Bush’s new generals in Iraq

Note to readers: This week I started a new arrangement whereby I shall be cross-posting some JWN posts to “The Notion”, a group blog hosted by the venerable New-York-based mag, “The Nation.” My goal is to disseminate my writing more broadly, and bring some more readers back here to JWN. JWN is still absolutely my primary blog. I’ll be putting a lot more things here than I send over there, and also paying a lot more attention to the comments discussions here than there.

Anyway, I posted an early, ways shorter version of this post over at “The Notion” shortly before noon. (One of their requirements is that my posts there be much shorter than many of my posts here turn out to be… Including the present one.)

So anyway, I’ll see how it goes. I just want to assure stalwart JWN folks that my main place is still right here. (And I far prefer the comments discussions here.)

Several people have recently written fairly glowing accounts of the “brainy”
and essentially anti-inflammatory role the US military’s new command team
in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus and his number two, Lt.-Gen. Ray Odierno
, may bring to their work there.  Okay, to be fair, most of these accounts
have centered on Petraeus– who has, I should note, long cultivated his relationship
with the press.  Thus, we have had
Juan Cole
:  “Petraeus is among the real experts on counter-insurgency, and did
a fine job… when he was in charge of Mosul”; and
Trudy Rubin
: “one of the Army’s smartest and most creative generals”, and many others…

However, very few of these people in Petraeus’s personal cheering section
seem to have dug much deeper– either into Petraeus’s own strategic thought,
as reflected in the
new counter-insurgency manual
he helped write during his latest gig as commander of the army’s “Combined
Arms Center” in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; or into the professional record
of the man who will be in charge of day-to-day operations in Iraq under his
leadership, Ray Odierno
.

A first stab at understanding what Odierno might bring to his new job should
start with the record of his service as commander of the 4th Infantry Division
during its time in Iraq, March 2003 through April 2004.  The WaPo’s
Thom Ricks wrote a lot about that at the time, and has included a lot of
information about Odierno in his recent book
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
 If you have a copy of the book, then go first to pp. 232-4, and then
to pp.279-91.  If you don’t have a copy, you could go to that Amazon.com
link there, and do a “Search inside the book” for either “Odierno” or “H
& I”.  

H&I, short for “Harrassment and Interdiction”, was just one of the aggressive
tactics Odierno used in the portion of the Sunni Triangle where the 4th ID
was operating…

On p. 234,  Ricks refers to an article Odierno later published in
Field Artillery magazine:

He wrote that he often responded with heavy firepower: “We used
our Paladins [155 millimeter self-propelled howitzer systems] the entire
time we were there,” he said [probably, “wrote”, not “said” ~HC]. 
“Most nights we fired H&I fires… what I call ‘proactive’ counter-fire.”
 His conclusion was that “artillery plays a significant role in counter-insurgency
operations.”  That assertion is at odds with the great body of successful
counterinsurgency practice, which holds that firepower should be as restrained
as possible, which is difficult to do with the long-range, indirect fire
of artillery.

It should go without saying that there is no such thing as “counter-“fire
that is “proactive”, i.e., pre-emptive.  Basically, what Odierno was
writing about there was a mode of operating inside Iraq that included going
around firing wildly with some pretty heavy artillery pieces simply to “harrass”
and, often pre-emptively, “interdict” any suspected or possibly even quite
imaginary opponents.  (Okay, that was just about  the same thing
that Bush did in ordering the whole invasion of Iraq, in the first place.
 To that extent, we could certainly note the unity of approach between
the commander-in-chief and Ray Odierno, at that time.)

Over the pages that followed that quote, Ricks also writes a lot about the
lethal, esclatory excesses committed by one of the brigade commanders working
under Odierno in the 4th ID, Col. David Hogg.  That portion of the book
is worth reading, too.

On p.232-3, Ricks writes of the 4th ID under Odierno,

Again and again, internal Army reports and commanders in iterviews
said that this unit– a heavy armored division, despite its name– used ham-fisted
approaches that may have appeared to pacify its area in the short term, but
in the process alienated large parts of the population.

“The 4th ID was bad,” said one Army intelligence officer who worked with
them.  “These guys are looking for a fight,” he remembered thinking.
 “I saw so many instances of abuses of civilians, intimidating civilians,
our jaws dropped.”

“Fourth ID fueled the insurgency,” added an Army psychological operations
officer…

“they are going through neighborhoods, knocking on doors at two in the morning
without actionable intelligence,” said a senior officer.  “That’s how
you create new insurgents.”

A general who served in Iraq, speaking on background, said flatly, “The 4th
ID– what they did was a crime.”

So here’s my question: Why on earth should we be expected to believe that
Ray Odierno– a man who spent the vast majority of his career rising up inside
the “massive land force” portions of the US Army– has had a complete character/professional
makeover since April 2004, and that he is now going to go into Iraq with
Petraeus and conduct any kind of a “brainy”, culturally and politically sensitive
counter-insurgency campaign?

Especially, if we consider Odierno’s record alongside the content in the
new counter-insurgency
manual
that Petraeus has just helped author along with a Marines general.  (Ricks’s
book makes quite clear that at the beginning of the current US-Iraq war,
the US Marines were generally much better at counter-insurgency than the
Army… Mainly because the Marines have always planned to operate in smaller
units and “live with the people” as much as possible, while throughout the
Cold War the Army had become accustomed, in Europe, to operating in very
large unites, with very large weapons, and living in a very large and comfortable
encampments…  To that extent, for Petraeus to work on this new manual
with a Marines general iindicates that he was trying, a little belatedly,
to get some of the Marines’ parctices and lessons systeamtized also for the
Army.)

In today’s WaPo, David Ignatius came close to joining the “cheering
Petraeus” gang in
this
column, in which his lead was this:

What makes sense in Iraq? The political debate is becoming
sharply polarized again, as President Bush campaigns for a new “surge” strategy.
But some useful military guideposts can be found in a new field manual of
counterinsurgency warfare prepared by the general who is about to take command
of U.S. forces in Baghdad.

Picking up on the widespread  “Petraeus as brainiac” theme, Ignatius
quotes approvingly from the quote– from an anoymous Special Forces officer–
that’s the epigraph at the head of Chapter 1: “”Counterinsurgency is not
just thinking man’s warfare — it is the graduate level of war.”

Ignatius also writes,

My favorite part of the manual, which I suspect Petraeus had a
big hand in drafting, is a section titled “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency
Operations.” The headings give the flavor of these unconventional ideas:
“Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be.”
(Green Zone residents, please note: “If military forces remain in their compounds,
they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the
initiative to the insurgents.”) “Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction.”
“Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.” And this military
version of the Zen riddle: “The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is,
the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted.” (As the host
nation takes control, “Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more
risk to maintain involvement with the people.”)

The abiding lesson of this manual comes in one of Petraeus’s paradoxes,
and it ought to be engraved as the cornerstone of U.S. policy going forward,
regardless of whether there is a troop surge: “The Host Nation Doing Something
Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well.” In making this
point, Petraeus cites the godfather of counterinsurgency warriors, Gen. Creighton
Abrams, who said when he was U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971: ” We can’t
run this thing. . . . They’ve got to run it.”

For my part, I’ve spent some time reading the whole of that crucial, doctrine-defining
first chapter of the manual… And it so happens I have made a few notes
on it, which I shall attach to this post in table form, below.

Bottom lines:  

1. Petraeus and his co-authors were spelling out a doctrine
for situations– which perhaps they see as occurring many places in the future,
in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan– in which the US military will be helping
friendly host governments to battle local counter-insurgencies.  (None
or almost none of the examples cited in Ch. 1 related to Afghanistan.)

2.  The doctrine assumes a wide permission for the US military to “eliminate”
any “extremists” that it judges to be violent and/or unwilling ever to reconcile
with the host government.

3.  The doctrine asserts that the US military commanders in any such
situation should lead the whole “COIN” effort, subsuming the efforts of local
US embassy staff, NGOs, and even the host government under their leadership.

4.  The manual attempts to engage with fundamental issues in democratic
theory like “the consent of the governed”, the  primacy of political
control over the military, and national sovereignty.  However,
the US military is what it is; and the manual importantly flunks all these
conceptual challenges.

Final bottom line:  Petraus may have tried very hard both to be a brainiac
and to produce a doctrine that allows a foreign occupying force to suppress
the forces of a deeply rooted and very multifacted national resistance movement–
and to do so in a way that looks a little “democratic” and senstive… But
he fails.

What’s more, if it’s going to be Ray Odierno who implements this COIN doctrine
in Iraq, then its failure in practice is likely to swift and fairly decisive.

The table containing my comments on the COIN manual text follows:

	Text of the US Army and Marine Corps’ December 2006 manual on Counterinsurgency	HC notes
1-4	Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule.(1) Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. This can include eliminating those extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government.(2)  Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.	1.  Buried in here is an assumption that the “host nation” that’s being supported by the US COIN people doesn’t start off enjoying the consent of the governed.  We could definitely return to John Locke here and his dictum that the legitimacy of any government stems from the consent of the governed.  COIN operations try to “win” that consent through coercive military means. 2. Here we have the highest-level “permission” given in the manual for extra-judicial executions.  Who, I wonder, is to act as the “judge and jury” in this process of determining that any given “extremist” holds such beliefs?  Even in the Spanish Inquisition, provision was made for active investigation into, and engagement with, the beliefs  of the heterodox.
1-14	Before most COIN operations begin, insurgents have seized and exploited the initiative, to some degree at the least. Therefore, counterinsurgents undertake offensive and defensive operations to regain the initiative and create a secure environment. However, killing insurgents—while necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat an insurgency .(1) Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the insurgency’s causes through stability operations as well. This initially involves securing and controlling the local populace(2) and providing for essential services. As security improves, military resources contribute to supporting government reforms and reconstruction projects. As counterinsurgents gain the initiative, offensive operations focus on eliminating the insurgent cadre(3) , while defensive operations focus on protecting the populace and infrastructure from direct attacks.  As counterinsurgents establish military ascendancy, stability operations expand across the area of operations (AO) and eventually predominate. Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.(4)	1.  So here, the manual goes beyond telling commanders that winning at COIN might require killing some kinds of “extremists”, as in para 1-4 above, to telling them that it “necessary” to kill “extremists” (and by grammatical implication there, all of ’em.) Ah, but but we are at least told that just doing this, by itself, can’t deafet the insurgency.  I’m relieved to learn this.  Otherwise, commanders who’ve read the manual might think they could just go on killing people until there’s no-one left to withhold her/his “consent” from the government. 2.  Right, “controlling” the local populace is definitely a key to this view of COIN. 3.  Here, we learn that the “elimination” (i.e. assassination) operations are to be extended to the entirety of the “insurgent cadre.”  This doesn’t sound very discriminating to me. 4.  “We will launch asassinations and other forms of violence against this population until, by God, they grant their consent!”
1-17	Before World War I, insurgencies were mostly conservative; insurgents were usually concerned with defending hearth, home, monarchies, and traditional religion. Governments were seldom able to completely defeat these insurgencies; violence would recur when conditions favored a rebellion. For example, the history of the British Isles includes many recurring insurgencies by subjugated peoples based on ethnic identities.(1) Another example of a conservative insurgency is the early 19th century Spanish uprising against Napoleon that sapped French strength and contributed significantly to Napoleon’s defeat.	1.  Yeah, and don’t forget about that pesky little UDI movement that some of the white settler locals  in North America launched against London’s colonial rule in the 18th century.
1-21	While some Cold War insurgencies persisted after the Soviet Union’s collapse, many new ones appeared. These new insurgencies typically emerged from civil wars or the collapse of states no longer propped up by Cold War rivalries. Power vacuums breed insurgencies. Similar conditions exist when regimes are changed by force or circumstances. Recently, ideologies based on extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies based on secular revolutionary ideals. These new forms of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. These conflicts resemble the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th century. People have replaced nonfunctioning national identities with traditional sources of unity and identity.(1) When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government’s ability to defend itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support for the insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist.(2)	1. Actually, this whole paragraph is an attempt to say that nationalism is no longer a motivating force for insurgents– with, most likely, special reference to Iraq.  I beg to differe. 2.  We might note that it was the US invasion and occupation of Iraq that brought about :state collapse” in Iraq– and most Iraqis know that.  So for the USmilitary now to seek to position themselves as “helping [to] reestablish political order and legitimacy” is inherently a very tough sell.  Perhaps the authors of this manual think Iraqis are stupid?
1-76	The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form.(1) Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions. Insurgent organizations like Al Qaeda use narratives very effectively in developing legitimating ideologies. In the Al Qaeda narrative, for example, Osama bin Laden depicts himself as a man purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline of the umma [Muslim community] and bring about its inevitable triumph over Western imperialism. For them, Islam can be renewed both politically and theologically only through jihad [holy war] as they define it.	1.  See also my recent JWN post about the importance of narrative in Iraq.
1-81	Many religious extremists believe that the conversion, subjugation, or destruction of their ideological opponents is inevitable. Violent extremists and terrorists are often willing to use whatever means necessary, even violence against their own followers, to meet their political goals. Nevertheless, they often pursue their ends in highly pragmatic ways based on realistic assumptions. Not all Islamic insurgents or terrorists are fighting for a global revolution . Some are purs[u]ing regional goals, such as a establishing a Sunni Arab-dominated Iraq or replacing Israel with an Arab Palestinian state. And militant groups with nationalist as well as religious agendas seek cease fires and participate in elections when such actions support their interests.	The whole of this paragraph– and the two that follow–show the authors wrestling with the problem of which kinds of insurgents might one day be ready to sit down at a negotiating table, and which not.  (for the impact of this determination, see my note 2 to para 1-1 above.)  They seem pretty confused.  I guess that’s a result of their heavy reliance on the intellectually vacuous discourse of anti-“extremism”.
1-83	The rigid worldview of such extremist groups means that friendly actions intended to create good will among the populace are unlikely to affect them. Similarly, if a group’s ideology is so strong that it dominates all other issues, dialog and negotiation will probably prove unproductive. The challenge for counterinsurgents in such cases is to identify the various insurgent groups and determine their motivations.  Commanders can then determine the best course of action for each group. This includes identifying the groups with goals flexible enough to allow productive negotiations and determining how to eliminate the extremists without alienating the populace.	Here, the authors identify the single most important political determination that leaders of counter-insurgency projects need to make.  But should this determination be made by the military commanders, or by the political echelon?  I would say, overwhelmingly the political echelon.  These guys say the military.
1-108	In almost every case, counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides. (See figure 1-2.) Because of the ease of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of popular support; a solid majority is often essential. However, a passive populace may be all that is necessary for a well-supported insurgency to seize political power.  [A graphic titled “Figure 1-2. Support for an insurgency” follows.  It shows that “whatever the cause”, there will always be  an active minority for it, an active minority against it, and a much larger “middle” described as the “neutral or passive majority.”] of the country. an insurgency.	Boy!  Leavenworth does social science!
At 1-112	HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
At 1-113-120	Legitimacy Is the Main Objective.	Correct.
1-113	The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government(1) . Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion.(2)  Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion —for example, against criminals—but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance.	1.  Right– except where it isn’t– in the US’s incitement of Fateh and others to undermine the effectiveness of rule by the elected Hamas government in Palestine… or in the case of the Contras.  Oh, I forgot.  Those were both fundamentally US-instigated insurgency operations, not COIN. (2) A little bit of a re-writing of John Locke, I’d say.  But then, in the last sentence, they try to sort it out.  Note there, though, how the language of criminalization is used to exclude people from the concern normally given to all bona-fide citizens.
1-114	In Western liberal tradition, a government that derives its just powers from the people and responds to their desires while looking out for their welfare is accepted as legitimate. In contrast, theocratic societies fuse political and religious authority; political figures are accepted as legitimate because the populace views them as implementing the will of God.  Medieval monarchies claimed “the divine right of kings.” Imperial China governed with “the mandate of heaven.” Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has operated under the “rule of the jurists [theocratic judges].” In other societies, “might makes right.” And sometimes, the ability of a state to provide security—albeit without freedoms associated with Western democracies —can give it enough legitimacy to govern in the people’s eyes, particularly if they have experienced a serious breakdown of order.	This last sentence is actually quite insightful– and of course, particularly relevant to Iraq.
1-115	Legitimacy makes it easier for a state to carry out its key functions. These include the authority to regulate social relationships, extract resources, and take actions in the public’s name . Legitimate governments can develop these capabilities more easily; this situation usually allows them to competently manage, coordinate, and sustain collective security as well as political, economic, and social development.  Conversely, illegitimate states (sometimes called “police states”) typically cannot regulate society or can do so only by applying overwhelming coercion. Legitimate governance is inherently stable; the societal support it engenders allows it to adequately manage the internal problems, change, and conflict that affect individual and collective well-being. Conversely, governance that is not legitimate is inherently unstable; as soon as the state’s coercive power is disrupted, the populace ceases to obey it. Thus legitimate governments tend to be resilient and exercise better governance; illegitimate ones tend to be fragile and porrly administered.	In general, this is an interesting and well-argued paragraph. However, the first two items on that list of a state’s “key functions” express a strongly state-centric view of the human condition.  I suppose one should expect nothing else from a military organization.
1-116	Six possible indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to stability include the following:   The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).   Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace.   A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes.   A culturally acceptable level of corruption.   A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development.   A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.	Not a bad list, though the first item isn’t so much an “indicator of legitimacy” as a “key function of government”, and therefore a source of legitimacy.  (Which is a major reason why the Maliki government has so little popular legitimacy right now.) Also, I wonder about the fourth of those indicators there (re corruption.)  The way it reads now, if the government isn’t marked by enough corruption, then it loses legitimacy.  Maybe it should read, “Corruption absent, or kept beneath a minimal level” — but then, surely it would be a source of legitimacy, rather than an indicator thereof. Then, too, iIf there is a very high level of official corruption– as in present-day Iraq– that surely represents something about the lack of faith even among present-day office-holders in the longterm sustainability of the government structure.  So I suppose in that way it is an indicator of a high degree of failure of the US political project in Iraq.
1-118	In working to understand the [legitimacy] problem, commanders and staffs determine what the HN population defines as effective and legitimate governance. This understanding continues to evolve as information is developed.  Commanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the HN [= “host nation”] population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations. Additionally, planners may also consider perceptions of legitimacy held by outside supporters of the HN government and the insurgents. Differences between U.S., local, and international visions of legitimacy can further complicate operations. But the most important attitude remains that of the HN population. In the end, its members determine the ultimate victor.	Here again, it is military commanders who are being given responsibility for making essentially political judgments.
1-119	The presence of the rule of law is a major factor in assuring voluntary acceptance of a government’s authority and therefore its legitimacy. A government’s respect for preexisting and impersonal legal rules can provide the key to gaining it widespread, enduring societal support. Such government respect for rules—ideally ones recorded in a constitution and in laws adopted through a credible, democratic process —is the essence of the rule of law. As such, it is a powerful potential tool for counterinsurgents.	Oops!  Too bad about Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, etc, eh?
1-120	Military action can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instruments of national power. A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN government achieving legitimacy.	The crux of the problem in Iraq, indeed.
At 1-121-122	Unity of Effort Is Essential
1-121	Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN operations. Usually, however, military commanders work to achieve unity of effort through liaison with leaders of a wide variety of nonmilitary agencies. The U.S. Ambassador and country team, along with senior HN representatives, must be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of command.	I read this para as (slightly indirectly) making the case that the local US military commander in any theater should be the one finally in charge.  The US Ambassador and his/her staff, and the “senior HN representatives” are brought into planning efforts under the senior US commander’s leadership.  (Re Iraq: So much for the HN’s “sovereignty”, huh?)
At 1-123	Political Factors Are Primary	Nothing to argue with here.  But why, then, should the military be the ones calling all the shots and making all the complex political judgments and decisions involved?
At 1-134-6	Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
1-134	Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. The populace may prefer the HN government to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. The insurgents’ primary battle is against the HN government, not the United States(1); however, U.S. support can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s viability. The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and the HN government(2) . Insurgents and local populations often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the United States to abandon a COIN effort. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome that perception and bolster faith in the steadfastness of U.S. support. But even the strongest U.S. commitment will not succeed if the populace does not perceive the HN government as having similar will and stamina. U.S. forces must help create that capacity and sustain that impression.	1. In Iraq, incorrect.  Many other places, too. 2. A correct judgment.  But why should the US citizenry go on supporting this bullying and heavily militarized global policy of ours, anyway?
1-135	Preparing for a protracted COIN effort requires establishing headquarters and support structures designed for long-term operations. Planning and commitments should be based on sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo limits for the various components of the force. (Operating tempo and personnel tempo are defined in the glossary.) Even in situations where the U.S. goal is reducing its military force levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN institutions usually remains for a long time.(1)	1. Like in Vietnam?
1-136	At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical.(1) Only the most senior military officers are involved in this process at all.   It is properly a political activity.(2) However, military leaders typically take care to ensure that their actions and statements are forthright. They also ensure that the conduct of operations neither makes it harder for elected leaders to maintain public support nor undermines public confidence.	1. Right.  But you already lost it. 2. Right– so why on earth should it be acceptable for the generals, whose comfy salaries and considerable perks are paid for from the citizen’s dime, to engage in this propaganda?