Israeli strategic analysts on the 33-day war

I had a 3-hour-plus bus-ride this afternoon from Charlottesville to Washington DC, so I had a good chance to read the weighty study titled The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives that my friends at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (formerly the Jaffee Center) mailed to me. One of the co-editors in Shlomo Bron, whose previous work has usually seemed to me to be pretty clear-eyed, forward-looking, and non-ideological. And taken as a whole this latest volume lives up to his reputation.
The INSS’s decision to publish the report now is notable because the Winograd Commission, which is Israel’s official commission of enquiry into the leadership shortcomings revealed during the war, recently indicated that it has postponed publication of its final, definitive report, for a second time. The report, which is now expected to be made public “within a few weeks”, is also expected to have broad political repurcussions inside Israel, most likely including stepped-up efforts to bring down PM Ehud Olmert.
In the INSS book I was delighted, first of all, to see that basically, the key judgments made by its authors about what the war was about, and what its outcome was, tracked almost exactly with the judgments I made in this article on the topic, that I wrote in September 2006 and that appeared in the Nov-Dec 2006 issue of Boston Review. (Note to BR editors!! Please can you get the typo in that sub-title fixed!!)
Here’s what I wrote there:

    A careful examination of the course of the war reveals that, at its core, it was about two central issues: reestablishing the credibility of each side’s deterrent power and achieving dominance over the government of Lebanon.
    Both sides won the first contest. The ceasefire that went into effect August 14 has proved remarkably robust. Given that no outside force has been in a position to compel compliance, that robustness must reflect the reemergence of an effective system of mutual deterrence.
    In the second contest, however, Nasrallah has emerged the clear winner. Indeed, not only did Olmert fail completely in his bid to persuade Beirut to crack down on Hizbullah, but the destructive power that the Israeli air force unleashed upon Lebanon significantly strengthened Hizbullah’s political position.

Of course, the authors represented in the INSS volume, nearly all of whom are retired luminaries from the apex of Israel’s national-security, military, and intelligence bodies, have access to a lot more firsthand information than I could ever dream of amassing. And some of what they share here is very helpful indeed in rounding out our picture of what happened during the war. I found the contribution by Giora Romm (former deputy chief of the Israeli Air Force) particularly informative.
For example, on p.50 he spelled out that, “The Israel Defense Forces was the entity that proposed the list of political goals to the government.” Interesting, huh? (On p.29, Giora Eiland, who had been head of the National Security Council under Sharon, made clear that, “In the government meeting held on July 12, 2006, immediately after news of the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbollah, the IDF presented its recommendations. Government ministers were placed in a situation where they had only two options: either approve or reject the military’s proposal. Non-approval meant not doing anything, something which on that day was perceived as
impossible. The outcome was clear…”)
Anyway, Romm also presented what seems to be a verbatim version of this list of goals. Here it is:

    1. To distance Hizbollah from the border with Israel.
    2. To strike a significant blow against Hizbollah’s military capability and status, and thereby put an end to terrorism originating from Lebanon.
    3. To strengthen the deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah and the entire region.
    4. To correct the prevailing system in Lebanon, based on an effective enforcement mechanism that is supported by international involvement (this was later changed to “have the Lebanese government use the Lebanese army to impose its sovereignty over its entire
    territory”).
    5. To foster auspicious conditions for freeing the kidnapped IDF soldiers.
    6. To accomplish these ends while keeping Syria out of the war.

Romm also gives more information than I have ever seen pulled together before about the sheer volume of the IAF’s operations during the war. He writes (pp.53-4):

    1. The total number of sorties during the fighting was only slightly fewer than in the Yom Kippur War.
    2. The total number of attack missions flown during the fighting was greater than in the Yom Kippur War.
    3. The total number of combat helicopter missions flown was double the number flown in the first Lebanon war [1982], Operation Accountability [Lebanon again, 1993], and Operation Grapes of Wrath [Lebanon yet again, 1996] combined.
    4. The air force depleted its supply of certain types of armaments, resulting in a need for immediate stocks from overseas. [Oh, guess where from!]

But here’s the thing. Even with this massive rate of operations sustained over 33 days, Romm is quite frank in admitting that the IAF was still quite unable to destroy all the rockets Hizbullah had ready to fire against Israel, from South Lebanon. Indeed, he writes that, “The marginal effectiveness of the air force combat missions declined steeply as the fighting progressed.” The IAF was able to take out all or nearly all of Hizbullah’s long- and medium-range rockets. It was the short-range, Katyusha rockets that were stored and ready to use in the zone very close to Lebanon’s southern border that they couldn’t destroy. That was because these rockets have a very short “exposure time”– plus, their launchers are light and agile and easy to move around and/or hide.
On p.52, Romm presents what is presumably the IDF’s official count of how many Katyushas were fired against Israel on each day of the war. The daily average was probably a little over 100. What is notable from this chart is also that (1) There were indeed two days– July 31 and August 1– when Hizbullah fired no rockets; (there was an attempt at a humanitarian ceasefire in that period. Hizbullah kept to it. Israel did not.) Also, (2) There was apparently no rocket-firing after the Resolution 1701 ceasefire finally went into effect at dawn on August 14, but on the 13th, Huzbullah ramped up a sizeable “last salvo” of 250 rockets– presumably as a way to hammering home the “deterrent message” it wanted to send to Israelis, very similar to the hard-hitting one that the IDF tried to deliver to the Lebanese people in the last 48 hours before the ceasefire went into effect.
What that record also shows quite clearly is that throughout the whole war, and until and after its end, Hizbullah’s command-and-control systems continued in operation, essentially undented by the assault Israel had launched against them. (Several of the authors remark on that fact.)
In Appendix 2, Yiftah Shapir writes that the Israeli police reported that a total of 3,970 rockets landed on Israel during the war. On p.223, he adds that 52 “home front people” were killed by these rockets. A total of 2,412 “home front casualties” were reported, of which 1,318 were cases of clinical shock.
… Well, there is a lot more fascinating material in the book, but I’m afraid I don’t have time to tell you about it all right now. Still, because the full text is available (as a PDF) there online, you can go and read it yourselves, and we can carry on discussing it here.
Bottom line: Raw military superiority just ain’t as effective now as it used to be. Hey, friends in Israel, maybe negotiating workable final peace agreements with all your neighbors would be a better way to proceed??

17 thoughts on “Israeli strategic analysts on the 33-day war”

  1. Fascinating. So these were the IDF goals presented to Olmert after the Hezbollah action?
    If so what was the IDF success rate?
    Going through it:
    “Anyway, Romm also presented what seems to be a verbatim version of this list of (IDF) goals. Here it is:
    1. To distance Hizbollah from the border with Israel.
    SUCCEEDED. Hizbollah now regrouped behind the Litani River and separated from Israel by 11,000 Unifil and 15,000 Lebanese Army troops prevented by Hizbollah opposition from deploying before the war in line with UN SC resolution.
    2. To strike a significant blow against Hizbollah’s military capability and status, and thereby put an end to terrorism originating from Lebanon.
    SUCCEEDED. No attacks have been mounted against Israel or Sheba Farms since end of the war.
    3. To strengthen the deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah and the entire region.
    SUCCEEDED. As per success of goals 1 and 2.
    4. To correct the prevailing system in Lebanon, based on an effective enforcement mechanism that is supported by international involvement (this was later changed to “have the Lebanese government use the Lebanese army to impose its sovereignty over its entire
    territory”).
    SUCEEDED – as per success of goals 1, 2 & 3.
    5. To foster auspicious conditions for freeing the kidnapped IDF soldiers.
    UNSUCCESSFUL – except in negative/positive sense that the incarceration of the two IDF soldiers is not a political issue in Israel as compared to the fate of the REMAINS of dead IDF soldiers in Hizbollah hands after 20OO.
    6. To accomplish these ends while keeping Syria out of the war.
    SUCEEDED. Syria did not enter the war.
    On face of it, 5 out of 6 IDF goals achieved seems a fairly good check off for the IDF? Does this report confirm Israel actually won the war?

  2. BB, I wonder how much you actually know about Lebanon? It seems to me to be a lot less than most of the authors of this volume… Goal 1 certainly was not achieved. Hizbullah, including fighting units, are still right up against the border. The IDF’s extremely arge bombardment did, yes, “strike a significant blow” but t did not put an end to Hizbullah’s military capabilities, described by Israel as “terrorism.” Numbers 3 and 4 relate to those outcomes, as you also note. Number 5 was not accomplished. Number 6 was.
    Several writers in the INSS volume refer to Hizbullah– as well as the IDF– having emerged from the war with a significant degree of deterrent capability still in hand. These include Brom himself, Yair Evron (the “dean” of deterrence studies in Israel), Romm, and Gabriel Siboni.
    One additional point that several of these writers make, which i think is a good one, is that these goals as articulated by the IDF were actually more modest than the war goals proclaimed in public by the political leaders who talked in bellicose fashion about “destroying Hizbullah” and of course about not considering a ceasefire until the two captured IDF soldiers– not “kidnapped”, since they were neither children nor even civilians– were released. These bellicose statements by Olmert and Co at the time “over-sold” the war’s benefits to the Israeli public and made it a lot harder for the government to climb down and consider a realistic ceasefire even when, some 21 days into the war, it became evident that time was certainly not on Israel’s side the confrontation. The element of time in the war, which i dealt with briefly in my article, is considered at some length by some of the INSS authors.
    But anyway, my point here: even the (relatively) modest political goals articulated by the IDF on July 12 were not realized, except #6 and #2, in part..

  3. Government ministers were placed in a situation where they had only two options: either approve or reject the military’s proposal.
    Generals dictating strategies. Sounds familiar. Common Wisdom: The US government should have listened to Shinzeki and is listening to Petraeus. Clinton & Obama (and others) want to pull out of Iraq BUT they will listen to the generals (and do whatever they say). Hillary Clinton said “the threat of force is the strongest tool in our toolbox” and now the tool rules. In occupied Iraq (and Washington) Petraeus is the alpha male and Crocker does . . .what?
    Considering all the countries in the world probably Israel and the US have the only governments that let the military rule policy. That’s wrong. The US and Israel need a Harry Truman type who can say “the buck stops here” and “MacArthur–you’re fired”.

  4. “Clinton & Obama…want to pull out of Iraqz”
    No they don’t. Listen carefully to what they say. They fully intend to complete Bush’s imperialist project in Iraq. Clinton is typically more detailed and explicit about it. Obama is a bit more subtle, but neither of them intends to pull out of Iraq.
    The only presidential candidates who have made clear their intention to pull out of Iraq are Kucinich, Richardson, and Ron Paul.

  5. 1 “Hizbullah, including fighting units, are still right up against the border.”
    Helena, isn’t it the case that prior to July 2006 Hizbollah had enjoyed total control all of southern Lebanon since 2000? Didn’t it steadfastly resist allowing the Lebanese Army to deploy in the south for six years? Didn’t it have complete freedom of operational action against Israel, either by mounting attacks into Sheba Farms, or into Israel itself if it so chose?
    Isn’t it the case today that Hizbollah has been forced to regroup north of the Litani River, that its fighters still in the south do not bear arms in public, that there are 26000 Lebanese and mostly European troops in control of the area it once called its own?
    That there has not been one attack into Sheba or Israel since the war ended, but that Israel still overflies Lebanon at will?
    Surely that all adds up to the achievement of the IDF’s first stated goal: “to distance Hizbollah from the border”?
    2 “The IDF’s extremely large bombardment did, yes, “strike a significant blow” but it did not put an end to Hizbullah’s military capabilities, described by Israel as “terrorism.” ”
    But the IDF’s stated goal wasn’t to “put an end to” Hizbollah’s military activities but to put an “end to terrorism originating from Lebanon” The fact that no “terrorist” attacks have been mounted by Hizbollah against Israel since the war ended suggests that so far this stated goal has been achieved, as least as far as Israel is concerned?
    Since the evidence is clear that IDF goals 1 and 2 were achieved, so were goals 3,4 and 6.
    The point about the bellicose statements from Olmert & Co overselling the war aims to the Israeli public is well made.
    But, from the IDF perspective, what “benefit” would there have been been from a “realistic” ceasefire 21 days into the war? Would such a ceasefire have resulted in Hizbollah giving up its operational control of the south to the Lebanese Army and 11,000 foreign, mainly European (!) troops which has resulted so far – nearly 18 months later – in the complete cessation of Hizbollah attacks on Israel or Sheba?. Not very likely.

  6. Thanks Helena, for directing my attention to this Israeli report. I found parts of it chauvinistic, particularly in describing Hezbollah and Iran, diminishing it as an objective analysis.
    Additional recommended reading:
    How Hezbollah defeated Israel By Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry @ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/others/hezbollah.html
    Hezbollah : a short history
    Norton, Augustus R.
    Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2007.

  7. Apart from being -the least one can say “chauvinistic”- a merely destructive war
    with aims that were thwarted, by a few brave
    men and women of Hizbullah, these honorable people have saved the Arabs/Iran/Turkey, from a new Middle East a la Bush and his neo-cons,the middle east was unchanged, and secondly, the Israeli greed was thwarted from the Litani River.
    They can analyze what they want.
    We wish the people of Southern Lebanon, a very Happy Eid, and our enormous thanks. We will never forget them .
    I will never forget the prime minister of canada,Mr. Harper who praised the israelis for their measured response.
    33 days in Lebanon, God knows how it felt, Israelis showed the world their true colour. The images on our tv screens were sufficient to tell a bit of the savagery, that people under this kind of occupation experience day in and day out.
    Gaza!!! can not even begin, may humanity find those who have lost it. Whoever they are and wherever they might be.
    Read Uri Avery last article on Gazans.

  8. Apart from being -the least one can say “chauvinistic”- a merely destructive war
    with aims that were thwarted, by a few brave
    men and women of Hizbullah, these honorable people have saved the Arabs/Iran/Turkey, from a new Middle East a la Bush and his neo-cons,the middle east was unchanged, and secondly, the Israeli greed was thwarted from the Litani River.
    They can analyze what they want.
    We wish the people of Southern Lebanon, a very Happy Eid, and our enormous thanks. We will never forget them and their suppoeters.
    I will never forget the prime minister of canada,Mr. Harper who praised the israelis for their restrained response.
    33 days in Lebanon, God knows how it felt, Israelis showed their true colour. The images on our tv screens were sufficient to tell a bit of the savagery, that people under this kind of occupation experience day in and day out.
    Gaza!!! can not even begin, may humanity find those who have lost it. Whoever they are and wherever they might be.
    Read Uri Avery last article on Gazans.
    Can not agree more with your last paragraph: “Bottom line: Raw military superiority just ain’t as effective now as it used to be. Hey, friends in Israel, maybe negotiating workable final peace agreements with all your neighbors would be a better way to proceed??

  9. It would be interesting to read a “weighty report” from the Lebanese perspective.
    For example, what exactly did the Lebanese people gain from permitting a private militia to commit the country to war with a powerful neighbor?
    Was “Nasrallah’s emerging as a clear victor” worth the toll it took on Lebanon?

  11. Truesdell, you are rewriting history. The war was begun by the Israeli. They were only waiting for a pretext, or the capture of their two soldiers (who were wenturing outside of Israel) won’t have degenerated in a 33 three days war.

  12. Hezbollah and Israel had been playing “the game” for years without going to all out war. The difference this time being the July Hezbollah raid was such an astonishing success.
    “Was Nasrallah’s emerging a clear victor worth the toll it took on Lebanon?”Hezbollah and Israel had been playing “the game” for years without going to all out war. The difference this time being the July Hezbollah raid was such an astonishing success.
    “Was Nasrallah’s emerging a clear victor worth the toll it took on Lebanon?”<--Truesdell. The war was unexpected but Hezbollah rose to the occasion. It emerged from the war stronger, rather than weaker. Tactically, it was able to match much stronger IDF forces, and the rocket artillery campaign was a success. Was the war worth it to the Israelis? Definitely not. As the report points out, the Israeli leadership and IDF experienced many deficiencies. True the IDF/AF inflicted damage and casualties, but it could not stop the rocket artillery campaign. Most glaring of all, the ground campaign did not fulfill expectations and it was forced to disengage and withdraw. Israel came out of the war weaker, rather then stronger.

  14. Well if you compare the situation of 2006 to the previous Israeli offensives and occupation of the 1980’s, then you find that the Lebanese were better off with the successful defensive stand made by Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War.

  16. That’s right. The war was unexpected. The game that was being played out between the IDF and Hezbollah was cross-border raiding (involving troops and fighters, not civilians), for the purpose of taking prisoners in order to try and exchange them for captured fighters held by their adversary. Hezbollah has made promises to the families of hundreds of resistance fighters that have been taken prisoner over the duration of the previous occupation, that efforts will be made to get their loved ones back home. Both Israel and Hezbollah have engaged in this game. The July 2006 raid was one of these operations, and it happened to be a spectacular success. But in this instance, the Israelis decided upon major war, with all the terrible results inflicted to both Israelis and Lebanese.

  17. H’mmm. What did the Lebanese think back in late July 2006? World Public opinion tells us this:
    Eighty-seven percent of the Lebanese back Hezbollah’s response to “Israeli aggression,” the Beirut Center for Research and Information found in survey taken July 24-26. That included strong majorities in Lebanon’s four major religious groups: 96 percent of Shiites, 87 percent of Sunnis, 80 percent of Christians; and 80 percent of Druze.
    I’m looking for something more recent. I think the numbers have gone down some since then… But my parents barely survived the Blitz on London– launched with the exactly analogous goal of “breaking the population’s will.” Of course, it had the opposite effect to that intended– in both cases. Funny thing about the human psyche, eh?

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