Wiklileaks, Egypt

Is here. H/T Adam Horowitz.
I hope some JWN readers have time to peruse and post highlights (with links) in the comments section here? Sadly, I don’t. Got a publishing business to run…

One thought on “Wiklileaks, Egypt”

  1. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/199866 talks about the military quid-pro-quo’s between the USA and Egypt:
    “– (S/NF) Egypt continues to improve efforts to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, but a decision by Field Marshal Tantawi to delay a counter tunneling project threatens progress.”
    “4. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as
    “untouchable compensation” for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S. military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. We believe, however, that our relationship can accomplish much more. Over the last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared strategic objectives to address current and emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited success.”
    http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09CAIRO1468.html discusses the Army’s massive and (they hope) lasting political and corporate power. The army was willing to accept Gamal Mubarak as figurehead, but fears religious political parties.
    “Dessouki is an NDP insider who has held a
    number of key positions. His assurances that the Egyptian
    military and security services would ensure a smooth
    succession to a civilian (by implication Gamal Mubarak) were
    unusually straightforward and blunt. The idea that the
    military remains a key political and economic force is
    conventional wisdom here. However, other observers tell us
    that the military has grown less influential, more fractured
    and its leadership weaker in recent years (reftel). They
    suggest that in a succession scenario in which President
    Mubarak is no longer present, outcomes are less predictable.

    Dr. Dessouki’s most important message, he said was to
    always keep in mind that “the real center of power in Egypt
    is the military,” a reference he said included all security
    forces. Dessouki noted that while the military did not
    intervene directly in matters of day to day governance, it
    leaders were determined to maintain order and that the
    importance of a “legal transition” should not be
    underestimated. Dessouki did acknowledge that the military
    is concerned about maintaining its “corporate interests,” but
    was emphatic in his declaration of their commitment to a
    “constitutional” transition of power. ”
    Famous last words?:
    “ΒΆ5. (S) Dessouki acknowledged there would be some violence
    around the upcoming 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential
    elections, but suggested security forces would be able to
    keep it under control. Widespread politically-motivated
    unrest, he said, was not likely because it was not part of
    the “Egyptian mentality.” Threats to daily survival, not
    politics, were the only thing to bring Egyptians to the
    streets en masse.”
    MB = evil, sez NDP:
    ” Dessouki warned that because Egyptians are very
    religious people, politics and religion is a volatile mix.
    In a more strident tone, Dessouki went on to say that he, and
    President Mubarak, “would not tolerate” the existence of
    political parties with a religious agenda whether Muslim or
    Christian and suggested that there was no such thing as a
    “moderate Islamist.” ”

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