Author: Helena

Ha’Aretz has two interesting articles today on the Palestinian situation. One is an assessment of Abu Mazen’s situation, written by Rob Malley and Hussein Agha. Rob worked on Palestinian-Israeli issues in the Clinton White House and Hussein has been a longtime advisor to the Palestinian leadership. They are both astute and experienced; but of course like everyone else they look at things almost exclusively from their own point of view.
I’ll come back to their article later. First, though, I want to mention this piece, by Arnon Regular, that gives what I judge to be an unrealisticially “optimistic” gloss to the Hamas position paper I wrote about here, a couple of days ago.
Somewhat breathlessly, Regular reports that,

Hamas has distributed a document … in which the organization, for the first time in its existence, unequivocally recognizes the 1967 borders …

Not so fast there!
What the document in question actually expresses, in Article I-6, is this:

Commitment to the goal of dislodging the occupation, and the establishment of an independent, fully soveriegn Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem.

“Dislodging the occupation” is notably not the same thing as “recognizing the 1967 borders”, for two reasons:
Firstly, the meaning of the term “occupation” is not spelled out there. There are plenty of Palestinians who believe that Israel’s entire presence inside its pre-1967 borders constitutes an “occupation”, just as much as its presence in the West Bank and Gaza. (Plus, under international law, certain significant chunks of pre-1967 Israel were not allocated to the Jewish state in the 1947 Partition Plan and are therefore not unequivocally regarded as “Israel’s”.)
For the Hamas leaders to use the term “occupation”, without specifying “occupation of 1967”, leaves the extent of the occupation that they seek to dislodge still ambiguous.
Secondly, regardless of the extent of the “occupation” they seek to dislodge, they are notably not saying that that is the end of their demands. What they say still leaves open the possibility of them having a “two-stage” approach…
I think it’s important to clarify these points. The Hamas document is significant, both for its existence as a first, publicly available clear statement of their current position and proposals, and for a number of points of its actual content. Including (but not limited to) Article I-6. What they say in Art. I-6 certainly leaves open the possibility of them settling for a two-state outcome. And that is new and significant.
But what it does not do, at this point, is commit Hamas to accepting the existence of Israel within its pre-1967 borders, or indeed, any stated borders at all.
I think it’s very important not to over-interpret the advances this document represents. To do so would be to lead to disappointment and accusations of betrayal of trust when, sometime down the pike, Hamas leaders might well say, “Oh no, we never agreed to the existence of Israel inside the 1967 borders.”
It’s also important to read their statement as near as one can to the way they wrote it. These are people for whom the power and impact of every single word is very carefully chosen. One cannot understand them well or deal with them effectively if one does not read what they are saying.
Having said all of which, what they did say was still extremely significant.
And now, to the Agha-Malley article:

Continue reading “Haaretz looking at Palestine”

Hamas did not give Abu Mazen anything of a honeymoon after his electoral win last week, but instead mounted (along with Jihad and the Aqsa Brigades) the operations at the Karnei crossing point, which killed six Israelis, including two truck drivers and four crossing-administrators. Then this week Hamas launched the attack against Shin Bet agents staffing a checkpoint deep inside Gaza, killing one of them.
But still, it seems the tide on both sides of the national divide there in Israel/Palestine is shifting toward the possibility of some de-escalation. Indeed, despite Sharon’s big announcement of a decision last week that he would not open talks with Abu Mazen because of the Karnei attack, tonight there was a meeting at the Erez checkpoint between high-level security delegations from both sides.
Abu Mazen has thus far laid a lot of stress on “cleaning up the internal house” of intra-Palestinian politics. A very wise move indeed, given the (sometimes deadly) internal chaos that had over recent years increasingly become the norm in relations even inside Fateh– and that had actually left Fateh with little time or energy to wage any kind of internal political battle against any other forces inside Palestinian society. (Let alone against Israel.)
Abu Mazen has also laid stress on resolving intra-Palestinian issues through negotiation and other peaceful means, rather than through force– though force is certainly what the Israelis and Americans have been urging him to use against the militant forces inside Palestinian society.
My sense of what’s happening in Palestinian politics right now is that most Palestinians are quite happy to see the schisms emerging inside Israeli society over the issue of the planned withdrawal from Gaza, and are fairly determined not to let similar schisms tear their own already very vulnerable society apart. I have to note that for all the many, many attempts the Israelis have made over the years to cultivate some form of a Buthelezi-like “third force” figure inside Palestinian society, they have never to this day succeeded in that.
(Anyone out there remember the name Mustafa Dudeen? He was the “great white hope” of the Begin administration, circa 1981.) Arafat, for his all his many, many flaws was never prepared to become a Palestinian Quisling– despite all the vitriol that Edward Said launched his way (from the safety and comfort of Edward’s perch at Columbia University). And Abu Mazen certainly is no Quisling, either.
Anyway, Abu Mazen’s first job is to try to fashion some kind of a working administration out of the organizational chaos and anarchy he has inherited from Arafat. According to this piece from occupied Jerusalem in Thursday’s Al-Hayat, Abu Mazen has said that, “the ‘reform file’ for the PA contains four principal headlines, which are the security organs, the administration, the economy, and the judiciary.”
Well, that should all be heard as good news by democracy-lovers all around the world. It might also come as good news for Hamas, which has also– just like Hizbullah in Lebanon– taken increasingly in recent years to promoting its cause under the general banner of “good governance.”
In recent days, Hamas reportedly presented a document to all the other Palestinian factions which was their suggested draft for a “Document of Palestinian Dignity”, which basically lays out ground-rules for how they want the different Palestinian factions to relate to each other.
It’s long on general principles and short on specific details, but one of the really significant things in it is the degree to which it avoids airy-fairy, specifically religious rhetoric or references and the degree to which it really does use the language of general good governance.
Look, for example, at numbers 4, 5, and 6 in the second part of their listing (“internal relations”):

Continue reading “Internal politics in Palestine”