Bolani on the fulcrum of the US-Iraqi balance

It was an interesting performance this morning, to see Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Bolani do some deft diplomatic footwork– while visiting Washington– to stay atop the fulcrum of the Washington-Baghdad political balance that, as I noted here recently, has tipped significantly in Baghdad’s favor in recent weeks.
Bolani was giving a presentation at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He had been sent (brought?) to Washington primarily to work at nailing down the details of the Iraq-US SOFA and MOU, and he entered the conference room at USIP with his Pentagon handlers colleagues clearly in evidence.
He had a soft-spoken, fairly engaging affect. You could see why, back in June 2006, he was chosen– by some combination of the US occupation authorities and the elected-majority Iraqi UIA coalition– to take over the ultra-sensitive job of Minister of the Interior, that is, to be in charge of all the Iraqi internal police, security, and intelligence forces that are not explicitly under the Defense Ministry. His main personal qualification seemed at the time to be his skill as an emollient diplomat– chosen as he was after his predecessor gained renown for having heavily politicized the Iraqi Police and stuffed it full of still-intact units of the Kurdish and Shiite (especially SCIRI) militias.
It is clear from all the reports I’ve read and heard that that situation is far from ended. But Bolani has been able– thus far– to put a good emollient face on the matter.
At USIP this morning, his skills as a diplomat were on full display. Notably, he filled up most of the time allotted to him with fairly meaningless managerial mumbo-jumbo, made repeated mention of a number of “loved in the US” buzzwords like “rule of law”, “specialized training opportunities”, etc, etc– and he completely avoided giving a clear answer to any of the key questions that were asked him.
All in all, an adroit performance. Next stop for this practised contortionist: Cirque Du Soleil?
It was fascinating to watch him pirouetting with such finesse atop the fulcrum of the Baghdad-Washington balance. We all recall that just ten days ago, as Barack Obama was about to reach Baghdad, Bolani’s boss, PM Maliki, gave him a great political gift by saying he thought that Obama’s timeline for a withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq was about right. But Barack Obama is not the US President yet, and may never be it. The present President is someone who’s still adamantly opposed to any fixed (as opposed to “horizon-related”) timetable for any portion of the US withdrawal from Iraq. Bolani and his boss need to keep some kind of a working relationship– for now– with the guy who is currently Commander in Chief of those 147,000 US troops in Iraq, completely dominating the country’s broad-brush security environment and its financial (and financial payoffs) system.
So, given how much raw military power the US exercises over Iraq, it was quite notable the degree to which Bolani demurred from saying anything that could be understood as expressing support for Bush’s or the GOP’s position in the GOP-Democratic dispute over Iraq.
He didn’t express clearcut support for Obama’s position, either. (Hey, the guy’s not stupid; and he’s in Washington.)
That’s the point. He didn’t say anything clear-cut on matters of importance, at all.
I see that Marc Lynch has blogged the event as, essentially, lacking any newsworthiness. But in the circumstances, I think it was the lack of a ‘story’, in conventional news terms, that was itself, precisely the story.
Here’s how Bolani danced on some of the pinheads that were presented him.
Michael Gordon of the NYT asked him explicitly, “What would the effects be if all the US combat brigades left within 21 months?”
In answering, Bolani said something like:

    Today we are looking at the transitional phase… The phase that will enable our police force to do its job and confront the challenges of the earlier era… The measures that have been taken in coordination with the coalition have been important in strengthening the capabilities of our state.

Well, it sounded like a clear, if slightly veiled, “buzz off” to me. A ‘buzz off” couched in a few emollient phrases about how it has been the coalition’s efforts that have gotten Iraqis to the point where they can stand on their own two feet.
M. Gordon pressed the question again. Bolani then– quite understandably– asked where the heck the “21 months” timeframe had come from anyway; and Gordon gave a response that pointed strongly to 23 months, to me. (I.e., supposing an Obama victory in November, then 16 months from January.)
Bolani then once again deflected the question, saying that “The objective is to strengthen the rule of law and this will enable us to confront all challenges, blah-blah-blah… ”
Asked about the current MOU/SOFA negotiations, he said,

    We have teams working hard on this, to foster and enhance what’s already been achieved. The environment is moving in the right direction to fulfill the needs of both sides.

He was asked whether, in light of the continuing incidents in which US forces have been killing Iraqi civilians, he thinks the US troops should have immunity under the final MOU/SOFA agreements. He said,

    We do have now have a growing experience of discussing such matters, with the aim of reaching the needed balance between the needs of our citizens and the need to have good cooperation between the Iraqi and coalition forces. We have a team working on this issue right now.

In all cases: no “story.”
But altogether: yes, the story.

5 thoughts on “Bolani on the fulcrum of the US-Iraqi balance”

  1. “Today we are looking at the transitional phase… The phase that will enable our police force to do its job and confront the challenges of the earlier era… The measures that have been taken in coordination with the coalition have been important in strengthening the capabilities of our state.”
    Sounds like a long winded, diplomatic way of saying “depending on conditions on the ground.”
    It’s good to see a human face finally being put on an Iraqi cabinet minister. Thanks H.

  2. Uh, basically, Crude, that despite all the pressures and blandishments to which no doubt he was subjected while in DC he didn’t come out and say anything that conveyed support for the Bush’s position on withdrawal…

  3. I have been saying for weeks on various blogs that the Iraqis would prevaricate (rather than sign the SOFA), and it seems, Helena, as you say, that it is turning out that way.
    It is the logical solution from the Iraqi point of view, from Maliki’s POV. Sign anything at all, and he has given away one of the two leverages he has on the US. The SOFA and the Oil Law are the crown jewels in Iraq’s relationship with the US: they should not be given away lightly. And will not be.
    Then there is Sistani and the Hawza. We are told that S. is now opposed to continuing US occupation. If that is true, is Maliki going to dare to go against him? Equally is Maliki going to say no to George Bush? Certainly not in either case. So prevarication is the only solution. Leave the US to seek prolongation of its mandate from the UN.
    Iraq is in a stronger position in relation to the US than it has been for years, precisely as you say.

  4. That’s the point. He didn’t say anything clear-cut on matters of importance, at all.
    Maybe there are things more important to Iraqis than Republican politics? Clearly not everyone shares your narrow fascination with the USA.
    blah-blah-blah.
    Interesting synopsis. Shows you were listening with an open mind.

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