Category: Iraq-2007-q2

This particular technique of movement control used by occupation armies is often called “quadrillage”– from when the French used it in Vietnam or in portions of Algeria. Strategic hamlets play the same function. So, of course, does the draconian system of invasive movement controls that Israel has maintained in the occupied West Bank for many years now…
But some smart-alecky officers in the US occupation army in Baghdad decided to call it a “gated communities” plan, instead. Never mind that in the US “gated communities” are a major marker of social inequalities, as well as a way for rich people to “gate themselves off” from taking any responsibility for the quality of life in the broader communities around them… I guess the officers who chose that particular name for the phenomenon thought that it sounded like something fairly desirable– or at least, sanitized, or acceptable??
(Note to Gen. Petraeus and his political masters: the French army is no longer in either Vietnam or Algeria. It actually didn’t work for them, did it?)
In that WaPo piece linked to above, reporter Karin Brulliard reported on one of these quadrillage projects in southern Ghazaliyah, which she described in these terms:

The square-mile neighborhood of about 15,000 people now has one entrance point for civilian vehicles and three military checkpoints that are closed to the public.
In some sealed-off areas, troops armed with biometric scanning devices will compile a neighborhood census by recording residents’ fingerprints and eye patterns and will perhaps issue them special badges, military officials said. At least 10 Baghdad neighborhoods are slated to become or already are gated communities, said Brig. Gen. John F. Campbell, the deputy commander of American forces in Baghdad.

One entrance point for 15,000 people? Why, that makes it sound just as economy-strangling as the situation in the occupied West Bank! I wonder where the US Army got their “brilliant” idea from, anyway??
Brulliard reported this bit of sophisticated (not!) “strategic thinking” from First Lt. Sean Henley, 24, there in Ghazaliyeh: “If we keep the bad guys out, then we win.”
She heard a lot more wisdom from a couple of the Iraqis whom she listened to:

Maj. Hathem Faek Salman… fears the barriers are more likely to anger residents than shut out violence.
“This is not a good plan,” Salman, 40, had said before the meeting. “If my region were closed by these barriers, I would hate the army, because I would feel like I was in a big jail. . . . If you want to make the area secure and safe, it is not with barriers. We have to win the trust of the people.”
The next day, a convoy rumbled out to Bakriyah, a small village west of Ghazaliyah — just outside the walls and a little more than two miles from the civilian checkpoint. It was a peaceful mission: to track down a town leader who is on a local citizens’ council that the soldiers meet with regularly. The man, Najim Abdullah, had skipped a recent meeting, and the soldiers thought his absence might have been to protest the barriers.
… Abdullah, cross-legged in a gray dishdasha, or traditional robe, said he had missed the meeting because of an emergency. But the gated community idea, he said, “doesn’t make any sense.” His villagers had long driven into Ghazaliyah’s west end to go to its markets or continue toward central Baghdad. Now they would have to drive around it.
“The barriers cannot be moved until all of the Ghazaliyah barrier plan is in place,” responded Lt. Lance Rae, 25. “But we will not forget the people down here. They’ve been very faithful to us.”
“It’s your order. I disagree with it. But I accept it,” Abdullah said. “It does not matter to me. It matters to the people.”
Abdullah rose, turned toward the blank white wall and sketched an invisible picture of the area with his hands. He pointed left, to Bakriyah. And a few feet right, to the checkpoint.
“It will take two hours to get from here to here!” he said.
Rae simply nodded and said, “Security is the key.”

I do wonder, though, at the journalistic decisionmaking involved in the construction of Brulliard’s article. Why are the views of these Iraqis put in only near the end of the piece– almost as a disposable afterthought? I would have thought they should constitute the lead and main thrust of the article. And why, too, does she make no reference to that other very evident example of a “barrier” that everyone else in the Middle East has as a touch-stone?
Anyway, Iraqi “PM” Nouri al-Maliki also hurried to say he wanted the wall-building exercise to stop. But he is out of the country– currently touring some other Arab capitals. And while he’s away from home, the “Iraqi military” which is supposed to report to him, seemed to have its own idea what should happen:

The chief Iraqi military spokesman said Monday the prime minister was responding to exaggerated reports about the barrier.
“We will continue to construct the security barriers in the Azamiyah neighborhood. This is a technical issue,” Brig. Gen. Qassim al-Moussawi said. “Setting up barriers is one thing and building barriers is another. These are moveable barriers that can be removed.”

That, though the US Ambassador in Baghdad had already said he would “respect Maliki’s wishes” on the matter.
In that story, AP’s Lauren Frayer also reported from Baghdad that,

hundreds of protesters took to the streets of Azamiyah to oppose what they called “a big prison.”

Juan Cole noted that prominent Kurdish pol Mahmoud Osman described the quadrillage plan as “the peak of failure.”
And Reidar Visser wrote this about the scheme:

Ordinary Iraqis – Sunnis and Shiites alike – have already reacted angrily to the idea of “gated communities”. It is now high time that the wider world understands how these reactions are linked to a more basic ideal of sectarian coexistence and that solutions devised for the Balkans will often tend to be highly irrelevant in Iraq. Iraqis of different sects may be in violent conflict with each other, but they nevertheless detest the territorial expression of sectarian identities, which they traditionally see as belonging to the private domain. Above all, the enshrinement (takris) of sectarian differences in government structures is a long-standing taboo in Iraqi political discourse. In this way, the “gated communities” idea shares a major flaw with the Gelb–Biden plan of dividing Iraq according to sectarian criteria: it is a “solution” which the Iraqis themselves are not seeking. To many Iraqis, “gated communities” will first and foremost mean ugly, permanent scars – even if the idea may well have been conceived with noble intentions of “securing Baghdad neighbourhoods”.

He also makes the quite correct point that the effect of “gated communities”– and this is the case in Florida or in Iraq– is to “tear the social fabric”.
The broad, multi-community resistance to this plan is some of the best news I’ve heard from Iraq for a long time.

A couple of days ago, Al-Hayat carried this report about a conference held by a coalition of southern Iraqi political figures called the the Federal Democratic Iraq Gathering (Southern region council). It aroused some interest in the ‘big’ blogosphere (e.g., Juan Cole.) However, Badger of Missing Links had a noticeably different translation into English of one of the key sentences there.

Then, building on Badger’s translation, Reidar Visser sent me and his other email ‘subscribers’ the quick analysis that follows. I reproduce it here with his permission. He asks me to note that this piece of analysis had been sent as an ‘exclusive’ to subscribers rather than being posted as an online article on his website.

His text follows.

By Reidar Visser (http://historiae.org)

15 April 2007

A conference
held in
Baghdad on 14 April by members of the Council for the Region of the
South (Majlis Iqlim al-Janub) has attracted some interest in the
pan-Arab press. The council works for the establishment of a southern
region limited to Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar that would create a wedge
internally among the Shiites by concentrating all the oil wealth in a
single region and leaving six Shiite governorates without any oil.

The pan-Arab
press
has focused on negative reactions to the project among Iraqi
parliamentarians, as could perhaps be predicted. Historically, even
Shiite politicians from Baghdad and Najaf have been uneasy about the
zest for autonomy among the population of the far south. Thus it is
unsurprising that Ali al-Adib of the Daawa party should criticise the
movement and its timing, although the manner in which he did so is
quite remarkable: he said that such conferences should not come about
without prior agreement with governmental and parliamentarian forces.
That sort of comment is of course antithetical to the “federalism from
below” spirit of the Iraqi constitution (where regions are to be
created by popular initiatives rather than by national politicians),
but is perhaps another sign that parliamentarians are ambivalent about
the powers they theoretically have ceded in this manner – the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) has so far been
prominent in trying to impose a federal vision “from above”, namely,
that of all the nine Shiite-majority regions south of Baghdad. Negative
reactions from Sunni Islamists (who refer to the ongoing process of
revising the Iraqi constitution) and “Sadrists” (who on this occasion
continue to construe federalism as a plot to partition Iraq) are more
in line with expectations, although it is noteworthy that the “Sadrist”
press comment was delivered by a Fadila MP from Basra – which could be
indicative of the ongoing tension between centralist and regionalist
wings inside the Fadila, or a case of a defection from Fadila to the
supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. (The media tend to use the term
“Sadrists” for the latter only. Conflict between the two groups have
surged in Basra lately.)

The goals of
the
southern regionalists are well known. They have been pursued for more
than two years, primarily by the Fadila party, but also by some
secularists in Basra and by tribal leaders in Maysan and Dhi Qar (for
background, see for instance http://historiae.org/oil.asp
) The interesting aspect about this story is the identity of the
regionalists in question. No names are given in the most recent press
report, but an organisation with an identical name was founded in
Nasiriyya in May last year – so far without attracting much attention
from outsiders. Intriguingly, the leading figures behind that move were
from SCIRI, Daawa and various smaller political groups in Nasiriyya.
The Sadrists and Fadila were not represented. Of course, the central
leadership of SCIRI favours a project which competes with the Region of
the South (three governorates) – the far bigger Region of the Centre
and the South (nine governorates), and as such the SCIRI-led
organisation in favour of a small-scale south at first comes across as
an astonishing contradiction.

There are at
least
two possible explanations. Firstly, regional sentiment in the far south
of Iraq is very pronounced and often overrides the ideology of the
central leadership of the national parties. This has been seen in
Fadila (which has always been more localist in Basra), Daawa, among the
Sadrists of Maysan (who sometimes employ regionalist rhetoric in the
context of oil), and even among SCIRI members in Basra (some of whom
continued to focus on Basra and the far south even after the central
leadership had declared a single Shiite region as their goal.) The
Nasiriyya-based Council for the Region of the South could be yet
another example of regionalist sentiment cutting across ideological
affiliations. Alternatively, this may be another instance of a
phenomenon seen elsewhere in the south, where SCIRI have created
“copycat” organisations in order to gain a foothold in a region where
they traditionally have had problems. In Maysan, for instance, there
are two Hizbollahs, one tribal and quite secularist, another pro-SCIRI
and more Islamist. SCIRI are clearly trying to capitalise on the
ongoing tension in the Sadrist camp in Basra between Fadila and
followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, and theoretically this latest move by the
Council for the Region of the South could have to do with another
attempt at breaking down resistance to SCIRI in the far south, by
co-opting and diluting it. The fact that the foundation of Majlis Iqlim
al-Janub back in 2006 was widely reported in SCIRI and Badr media might
suggest that the latter interpretation is the more plausible one.

Thanks to Badger
for highlighting these interesting developments at his site http://arablinks.blogspot.com

Okay, I know I’m a little late writing about the news that came out last week (here and here) that (1) the Bush administration had decided to hire a new “Iraq war czar” (also briefly, and quite infelicitously, titled an “execution manager”) who would sit in the White House and provide a direct operational link between the Prez and David Petraeus, the US commanding general in Iraq; and (2) no fewer than five retired generals have now turned down an invitation to take up this post.
But I actually think this new plan is a more serious sign of disarray in the highest levels of the US chain of command than most people have so far realized.
Crucially, I think it signals that the President has a serious lack of trust in Defense Secretary Robert Gates. This, because– in line with longstanding US practice, as written into US law– the chain of military command currently runs from the President, through the (civilian) Secretary of Defense, and from him to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thence to the commander on the ground.
This is not, in practice, too onerous a process to go through. Especially with the speed and convenience of modern-day communications. And meanwhile, it ensures the effectiveness of the civilian command of the military, the integrity and predictability of the chain of command at those high levels, and the ability of both the military and the civilian leaders in the Pentagon to be able to act strategically (that is, to be able to deploy military assets around the world in an informed and balanced way.)
But now the President wants to disrupt this longstanding system. Why?
Well, according to the WaPo’s Peter Baker and Tom Ricks, one key impetus for the change was a memo that former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (who for unknown reasons fancies himself a strategic thinker) sent to the White House several weeks ago. This was one of 18 recommendations he made in the memo.
Baker and Ricks write:

“The slowness and ineffectiveness of the American bureaucracy is a major hindrance to our winning, and they’ve got to cut through it,” Gingrich said in an interview yesterday.
Under the proposal [as subsequently developed] by national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, the execution manager would talk daily with the military commanders and U.S. ambassadors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The official would then meet with Bush each morning to review developments. The goal to meet requests for support by Petraeus and others would be “same-day service,” the proposal said.

Right. When what you’re doing in Iraq isn’t working, why not re-scramble the wiring diagram, play musical czars, and figure out a new bureaucratic fix?
Makes perfect sense. (Not!)
In their April 11 article, Baker and Ricks revealed that the three generals who (as of then) had turned it down included retired Gen. Jack Keane– who was one of the main intellectual authors of the “surge” proposal!– and retired Marines General Jack Sheehan.
They wrote,

Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. “So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, ‘No, thanks,’ ” he said.

At this point, three things seem clear to me:

(1) There is a widespread distrust among senior retired generals in either the content of the present policy, or the conditions under which this new post is being created, or both;
(2) The Prez definitely looks as if he’s wanting to cut the Secdef out of the loop. (I believe this may even be illegal? It is, anyway, very very unwise.) And,
(3) The scrambling around and trying to find a new bureaucratic “quick fix” for the policy is a sure sign that the senior administration people themselves realize the policy isn’t working well.

In this regard, the situation in Washington seems highly reminiscent of what was happening in Israel in the third week of their war against Lebanon last summer. At that point the IDF’s increasingly desperate chief of staff Dan Halutz summarily appointed a new commander to come in and take command of the Northern Sector over the head of the sector’s existing commander… Now, in Washington, Bush seems to be trying to bring in a new (preferably military) person to come in and, in effect, replace Bob Gates.
All this is potentially very disquieting. On the other hand, the administration has already seen fairly high levels of (high-level) distrust, second-guessing, and general administrative flailing around throughout the disastrous course of this war in Iraq. One thing that struck me from reading Tom Ricks’s book “Fiasco”, for example, was how often Condi Rice or Don Rumsfeld or other high-level actors felt they needed to send their own personal envoys out to Baghdad to get a feel for what was going on there. That gave me the distinct sense that these officials didn’t trust the reports they were receiving through the normal channels, that is, from each other. (And therefore, they didn’t trust each other.) Meeting and dealing with this constant stream of high-level envoys must quite often have been a real headache for the Iraqis, and for the US generals on the ground.
So this latest development is, it seems to me, a continuation of a long-running flailing around within the upper reaches of the Washington bureaucracy. But it’s probably the most serious to date.
(Maybe it marks the ‘beginning of the end-game’ for the US military presence in Iraq? Let’s hope so!)
Meanwhile, I’d love to know what Bob Gates is thinking about all this…

The WaPo’s Walter Pincus has a very disturbing piece in today’s paper in which he writes that the US forces in Iraq are currently holding about 18,000 detainees, the vast majority of them Iraqis. Pincus also mentions almost as an afterthought that “As of last month, the Iraqi detention [by which I assume he means the separate archipelago of prison-camps that is run by the Iraqi ‘government’] contained about 34,000 detainees.”
For a total of 52,000? This is truly horrendous.
First, remember that these detainees are probably nearly all able-bodied men of breadwinning age and imagine how many dependents each might have, relying on this man to bring home an income for the family.
Second, remember that these ‘detainees’ have not been incarcerated as the result of any transparent, fair judicial hearing. Instead, they are ‘security detainees’– such as may be held by an occupying power in the territory it occupies, if there is an overwhelming security reason to do so in each case… But the conditions for such detentions are strictly regulated in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which Pincus doesn’t mention. I wish he had.
I should note that– notably unlike Afghanistan– the US military and political leadership did say when it went into Iraq that it would respect the Geneva Conventions there and considered its status there to be that of a foreign occupying power. Thus, duly organized combatants captured there would be considered as POWs; and other individuals held as security detainees there should be held only under the conditions specified by the Fourth Geneva Convention. This includes access to the ICRC, guarantees of decent basic treatment, no torture, etc.
If the US and the Iraqis between them are now holding 52,000 security detainees– with the majority of them presumably Sunni Arabs– then this makes the detention rate there comparable with that in numerous other (generally unsuccessful) counter-insurgency campaigns around the world. See some of my notes on this phenomenon in this paper I published recently.
I am also very familiar with mass incarcerations from Israel’s longstanding practice of holding thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories there in Palestine as “administrative detainees”. I note, though, that while in Israel each such detainee has to have his/her case reviewed every six months, according to Pincus’s account that period of time in the US detention system in Iraq is three times as long: 18 months!
Here’s what Pincus says about the process in the US detention centers:

The average stay in these detention centers is about a year, but about 8,000 of the detainees have been jailed longer, including 1,300 who have been in custody for two years, said a statement provided by Capt. Phillip J. Valenti, spokesman for Task Force 134, the U.S. Military Police group handling detainee operations.
“The intent is to detain individuals determined to be true threats to coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces and stability in Iraq,” Valenti said. “Unlike situations in the past, these detainees are not conventional prisoners of war.”
Instead, he said, they are “diverse civilian internees from widely divergent political, religious and ethnic backgrounds who are detained on the basis of intelligence available at the time of capture and gathered during subsequent questioning.” [Um, how’s that again? You detain a person on the basis of intel you gather after you’ve detained him? How does that work again? ~HC] Valenti said 250 of those in custody are third-country nationals, including some high-value detainees.
Last month, military spokesmen in Iraq told The Washington Post that the United States held 17,000 detainees — 13,800 in Camp Bucca in southern Iraq and 3,300 at Camp Cropper, outside Baghdad. One year ago, less than 10,000 Iraqis were in U.S. facilities in Iraq, but that figure has grown and could reach 20,000 by the end of this year, according to military contracting documents. [That sounds worrisome. Does it mean some of these people are being guarded and questioned by contractors? And who keeps the contractors in line? ~HC] As of last month, the Iraqi detention system contained about 34,000 detainees.
The initial decision to detain or release those arrested is made by a U.S. unit commander with the assistance of an Army lawyer, Valenti said. A file is made for each detainee that includes intelligence reports and any sworn statements and other evidence that supports the determination that the person is a threat.
At the U.S. detention facility, each case is reviewed by a Magistrate Cell. The decision of the Magistrate Cell is given to each prisoner in writing. Each case is reviewed after 18 months by the Joint Detention Review Committee, an Iraqi-U.S. panel. “Approval for continued detention beyond the initial 18-month timeframe requires joint approval from the MNF-1 commander [Multinational Force commander Gen. David H. Petraeus] and the prime minister of Iraq,” Valenti said.

Actually, in counter-insurgency ops everywhere, mass detentions are used for a number of reasons both related and unrelated to the need to protect the public. They are used to punish large swathes of the population. They are used to try to gather intelligence (though the intel gathered from broad round-ups of the population is usually pretty suspect or useless.) But they are also used, crucially, to try to “turn” members of the targeted population– that is, by applying unbearable pressures to these individuals during the time of detention, or by using the detention period to develop means of blackmailing them, the aim is to turn a large enough number of them into informers for the occupying power that then everyone who’s been incarcerated becomes suspect to the insurgent commanders… And thus, the hope is, the the unity of the insurgent force can be eroded.
It nearly always fails to bring victory to the occupying power. But meanwhile, the human cost on the detainees of undergoing those means of humiliation and coercion can be long-lasting and truly damaging.
(And the US forces are doing all this, like Guantanamo, in the name of ‘freedom’?? It truly is Orwellian.)
Pincus writes,

Noah Feldman, a New York University law professor who helped draft the Iraqi constitution, asked, “Pursuant to what law are we holding people who are not turned over to Iraqi courts?” Because they are not considered prisoners of war, he said, the United States must consider them in the “enemy combatant” category used to justify holding detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

I think Feldman fails to understand a few things about the laws of war. The US is still, under international humanitarian law (the laws of war), the occupying power in Iraq… That is the only status the US forces there have: as a “belligerent military force” under the terms of the Geneva Conventions. Certainly, they are not there under the terms of any ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ with the Iraqi government, since the Iraqi ‘government’ has never concluded any such agreement with the US.
So the detainees in Iraq are being held pursuant to the laws of war, pure and simple, Noah Feldman. Why do you think the dainty little ‘Iraqi Constitution’ they paid you to write for them back in the day might get in the way of that?
Feldman is also wrong to say the US must consider the detainees it holds to have the same status as the ‘enemy combatants’ it captured in Afghanistan. Because, as I noted above, the US did (quite rightly) declare that it would respect the Geneva Conventions in Iraq; and because those conventions do allow it to hold security detainees, under conditions regulated by Geneva 4.
(The US was quite wrong, anyway, to undertake that unilateral derogation from the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan.)
Pincus also quotes an anonymous non-governmental expert as saying that the Iraqi detainees are anyway “better off” being held in US custody for the time being than they would be if they were sent to join the 34,000 detainees being held– often in lethal or otherwise atrocity-marked conditions– by the US-trained ‘Iraqi’ security forces.
Well… yes, at some level I suppose that is true.
On the other hand, the US still is the responsible occupying power in Iraq– and therefore it is just as responsible for the gross abuses being committed by security forces whom it has raised up and trained there, as it is for the abuses its own units commit directly. So the fact that the 18,000 detainees in US hands may in some ways be “better off” than their 34,000 compatriots held by the Iraqis doesn’t excuse the US from having to take responsibility for the whole darned stew of violence, coercion, and brutality it has brought into being in Iraq.
Beyond that, the US needs to figure out how to leave Iraq– rapidly, and completely. Under those circumstances, there is at least a significant chance that the Iraqi political figures and community leaders who have been dealing with each other in one way or another for millennia now will find a way to resolve their currently continuing conflicts and figure out a way to coexist with each other into the future.
That notably has not happened at all during the now four years of US occupation of the country. Instead, every year the US troops have been there the situation of Iraq’s people has gotten significantly worse.
And even in these past few weeks– when the US forces have been “surging” into some parts of Baghdad, and the numbers of suspects detained has also risen further– these tactics have still, quite clearly, done nothing to end the carnage that still stalks the country.
When the US forces do finally leave the country, we will leave behind many broken souls, many broken bodies, many broken families and communities. One of the ways we have been inflicting this harm is through the detentions policy. Let us recognize this harm for what it is and end it– and the whole occupation– as soon as possible.

I see we have new competition for Tony Snow’s job.
Today, “tens of thousands” of Iraqis marched in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of Baghdad’s fall to American forces and in response to calls from firebrand cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr.
Colonel Steven Boylan, a top U.S. military spokesman, praised the peaceful nature of the demonstration, saying Iraqis “could not have done this four years ago.”

“This is the right to assemble, the right to free speech – they didn’t have that under the former regime… This is progress, there’s no two ways about it.”

But of course. And by the way, just what was it that the marchers were chanting?
That America go home. “Get out, get out occupier!”
Progress indeed.
Yesterday, al-Sadr’s written marching orders included a call for Iraqi partisans to stop fighting each other and instead unite to concentrate on their common arch enemy – America:

“Oh my brothers in the Mahdi Army and my brothers in the security forces, stop fighting and killing because that is what our enemy and your enemy and even God’s enemy hope for….”
“God ordered you to be patient and to unite your efforts against the enemy and not against the sons of Iraq. They want to drag you into a war that ends Shiitism and Islam, but they cannot.”

Anybody else hear an echo to the William Wallace “Braveheart” line about “sons of Scotland?”
Yet Colonel Boylon wants to characterize Iraqi streets filled with protestors calling for America to go home as an unequivocal sign of “progress?” One wonders if he also was in charge of Senator John McCain’s April Fool’s Day tour of Baghdad?
Back to al-Sadr, Edward Wong’s report yesterday ominously noted that,

“Mr. Sadr’s statement on Sunday indicated he might be ready to resume steering his militia, the Mahdi Army, toward more open confrontation with the American military.”

Yet I am aware of analyses suggesting that Sadr’s latest rhetoric and this march are an effort to “let off steam” for frustrated followers, or a sign of “desperation” in the face of recent US military attacks against his Mahdi “Army” in Diwaniyeh. (These assaults, by the way, included the use of US bombers….) In the following extended McClatchy story, we have:
Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group observing that Sadr’s “lie-low” strategy has backfired among his more militant followers:

“Shiites who were targets [of sectarian violence] want to respond, and Muqtada is coming under more pressure to call for some kind of retaliation… [The mass demonstrations are] “one way of allowing people to let off steam.”

And this from Vali Nasr of the US Naval Postgraduate School, who contends that Sadr’s response to the U.S. troop assault against his once government-protected militia has put his position of power in jeopardy, and that his statements were meant to distract his followers, including militiamen who are eager to retaliate.

“This tough rhetoric essentially camouflages the decision not to fight.”

Perhaps they are correct. But my comment for the moment reduces to two words:

Wishful thinking.