… You can find it here, and archived here.
I know I haven’t written much about Iraq recently. So I really welcomed the opportunity to do so today.
I also think I need to write more about the US’s disastrous war in Afghanistan– though I don’t think that will fit into the arrangement I have with IPS, which is limited to the Middle East.
For this one, given that I was up against a deadline that turned out to be more brutal than I’d expected, I was really glad to be able to quote some from our longtime JWN friend Reidar Visser’s very relevant and timely analysis of Iraqis’ fears of muhasasa. I translated that (after a quick consultation with Hans Wehr) as “apportionment”– and in the IPS piece I said it seemed very similar to the “confessional” system (ta’ifiyyeh) in Lebanon.
Of course, in the IPS piece there were many aspects of the Iraq story that I had no room to include. I should probably come back and write more about it in the months ahead than I have done recently.
12 thoughts on “IPS piece on Biden and Iraq”
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The Lebanese confessional systen is nothing like Iraq’s electoral system. In Lebanon the seats are divvied up according to PRE-SET sectarian quotas. You of all people should know this, Helena.
In contrast, Iraq has an electoral system based on proportional representation virtually identical to Reidar’s home country of Norway.
As in Norway, the PR system virtually ensures governments have to be formed from coalitions. Each coalition partner shares in the ministries. This is not pre-set quotas.
In Norway, after an election, the party with the plurality of seats gets to nominate the Prime Minister and Cabinet. This is exactly what happens in Iraq.
The allocation of ministries is negotiated between the parties in the coalition. This too is exactly what happens in Iraq.
Currently, in Norway, the Labour party governs in a coalition with the Socialist Left and the Center Party. Labour has 50% of the seats in the Cabinet, Socialist Left 30% and the Center Party 20%. In Iraq, the coalition is made up of the major shia, kurdish and sunni parties – and reflect the choice (!) of the voters at the election in Dec 05 not any preset quotas or gerrymanders!
There is no mystery about the processes in Norway and Iraq if one understands how PR systems work. Helena, with a British and US background instead of European obviously doesn’t understand how PR works. It’s more curious that Reidar Visser doesn’t care to acknowledge the identical systems in both countries.
The current configuration in the government of Iraq, as in Norway, simply reflects the proportional results of the vote – not a preset formula. Iraqi elections of course are overseen by international monitors.
btw I’d be interested to know two things:
does the Norwegian constitution gives the same powers to its legislative body to constrain executive power to the extent that the Iraqi constitution empowers its legislative body??.
And do the minor parties in the Norwegian government get to choose their own ministers?
Yes, I had to look up ‘muhasasa’ too.
I thought too that Visser’s analysis was pretty good, though not perhaps quite in the way you took it, Helena. What Visser is saying, to my mind, is that the internal conflict in Iraq is morphing back from a sectarian free-for-all into a contest between the KRG and the rest, represented by Baghdad. Quite reminiscent of Saddam’s times. The conflicts of the occupation years are disappearing (the US can do nothing about it) and leaving the KRG as the outstanding issue.
When Biden said he wants to bring Iraqis together into dialogue, what he really meant is that he has been asked by the KRG to intervene on their behalf. Remember there is a KRG representative in Washington now, and, surprise, surprise, it’s Talebani’s son, Qubad.
The KRG absolutely does not want the US to withdraw in 2011. I’ve read remarks that Qubad has been lobbying for the US to take the position of not withdrawing in case of turmoil in Iraq.
And then, funnily enough, there’s the campaign of bombing in Baghdad and elsewhere, before the “withdrawal from the cities” on June 30. In spite of the traditional attribution to al-Qa’ida, the only ones I could see who might profit are indeed the KRG, as the US rebels against withdrawal seem to have been slapped down by Obama.
So it looks like the KRG is on the one hand petitioning the US to intervene, and on the other hand creating the turmoil themselves.
The picture is not fully clear yet, I would be the first to admit it. But I am pretty certain that these are the right lines, and things will develop.
Of course, the implication is that the KRG is very worried about the future. They are right to be. The US is going to withdraw, and the Kurdish position has not been stabilised. That is what Biden is supposed to do, get for the Kurds what Maliki is not willing to give.
BB, with all due respect, this is not about electoral systems at all but about institutionalised and de facto power-sharing within the executive. Iraq has tendencies of this, in that for the first parliamentary cycle a tripartite presidency (one president, two vice-presidents) expected to represent Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds must be elected on a single list with a two thirds majority before the process of forming a government gets going. Of course, we have nothing of the kind in Norway, rather we have a tradition for minimal-winning or even minority cabinets – almost never oversized ones of the kind associated with consociational democracy.
At any rate, what Helena and I was referring to was fear among Iraqis about further steps towards explicit muhasasa or quota-sharing as the possible consequence of “assistance” by the United States towards some kind of grand compromise as per Biden’s ideas – and that at a time when the Iraqis themselves, both Shiites and Sunnis, seem more interested in moving towards a majoritarian form of democracy in which sectarian differences can fade into the background instead. The contradictions between what Iraqis are doing and what Americans are thinking can be seen clearly from an AP report of today’s date. Supposing it faithfully reflects the stance of US policy-makers, it is very alarming indeed. It reads, “U.S. officials have faulted Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, for not taking advantage of the dramatic reduction in violence over the last two years to bring Iraq’s rival ethnic and religious groups together. They fear the lack of an enduring, power-sharing formula raises the specter of a return to the brutal sectarian bloodshed of 2006 and 2007.”
It is extremely worrisome that US policy-makers do not seem to understand that it is precisely the creation of an “enduring, power-sharing formula” that would be seen by Iraqis as the ultimate destruction of their country. The Iraqis want less formal sectarianism, not more! They speak of the Lebanon model as a disaster, and, after all, perhaps we should remember that the Lebanese, too, have a declared goal in the Taef agreement of abolishing sectarian power-sharing. Advocates of consociational democracy simply need to understand that ethno-sectarian quotas are not seen as desirable in all parts of the world, and that to encourage or even impose them where they are uncalled for may backfire severely.
At the very time that we in South Africa were doing away with apartheid, the USA was promoting ethnic-based politics in Ethiopia, balkanising the Balkans, and sectarianising the Caucasus and Central Asia. In Rwanda, the Belgian and previously German colonial policy of the same kind was working itself out in a tragic way. In Kenya at the time of independence, the British promoted something called “majimbo” meaning regionalism. That’s nearly half a century ago.
This is a monotonous divide-and-rule strategy that the Imperialists are pushing all the time. It’s so old and stale and obvious.
Reidar: “but about institutionalised and de facto power-sharing within the executive. Iraq has tendencies of this, in that for the first parliamentary cycle a tripartite presidency (one president, two vice-presidents) expected to represent Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds must be elected on a single list with a two thirds majority before the process of forming a government gets going. Of course, we have nothing of the kind in Norway, rather we have a tradition for minimal-winning or even minority cabinets – almost never oversized ones of the kind associated with consociational democracy.”
Norway is a constitutional monarchy. Its head of state is not elected at all. As you point out the tripartite presidency requires a two thirds majority vote of the Parliament. The current arrangements reflect the comparative strengths of the shia, kurdish and arab sunni parties in the parliament which are the direct result of the national PR vote by the Iraqi electorate, not pre set sectarian quotas. Who knows, the Iraqi electorate may change the equation next time?
I would suggest that the tradition of minority governments in Norway reflects the local political conditions in that country, just as the current Iraqi government reflects local conditions there. The point is, what they have in common is a national list PR system of voting, which produces coalitions, not “winner take all”.
“explicit muhasasa or quota-sharing”
I do empathise with your Biden fears. But the fact is, is it not, that the only muhasasa being demanded in Iraq at the moment is in Tamin province? Where the Sunni Arabs and Turkmen are demanding explicit ethnic quotas because of their calculation that the Kurds would win a substantial majority of the vote in that province and would continue to govern it in their own right?
It seems that in Iraq the muhasasa good-or-bad debate depends very much on the eye and self interest of the beholder?
btw – this is in passing, but it is not clearly understood that the coalition parties governing Iraq are in themselves coalitions of a multiplicity of political parties and groupings.
Along with the huge number of candidates who stood for the provincial elections this is surely testimony to the vibrancy of the political debate in Iraq enabled by their constitution?
Riders,
And that at a time when the Iraqis themselves, both Shiites and Sunnis, seem more interested in moving towards a majoritarian form of democracy in which sectarian differences can fade into the background
Riders, I hope what you stated will be happens.
What we saw and seen today US brought individuals/ radical groups who have their own agenda which far from the majority Iraqis lived as one nation despite from time to time before some political interference inside Iraq caused some problem not reaching to vast ethnic cleansing.
Iraqi stayed close each other, proved after 2003 invasion and occupation Sunni Shits fights occupiers in same strength for few years after invasion.
Then it took more than TWO years to ignited civil/ethnics clashes which most Iraq if you asked will tells you its from Outside interference and support.
Anyway these US political groups who emerged after 2003 in Iraq for so long have claimed the suffering of Shits in Iraq they come to the moment of truth. they have failed miserably and uncovered their ugly faces in fact they are not better that tyrant regime in matter of killing or corruptions they far more corrupted that tyrant regime if you compare tyrant 35 years and how money theft by him not the money that lost and wasted on tyrant stupid wars.
What should be the institution free from any quota of any ethnic flavours?
We had very good example live still not sorted due to this evil clues in the constitution set by invader, the example is Lebanon, ethnic eruptions raised from time to time and never fading.
Obama Denies ‘Green Light’ for Israeli Attack on Iran
“I think Vice President Biden stated a categorical fact which is we can’t dictate to other countries what their security interests are,” Obama said in Moscow. “What is also true is that it is the policy of the United States to try to resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear capabilities in a peaceful way through diplomatic channels.”
“We can’t dictate to other countries what their security interests are… only Israel can do that. Israel has been dictating what “our” security interests are to us for forty years.. and you can rest assured that Israel will continue to do so under my administration. It is the policy of the United States to try to resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear capabilities in a peaceful way through diplomatic channels… and not to stand in the way of a pre-emptive Israel attack once we’ve failed.”
“I as the commander in chief preserve the right to take whatever actions are necessary to protect the United States. But we are committed to a peaceful resolution to this conflict and I think it is still possible, but ultimately if we present an opportunity to the Iranians at some point, they’ve got to seize that opportunity,” he said.
“I as the commander in chief preserve the right to take whatever actions are necessary to protect the United States after Israel does begin the war with Iran, but we are committed to a peaceful resolution to this conflict and I think it is still possible, but ultimately if we present an opportunity to the Iranians at some point, they’ve got to roll over or suffer the consequences.”
The ethics of contribution
More excellent entertainment from bb – thanks, bb, for always being good for a laugh.
BB, I have to say that Norway’s status as a constitutional monarchy also seems quite irrelevant in this comparison, given that the monarch in Norway has a purely ceremonial role. He does not interfere with legislation or affect the formation of governments. Conversely, in Iraq no government can be formed before there is a two thirds parliamentary agreement on a tripartite presidency, and the presidency is frequently used in attempts to strike down legislation. In the classification of democracies we need to move beyond the simplistic dichotomy of elections systems (PR/winner-takes-all) to a multi-variable analysis that also includes other aspects of government formation, as for example Arend Lijphart has done. In his analysis of the spectrum from majoritarian to consensual democracies, Norway has an intermediate position on the scale. On the other hand, Iraq of 2005, had it formed part of the analysis, would have been at the extreme end of the scale, as some kind of hyper-consensual democracy. It is almost impossible for the government to do anything without the consent of the leaders of the biggest blocs behind the two-thirds presidency majority. And here is the main point: As they are discovering the weaknesses of their own system, Iraqis are trying to move beyond consociationalism – the whole atmosphere of the January 20089 local elections campaign testified to this – Biden, on the other hand, is suggesting they should freeze it.
With regard to Kirkuk/Tamim the stance of the nationalist parties and their resort to a quota logic of their own may look paradoxical at first. Often this is explained as an attempt to challenge the Kurds using the Kurds’ own favourite weapon. More important, I think, is the fact that these are essentially temporary measures designed to rescue the Iraqiness of Kirkuk at a time when the city is facing strong challenges by Kurdish annexation schemes. It is also noteworthy that these quotas are ethnic ones and not sectarian ones (for “Arabs”, not for “Sunnis”); I think the latter would still have been unthinkable except for the micro-minorities (i.e. Christians who have had quota representation since Ottoman times in accordance with the “millet” logic). After all, most Iraqi nationalists would be happy to see a special status for Kurdistan, I think it is the extension of the muhasasa logic to the sectarian sphere that above all causes them to object to Biden.
Thanks R for your interesting and as usual informed thought provoking response. I have a couple of observations/questions.
Lijphart came down very much in favour of cosociationalism and consensus democracy as opposed to majoritarian democracries? I would think this would coincide with your and Helena’s sentiments, as it does with mine.
Going to my understanding of the “veto” powers of the tripartite presidency, isn’t it the case that if the parliament amends or initiates legislation it goes to the presidency and any one of the presidents can veto it? Then after a set period of time the legislation must be returned to the parliament but this time requires a two thirds majority to pass?
“Hyper consensual”? Well, maybe, or maybe that is a henny penny exaggeration. But how often has it happened, R? How many times has the presidency used its veto powers? Hasn’t it been almost invariably the case that disputes between parliament and the executive have been solved by further negotiation and compromise, not by the processes of presidential veto?
Sure the complaint can be made that all this is time consuming and “is almost impossible for the government to do anything without the consent of the leaders of the biggest blocs behind the two-thirds presidency majority” but that is true of all countries who have governing coalitions, is it not? And the stronger and the more vigorous political debate as you have in Iraq the more time consuming it is. In my view, there would be substance to the complaints if there were a pre-set quota system/gerrymander as in Lebanon. But (as in my earlier point) the present configuration of the tripartite presidency simply reflects the relative strengths of the three major party blocs – as voted for by the Iraqi electorate on PR lines. As the result Iraq adpting cosociational/ consensus democracy.
Perhaps the Iraqis would prefer a majoritarian system? Unless the PR system were abolished, this could only happen if the Kurdistan quit Iraq. In which case the shia parties would have a perpetual majority, perhaps even veto-proof.
Re Tamin – in saying pre-set ethnic quotas might be “temporary” how do you think it could ultimately be resolved, then? I just can’t see why the Kurds would ever agree to the electoral arrangements for Tamin province being treated differently to the rest of Iraq just because they have a clear and probably growing majority there?
Still maybe they’ll offer a trade off in return for pre-set quotas in Ninewa, heh, heh? That’d the argument going for another 4 years!
Two pretty momentous uses of the veto come to mind. First, March 2008 and the provincial powers law. The Kurds and ISCI objected to the idea of a timeline for local elections and used the presidential veto. They simply wanted to hold on to the power they gained in 2005, and when challenged by a parliamentary majority used the presidential veto instead. Some claim they only reversed it after Dick Cheney told them this would be over the top. None of this impresses me as examples of a flowering democracy. Second, August 2008, provincial elections law, Talabani protested over the Kirkuk arrangements. In sum, the presidential veto is an effective blocking mechanism that is used to strike down legislation and probably also serves as a deterrent to some extent.