Bottom lines:
1. Petraeus and his co-authors were spelling out a doctrine
for situations– which perhaps they see as occurring many places in the future,
in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan– in which the US military will be helping
friendly host governments to battle local counter-insurgencies. (None
or almost none of the examples cited in Ch. 1 related to Afghanistan.)
2. The doctrine assumes a wide permission for the US military to “eliminate”
any “extremists” that it judges to be violent and/or unwilling ever to reconcile
with the host government.
3. The doctrine asserts that the US military commanders in any such
situation should lead the whole “COIN” effort, subsuming the efforts of local
US embassy staff, NGOs, and even the host government under their leadership.
4. The manual attempts to engage with fundamental issues in democratic
theory like “the consent of the governed”, the primacy of political
control over the military, and national sovereignty. However,
the US military is what it is; and the manual importantly flunks all these
conceptual challenges.
Final bottom line: Petraus may have tried very hard both to be a brainiac
and to produce a doctrine that allows a foreign occupying force to suppress
the forces of a deeply rooted and very multifacted national resistance movement–
and to do so in a way that looks a little “democratic” and senstive… But
he fails.
What’s more, if it’s going to be Ray Odierno who implements this COIN doctrine
in Iraq, then its failure in practice is likely to swift and fairly decisive.
The table containing my comments on the COIN manual text follows:
Continue reading “Bush’s new generals in Iraq”