Broder on Bush’s gamble

I don’t know when the WaPo started putting thier Sunday columns up on their website on Saturday. But today I just saw this column by the generally very wise Washington insider David Broder.
It’s worth reading. Broder starts:

    With his new Iraq policy, President Bush essentially has written off any prospect of regaining broad support at home for his course of action, in the slender hope of finding the key to military success and political agreements in Baghdad.
    It is a huge personal gamble, one that has triggered a debate that may well dominate the final two years of Bush’s tenure.

Later, this:

    Bush said that he has Maliki’s word that all this will happen — and that there will be an end to the unspoken policy of targeting Sunnis while protecting Shiite militias. When I asked a National Security Council official why the promise should be taken seriously, after so many disappointments in the past year, he said that the prime minister faces not just external pressure from the United States but also the urgings of “other moderate elements” in his own coalition who are weary of the fighting.
    A skeptic would say that Bush has sacrificed the support of moderates at home — the Republican as well as Democratic lawmakers voicing skepticism about his plan — for some supposed “moderates” in Baghdad.
    For this gamble to work, a lot of implausible things have to happen. Maliki’s governing coalition, which includes the party of Moqtada al-Sadr, will have to steel itself to send troops into the neighborhoods controlled by Sadr’s own Mahdi Army. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says this will happen, but the promise remains to be tested.
    Also unproved is the capacity of the Iraqi army and police force, which are supposed to be “in the lead,” with American troops in support, in clearing out Baghdad…

I gotta run. I’m expecting Laila el-Haddad and her family here any moment…

Last-ditch ground force ‘surge’: Israel’s precedent

US Secdef Robert Gates, appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, was trying to re-package Bush’s outrageous “surge” plan in what looked like a frenzied attempt to tamp down the criticisms it has incurred from lawmakers of both parties. In today’s WaPo, Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson described Gates’s testimony there thus:

    If the plan works, the United States could begin drawing down troop levels by the end of the year, Gates said. If the Iraqi government does not deliver troops and political and economic support, he said, the United States could withhold many of the 21,500 additional troops Bush has ordered to secure the most violent parts of Iraq.

Oops, maybe not such a strong commitment from Gates to the “surge” after all?
But honestly, at this stage in the tangled decisionmaking of this Keystone Cops of an administration, who knows?
(The Senate ASC also got a nuanced little message from Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the brass in the Pentagon do not want to get dragged into any military adventures against Iran. Pace, those same reporters write,

    assured members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that there are no plans to take military operations into Iran, clarifying remarks Bush made on Wednesday in announcing the new Iraq package.
    “From a military standpoint,” Pace said while responding to questions, there is “no need to cross the Iranian border.”

Let’s hope that position stands firm, eh? Also, as I’ve written before a number of times– e.g. here, last September– the US military really should agitate very hard indeed at this point for military-to-military hotlines and other deconfliction mechanisms with Teheran. Right along the length of the Iraq-Iran border, along the whole of the Iranian coastline onto the Gulf, and also along Iran’s border with Afghanistan, the two militaries face each other eyeball to eyeball. A confrontation or provocation could flare up at any point– by the intent of the national command authorities on either side, through the intent of infiltrators into the forces on one side or the other, or completely “inadventently.” That’s why the highest levels of the militaries need to have a way to communicate clearly and authoritatively with each other.)
Anyway, this post was not meant, primarily, to be about that. It’s about the present Keystone Cops-ish disarray in the highest levels of the US strategic/military decisionmaking strata over this whole question of Bush’s much-ballyhooed “surge.”
The more one hears from people like Gates, the more unclear the point of this “surge” seems to be…
So okay, let’s go back to early August last year: Israel. By then it was abundantly clear to the national leaders that the “knockout blow” against Hizbullah that their strategically illiterate chief of staff had promised them in Lebanon had not worked… With 100-200 Hizbullah rockets raining down daily on communities in northern Israel that were either completely unprepared for such a barrage or seemed paralyzed by it, PM Olmert was coming under increasingly open criticism from his public… His political capital was washing out from under his feet from hour to hour… I can imagine Olmert– a national leader with very little experience of his own either in the military or in military-strategic decisionmaking– tearing his hair out (if he had much left to tear, okay), in desperation, and imploring his chief of staff to “Do something! Do something! Quick!”
So what Dan Halutz, the chief of staff, came up with was to add to his previous (by now, quite evidently failed) military plan in Lebanon the previously unplanned addition of– a quickly-thrown-together ground force surge. What’s more, that surge– like the one presently being discussed in Washington– also involved around 20,000 additional troops.
Didn’t make any sense for the IDF. Won’t make sense for the US in Iraq.
Olmert’s reckless insistence back in August that the ill-prepared Israeli ground forces mount that last-minute “surge” into Lebanon cost Israel the lives of some 36 or more soldiers. It notably did not succeed in improving Israel’s position on the battlefield in south Lebanon. Instead, the widely-disseminated reporting of the wounded Israeli units streaming back over the border into Israel with their casualties further pummelled an Israeli posture of strategic deterrence that had already been considerably weakened by the events of the previous 30 days. Some members of those units returned home and immediately joined in a broad campaign of criticism and reproach against Olmert, Halutz, and the rest of the reckless leadership that had thrown their units thus cavalierly into the caldron of war… And at the domestic political level, Olmert has never really recovered since.
Bottom line on Olmert’s surge: not good for Israel’s strategic deterrence, and not good for Olmert’s political standing.
So now, here we have Bush and his team, launching an eery replay of many of those very same moves. Go back and read some of the reporting from Israel that I cited in this JWN post on August 6. Especially at the portion subtitled “Note 2: Disarray and splits in Israeli decisionmaking”.
This looks remarkably similar to the way that Gates is now trying to re-fashion and/or re-package Bush’s absurd and esclatory orders to undertake a “surge” in Iraq… and that Gen Pace is also trying to re-fashion and/or re-package what Cheney and Bush might have been pushing toward, regarding a huge escalation against Iran.
With this difference. Gates and Pace may both have many faults and weaknesses. But at least both men have considerably more experience in strategy and strategic decisionmaking than their counterparts in Israel had last August.
However, the US (like Israel) is a country in which the political echelon, quite rightly, remains in command of even the highest levels of the military. So we, the concerned citizenry of the US, cannot simply leave it to Robert Gates and Peter Pace to rein in the mad adventurism of the President. We have to continue– working at the grassroots as well as with and through our representatives in Congress– to keep the pressure up, politically, on Bush to reverse his disastrous course in Iraq.
My lord, I wish we had a decent parliamentary system here! If we did have one, the elections of last November would not have left this dangerously crazy Presidential-Veep team in control.

Big shifts against the Bush War

The tectonic plates of history are, finally, shifting in this country. A citizenry that was largely stunned into fearful followership by the attacks of September 2001 has started to regain its sense of reponsibility, its morals, and its agency.
We saw that at the ballot-box, November 7. But it didn’t end there. Since November, citizens’ antiwar pressure on our lawmakers has continued. An incoming Congress whose leaders originally planned to put their first focus on domestic affairs was forced instead to put the Iraq war at the top of its agenda. They started yesterday. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was grilling Condi Rice on the President’s new “plan” for Iraq, at the same time the House Armed Services Committee was grilling new Secdef Gates on the same topic.
Crucially, in the Senate hearings, nearly all the Republicans there joined the Dems in expressing strong criticism of the Bush Plan.
The best read on that is Dana Milbanks in today’s WaPo. He wrote that at the end, committee chair Joe Biden told Rice bluntly:

    “I hope you’ll convey to the president… that you heard 21 members, with one or two notable exceptions, expressing outright hostility, disagreement and/or overwhelming concern with the president’s proposal.”

I saw some news clips of the hearing on t.v. last night. GOP Sen. Chuck Hagel was completely scathing about the Prez’s plan for escalation, and very, very persistent in his criticism of Condi.
Condi tried to claim that what the Prez is proposing is not an escalation but an “augmentation.” (What on earth does that mean, anyway? Sounds like a distinction without being a difference to me.)
I believe the Prez’s plan is an escalation in two ways:

    (1) It’s an increase over the current number of US troops in Iraq (though admittedly still not an all-time high), and also
    (2) It mandates a significant increase in the lethality of the operations the GIs will be allowed, or even encouraged, to undertake in Iraq in the period ahead.

The enhanced permissivity of the military’s ROEs in Iraq (as spelled out quite clearly by the White House on Wednesday, here, p.10) is an even stronger marker of the escalation in the level of conflict that the new plan will bring to the “battlefield” in Iraq than the somewhat paltry increase in the troop numbers.
This escalation spells increased death and destruction– overwhelmingly for the Iraqis, but also for the US service members who will be caught up in the middle of it.
… And the US citizenry are starting, in strong numbers, to understand this.
Longtime JWN readers will know that every Thursday when I’m in my home-town in Charlottesville, Virginia, I take part in our town’s weekly antiwar vigil/demonstration. On many occasions there have been just three or four of us gathered on the windy street corner outside the federal courthouse building here, valiantly holding up our signs that urge the many passing motorists to “Honk 4 Peace”.
Throughout 2006, we saw a steady increase in the numbers of motorists responding. But still, for the most part, there were just between three and seven of us standing there for that one hour per week. (On occcasion I have stood alone, at least for a short time; and several times just two of us have been standing there for 15 minutes or so till someone else came to join us.)
On Thursday last week, there were about 15 people.
Then yesterday, as my doughty co-demonstrator Jane Foster, age 82, and I approached the corner at 4:30 p.m. with our bulky bundle of signs, we were surprised to see people waiting around there for us to come. People whom, for the most part, we didn’t know. “What– ?” I thought to myself as I rushed over to them with the signs. People grabbed them from the pile. Soon, we ran out of signs. People kept coming… Mothers with kids in strollers. Middle-aged couples coming in from out of town. A bunch of people from our Quaker meeting… My dear friend Catherine Peaslee, age 84. (She and Jane have both been stalwart demonstrators over the past year. What incredible women!) I saw people there I hadn’t seen at demonstrations since the big ones we held before the invasion of Iraq– and, as I said, lots of folks I’d never seen before.
The “front” side of our demonstration stretched out, facing the traffic, right along that one corner kerbside outside the courthouse and stretching a long way down sidewalks both ways.
The honking was incredible. Definitely the most ever. We’ve been working hard to “train” the drivers on this for more than three years now. I was so proud of their response yesterday! For sure, everyone who was anywhere near our busy intersection during that hour would have gotten a very strong message… and that includes, probably, the occupants of some 5,000 or 7,000 vehicles driving through. As usual, we got a particularly strong response from African-American drivers, and women. But all sorts of demographics were represented among the honkers yesterday, including the (white, male) drivers of some enormous trucks, people in expensive cars, drivers of old jalopies crammed with a bunch of co-workers going home after a long shift, etc, etc.
Many people wanted just to lean long and hard on their horns. Others did a defiant little thum-thum-a-thum-thum. At times it built up into a broad, glorious concert of varied rhythms and tones.
I must admit that the back side of our demonstration had a bit of a carnival atmosphere as old friends saw each other and went over to hug and say hi. We old-timers had been totally unprepared for this and asked each other in amazement: “What happened?” The general answer was twofold. Number one: the totally unconvincing nature of the President’s speech the night before. Number two: one of our people, Chip Tucker, had actually listed our weekly demonstration on the website of the national organizing group Moveon.org, and several of the new people had seen it there and come along.
In retrospect, I wish we had done more to follow up on and consolidate some of the new energy we saw there. (We should probably try to be a lot more intentional about this next week.)
But it really was an amazing experience… and it certainly helped convince me that Bush has now, fairly definitively, lost the battle for public support of his Iraq war.
Other indicators of this abound. The hearings on Capitol Hill– which are continuing today, and will certainly continue next week– are just riveting. They remind us how great it is, finally, to have a bit of a two-party system back in operation here… I do still want to underline that the opposition to the Bush War is not “merely” partisan. Now, as since the very beginning of this war, there has always been serious opposition to it from some Republicans. But oh, it is so great to see a leadership in the the two houses of congress that now seems prepared to explore, harness, and focus this opposition and– finally– to start to hold the administration accountable.
Today’s papers also have lots of indications that disenchantment with the President and his war policy is strong, deep, and growing. There are some poll results– I can’t immediately find a link– that reportedly show that Bush didn’t even get any tiny blip of an increase in poll numbers with his Wednesday night speech.
And today’s NYT tells us that:

Over in the WaPo, meanwhile, Sudarsam Raghavan wrote about the disillusionment of US soldiers on the frontlines, in the Hurriyah district of Baghdad. Including this great quote, from 20-year-old infantryman Daniel Caldwell: “They’re kicking a dead horse here. The Iraqi army can’t stand up on their own.”
(All of that short report from Raghavan is worth reading. In it, he describes going out with this unit on an allegedly “intel-driven” raid on some houses “near the Mahanara School”… Turned out, though, that they’d done their intrusive house-to-house searching in a neighborhood near a completely different school, altogether… Those guys didn’t have a clue where they were, or where they were going… And as for their commander-in-chief??)
But what, you might wonder, is absolutely the weakest of the many weak links in the latest Bush “plan” for Iraq?
That would be its reliance on having won the “commitment” to it of Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki. In Condi’s appearance at the Senate F.R. Committee yesterday, she had made a huge deal about how this was the decisive new element in the new plan.
In Baghdad, however, as John Burns and Sabrina Tavernise noted laconically in this NYT piece,

    The Iraqi leader, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, failed to appear at a news conference and avoided any public comment. He left the government’s response to an official spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, who gave what amounted to a backhanded approval of the troop increase and emphasized that Iraqis, not Americans, would set the future course in the war.
    Mr. Dabbagh said that the government’s objective was to secure the eventual withdrawal of American troops…
    “The plan can be developed according to the needs,” Mr. Dabbagh said. Then he added tartly, “What is suitable for our conditions in Iraq is what we decide, not what others decide for us.”

History, as I said, is in the making.

US arrests Iranian diplomats in Arbil

I guess this were the (poisoned) first fruits of the “New Way Forward” that Bush announced last night? Early this morning, US forces stormed an Iranian governmental rep’s office in the Kurdish capital of Arbil (Erbil), arresting five employees, including diplomats and staff.
Unbelievable. And that was in the capital of Washington’s Kurdish allies, too. Reuters had this, later:

    Iraq’s Kurdish regional government on Thursday condemned a U.S. raid on an Iranian government office in the Iraqi city of Arbil as a violation of the region’s sovereignty and of international immunity laws.
    In a strongly-worded statement from one of Washington’s closest allies in Iraq, the offices of the Kurdish prime minister and Kurdish president expressed their “concern and condemnation” over the pre-dawn operation and urged the U.S. military to release Iranian staff arrested during the raid.

How to make friends and influence people, huh?

The Petraeus doctrine and extra-judicial executions.

I hope you have all now read the table I posted here yesterday, containing my notes on the text of the new US Army-and-Marines counter-insurgency manual co-authored by Gen. Petraeus.
It gives what I understand to be broad permission for those engaged in counter-insurgency operations to “eliminate” broad classes of those whom military commanders judge to be “extremists”.
That is, for the military to engage in extra-judicial executions.
(We could note that Israel’s broad pursuit of that policy has quite failed top bring a solution to its problems with its neighbors any closer.)
On a related note Bill the spouse pointed out this morning that in the penultimate slide (“Key Operational Shifts”) in the PowerPoint presentation on the “Iraq Strategy Review” that was distributed by White House staffers yesterday, the third change noted is from “restrictive ROE [Rules of Engagement]” to a new state of affairs in which “Iraqi leaders [are] committed to permissive ROE”. It’s not clear there whether these “permissive ROEs” are for the Iraqi forces or the US forces, but either way it looks like very bad news.
It strikes me that we, the US citizenry, have no excuse whatever these days for claiming that “we don’t know” what is being done by our leaders in our names. This is the case regarding this new permission for extra-judicial executions, as well as what continues to go on in Guantanamo and other prisons run by the US military around the world, and a number of other clear US infractions of the laws of war.
In South Africa today, nearly every white citizen claims he or she “never knew” what the apartheid government was doing in his/her name prior to 1994. In many cases, those claims seem non-credible. But at least the apartheid government had what one might call the basic “decency” not to go about advertising its more heinous rights abuses far and wide. Our government, by contrast, seems to have little shame regarding its current and ongoing abuses.
No to extra-judicial executions! No to torture! Bring the troops home now!

Bush’s new generals in Iraq

    Note to readers: This week I started a new arrangement whereby I shall be cross-posting some JWN posts to “The Notion”, a group blog hosted by the venerable New-York-based mag, “The Nation.” My goal is to disseminate my writing more broadly, and bring some more readers back here to JWN. JWN is still absolutely my primary blog. I’ll be putting a lot more things here than I send over there, and also paying a lot more attention to the comments discussions here than there.

    Anyway, I posted an early, ways shorter version of this post over at “The Notion” shortly before noon. (One of their requirements is that my posts there be much shorter than many of my posts here turn out to be… Including the present one.)

    So anyway, I’ll see how it goes. I just want to assure stalwart JWN folks that my main place is still right here. (And I far prefer the comments discussions here.)

Several people have recently written fairly glowing accounts of the “brainy”
and essentially anti-inflammatory role the US military’s new command team
in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus and his number two, Lt.-Gen. Ray Odierno
, may bring to their work there.  Okay, to be fair, most of these accounts
have centered on Petraeus– who has, I should note, long cultivated his relationship
with the press.  Thus, we have had
Juan Cole

:  “Petraeus is among the real experts on counter-insurgency, and did
a fine job… when he was in charge of Mosul”; and
Trudy Rubin

: “one of the Army’s smartest and most creative generals”, and many others…

However, very few of these people in Petraeus’s personal cheering section
seem to have dug much deeper– either into Petraeus’s own strategic thought,
as reflected in the
new counter-insurgency manual

he helped write during his latest gig as commander of the army’s “Combined
Arms Center” in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; or into the professional record
of the man who will be in charge of day-to-day operations in Iraq under his
leadership, Ray Odierno
.

A first stab at understanding what Odierno might bring to his new job should
start with the record of his service as commander of the 4th Infantry Division
during its time in Iraq, March 2003 through April 2004.  The WaPo’s
Thom Ricks wrote a lot about that at the time, and has included a lot of
information about Odierno in his recent book
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

 If you have a copy of the book, then go first to pp. 232-4, and then
to pp.279-91.  If you don’t have a copy, you could go to that Amazon.com
link there, and do a “Search inside the book” for either “Odierno” or “H
& I”.  

H&I, short for “Harrassment and Interdiction”, was just one of the aggressive
tactics Odierno used in the portion of the Sunni Triangle where the 4th ID
was operating…

On p. 234,  Ricks refers to an article Odierno later published in
Field Artillery
magazine:

He wrote that he often responded with heavy firepower: “We used
our Paladins [155 millimeter self-propelled howitzer systems] the entire
time we were there,” he said [probably, “wrote”, not “said” ~HC]. 
“Most nights we fired H&I fires… what I call ‘proactive’ counter-fire.”
 His conclusion was that “artillery plays a significant role in counter-insurgency
operations.”  That assertion is at odds with the great body of successful
counterinsurgency practice, which holds that firepower should be as restrained
as possible, which is difficult to do with the long-range, indirect fire
of artillery.

It should go without saying that there is no such thing as “counter-“fire
that is “proactive”, i.e., pre-emptive.  Basically, what Odierno was
writing about there was a mode of operating inside Iraq that included going
around firing wildly with some pretty heavy artillery pieces simply to “harrass”
and, often pre-emptively, “interdict” any suspected or possibly even quite
imaginary opponents.  (Okay, that was just about  the same thing
that Bush did in ordering the whole invasion of Iraq, in the first place.
 To that extent, we could certainly note the unity of approach between
the commander-in-chief and Ray Odierno, at that time.)

Over the pages that followed that quote, Ricks also writes a lot about the
lethal, esclatory excesses committed by one of the brigade commanders working
under Odierno in the 4th ID, Col. David Hogg.  That portion of the book
is worth reading, too.

On p.232-3, Ricks writes of the 4th ID under Odierno,

Again and again, internal Army reports and commanders in iterviews
said that this unit– a heavy armored division, despite its name– used ham-fisted
approaches that may have appeared to pacify its area in the short term, but
in the process alienated large parts of the population.

“The 4th ID was bad,” said one Army intelligence officer who worked with
them.  “These guys are looking for a fight,” he remembered thinking.
 “I saw so many instances of abuses of civilians, intimidating civilians,
our jaws dropped.”

“Fourth ID fueled the insurgency,” added an Army psychological operations
officer…

“they are going through neighborhoods, knocking on doors at two in the morning
without actionable intelligence,” said a senior officer.  “That’s how
you create new insurgents.”

A general who served in Iraq, speaking on background, said flatly, “The 4th
ID– what they did was a crime.”

So here’s my question: Why on earth should we be expected to believe that
Ray Odierno– a man who spent the vast majority of his career rising up inside
the “massive land force” portions of the US Army– has had a complete character/professional
makeover since April 2004, and that he is now going to go into Iraq with
Petraeus and conduct any kind of a “brainy”, culturally and politically sensitive
counter-insurgency campaign?

Especially, if we consider Odierno’s record alongside the content in the
new counter-insurgency
manual

that Petraeus has just helped author along with a Marines general.  (Ricks’s
book makes quite clear that at the beginning of the current US-Iraq war,
the US Marines were generally much better at counter-insurgency than the
Army… Mainly because the Marines have always planned to operate in smaller
units and “live with the people” as much as possible, while throughout the
Cold War the Army had become accustomed, in Europe, to operating in very
large unites, with very large weapons, and living in a very large and comfortable
encampments…  To that extent, for Petraeus to work on this new manual
with a Marines general iindicates that he was trying, a little belatedly,
to get some of the Marines’ parctices and lessons systeamtized also for the
Army.)

In today’s WaPo, David Ignatius came close to joining the “cheering
Petraeus” gang in
this

column, in which his lead was this:

What makes sense in Iraq? The political debate is becoming
sharply polarized again, as President Bush campaigns for a new “surge” strategy.
But some useful military guideposts can be found in a new field manual of
counterinsurgency warfare prepared by the general who is about to take command
of U.S. forces in Baghdad.

Picking up on the widespread  “Petraeus as brainiac” theme, Ignatius
quotes approvingly from the quote– from an anoymous Special Forces officer–
that’s the epigraph at the head of Chapter 1: “”Counterinsurgency is not
just thinking man’s warfare — it is the graduate level of war.”

Ignatius also writes,

My favorite part of the manual, which I suspect Petraeus had a
big hand in drafting, is a section titled “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency
Operations.” The headings give the flavor of these unconventional ideas:
“Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be.”
(Green Zone residents, please note: “If military forces remain in their compounds,
they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the
initiative to the insurgents.”) “Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction.”
“Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.” And this military
version of the Zen riddle: “The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is,
the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted.” (As the host
nation takes control, “Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more
risk to maintain involvement with the people.”)

The abiding lesson of this manual comes in one of Petraeus’s paradoxes,
and it ought to be engraved as the cornerstone of U.S. policy going forward,
regardless of whether there is a troop surge: “The Host Nation Doing Something
Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well.” In making this
point, Petraeus cites the godfather of counterinsurgency warriors, Gen. Creighton
Abrams, who said when he was U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971: ” We can’t
run this thing. . . . They’ve got to run it.”

For my part, I’ve spent some time reading the whole of that crucial, doctrine-defining
first chapter of the manual… And it so happens I have made a few notes
on it, which I shall attach to this post in table form, below.

Bottom lines:  

1. Petraeus and his co-authors were spelling out a doctrine
for situations– which perhaps they see as occurring many places in the future,
in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan– in which the US military will be helping
friendly host governments to battle local counter-insurgencies.  (None
or almost none of the examples cited in Ch. 1 related to Afghanistan.)

2.  The doctrine assumes a wide permission for the US military to “eliminate”
any “extremists” that it judges to be violent and/or unwilling ever to reconcile
with the host government.

3.  The doctrine asserts that the US military commanders in any such
situation should lead the whole “COIN” effort, subsuming the efforts of local
US embassy staff, NGOs, and even the host government under their leadership.

4.  The manual attempts to engage with fundamental issues in democratic
theory like “the consent of the governed”, the  primacy of political
control over the military
, and national sovereignty.  However,
the US military is what it is; and the manual importantly flunks all these
conceptual challenges.

Final bottom line:  Petraus may have tried very hard both to be a brainiac
and to produce a doctrine that allows a foreign occupying force to suppress
the forces of a deeply rooted and very multifacted national resistance movement–
and to do so in a way that looks a little “democratic” and senstive… But
he fails.

What’s more, if it’s going to be Ray Odierno who implements this COIN doctrine
in Iraq, then its failure in practice is likely to swift and fairly decisive.

The table containing my comments on the COIN manual text follows:

Continue reading “Bush’s new generals in Iraq”

How to withdraw from Iraq: The three-step program

So the House Democratic leaders say they want to put forward their own plan for Iraq as a counter to Bush’s? Here is an excellent plan that I have thought long and hard about that I urge them to use.
(Please note that, unlike the vast majority of the people now producing “plans” for Iraq, I have extensive experience in both Middle East studies and strategic studies, as well as the study of peacemaking. Readers might want to see some of what I was writing back in August 2002, Jan. ’03, Feb. ’03, or April ’03 about the US and Iraq….)
So here is my Three-step program for a US disengagement from Iraq:
(1) The President makes an authoritative public statement in which he announces,

    (a) His firm intention to pull all US troops out of Iraq by a date certain, perhaps 4-6 months ahead;
    (b) An assurance that the US has no lasting claims on the land or resources of Iraq;
    (c) An expression of the US’s goodwill towards the people of Iraq, and its sympathy for all the harms that they have suffered in recent years; and
    (d) An invitation to the UN Secretary-General to oversee the process of negotiating all the modalities of the US troop withdrawal, including the formation of an Iraqi negotiating team of his (not the US’s) choice, and the convening of a parallel negotiation that involves Iraq, the US, and all Iraq’s neighbors.

(2) The clock starts ticking on the timetable announced by the President. That fact and the other new diplomatic realities created by his announcement all act together to start transforming the political dynamics within Iraq, the region, and indeed the US, as well. The Iraqi parties and movements all have a powerful incentive to work with each other and the UN for the speedy success of the negotiation over the post-occupation political order. They and the UN also start planning for the many tasks of social, economic, and political reconstruction that the country needs. Another important function for the UN will be to resurrect and re-stress the principle of Iraq’s territorial integrity and national soveriegnty against all the pressures that its powerful neighbors may exert in this fragile period. In these months the US troops in Iraq might come under some form of UN command (as happened– imperfectly, but with ultimate success– during an analogous process of a negotiated troop withdrawal in Namibia, in 1989.) But anyway, the US troops’ main mission in this period will be to organize and start implementing their own orderly departure from the country.
(3) On the date certain the last US troops leave Iraq and there is a handing-over ceremony.
… For those who don’t believe such a program is feasible, I’ll just note that when I was growing up in England in the late 1950s and the 1960s this kind of thing was happening almost every week as our “empire” got dismantled. It truly ain’t rocket science.
Iraq is lucky that it has hundreds of thousands of very well-trained technicians, administrators, and other professionals who can– in the right political circumstances– set to work to rebuild their country. They did that successfully after the end of 1990-91 Gulf War, even in the difficult situation of ongoing UN sanctions. (The US should contribute some “reparations” payments to help Iraq’s next reconstruction program along, but should absolutely not seek any control over it.)
Can Iraqis reach and sustain the kind of internal political entente that will allow an orderly, negotiated US troops withdrawal to take place? If they are convinced they can truly regain their national sovereignty through a process like that outlined above, there is no reason to believe that they can’t. Unlike the way Iraq is portrayed in most US media, there is still an ongoing process of cross-sectarian politics underway in the country, alongside the many, more widely publicized, episodes of sectarian killing and ethnic cleansing.
The US and the rest of the international community have a strong incentive to allow (or even quietly help) Iraqis to reach such a withdrawal-focused entente. Apart from anything else, the lives of 150,000 US Americans come close to depending on it.

Congress moves toward confronting Bush on the war

So it seems that the Democratic Party leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives have finally “gotten” at least a portion of the antiwar message the voters sent last November?
Yesterday, that renowned control freak (but also, very savvy pol) Nancy Pelosi announced that she has abandoned the plans she’d earlier laid to focus the much-touted “first 100 hours” of the new House’s legislative work completely on some long overdue pieces of domestic legislation. Now, as Jonathan Weisman reports in today’s WaPo, the congress’s new leaders,

    have concluded that Iraq will share top billing, and they plan on aggressively confronting administration officials this week in a series of hearings.
    Pushed by House members who want a quick, tough response to the Iraq strategy President Bush is expected to announce this week, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has backed off from her initial assertion that nothing should detract attention from the legislation she hopes to pass in the first 100 hours of House debate.
    Late last week, she summoned the chairmen of the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, intelligence, Homeland Security, and Oversight and Government Reform committees to plot a series of hearings. On Thursday, Democrats will call Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to defend the war-strategy shift Bush will outline in a nationally televised speech [on Wednesday].
    A House Armed Services Committee hearing with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, planned for Jan. 19 was abruptly moved to this Thursday after consultations with Pelosi. And leadership aides went to work on a response to Bush’s speech that they hope will be delivered on national television after the president’s appearance…
    “Iraq is the elephant in the room,” said Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-Calif.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee and a close ally of Pelosi’s.

Good political antennae there, Ms. Sanchez!
The Senate is also planning Iraq-related hearings this week. The Foreign Relations Committee under new chair Joe Biden will start its hearings Wednesday and will call Rice to testify Thursday. The Armed Services Committee will call Robert Gates in to testify Friday…
Earlier, Democratic leaders had said they would not use the powers they have under the Constitution to cut the funding for the war. But in an interview with CBS talkshow ‘Face the Nation’ yesterday Pelosi made a clear distinction between the funding for the troops that are there now, and those whom Bush is reportedly planning to add to their number in the surge/escalation he is expected to announce on Wednesday.
Pelosi made clear to CBS that she’s not saying a complete ‘No’ to the deployment of the additional troops. But, she said, the President “is going to have to justify [the new deployment] and this is new for him because up until now the Republican Congress has given him a blank check with no oversight, no standards, no conditions.”
Indeed, any degree of real congressional oversight of his war plans is very new for Bush.
There is more caution, however, from Sen. Biden. Over in this WaPo article, Ann Scott Tyson notes that Biden told an NBC talkshow yesterday,

    that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to authorize the war but then cap troop levels or cut funding for specific items. Biden said any troop increase would be “a tragic mistake . . . but as a practical matter, there is no way to say, ‘Mr. President, stop.’ ”

Well, Congress could always think about revisiting the terms of that old, October 2002 war-allowing resolution, built as it was on the whole argument about the threat from (the late) Saddam Hussein’s (non-existent) WMDs… But of course, we have to take into account that Biden is also– as he confirmed there yesterday– definitely planning to run for president in 2008. So it is quite likely that his vanity in that direction and the political timorousness associated with running for prez may get in the way of him going into any principled, forthright confrontation with Bush over the war…
In general, the Democratic leaders of the senate are (a) in a tighter position from the votes viewpoint, and (b) less energized by the antiwar “Spririt of November 2006” than their House colleagues. (Especially since only one-third of the Senators have to go to their home districts and engage fully with the voters in election races in any given election year; though all the members of the House have to do that every time.)
But still, this looks like an epoch-making week ahead in Washington.

Washington’s ‘benchmarks’ for Maliki: Threatening what?

Many voices in the US policymaking elite currently like to couch their discussion of the country’s Iraq policy in terms of establishing firm “benchmarks” for Nouri al-Maliki’s government in Baghdad, with the threat that–
What?
I find this “benchmarks” aspect of the US policy discourse by turns hilariously funny, tragically misguided, or just plain mystifying.
There are two issues here. The first has to do with the US claim that it has any right at all to establish “benchmarks” for what most of these same people (and certainly the ones inside the Bush administration) also claim is the “soveriegn government” of Iraq. Well, many JWN readers may agree with me that the latter claim is quite unfounded– Iraq is still, in fact and under international law, still a territory under foreign military occupation. But it’s kind of interesting to note the contradiction between that and the other claim, anyway? (If truth is the first casualty of war, perhaps logic is the second?)
The second issue is one in pure political realism. Like “benchmarks” in many other contexts, these ones come with an associated threat of some kind of sanctions to back them up. I used to establish “benchmarks”, for example, regarding the school performance of my son when he was still a teenager… along with threat that if he failed to meet them there would be some kind of sanction against him.
But if “PM” Maliki fails to meet the “behcnmarks” being discussed by Washington– what then?
As I see it, the strategic “thinkers” (hollow laugh permitted there) inside the Bush administration may have had two different kinds of sanction in mind. The first, that if Maliki doesn’t dance completely to their tune– by joining the campaign to isolate and suppress the Sadrists, for example– then, fairly evidently, they were planning (and indeed, almost openly threatening) to unseat him.
The original version of that plan relied on building up a credible threat that an alternative player within the Shiites’ broad UIA alliance– SCIRI’s head, Abdul-Aziz Hakim– could build a parliamentary coalition strong enough to outflank the Maliki-Sadr bloc. That plan got stymied by the firm edict that the UIA/Sistani issued on December 23rd, to the effect that the Sadrists were still a full and protected part of the UIA alliance, and that Hakim had better stop playing his dangerous games with the Americans. Hakim apparently bowed to that.
Possibly, the US overlords in Baghdad have plans for other schemes whereby they could mount a credible “unseating”-type threat against Maliki. A coup led by Iyad Allawi, perhaps? (Not very credible, imho: Allawi and which army?) Still, as I said, logic and rational assessment/reasoning are not exactly the hallmarks of this bunch of increasingly tired and desperate rulers in Washington.
But I said there were two possible kinds of sanction with which the Americans might be backing up their demand to Maliki re the “benchmarks.” The other one, which has also been heard from Washington in recent weeks, is of the order of “If you don’t dance to our tune we’ll pack up and leave you and your country to its fate.”
This threat has some credible aspects, and some non-credible aspects (but more, I think, of the latter.)
Credible: that the US citizenry and leadership may indeed be getting very near to the point of deciding to simply “pack up” and leave Iraq; and also, that the situation inside Iraq does indeed currently look quite horrible and may continue to be equally– or even more?– horrible for at least a while after the American troops leave.
Non-credible (as a threat against Maliki, at present): the fact that he actually does want the US troops to leave— and has said this on a number of occasions. So to wield this as a “threat” against him has strong tragico-farcical aspects to it.
Now it’s true that neither Maliki nor, as far as I can figure, any other Iraqi at all wants the US troops to leave in such a way that there is a bloodbath after they leave. And it’s also true that some of the presently reported US plans– such as bringing large units of Kurdish pesh merga down to Baghdad to help with the planned next “clean-up” there– may threaten to do just that.
It is also true both that there is already an extremely lethal cycle of Sunni-Shiite sectarian fighting underway throughout many areas of Greater Baghdad as well as in other areas… and, equally importantly, that this cycle of violence is being fed– from each side– by the irresponsible fear-mongering and incitement of powerful neighboring nations.
So the threat of a massively escalating fitna (that is, complete and perhaps genocidal socio-political breakdown) inside Iraq after a US withdrawal is not entirely an empty one.
But here’s the thing: Such a breakdown inside Iraq will also massively burn the US troops as they attempt to leave the country and is therefore completely against the interests of any any responsible US leader or politician.
I can’t stress that point enough.
If there is a complete fitna inside Iraq, moreover, it will not be limited to there, but will affect the (pro-US) status quo interests throughout the whole region. And though there may be an irresponsible few among the neocons or others who might not be disturbed by the prospect of a broad Sunni-Shiite sectarian war starting to rage across great portions of the Middle East (just as many Americans and other westerners did not mind much– or even were quietly happy– when Iran and Iraq slugged it out in very damaging regular warfare for eight years in the 1980s)… still, to do anything at all that allows such a broad, and always unpredictable, conflagration in the region today would be (a) the height of callousness and cruelty, as well as (b) extremely damaging to the interests of the US citizenry for many decades to come.
Therefore, I cannot imagine that anyone in the US policy discussion would be prepared even to contemplate scenarios that would involve “heating up” the sectarian tensions inside Iraq in the context of a simultaneous attempt to withdraw from it.
As I’ve written many times before, it is in the strong interests of the US citizenry that our leaders choose as quickly as possible the path of a troop withdrawal from Iraq that is speedy, total, orderly (and generous.) Any kind of orderly withdrawal will rely on there being inside Iraq some form of at least minimal intra-Iraqi consensus that will allow this withdrawal to take place. It is therefore in our interests as US citizens to urge our leaders to do all they can to help the Iraqis to build that consensus.
A chaotic withdrawal-under-fire as Iraq burns is in absolutely nobody’s interests at all.
… Which leaves the Bush administration with what as a credible threat to back up any “benchmarks” it lays down for Maliki? Well actually, nothing at all. But here’s the other little-discussed aspect of this whole “benchmarks for Maliki” discussion: Maliki himself is, at this point, just about irrelevant.

Musical (deck-)chairs in Bush’s running of Iraq policy

The Bushists have been leaking news of a fairly large number of upcoming personnel changes, amny of which have to do with the implementation of their Iraq policy. In the BBC‘s account of these, they will be:

    * Adm William Fallon to replace Gen John Abizaid as head of Central Command for Iraq and Afghanistan
    * Lt Gen David Petraeus to take over from Gen George Casey as the leading ground commander in Iraq
    * US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to replace John Bolton as US ambassador to the UN
    * Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to Pakistan, to replace Mr Khalilzad in Baghdad
    [And] On Friday, Mr Bush confirmed he had named retired Vice Admiral and intelligence official Michael McConnell to replace John Negroponte who has been appointed deputy secretary of state.

In addition, Harriet Miers has announced her decision to step down as White House counsel.
To me, the most significant of these is the naming– for the first time ever– of an admiral to head Centcom. This makes it look far more likely that the focus of operations of this gigantic, multi-service “regional command” in the coming weeks and months will be on a strategically sensitive zone in its area of operations that has a large coast-line.
Iran, anyone? Pakistan?
(Or perhaps Fallon’s main job will be to organize the flotilla of small boats needed to execute a Dunkirk-style withdrawal-under-fire from that tiny piece of Shatt-estuary where Iraq debouches into the Gulf? Nah, I don’t think so.)
For some reason Juan Cole, who has never spent much time in Washington, felt moved to pen this breathless appreciation for the “new” personnel:

    These are competent professionals who know what they are doing… I wish these seasoned professionals well. They know what they are getting into, and it is an index of their courage and dedication that they are willing to risk their lives in an effort that the American public has largely written off as a costly failure…

Of course, if Zal Khalilzad is going to be so wonderful at the UN, how come he wasn’t terribly successful inside Iraq? (And another question about Zal. Should we presume he’ll be sworn into his new job on a Koran? What will our IslamophobicRep. Virgil Goode– also, like Zal, a very conservative Republican– have to say about that? Especially since Zal falls into the category to which Goode takes particularly strong exception: Muslim Americans who are also immigrants… )
Oh well, Virgil Goode is really small potatoes in this whole story, I know.
Meanwhile, back to Washington: Dan Froomkin of Washingtonpost.com, who understands the relationships within the nation’s policymaking elite a whole lot better than Juan Cole does, gives Bush’s present round of personnel changes this, rather different reading:

    I see a possible theme: A purge of the unbelievers.
    Harriet Miers, a longtime companion of the president but never a true believer in Vice President Cheney’s views of a nearly unrestrained executive branch, is out as White House counsel — likely to be replaced by someone in the more ferocious model of Cheney chief of staff David S. Addington.
    Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalizad, considered by Cheney to be too soft on the Sunnis, is kicked upstairs to the United Nations, to be replaced by Ryan Crocker, who presumably does not share his squeamishness.
    John Negroponte, not alarmist enough about the Iranian nuclear threat in his role as Director of National Intelligence, is shifted over to the State Department, the Bush administration’s safehouse for the insufficiently neocon. Cheney, who likes to pick his own intelligence, thank you, personally intervenes to get his old friend Mike McConnell to take Negroponte’s job.
    And George Casey and John Abizaid — the generals who so loyally served as cheerleaders for the White House’s “stay the course” approach during the mid-term election campaigns — are jettisoned for having shown a little backbone in their opposition to Cheney and Bush’s politically-motivated insistence on throwing more troops into the Iraqi conflagration.

In my view, having yet another such large round of personnel changes also falls into the meta-narrative of a tired, confused, hacked-out administration desperately shuffling the deck-chairs on the Titanic one more “last” time before– well, before who knows what?
I have recently been working my way through reading Thomas Ricks’s recent book Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Ricks, who’s the WaPo’s chief Pentagon correspondent, goes into searing detail on the incompetence and internal disarray in the Bushists’ handling of every single stage of the Iraq imbroglio. Of course, I’ve read his waPo pieces on many of these incidents before. (He discloses a lot more of his material along the way, in the form of good, straightforward reporting, than Bob Woodward has done for a long time.) But Ricks has also done a good, basic job of pulling all these vignettes together in the book and starting to apply some higher-level analysis to them.
One big theme that comes through the book is how the instability in terms of personnel and entire groups of personnel that marked all aspects of the US administration of Iraq served– and to this day still serves– to compound the mistakes and incompetence displayed by the US national command authorities at the highest level.
On a parallel note, one of the main things that came through my reading of Bob Woodward’s State of Denial was the continuing administrative chaos in just the Washington end of things… To the extent that the various “players” in DC, distrusting each other and everything they were hearing from the field inside Iraq, would have to very frequently either undertake “fact-finding” trips of their own to Iraq, or find a trusted sidekick to do that for them. At times, it seems they were all criss-crossing with each other as they darted in and out of Baghdad airport. And distrusting each other quite a lot, it seemed. Ricks also makes a big point about the debilitating effect of the fragmentation of command at the military level.
… And so it goes on. I have no reason to believe that this latest round of personnel changes will have any great effect on either (a) the content of a policy that still seems to to be in a strong “state of denial” about the depth of the strategic setback the Bushists have already walked into inside Iraq, or (b) the incompetent administration of that policy, relying as it has to a quite unprecedented and extremely counter-productive degree on “market-based approaches”, pure ideology, and recklessness, rather than any model of sound, conservative strategic planning.
Watch for icebergs ahead.