Here is the 35-year-long purview piece on this topic I wrote for IPS this morning. I noted that the current war on Gaza is the sixth war aiming at imposing forced regime change (FRC) on its neighbors that Israel has waged since 1982. Two of the earlier ones were against Palestinian “regimes” and their associated infrastructures: Lebanon 1982 and the OPTs, 2002. Three were against Hizbullah in Lebanon in 1993, 1996, and 2006.
I concluded thus:
- The history of Israel’s FRC wars deserves close study. All have been “wars of choice” in that the “unbearable” situations that Israeli leaders have cited, each time, as giving them “no alternative” but to fight can all be seen as having been very amenable to negotiation — should Israel have chosen that path instead.
Also, all these wars were planned in some detail in advance, with the Israeli government just waiting for — or even, on occasion, provoking — some action from the other side that they could use as a launch pretext. All have received strong financial, rearming, and political support from the U.S., not least because they were waged in the name of counter-terrorism.
But the outcomes are important, too. At a purely military level, the two FRC wars against the PLO were the ones that Israel was able to “win”, in terms of being largely able to dismantle the structures it targeted. But the longer term, political-strategic outcomes of both those wars were distinctly counter-productive for Israel since they paved the way for the emergence of much tougher minded and better organised movements.
By contrast, Israel was unable to win any of its three FRC wars against Hizbullah. In each, Hizbullah withstood Israel’s assault long enough to force it into a ceasefire. All these wars ended up strengthening Hizbullah’s position inside Lebanese politics.
So how will Israel’s current attempt to inflict forced regime change on the Gaza Palestinians work out? If history is a guide, as it is, then this war will bring about either Hamas’s dismantling or a ceasefire on terms that will lead to (or at least allow) Hamas’s continued political strengthening.
A dismantling is unlikely, since Hamas’s leadership is located outside Gaza and has links throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds that ensure that annihilation of Hamas in Gaza would have serious global consequences. But if Hamas is dismantled in Gaza, it is most likely to be replaced there — faster or slower — by groups that are even more militant and more Islamist than itself.
Meantime, the high human costs of the war continue to mount daily.
IPS today also carries a great piece titled Israel Rejected Hamas Ceasefire Offer in December by Gareth Porter. It gives more details of the negotiations carried out in early and mid-December over the possibility and modalities of a renewal of the six-month tahdi’eh that was due to expire December 18.
He writes about–
- Dr. Robert Pastor, a professor at American University and senior adviser to the Carter Centre, who met with Khaled Meshal, chairman of the Hamas political bureau in Damascus on Dec. 14, along with former President Jimmy Carter. Pastor told IPS that Meshal indicated Hamas was willing to go back to the ceasefire that had been in effect up to early November “if there was a sign that Israel would lift the siege on Gaza”.
Pastor said he passeda Meshal’s statement on to a “senior official” in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) the day after the meeting with Meshal. According to Pastor, the Israeli official said he would get back to him, but did not.
“There was an alternative to the military approach to stopping the rockets,” said Pastor. He added that Israel is unlikely to have an effective ceasefire in Gaza unless it agrees to lift the siege.
Porter has more details. Read the whole thing.
And for the final item on your reading list on the political dimensions of the ongoing tragedy in Gaza, there is this piece from the percipient Palestinian analyst Mouin Rabbani. I hope you all understand the ironic (or despairing?) reference in its title: “Birth Pangs of a New Palestine.”
Rabbani made this excellent point in his essay:
- It is true, as commonly observed, that Israel’s initial aerial campaign failed to decapitate either Hamas or Islamic Jihad, vanquish them militarily or even prevent the intensification of Palestinian rocket fire. But the observation misses the point. As in 2002, Israel’s first objective was to incapacitate public administration, sever the link between government and people, and isolate the leadership, rather than deal an immediate body blow to militant groups. And as in the West Bank at the height of the second uprising, Israel recognizes that smashing armed groups goes only so far; a sustainable victory requires that the population be cowed into submission and lose faith in its leaders and militants, with its energies redirected toward more mundane projects such as obtaining basic needs and services that the crippled government can no longer provide, and protecting itself from the ensuing chaos in an increasingly competitive environment.
In the case of Hamas, this goal has additionally meant dismantling — with bombs and missiles launched from land, sea and air — the network of Islamist social, religious and charitable institutions that preceded and laid the foundation for the emergence of the movement as a political and military force in the late 1980s, and have been vital to its ability to establish and maintain a support base in every sector of Palestinian society. Israel concluded that because the movement controls the PA in Gaza and has an autonomous web of institutions that can provide services independently of the government, both types of installation had to be destroyed.
He concludes:
- when all is said and done, two issues rise head and shoulders above the rest: the urgency of beginning the process of reversing Israel’s impunity in its dealings with the Palestinian people, and the equally dire need to address the fundamental issue of occupation, without which ceasefires, sieges and code-named calamities like Operation Cast Lead would be unnecessary.
H,
Adroitly construed and usefully contextualized. Thanks!
KDJ
Interestingly enough, the Israeli right openly agrees and admits it. The Jewish Daily Forward in an article today says:
Martin Kramer, a senior fellow at the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies, which is a department of the hawkish Jerusalem-based Shalem Center, believes that stopping Hamas from firing rockets into Israel — the declared aim of Operation Cast Lead, as the Israelis have dubbed their military campaign — is only part of Israel’s objective.
“The long-term strategic goal is to restore the Palestinian Authority and eliminate Hamas control in Gaza,” he told the Forward.
In his reading of the situation, Israel’s blockade is, as planned, communicating to Gaza residents that being under Hamas comes with a cost to their standard of living.
“Israel could have ceased [Hamas] rocket fire by opening crossings,” he acknowledged. But “from a political point of view, it is not about rockets but about crossings. This is where Israel needs to be really tough.”
I still believe that he is correct and if the border crossings are opened as part of the ceasefire, Hamas wins. If there is not agreement on the crossings, Hamas must fight to the bitter end which will result in a formal reoccupation of Gaza by Israel (of course the occupation never really ended anyway). Either way, Israel loses.
Jack, clue me in, how does Israel loose? I get the significance of the crossings, part of a long and and planned ghettoization of a disrooted people.
The Palestinians are cramped in a ghetto now, as we all see. Like Warsaw circa 1941. They are being shelled and bombed there. They die there in droves, like Warsaw, but not quickly enough, as in Warsaw. I regret they lack the good manners of civilized folk to just line up for the trains like good Jews but they don’t answer to me you see.
What disturbs the Israeli plan for dominance tell me? Maybe global warming?
The Nazis had America to content with, and the Israelis do not. Its a zero sum game.
If the crossings are opened as Hamas demands it means that, in the showdown, Israel blinked and Hamas won. This victory would damage Israeli deterrent reputation, not to mention Israeli morale, even more than the Lebanon defeat.A clear loss for Israel in Arab eyes.
If Hamas is destroyed and Israel once again occupies Gaza on the ground, they will be forced to administer and provide all the neccessities of life to the one and a half million Gazans -a job they had foisted off on the international community. The PA under Fatah would not dare ride back in on the Israeli tanks. This would be a tremendous financial burden, not to mention the inevitable bloodletting on both sides which would go on as long as the IDF was within Gaza. Another loss for Israel.
This does not even begin to calculate the damage to Israel’s standing internationally and especially with the incoming Obama administration to whom this operation is a clearly unwanted distraction and challenge. And there is the risk of the Arab street to the “moderate” Arab regimes.
Of course, for Barak and Livni who are looking only at boosting their own election chances on 2/10 there is a big potential gain. But what of the real interests of the Israeli people? Perhaps someone can suggest a scenerio under which Israel comes out of this a winner.
Obama’s Peace Offensive
Thursday 08 January 2009
by: Michael Hirsh, Newsweek
from Truthout
http://www.truthout.org/010909E
Dennis Ross to be Obama’s Middle East head honcho? Read between the lines in this report.
He is totally pro-Zionist, and will do all he can to protect their interests, until the time, sooner or later, the Zionists (not necessarily the Jews) are ejected from the Levant.
Jack: Kramer’s analysis is not quite as your links have it. He says:
“Israel’s long-term strategic goal is the elimination of Hamas control of Gaza. This is especially the GOAL OF THE KADIMA AND LABOR PARTIES, which are distinguished by their commitment to a negotiated final status agreement with the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas”
And then goes on to say:
“In particular, the opposition Likud has less confidence in Abbas and the “peace process” as presently configured. While it is adamant about ending Hamas rule in Gaza, it would be MUCH LESS CONCERNED WITH RESTORING THE UNITY OF THE PALESTINIANS.”
In other words his view is that it is Kadima/Labor (CENTRE-LEFT)currently conducting this war that has a vested interest in seeing the PA being restored to power in Gaza in order to advance two state solution. If Netanyahu and Likud (RIGHT) win the election they would have no such committment.
Yet another demo of how this issue is really about the rejection/acceptance of the jewish state and its visceral origins in the UN resolution now 61 years ago. All of Helena’s posts need to be seen in this context. A perfect illustration of how the extremes of the Right and Left get into a political bed and engage in congress against the centre.
Someones comment that should be taken into serious consideration:
”
Now that Israel has ignored and, indeed, defied the Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, I guess we’ll have to follow the precedent set by our government in Iraq and bomb Tel Aviv in order to shock and awe the Israelis into compliance with Security Council resolutions.
At 9:53 AM, Anonymous ”
What about a three state solution: Israel, West Bank, Gaza. Israel, the US, EU and perhaps the Arab States could provide massive aid to the West Bank with the promise of similar help to Gaza if they reform their policies and behavior. Over time the Gazans might reject Hamas, if not, then Israel could follow the Bush model and eliminate Hamas and free the Gazans from their oppression. The current war seems to have no end game other than a stalemate, which would strength both Hamas and Iran, which is after all, their objective in starting the war in the first place.
What about a three state solution: Israel, West Bank, Gaza. Israel, the US, EU and perhaps the Arab States could provide massive aid to the West Bank with the promise of similar help to Gaza if they reform their policies and behavior. Over time the Gazans might reject Hamas, if not, then Israel could follow the Bush model and eliminate Hamas and free the Gazans from their oppression. The current war seems to have no end game other than a stalemate, which would strength both Hamas and Iran, which is after all, their objective in starting the war in the first place.