What Bush’s surge has cost

1,110 dead Americans, tens of thousands of dead Iraqis, and $180 billion of US taxpayer money…
Bush’s military surge in Iraq represented, essentially, an 18-month prolongation of the war there. Now, in July 2008, it is increasingly clear that the US troop presence in Iraq is starting to wind down, one way or another. US public and elite opinion is rapidly “surging” toward the judgment that Afghanistan is more important, and that resources– including many or all of those currently deployed in Iraq– urgently need to be redirected there.
This wind-down in Iraq could have started 18 months earlier. And it would have, if the President had followed the recommendations made in the Iraq Study Group report of December 2006. But he didn’t do that. Instead, he bull-headedly pursued the “surge”, which involved pumping considerable new troops, materiel, and other resources into Iraq.
Apologists for the surge, who include Sen. John McCain, argue that without it, the political situation in Iraq today would not be anywhere near as hopeful as they see it. (They conveniently ignore the fact that the main bedrock of the emerging political entente inside Iraq is a demand that the US troops leave that country to as short a timetable as possible.)
The apologists’ claim is considerably overblown if not flat-out wrong. If Bush had followed the recommendations produced by the determinedly bipartisan ISG, that in itself would have had a huge and positive effect on political relations among Iraqis. Iraq’s political system might well have arrived at the level of (still very fragile) internal entente that we see now– but 18 months sooner than today.
At the start of the 18-month period that started January 1, 2007, the US military organized a massive and very costly operation to assemble and deploy into Iraq an additional 30,000 or so troops. That strained the US force planners’ calculations just about to their limit. Then more recently, they have been bringing the number back to just about where they were back in December 2006.
During the 18 months January 2007 through June 2008, an additional 1,110 servicemembers were killed in Iraq, and many thousands more were badly wounded. 1,110 more American moms had to bury their sons or daughters. Many thousands more were faced with the longterm challenges of dealing with a chronically disabled loved one.
With the Iraqi occupation’s cost running at around $10 billion/month, those wasted 18 months also cost US taxpayers $180 billion more than the speedier, ISG-recommended kind of wind-down would have cost. As with all of George W. Bush’s wars, this money has been financed through debt.
Surge apologists claim that it was only the broader deployments made possible by the surge that succeeded in bringing to Iraqis the relative degree of “pacification” that hey have experienced since December 2006. But there are numerous other, more powerful ways of explaining the currently visible (and still very partial) degree of political entente. Including the buying-off of large portions of the country’s Sunni population and the ceasefire announced (and in good part observed) by the Sadrists. Those processes started before the surge. And, I repeat, if Washington had followed the ISG’s strongly pro-diplomacy recommendations back in December ’06, that would have transformed the regional and internal political situation into one much more conducive to achieving a sustainable political entente inside Iraq.
In his recent speeches, John McCain has tried to score points by saying that Obama “was wrong to oppose the surge.” Obama has replied that he was right on the bigger question of launching the war against Iraq in the first place; but he has largely dodged making any comment about the surge itself. He should certainly carry on stressing the larger point about having opposed the whole war. But he should also counter McCain’s claims about the value and necessity of the surge by pointing out that in late 2006, the far quicker, and most effective, way to win an acceptable outcome in Iraq would have been to follow something like the ISG’s recommendations, instead.
In other words, he should change the subject from the surge to the non-implementation of the ISG report.
He should also, certainly, point out what the delay in diplomacy that the surge represented has cost the nation and the world: 1,110 American lives, $180 billion, and countless lives and material damages in Iraq, too.

8 thoughts on “What Bush’s surge has cost”

  1. Unfortunately, Obama has little choice at this point. The MSM has decided, for whatever reason, that the surge was a success and it was the reason that violence in Iraq has slowed down. Your points are well made about other causes, and I might add the fact that the ethnic cleansing by each side is now pretty complete is another reason for the downturn in violence. Nonetheless, Obama is addressing the American electorate which is notoriously dumb and easily manipulated by propaganda whether put out by the administration or the MSM (which have been working hand in hand for a while now). Remember 40% of Americans still believe that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11. So Obama must work with the perception that the vast majority of the ill-informed have been fed by the MSM and go from there. The actual truth, which requires some work to uncover and some political intelligence to understand, simply will not fly. We can only hope that Obama’s understanding of the realities of Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Iran and other issues is greater than he has been displaying of late.

  2. Obama has little choice at this point
    Nonsense! It should be easier for Obama to sell ending the occupation than it was for Bush to sell the invasion in the first place. Just hire the right P.R. firms and pay them enough money, and it’s a done deal. Besides, it should be an easy step from “The Surge™ worked”, to “it’s time to leave”.
    Of course, the reality is that Obama never had any more intention to end the occupation than Georgie and the Neocons do. As one very astute Iraqi journalist (sorry, I forgot who) put it the other day, what Obama will do is merely change the form of the occupation. We are about to move into the Mandate period.
    As I have said, Obama’s plan was never a withdrawal plan, it was a plan to reconfigure the occupation and continue it in another form. Change you can gnash your teeth at.

  3. Change you can gnash your teeth at.
    Now, now, the Senatorino is not quite as bad as THAT! Not so bad as to secretly cherish “a plan to reconfigure the occupation and continue it in another form.”
    Consider the geopolitics, if you would. Notice in particular that Cook County is located a long, long way from salt water. Isn’t it far more likely that B. Hussein Obáma of Hyde Park does not, properly speaking, have any PLAN at all for the former Iraq? Not, that is, unless it is to count as a plan that, after his coronation, he will apply his peerless intellect to the bushogenic quagmire and — at that point, not before — decide conscientiously what ought to be done about it.
    What will the peerless intellect then resolve upon? Not an easy question, and one that calls for making predictions about the future, always a tricky business. And unfortunately some mere superficial reconfiguration of the AEI-GOP-DOD occupation can not be ruled out. Yet even if it should come to just dabbing some lipstick on the pig, it is not as if BHO is cold-bloodedly plotting in advance to pull a mccain on us.
    Meanwhile, HIMSELF is obliged to pretend to have a definite plan in mind for ex-Iraq (and one for neo-Afghanistan too), but that is far more a fact about American politics than about the individual pol.
    I am probably more interested in the technical play of the game than is somebody who wants to gnash her teeth. At that level, I’d say HIMSELF is doing very well when it comes to what sort of plan he should pretend to have for electoral purposes. If nothing else, he is driving Dr. Limbaugh bananas, which is a good thing as far as it goes. (Isn’t it?)
    Happy days.

  4. You are right, of course, Helena, that the surge has achieved nothing and has led to a great many deaths.
    My feeling is that wars stop when one or both sides are willing to let it go. Be it victory, defeat or whatever. Iraqis will never, ever, give up, as it is their country. So it is up to the US. Back at the end of 2006, when it was a question of surge or peace, I did not have the feeling that the US was yet ready to stop. Bush-Cheyney had two more years to go, and they are committed to the war. Now things are different. The surge has been tried, and one may say that it has led to nothing. On the other hand, the warmongers can say that victory has been obtained. As far as I am concerned, I don’t mind if the Neo-Cons claim victory, as long as US troops depart, with no residue.
    Now the US is on the edge of withdrawal. Once the ball starts rolling, there is no logical point where it can stop before the finish. Withdrawal may be slow, and interrupted, but it will not stop. Iraqi hostility to the occupation is solid. The issues of the SOF agreement, and the oil law, have consolidated Iraqi nationalism – the negotiations were very foolishly carried out by the US. They have lost the conflict there: who cares if they declare victory?
    I don’t agree with the commenters who say that the US plans to stay permanently in Iraq, and will not withdraw voluntarily. That is true, and Obama affirms it. But it is a dream, pie-in-the-sky. Iraq will always resist, and an occupation by force would have to continue. The US is unable to continue a forced occupation endlessly, for financial reasons, exhaustion of the military, and other commitments (we can talk of Afghanistan another time).
    The idea of withdrawal, once sown, can only snowball. There is no other idea. The SOFA and the oil law have failed. You may say that Maliki will sign watered-down versions. That is not my impression. The reports that say he is only dickering to have better conditions come only from the White House, who have their own agenda. Maliki is stuck on the prong of absolute resistance in Iraq. If he signs anything which could be construed as giving away Iraqi sovereignty, and that means anything, he risks assassination, even from his own bodyguard. It has reached that point, I think.

  5. Alex, I hope fervently that you are right about withdrawal, but I fear you are too optimistic.
    I do agree with you completely that the Iraqis will never stop fighting, first because it is their country, and second because they are Iraqis, and it is not their nature to give up. However, I don’t think the U.S. will try to the bitter end to hold onto their dream of a permanent controlling presence, so it looks to me that the fight will go on for quite some time before the Americans finally realize they are not going to get what they came after and leave.
    I hope you are right and I am wrong, and if so, I will give you all credit, buy you dinner, and we can share a magnum of champagne or the celebratory beverage of your choice.

  6. Oooops! Correction:
    I DO think the U.S. will try to the bitter end to hold onto their dream of a permanent controlling presence.

  7. No, I don’t think I am being too optimistic. Obviously any predictions about the future, one never knows whether they will be right or not. Here the doubt is in the time-scale. Will US withdrawal be in two years, as stated by Obama (whatever he means by withdrawal) and Maliki, or ten?
    The point here is the negativity of the future for the US, in the wake of the failure of the SOFA, and the oil law. Iraqis are not going to be tricked into signing away their rights. The US thought that silly Arabs, they will sign anything, especially if we stir up sectarian dissension. I still think it was the US who bombed the Askari shrine in Samarra; who else could have carried out such a professional job? But that is not important. Dissension was certainly sown. However it was still necessary to persuade Iraqis to sign away their rights, and that provoked an unexpected powerful reaction. Nationalism, which the Neo-Cons, and many others, thought didn’t exist.
    That failure was the true turning point in the war in Iraq, not the surge.
    I see, by the way, that Maliki has abandoned his destined role of puppet, over the SOFA affair, no doubt under instruction from Najaf. The US should be getting rid of the disobedient puppet, if they want to retain control. But they are hesitating, no doubt out of reluctance to confront Sistani. Fatal.
    By the way, I’ve never believed Maliki was really a puppet. He’s very Iraqi, like lots of government officials I’ve known in Iraq. He’s very susceptible and sensitive to the intra-Iraqi debate, but is not good at handling the Americans. Quite the opposite of a Chalabi. When M talks about a withdrawal timetable, as in the Spiegel interview, you know for certain that he is representing a widespread point of view in the country.

  8. Alex, I think we are far more in agreement than disagreement. I just don’t think there is a chance in hell of getting rid of the Americans within two years,unless something pretty cataclysmic happens for force them to leave.
    Obama has made it clear from the beginning to those of us who looked beyond the pretty sound bytes and the campaign P.R. that when he spoke of “withdrawal”, he did not really mean withdrawal, and even when he spoke of “withdrawing combat troops within 16 months”, he was not being entirely honest, since some of the “missions” he listed for his “residual force” were undeniably combat missions. The only reasonable conclusion, therefore, was that what he really intended was to reconfigure the occupation.
    I DO believe that sooner or later the Iraqis will force the Americans out, just as they forced the British out, and I hope it will happen sooner rather than later because Iraq will never be able to truly begin to heal until the Americans are gone.

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