Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned yesterday
that,
residual elements in the administration who are tempted by the
use of force against Iran.. And there are some elements in
Israel, too, who are watching the situation very closely.
Brzezinski, who served in the Carter administration, was speaking at
Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, just three
days after Under-Secretary of State Bill Burns took part in a meeting
the “P5+1” group had in Geneva with Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator,
Saeed Jalili. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice downplayed
the importance of the Geneva meeting, though it was one of a number of
tentative moves the administration has made in recent months that may
(or may not) signal an attempt to de-escalate the administration’s
long-running confrontation with Iran.
(By the way, if you want to see what I said about the US-Iran
situation at the meeting in Charlottesville Monday night, you can see a
YouTube version of my 24-minute speech, here.
Great audio but, um, idiosyncratic camera work.)
At yesterday’s forum at CSIS, Brzezinski was speaking alongside Brent
Scowcroft, who had been Pres. George H.W. Bush’s National security
Advisor, and David Ignatius, Associate Editor and columnist at The Washington Post.
Brzezinski and Scowcroft both expressed forceful criticisms of the
hard-line policy the Bush administration has maintained against Iran
until now. Ignatius expressed a notably less critical view.
Brzezinski said,
insisting on Iran making a fundamental concession as
a precondition for entering into talks. It’s hard to to judge
that any Iranian government, however weak would
give up something to which under NPT it has a right–
and that it would do so upfront, before any negotiations have even
started.
If the logjam is to be broken, then there should be a signific
quid-pro-quo at
the beginning of negotiations. Or, both sides could agree to
negotiate without preconditions, but on the basis of a
statement from the P5+1 that the negotiations should not be
dragged out beyond a certain period.
Without a breakthrough like this, the situation could continue
in its present stalemate. The danger of this is that not only
is the Iranian government weak and divided but the United States is,
also; and in the background, the Israeli government is weak and
divided, too.
The panelists were asked, “What do the Iranians want?” Scowcroft’s
answer was:
security problem in the region, including their recent experience of
having been invaded by Iraq…
The reason they insist on doing the uranium enrichment themselves,
rather than taking up offers by others to enrich uranium for them is
that they’ve been subjected to political this issue
in the past.
You have to get at the kind of arguments they have, and understand the
arguments a little!
The problem has been our demand that they have to stop
enriching, before we talk to them. The ‘freeze for freeze’ proposal
made by Javier Solana is at least a step ‘back’ from that.
Brzezinksi’s answer to the same question was, “They want to
continue their nuclear program to the point where it would be
like
Japan’s. That is, it would be a peaceful nuclear power
program but with a capability for rapid conversion to
a weapons program.”
Ignatius said that he had heard, from ‘sources close to Solana” that
the Iranians are actually spinning “almost no centrifuges” right now. He
speculated they might be trying to meet the “freeze” conditions in
practice without actually announcing it.
He said,
the Iranians as a journalist, they see themselves as on a
roll right now. There is quite a debate inside Iran on what to
do with this
moment of opportunity: whether to push further or negotiate now, in order
to consolidate their position.
He also said that he judged that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i
saw his core mission as being “to
preserve the legitimacy of the Islamic
Republic”, and that Khamene’i was therefore wary negotiating with the
much-reviled U.S.
Later in the forum, Scowcroft warned quite sharply that too many
commentators in and close to the administration were adopting far too
“militarized” an approach to the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear
program. “much more of a complex political and diplomatic job.”
He said,
of a forward surge in nuclear proliferation. If Iran gets nuclear
weapons, then Egypt and Saudi Arabia and others will want them, too.
Within a few years, we could have 30 or 40 countries on the brink.
So the question is not ‘Do we bomb them now or bomb them
afterwards?’ The question is: How do we prevent
Iran from getting it?
… Asking the first of those questions militarizes the
problem, which is much more of a complex political/diplomatic
problem than a military problem.
The forum’s moderator, Bob Schieffer, noted that Elizabeth Cheney had
said the core question was “whether we could live with a nuclear Iran”,
and asked the panelists’ reactions to that.
Brzezinksi replied:
nuclear-armed Soviet Union for so many years. We
lived with a nuclear-armed China, Israel,
India, Pakistan… We know deterrence works– and we know that
‘preventive war’ very frequently doesn’t work… We know that
a war with Iran would be a disaster, while deterrence
historically has worked.
People might say yes, but it might not work with Iian.I say:
‘Yes, that’s the
most you can say, that it ‘might’ not work’ But look
at the nature of
the Iranian regime. What kind of state is it? It’s a very ancient
state, with very many capabilities… And then, what would they do with
their first nuclear weapon? Would they shoot it off at Israel
or give it to Hizbullah? Israel is quite capable of deterring them.
I think a war with Iran would produce calamities for sure.
But deterrence has worked in the past and may well work this
time.
…
Meanwhile, implicit in our present negotiating posture is that we might initiate the
use of force. That’s what they mean when they
say ‘all options are on the table.’
I don’t want the public here
getting the idea that the consequences of Iran getting nuclear weapons
are so
horrendous that an attack is justified. Also, using this tough
rhetoric has two bad effects inside Iran.
It pushes Iranians to think maybe they do
need nuclear weapons, to deter this
attack. It also unites the Iranian population
around the mullahs.
… There is a further problem, too. By casually saying that
‘all options are on table’ we are
legitimating the
idea among our public that an attack is acceptable—
whether for us
or for Israel. If Israel attacks Iran, this would be disastrous
because the Iranians would respond to an
Israeli attack, against
us. So we need to engage seriously &
hardheadedly in the negotiations while giving them a way out, not boxing them
in.
Schieffer asked, “What should we be telling the Israeliis right now?”
Scowcroft had just two words for them: “Calm down!”
Brzezinski’s reply was just a little longer:
it! Because if we have a complex catastrophe in the region, and
a further degradation of our position in the region it
would be catastrophic for Israel,
too.
As noted above, Ignatius was notably less critical of the Bush
administration’s hard-line path than either Brzezinski or Scowcroft.
He noted that the Iranians have their own elections next
March, and said what the US does
the
hardline in their debate. Especially if Ahmadinejad could
argue that back when they had a reformist president the US didn’t give
anything to him, but that his approach has ‘brought the US
begging to the table.’ An alternative approach could
be to move more slowly so
as not give the ‘prize’ of negotiations to Ahmadinejad.
Scowcroft’s response to this was, “No, I believe continuing Condi’s
tough
response could play into Ahmadinejad’s hands.” He said he thought the
sanctions were starting to hurt Iran, and implied that therefore now
would be a good time to negotiate:
sanctions, but give them an
out. For example, allow them to have nuclear fuel supplied by others,
perhaps subsidized quite heavily, and under
escrow to the UN/IAEA…
Of course, this could only work if they don’t yet have their
own enrichment capability.
Brzezinski had the text of the P5+1’s proposal in his hand and riffled
through it as he said,
Iran they said they could discuss giving help for Iran’s nuclear power
program if the if
Iranians give up enrichment; and they could also offer
political cooperation, and cooperation in many other technical fields,
too… So why don’t we say to them that if they stop
enriching then immediately we’d give them a good, well-defined package,
upfront, so they know what they could get, and then continue the
negotiations from there, rather than mentioning all these forms of
cooperation and saying, ‘You give up your enrichment first and then you
may– or may not– get some or all of these things.’
Brzezinski also had what seemed like a sophisticated analysis of the
power dynamics within the P5+1 group. He said,
are both essentially in the same place. The Chinese
and Germans are the most
deeply pro-diplomacy, and focused on the economic consequences if the
negotiations should fail. The French are a little ‘esoteric’.
Then there’s Russia. If you look at who might be
the beneficiary
of a prolonged stalemate and/or a military attack, in terms of the
effects on oil prices– well, maybe
there are in Russia those that wouldn’t be devastated by a breakdown
of
the negotiating process.
Brzezisnki’s long history of Polish-origined sensitivities to Russian
power may have been affecting his judgment there somewhat. But
nonetheless it seemed like an intriguing and relevant point to make.
One question that came to the panelists invited them to
compare the administration’s policy toward Iran with that
toward North Korea.
Scowcroft replied,
policy of regime change toward both countries, but backed away
from it. In North Korea, we found that ‘regime
change’ was anathema to the Chinese
and others that we needed to work with.
In Iran, we backed away from ‘regime change’ but not toward
much else…
(For my part, I see no convincing signs yet that the administration has
backed off from regime change in the case of Iran, though perhaps if
the rumored US interest section gets opened in Tehran, that would be a
good preliminary suignal of this.)
Brzezinski said it was “a breakthrough” in the
Iran negotiations earlier this year when the Chinese became “seriously
engaged” in them, and the Germans joined them in a serious way, too.
don’t have the same leverage
over the Iranians that they had over North Korea… So the negotiating
process
lacks that edge. And meanwhile, we have
still not decided which way to go. There are people in this
administration who still want this to be ‘decided’ before end
of this presidency.
The panelists were specifically asked, by the former head of the U.S.
Institute for Peace, Amb. Samuel Lewis, whether, one good answer to the
question about ‘what Iran wants’ would be that they want their regime
recognized, along with a ‘dominant’ role for it in the Persian Gulf
region.
Scowcroft replied that, while he would not want to see Iran having a
dominant role in the region, still, there should be “a regional
security framework in which they can
participate.”
Ignatius said that during a recent interview with Iranian Foreign
Minister Muttaqi, in New York, he had discussed the idea of “a
Kissinger style of
‘grand regional bargain.’ between the two nations… But Muttaqi was
skeptical and said it would only be a
form of taarof
(making nice); and that we should start the negotiation
with small things, instead.”
A journalist with the Persian-language service of Voice of America
asked if based on the evidence of the past 30 years, the panelists
could conclude that Iran’s rulers are “rational”?
Scowcroft said, “The
mullahs are highly rational and cautious, but Ahmadinejad
likes to stoke things up because it redounds to his political benefit.
Brzezinski replied merely by asking, “Have we been
acting rationally over past seven yrs?”
There was quite a degree of laughter at that remark– significant and
interesting in CSIS, which is a bastion of hard-nosed “realist”
thinking. That provided one of the few light moments in a discussion on
a very momentous topic.
Thank-you very much for letting us hear Zbig and Brent S. – but are they destined to be our Solons or our Cassandras?
Did anyone ask the panel about the Pickering plan whereby uranium enrichment takes place in Iran under close international cooperation? Apparently the Iranians have signaled their interest in this idea.
For a different point of view, check out what the former head of Israeli military intelligence says….
Full report available at: http://www.jcpa.org/text/iran_page_38-43.pdf
IRANIAN STRATEGIC VULNERABILITIES:IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY OPTIONS TO HALT THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
By
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Zeevi Farkash *
Ayatollah Khomeini’s heirs are breathing new life into the Islamic revolution that began in 1979 into the hopes of transforming Iran into a regional power. The Iranian revolution can only point to a single achievement in the Arab world: Hizbullah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah are keeping alive the revolutionary fervor in Lebanon. This base of exported revolution, in addition to the longstanding alliance with Syria, is central to Iran’s political-diplomatic efforts to achieve a higher status in the region and in the wider world. Two additional foundations of Iranian power must be added to the above:
* The Iranian nuclear program, complete with delivery systems capable of reaching targets in the Middle East and Europe.
* Iran’s relative economic independence since 2003 because of the dramatic rise in revenue from oil sales.
At the beginning of 2003, the Iranians were concentrating their efforts on the centrifuge program in Natanz, where they had managed to build a cascade with 164 centrifuges. Today, they have reached a capacity of 3,000 centrifuges.
The Iranian Nuclear Program
The Iranian nuclear weapons program is comprised of three key elements:
A delivery system, requiring the development of surface-to surface missiles.
The accumulation of fissile material through uranium enrichment and plutonium production.
Weaponization – preparing a warhead from the fissile material and fitting it to a missile.
* Maj. Gen. (ret.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash is a former head of Israeli Military Intelligence. His other positions in the IDF included chief of the Logistics and Technology Branch, as assistant chief and deputy chief in the Planning Branch, and commander of 8200, Israel Signit National Unit.
He is presently director of the Sari and Israel Roizman Program in Intelligence Studies at the Institute for National Security Studies.
Ze’evi Farkash holds a BA and MA in Middle East History from Tel Aviv University, and is a graduate of the International Senior Manager’s Program at Harvard Business School.
Full report available at: http://www.jcpa.org/text/iran_page_38-43.pdf