I’ve been thinking that, to really “market” the proposal for a US exit from from Iraq that is total, speedy, and generous, it needs some kind of a snappy name.
I was thinking “Clean Break”…
Oh shucks, was that title already trademarked back in 1996 when Richard Perle, Doug Feith and Co. used it to label the piece of advice they were giving a foreign leader to the effect that he should seek to subvert the long-time committed policy of the US government regarding the Israeli-Arab process, and handily gave this foreign leader “insider advice” on how he could do this?
You may recall that the Perle/Feith “Clean Break” document also urged the foreign leader in question to focus on, ” removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq”…
Well, gosh. That foreign leader (Israel’s Bibi Netanyahu) never did have the guts to do that. But plucky stalwarts Perle, Feith and Co. then managed to get another government to do it for them…
My government, here in the US.
Yes, I definitely think we should appropriate that title– for the policy that we Americans should seek to pursue towards today’s occupation in Iraq.
Author: Helena
A too-weak ‘alternative’?
Carl Conetta, co-director of a small Washington-based
NGO called the “Project on Defense Alternatives” has come out with a six-point
plan
for arriving at what he– somewhat misleadingly– calls a
total US troop withdrawal from Iraq within 400 days. Misleading,
because if you read the fine print in his plan, he is advocating a process
that would involve:
- the US continuing to try to control the internal-Iraqi politics of the
entire “withdrawal” process, and - the US still, after those 14 months, leaving “2,000-3,000 US troops
… in Iraq to participate in multinational military training and monitoring
missions, commanded by NATO and under a three-year UN mandate.”
So I would say that, while Conetta’s proposing of this plan shows that yes,
there is indeed a rising groundswell of opinion in some parts of the US punditocracy
in favor of a withdrawal from Iraq– and Conetta’s sensing of this may well
be what led him to describe his plan as one for a “total” withdrawal–
still, this plan is far too timid and, if I may say, too uncognizant
of regional realities in that part of the Middle East, to be realistic and
achievable.
In fact, Conetta’s plan adds little or nothing to the one laid out in
this July 15 NYT op-ed
by former CIA Director (and MIT professorial brainiac) John Deutch. In
it, Deutch built on the
remarks he’d made
back on June 7 that urged a US withdrawal from Iraq, and told the NYT-reading
public:
Buy a kidney, anyone?
Illegal trade in human organs, including visits from organ-harvesting ‘medical tourists’, emerges in occupied Iraq.
Notes from a busy Sunday
This morning our Quaker Meeting held its regular (generally monthly) “Meeting for Worship with a concern for Business”. Since we don’t have a paid minister, it’s the responsibility of all members of the Meeting community to run all the Meeting’s affairs. So it’s quite a bit of work– but that’s the price we pay so that the spiritual gifts of all of us are equally recognized and valued. I love our way of doing things! (But boy, it was hot in the room this morning, even with all fans whirring like crazy.)
This evening we have the regular (also, generally monthly) business meeting of the C’ville Center for Peace and Justice. Phew! Enough meetings!
Meanwhile, here are a few of the other things I’ve been thinking about:
(1) The terrible current death toll from terror attacks inside Iraq. AFP is reporting today that More than 110 Iraqis were killed and 300 wounded in a three day suicide bombing blitz… That includes the incident in Musayyib where a fuel truck was exploded, though there are differing accounts of whether that was an intended part of the plan or not.
But how can someone culpably idiotic like Dick Cheney claim that the Iraqi insurgency is “in its last throes”?
How can any US leaders credibly claim that they brought “security and freedom” to Iraq’s people?
My first thoughts are for members of the country’s Shiite community, which seems to be the target of this wave of terror attacks. They must be feeling so pained, so vulnerable.
How long can Ayatollah Sistani and others who urge nonviolence continue to restrain the aggrieved from trying to hit back at those they accuse?
Meantime, I’d like to propose that communities around the world that held a 3-minute silence for 50 victims of terror in the UK also stage a silent commemoration for all the victims of violence in Iraq.
You have to know that many of those who were wounded in the attacks in Iraq, whose lives could have been saved if they’d had access to the kinds of medical services available in Iraq before March 2003, ended up dying in July 2005 because of the degradation of the country’s medical system and other public services under the impact of occupation. Perhaps those are the lives that we in the west should mourn the most.
(2) Sir Jeremy Greenstock— who’da thunk it? Remember Greenstock, the tight-lipped professional diplomat who was the UK’s representative at the UN during the lead-up to the US/UK invasion of Iraq, and after that was London’s representative inside occupied Iraq? So it turns out he wants to publish a tell-all memoir about those experiences. Okay, maybe not tell-exactly-all. But at least, tell a whole lot more than Tony Blair’s government currently wants told…
This, from the London Observer:
- Publication of The Costs of War by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK ambassador to the UN during the build-up to the 2003 war and the Prime Minister’s special envoy to Iraq in its aftermath, has been halted. In an extract seen by The Observer, Greenstock describes the American decision to go to war as ‘politically illegitimate’ and says that UN negotiations ‘never rose over the level of awkward diversion for the US administration’. Although he admits that ‘honourable decisions’ were made to remove the threat of Saddam, the opportunities of the post-conflict period were ‘dissipated in poor policy analysis and narrow-minded execution’…
Greenstock is also thought to be scathing about Bremer and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Greenstock’s British publishers, Random House, were remaining tight-lipped but it is thought that the book is almost certain not to be published in the autumn as planned. It was also to be serialised in a British newspaper.
… The Foreign Office last night issued a statement: ‘Civil Service regulations which apply to all members of the diplomatic service require that any retired official must obtain clearance in respect of any publication relating to their service. Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s proposed book is being dealt with under this procedure.’
Oh, censorship– don’t you love it? So much for a commitment to the basics of democracy…
(3) And while we’re on the subject of a not-yet-post-colonial Britain, I wanted to mention that I’ve been hurriedly reading an amazingly good book called Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya. The author, Caroline Elkins, was a doctoral student in the History dept at Harvard, where she evidently found some excellent mentors amongst her teachers. Building on a wide variey of sources, she tells the story of the brutal counter-insurgency campaign the British waged in the 1950s against a nationalist secret organization in Kenya called Mau Mau.
The parallels with the situation in occupied Iraq (and Palestine) today are shockingly numerous, and quite mind-searing.
The testimonies she records– from perpetrators as well as survivors of British colonial violence– are quite disgusting, including a lot more lethal violence than in Iraq or Palestine, as well as a lot of “interrogation” techniques that are just about exactly the same.
At the height of the anti-Mau Mau campaign, the British colonial authorities had moved just about the entire 1.5-million population of Kenya’s Kikuyu community into barbed-wire-fenced detention camps. In a bizarre system called the “pipeline” they were supposed to be moved between these camps according to whether and how much they cooperated with their British captors.
Elkins writes (p.xvi) that,
- Officially, fewer than one hundred Europeans, including settlers, were killed and some eighteen hundred [pro-British] loyalists died at the hands of Mau Mau. In contrast, the British reported that more than eleven thousand Mau Mau were killed in action, though the empirical and demographic evidence I unearthed calls into serious question the validity of this figure. I now believe there was in late colonial Kenya a murderous campaign to eliminate Kikuyu people, a campaign that left tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, dead. Mau Mau has been portrayed as one of the most savage and barbaric uprisings of the twentieth century. But in this book I ask that we reconsider this accepted orthodoxy and examine the crimes perpetrated by colonial forces against Mau Mau, and the conisderable measures that the British colonial government undertook to conceal them.
Among the many parallels with today’s “counter-insurgency situations” in Iraq and Palestine:
(a) The fact that the worst anti-personnel atrocities against Mau Mau suspects (and innocent Kikuyu) were perpetrated by settlers– whether civilians, or those hastily drafted into the colonial army;
(b) The kinds of explanations given by the colonial authorities for the anti-British actions of the Mau Mau– including that they it was “psychopathological in origin”, not political; and that it stemmed from the unique problems the Kikuyu had in “engaging with modernity”, and thus represented some kind of “crisis of modernization” within Kikuyu society.
H’mm. Well if modernization includes British settler colonialism and consigning all the indigenes to gulags, maybe that is justifiably judged “hard to deal with”???
More on Elkins’ great book later, I hope.
(4) I’ve also been reading Swedish writer Sven Lindqvist’s amazing 2000 book, A History of Bombing. It’s a very informative and fairly unconventionally organized book. Here’s a handy little excerpt from the history for 1920:
- Like other colonial powers, the British had already been bombing restless natives in their territories for several years. It began with the Pathans on India’s northwestern border in 1915. It didn’t help much just to destroy their villages. But if their irrigation ditches were bombed, their water supply would be emptied and the topsoil washed away from the terraces. Then they got the message.
The British bombed revolutionaries in Egypt and the rebellious Sultan of Darfur in 1916. In 1917, bombers put down an uprising in Mashud, on India’s border with Afghanistan. During the third Afghan war in 1919, Dacca, Jalalabad, and Kabul were bombed by a British squadron chief named Arthus Harris. In his memoirs he writes that the war was won by a single strike with a ten-kilo bomb on the Afghani king’s palace. Harris would spend the rest of his life trying to repeat that strike. [He was the one who organized the fire-bombing of Dresden in WW2.]
That same year, the Egyptians demanded independence, and the RAF sent in three squadrons of bombers to control the rebellious masses. In 1920, Enzeli in Iran was bombed in an attempt to create a British puppet state, and in Trans-Jordan the British put down an uprising with bombs that killed 200.
This kind of thing was, only ten years after the first [aerial] bomb, already routine. But in Iraq the assignment was different. It was called ‘control without occupation.’ The RAF and its bombers were assigned to replace completely fifty-one battalions of soldiers, which was what the army had needed to control a country that, during the First World War, had freed itself from centuries of Turkish rule and now refused to accept the British as their new masters…
The first report from Baghdad describes an air raid that causes wild confusion among the natives and their families. “Many of them jumped into a lake, making a good target for the machine guns.”
Churchill wanted to be spared such reports…
Plus ca change plus c’est la meme chose, don’t you think?
Iraqi constitution as US drawdown pretext?
Back in the 1990s, the rushed holding of an “election” was, in several recently strife-torn countries, used as a prime exit strategy for those other nations that were eager to withdraw their peacekeepers…
In the lead-up to last January’s election in Iraq, I spelled out a few scenarios for how those elections could be used as part of a strategy for a speedy US withdrawal. The Bush administration notably failed to take that opportunity.
Then, I started thinking they were seeking to rush the Constitution-writing exercise in Iraq through with very unseemly (and in the medium-term, counter-productive) speed … with a view to using the adoption of this hastily scrawled text as their pretext for — well, if not a total exit (though that would indeed be nice, wouldn’t it?)– but at least, a significant drawdown in the US troop levels.
I wrote about the dangers of rushing the Constitution-writing project back in April, in a column in the CSM. I guess it took some other people a bit more time to see the same point. Yesterday, someone called “J Alexander Thier, director of the Project on Failed States at Stanford University” wrote an op-ed along similar lines in the NYT.
I have been thinking quite a bit more, recently, about the instructive precedent of the peace agreement “signed” between Israel and Lebanon back on May 17, 1983. That too was a political document imposed on a puppet government (in Lebanon) that had been installed by an occupying power (Israel). That agreement, too, was meant to form one of the major “political” gains that the occupying power was able to win at the end of an aggressive war of choice that had culminated in a broad occupation of the target country by the aggressor.
The May 17 agreement sketched out the terms of a “final peace agreement” between Israel and Lebanon that would have given Israel considerable control over security affairs in south Lebanon… (As such, it also contradicted the terms of the major extant UN Security Council resolution on the subject of Lebanpn, which called for an immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the whole country.)
The May 17 agreement notably did not represent the considered will of the Lebanese people, and turned out not to be worth the paper it was written on. Indeed, during the latter months of 1983, as the political tides within Lebanese society turned against the Israelis, the May 17 agreement increasingly became identified as the major obstacle to the country attaining some form of internal political accord; and in I think February 1984, President Amin Gemayyel simply abrogated it.
The same could oh, so easily happen to any Iraqi “Constitution” that is judged by the Iraqi people to have been forced down their throats by an occupying force… So why bother?
I should note here, that if the US intention is to use the Constitution-writing project as a “pretext” for a total and speedy withdrawal of US forces from the country, then I could stomach it. (Though again, why bother? Why not just do the withdrawal, and fast?) If, however, the Constitution-dictation– oops, sorry, constitution-“writing– project is being used as a ploy by the Americans to continue to exacerbate intra-Iraqi differences, then it is a very dangerous project that should be halted immediately.
Also, of course, under the Geneva Conventions, the occupying power is not supposed to change the major mechanisms of governance inside the occupied country, at all…
Back in April, I wrote:
Continue reading “Iraqi constitution as US drawdown pretext?”
Hiroshima + 60, part 3
This afternoon, I watched the DVD of the 3-hour Canadian-Japanese movie, Hiroshima. I was previewing it to see if our local peace group, the Charlottesville Center for Peace and Justice, could use it as part of our observances of the upcoming 60th anniversary of the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
I definitely think we can use it. It’s beautifully made, with what looks like a fairly meticulous eye to historical accuracy. Mainly, it tells the story of why Truman and Co. ended up making the decisions they did on dropping the bombs. It has good re-enactments of vital meetings and events on both the US and the Japanese sides, mixed in with contemporary newsreel footage. The actors who play Truman, Churchill, Stimson, etc all look reasonably like their subjects. I imagine the actors on the Japanese side do, too? The actors who play the Japanese leaders are Japanese, and speak in Japanese. In our edition, the DVD has English subtitles for the Japanese scenes. (I imagine there may be a Japanese-language edition with subtitles in the English-language scenes?)
Five years ago, Bill and Lorna and I went to Japan, and we spent a couple of days in Hiroshima. Nowadays it is once again a bustling city. It’s very modern, with many high-rises. When I was first there, it felt almost unreal. Had I expected it all to stay steeped in black-and-white and charred forever?
We were very warmly shepherded around by a woman in her early 60s who was a hibakusha (bomb survivor.) I should dig out my notes from that trip… I remember the green expanses of the Peace Park in the center of town; the very instructive and somber displays in the peace museum; the schoolkids all flocking to the memorials; the memorial to the Korean indentured/slave laborers who had been working in the city at the time and were incinerated along with nearly everyone else; the stonrg commitment the city authorities have today to campaigning in total opposition to nuclear weapons.
… So here in Charlottesville, Virginia, every year CCPJ does something on the Saturday nearest August 6th to raise awareness about nuclear weapons. This year, August 6 actually is on the Saturday. We had a little planning meeting today to firm up some of our plans for this year’s events.
Earlier this week I made an informational brochure to use in our organizing for this. I just thought: Hey, I could upload it onto the blog– then if any of you wants to use it (adapted) for anything you’re doing in your communities– why go ahead and do so. Attribution to CCPJ- Charlottesville, VA, please.
Here it is. It’s a Word-for-Windows file, formatted to make a two-sided trifold brochure on US letter-size paper. If you think you could use it in your own locality, let us know!
Faiza’s son, Bastille Day
Faiza’s son Khalid has been arrested in Baghdad.
His brother Raed wrote today,
- If your child or sibling vanishes for two days then calls from the secret service jail in any other place on earth, that would be considered a disaster and a violation of human rights
CSM column on NZ
The column I wrote earlier this week on New Zealand is in today’s Christian Science Monitor. They cut it pretty drastically and I see now there’s a little bit of infelicitous copy-editing in there. Basically, though, the editors did a pretty good job.
It probably wasn’t fair to cram into just the one small column all I had to say about the country. I wish I’d laid out and explored the reasons’s for the country’s general trend toward non-belligerency and a respect for “fairness” quite a bit more. Also, I didn’t even mention the upcoming elections and the things some of my NZ friends said about the roots of the dissatsifaction with PM Helen Clark.
Well, that’s all the things I didn’t say in the piece. You can go read it and comment on the things I did say.
Dougie admitting doubts now?
Douglas Feith, a longtime pro-Likud mole inside successive US administrations and one of the small coterie of neocons near the top of the Rumsfeld Pentagon who worked tirelessly to push the US into invading Iraq… is now admitting some doubts about aspects of the planning and conduct of the war???
This, after 1,758 members of the US military and scores of thousands of Iraqis have lost their lives, and millions more have had their lives irreparably blighted, because of the invasion…
Feith, who will soon be leaving his position as Under-Secretary of Defense of Policy, had this to say about the invasion of Iraq, according to that article by WaPo reporter Ann Scott Tyson:
- “I am not asserting to you that I know that the answer is, we did it right. What I am saying is it’s an extremely complex judgment to know whether the course that we chose with its pros and cons was more sensible.”
… He said mistaken actions and policies in Iraq resulted in frequent “course corrections,” pointing to two that he considered significant.
He identified these “mistaken actions and policies” as:
- (1) not giving military training to enough Iraqi exiles before the invasion was launched (for which he appeared to blame the generals of U.S. Centcom), and
(2) the reluctance among some U.S. officials to transfer power early on to an Iraqi government and dismantle the U.S. occupation authority, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.
Oh, how very handy to be able to blame the generals and the now-ousted Paul Bremer… Rather than, for example, the extremely immoral decision to launch the invasion at all– let alone, to launch it almost completely unilaterally, and according to Rumsfeld’s stealth-induced and extremely rushed timetable…
Tyson apparently asked Feith explicitly about the question of the troop levels at the time of entering Iraq. She got this response:
- On troop levels in Iraq, Feith said U.S. military commanders — not the Pentagon — determined the flow of and number of forces into the country. “I don’t believe there was a single case where the commander asked for forces and didn’t get them . . . the commander controlled the forces in the theater,” he said.
Senior U.S. Army officers dispute this view, saying the Pentagon cut off the planned influx of nine division-equivalents into Iraq in the war’s initial phase.
I wonder whether she got around to asking him the really big question: From the vantage point of today, do you still think that the decision to launch the war against Iraq was the right one?
I think I can guess Feith’s answer. (“Yes.”) But I wish we had his response to that question on the record.
So, shortly this extremely ideological, racist, and militarist man will be leaving the upper echelons of the US government payroll and returning to the private sector. Maybe he’ll go back to the same law firm he was a partner in before, along with the Israeli settler and lawyer Marc Zell? I’m sure they could organize some nice land-sale deals for good clients in the occupied West Bank.
(Oh, make that good Jewish clients, since those are the only people allowed to undertake real-estate projects under the present “Jews-only” land-grab system in the West Bank.)
But what about Iraq meanwhile? Tyson’s article ends with this about Feith:
- He declined to comment on a possible timetable for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
Drawdown in Iraq: background and present priorities
There’s an excellent piece in today’s NYT about the intense manpower crunch the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have come up against, as more and more Reserve and National Guard troops reach the (fairly firm) 24-month cap on deployment that the Bush administration has reaffirmed more than once.
Obviously, softening this cap, like moving toward a draft, would be a very politically costly move for the Prez.
The article, by Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, quotes Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a retired four-star Army commander who was dispatched to Iraq last month to assess the operation there, as saying:
- By next fall, we’ll have expended our ability to use National Guard brigades as one of the principal forces… We’re reaching the bottom of the barrel.
By “next fall”, I take it he means fall 2005.
Obviously, it is this manpower crunch (and just possibly also a concern for the federal budget deficit??) that is driving the serious move inside the Pentagon toward formulating a plan for the radical drawdown of US troop numbers in Iraq. As revealed in the leaked British memo discussed here yesterday.
Here in the United States, we still have to see how the Bush administration is going to package this ‘radical deployment’ of US troops inside Iraq, so it might appear that the Prez is not currently lording it over a still unfolding, major strategic setback in that country.
(Though in truth, he is.)
My guess: they’re going to rush Jaafari and Co toward making some phony announcement about having reached agreement on a “Constitution” in mid-August, and then use that as the drawdown pretext. At this point, the folks in the Pentagon and White House probably care little about either the content of this “Constitution” or whether it even holds up for more than a few months– so long as it allows them to declare “victory”, and undertake their large-scale– but still notably incomplete— drawdown of forces…
The NYT piece notes, quite rightly, that the approaching train-wreck (ouch, sorry, probably a bad metaphor these days but I can’t think of a better one) of the arrival of so many scores of thousands of 24-month deployment caps is not news, but has been calmly and clearly predicted by military manpower-watchers for some time now:
- There have been warning signs of the looming shortages. In the last several months, the chief of the Army Reserve, Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, has repeatedly cautioned that the Reserve was “rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.” General Helmly declined through a spokesman to comment for this article.
Certainly, the folks over at Today in Iraq have been tracking this issue closely for some time. I have tried to when I could. And on June 19, I took very seriously this report from the excellently informed NYT correspondent John F. Burns:
- whether there are too many American soldiers or too few, a feeling is growing among senior officers in Baghdad and Washington that it is only a matter of time before the Pentagon sets a timetable of its own for withdrawal…
“I think the drawdown will occur next year, whether the Iraqi security forces are ready or not,” a senior Marine officer in Washington said last week. “Look for covering phrases like ‘We need to start letting the Iraqis stand on their own feet, and that isn’t going to happen until we start drawing down’. ”
Maybe other folks who comment on the situation on Iraq should also pay closer attention to solid matters of manpower availability and other aspects of logistics?
I’m thinking in particular of those two much-published and well-paid MSM commentators Tom Friedman and Ken Pollack…
Continue reading “Drawdown in Iraq: background and present priorities”