I come back to the US and to analyst/blogger mode after my great break in Spain, and find many signs of escalating tensions on the world scene. It’s hard to know where to start…
* The horrible recent bombing in Pakistan, presaging the strong probability of continued political deterioration there?
* News of continued security deterioration in Afghanistan?
* The sharp rise in tensions between Turkey and northern Iraq?
… And it is at this point that Vice-President Cheney chooses to up the rhetorical ante against Iran??
His recklessness is almost unbelievable.
In remarks delivered yesterday at the annual conference of the AIPAC-sired “Washington Institute for Near East Policy” (WINEP), Cheney promised “serious consequences” if Iran doesn’t abandon its present nuclear policy (which the Iranians have said is aimed only at enriching uranium to power-generation olevels, not the much higher levels required for nuclear weapons.) He also warned that:
“The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose serious consequences…The United States joins other nations in sending a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.”
Many people have already noted that this language is almost exactly the same as the tension-raising rhetoric that Cheney and Bush both used in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq.
Just days before Cheney’s speech, Bush himself had warned in a press appearance that Teheran’s achievement of even the knowledge of how to make a nuclear bomb could lead to World War 3. (This seemed like a silly threat, since the knowledge as such is widely available on the internet.) Bush later tried to deny he had been raising the tensions there… But then Cheney chimed in with his Sunday statement.
For many months now, people have been speculating about the chances of the Bush administration launching an attack (or permitting Israel to launch an attack) on Iran.
Until recently, I have remained fairly sanguine on this score, considering the probability to be considerably less than 50%– say, about 30% (max.)
On Sunday, I think the probability went up. So today, I have produced a little graph to illustrate what I think has happened:

The reason that, despite Cheney’s alarmist rhetoric, I still haven’t raised the number above 50% is because this time, unlike in late 2002, we no longer have Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. I have a lot more confidence in the good (realist) sense of Bob Gates than I ever did in Rumsfeld.
I have the strong impression that Cheney is once again now, as in 2002, trying to “corner” the President into seeing “no alternative” but to launch the military attack that, apparently, Cheney seems to strongly favor. (On Iran this time, as on Iraq five years ago.) He may well be doing this at this point by claiming to the president that the rhetorical escalation is an essential part of the “coercive diplomacy” required to force the Iranians to back down on the nuclear issue. My judgment is, however, that this will not force the Iranians to back down, for a number of reasons– and also, that Cheney most likely shares this assessment. So then, Cheney could hope that two things may happen: (1) The Iranians in their turn would also up the rhetorical ante, or even the policy ante, by one or more further notches in response to the braggadocio from Washington, thus (in Cheney’s view) even further “proving” their irrationality and the danger this poses, both to Bush and to the US public, and (2) Bush would also find it harder to bring his administration down the tree of escalation that Cheney has been assiduously pushing it up into…
And thus would Cheney “corner” his man.
Back in late 2002, we can certainly nowadays discern a very similar cornering effect at the level of escalating the accusations and the hate-rhetoric against Saddam. But there was also another form of cornering going on: that from the military preparations that Rumsfeld was assiduously masterminding from over in the Pentagon. By February of 2003, Rumsfeld had in place (or, well on the way to the battleground) just about all the forces he thought he needed for the assault on Iraq. Keeping armies of such a size in the field is an expensive undertaking. In the recent El Pais account of the conversation between Bush and Aznar on the eve of the war, you certainly heard Bush talking about the “need” to use the invasion force soon.
(But oh! From today’s perspective we can see how very, very much cheaper and better it would have been for everyone all round if he had never launched them into battle that March, but merely kept them hanging around while the diplomacy continued its course… )
This time, though, I feel fairly sure that Gates is not playing the same game as Cheney. At this point, I think of Condi and Hadley both as being empty ciphers on this issue. Maybe I’m wrong.
So the months ahead will be really momentous ones.
Unfortunately, the dynamics of a US election year can too often be dynamics that favor belligerency and the braggadocio that leads to it. And I feel no confidence at all that, on the issue of Iran, the Democrats will be any cooler and saner than the administration.
I wish the “international community” had a few effective adults in it– leaders who could step in and persuasively explain to Pres. Bush just how crazy it would be to attack Iran. (They could also explain how crazy and destabilizing the present rhetorical escalations already are.) I don’t, however, see any such adults from outside the US playing any effective role in this direction.
I guess we, the US citizenry, are just going to have to be our own adults, and exert whatever pressures we can to rein in this escalation and take our country back to a saner path.
Anyway, from now on, I’m going to try to keep my little “Probability of Attack on Iran Counter” updated, at least once a month. I have the cut-off date for it, as of now, at Inauguration Day 2009. There may well be some periods of particular sensitivity along the way between now and then– determined by the political calendar…. I’m also trying to imagine which way the political pressures may push Bush in that strange twilight period after the election… In the past, in those uber-lame-duck nine weeks, presidents have done a number of surprising, and not always belligerent, things.
(Also, of course, January 20, 2009 will not necessarily see the sudden arrival of realism and sanity in the White House… )