Obama on Iraq: before and after

After a spirited exchange with Alex regarding what Barack Obama’s plans might be for Iraq, I thought it would be informative to look at Obama’s remarks before and after the election.
March 19, 2008
I will immediately begin to remove our troops from Iraq. We can responsibly remove 1 to 2 combat brigades each month. If we start with the number of brigades we have in Iraq today, we can remove all of them [in] 16 months. After this redeployment, we will leave enough troops in Iraq to guard our embassy and diplomats, and a counter-terrorism force to strike al Qaeda if it forms a base that the Iraqis cannot destroy.
December 7, 2008 (Meet the Press)
We are going to maintain a large enough force in the region to assure that our civilian troops–or our, our, our civilian personnel and our, our embassies are protected, to make sure that we can ferret out any remaining terrorist activity in the region, in cooperation with the Iraqi government, that we are providing training and logistical support, maintaining the integrity of Iraq as necessary. And, you know, I–one of the things that I’ll be doing is evaluating what kind of number’s required to meet those very limited goals.

9 thoughts on “Obama on Iraq: before and after”

  1. If we start with the number of brigades we have in Iraq today, we can remove all of them [in] 16 months. After this redeployment, we will leave enough troops in Iraq to guard our embassy and diplomats, and a counter-terrorism force to strike al Qaeda if it forms a base that the Iraqis cannot destroy.
    So, we’re gonna remove all of them, and leave enough to do X, y, and Z? And how, exactly, does that add up to getting out of Iraq?
    And about “striking Al Qa`eda” – isn’t that, like, you know, combat? And guarding the so-called “embassy” (the fact that he can actually call it that with a straight face is very telling, isn’t it?) – well, could that not potentially include – you know, combat?
    Obama never intended to get out of Iraq, he never SAID he intended to get out of Iraq (though, like any politician, he certainly implied it on a regular basis), and he has no intention now of getting out of Iraq.
    I’ve understood that all along, and shouted it from the rooftops on a regular basis. Therefore, I am not disappointed. It’s about what I expected. But bitter? You betcha!

  2. I don’t find anything “telling” about using the word, “embassy”. The only thing I find is Shirin’s insistance to mashing Obama’s words into some scenario he already had before Obama gave this interview. From this paragraph he jumps to his accusations that he never intended to get out of Iraq and he hypes himself as some Messiah screaming from the rooftops at us lower life forms.

  3. Inkan, I suppose it is not your fault that you did not make an effort to look beyond the pretty campaign sound bytes to find out about the candidates’ actual plans for Iraq, which Obama and Hillary Clinton each spelled out quite clearly and in detail. Their plans were, for all practical purposes, the same, and neither intended to end the occupation of Iraq. Both of them intended to keep a significant troop presence indefinitely, and to maintain that imperial citadel in Baghdad, absurdly called an “embassy”, fully staffed and fully functional. The information of which I availed myself in regard to their plans for Iraq was and is readily available in the candidates’ own words to anyone who bothered to look for it. You cannot be blamed for not bothering to look below the surface.

  4. I found Obama’s stuttering over “civilian troops” interesting in the light of two recent news reports from Afghanistan:
    (1) Most of the additional U.S. troops going to Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near Kabul (the situation is that bad).–NYT
    (2) The U.S. Army is looking to private contractors to provide armed security guards to protect Forward Operating Bases in seven provinces in southern Afghanistan.–WaPo
    Could this be the Iraq model also?

  5. As you know, the issue is not so much what Obama has to say, but rather what the US is capable of doing in Iraq. I do not believe in US omnipotence.
    Today we have news of final British withdrawal. The situation seems in general decline.
    I have consulted my Syrian students, as well as the Iraqi group. No-one sees a complete US disappearance. The Sunni Iraqis continue to desire American protection against the Shi’a. A point of view, well known, which is seen as temporary.
    My conclusion is that Obama, if he pushes for the preservation of the bases, can do it. However, that situation will not necessarily last long. The nationalist point of view will probably bring up objections soon.
    Nationalism in Iraq has often been discounted. It is not overtly powerful, as in Iran or Greece. Peter Gabriel denied its existence, in order to forward Kurdish interests. And that point of view has been much adopted by US politicians, the last being Biden. However, it is central. Maliki has adopted it, for his position on the SOFA/Withdrawal negotiations.
    The tendency for Iraq to go for a centralist administration has a long history, thus nationalist. Reidar Visser’s history of the experience of Basra is a good proof. We will have to see what they think today, as Visser continues to keep us informed.

  6. Alex,
    I believe you mean Peter Galbraith? I will reserve comment on his “expertise”.
    Thank you for pointing out the importance of nationalism. It has always been a core value for Iraqis, and I think it is stronger than you think, though recently it has been somewhat overwhelmed by other things.
    As for Maliki, yes, he is playing the nationalist card these days because he understands that is what he needs to do to keep his job, but I do not think for a moment that is his real sentiment or motivation nor is it that of any of the Da`wa party.

  7. I always get Galbraith’s name wrong. Don’t know why.
    I too wouldn’t have too high an opinion of why Maliki has taken a nationalist stance. But the fact that he chose that stance, shows the importance of nationalism as a political factor.
    I personally think nationalism is the key to the Iraq problem. The US has consistently underestimated it, and it was there that the US negotiators made their big mistake these last months. It is why we have a “Withdrawal” agreement, and not a SOFA, whether or not one thinks that the US government will obey it.

  8. Alex, I have always felt that Iraqis’ nationalism would be the key, and yes, the US has not just underestimated it, but completely discounted it thanks in large part to self-styled “experts” like Peter Galbraith. Galbraith and others like him are excellent examples of the saying that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. And it is scary the way the careless and fallacious conclusions of Galbraith and his ilk are so easily taken for granted and so quickly become the accepted reality.
    The popular “received truth” (Badger once had a great term for this, which I cannot for the life of me remember!) that says “Iraq is an artificial, inherently non-viable entity cobbled together by the western powers from three distinct geo-ethno-sectarian regions whose people have always detested each other and never wanted to live together and was only held together by the iron hand of Saddam” is pure processed bull food. It ignores centuries of historical and social reality pre-statehood, and it ignores the historical and social reality of Iraq as a modern-day nation state.

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