Reidar Visser yesterday sent out an informative email note that
drew on his long and close study of the politics of, in particular,
Basra and the surrounding regions of southern Iraq to assess the
implications of Britain’s final withdrawal of the remainder of
its forces from downtown Basra and their redployment
(concentration) back to the bigger base near Basra airport that is now
the Brits’ only military base inside Iraq. (Can full British
withdrawal be far behind, I wonder?)
Anyway, I asked Reidar’s permission to publish this on JWN. He
explained that the note “is part of
an experiment
that was launched in January 2007 featuring occasional e-mail updates
exclusively for historiae.org
subscribers.” So if you want to read the whole thing, you have to
go there and subscribe. The good news: I don’t think you actually
have to pay him anything, or give him any personal details apart from
your email address in order to do so. So maybe y’all should
head on over and do that….
Meantime, here are the excerpts that he has kindly agreed I can use
here, along with a few of my own comments. He has also said he
will welcome yours, so chip on in.
Local Reactions to the British
Withdrawal from
Basra: Sadrists Claim Victory
4 September 2007
Perhaps the most
important aspect of the recent British withdrawal from the urban centre
of Basra to a base near the city’s airport is the reaction from local
political forces. So far, the loudest response has come from the
Sadrists, who publicly claim that their armed campaign led to the
British withdrawal.
… [T]he
recent pullout itself was a largely symbolic affair:
the British ceased exercising effective control of Basra a long time
ago.
Also Western
commentators – particularly in the United States – have suggested that
the Basra pullout represents “British defeat”. However, that judgment
rather exaggerates the differences between “gangland Basra” and what is
construed as the more “pacific” central parts of Iraq. The main
difference between the US and the British approach does not relate to
militia power as such, but rather to the extent to which there has been
an attempt to manipulate the political games in which the militias take
part.
In the south, the
British have largely maintained a neutral
position, with a variety of armed factions coexisting in some kind of
uneasy equilibrium, and with a diverse range of political forces
gaining power…
In the rest of Iraq, US forces have largely allied themselves with
Kurdish and ISCI parties and their militias (technically “integrated”
in the security forces and the Iraqi army), and have supported these
groups in their efforts to suppress internal dissent. Ideologically,
this has been presented as an effort to build a “moderate” base; in
practice it has involved giving consent to much highhandedness by local
authorities. Thus, repression and militia rule are not absent from the
US-controlled parts of Iraq, but they take on a more orderly form than
in
the far south.
(I would add in here that in the
US-controlled parts of the country the US forces have also found
themselves having to deal with the whole range of Sunni groups, a
factor that has made their task even more complicated than that faced
by the brits in the south. And of course,it was the over-all
policy pursued by the US in Iraq since 2003 that gave birth to and then
increased those problems… Actually, I question whether it’s
correct at all to describe any stark contrast between “gangland Basra”
and the more “pacific” environment further north, in general.
Baghdad, the triangle south of it, Diyala Province, and many other
areas are currently far from pacific. The only, demographically
relatively small “island” of peaceableness in the US-held,
majority-Arab part of Iraq is a portion of Anbar Province– the only
part of the whole country that was deemed safe enough for Bush’s recent
extremely “flying” visit. And who knows how long the current balance in
that portion of Anbar will even last? ~HC)
… Over the coming
months, both the position of the Sadrists and the further development
of militia relations in Basra will be crucial. There is some indication
that relations between Fadila (which remains in control of the
governorate despite a vote of no confidence) and Sadrists have improved
slightly during the summer… On the
other hand, ISCI has in the past been skilful in forestalling alliances
between its two main competitors in Basra, and, moreover, could now
benefit from the handover to Iraqi government forces.
Westminster-centric
analyses of the British withdrawal have pondered whether the timing was
linked to the Labour Party’s upcoming annual conference. (I am shocked! shocked! by this
siuggestion. ~HC) The more
important question is who will be Basra’s governor three months from
now. It would be a setback to the image of the Iraqi army as a “neutral
player” if the first thing to happen after the British withdrawal were
the ouster of Fadila and the fall of one of the last bastions of
resistance to ISCI rule in the Shiite parts of Iraq.
— end of Visser text
Okay,
here’s my (HC) one major remaining
comment on this. I saw a slightly twittish British officer on the BBC
tonight assuring viewers that the redeployment to the airport area was
“not a defeat”. Of course he had to say that. They all do!
Just like Ronald Reagan, as he pulled the US Marines out of Beirut in
February 1984 under the rubric of a “redeployment offshore”… Or Ehud
Barak pulling the Israeli troops out of Lebanon in 2000…
Well, at least on all those occasions the withdrawal redeployment
was carried out in good order and without casualties. The British
withdrawal from Basra and, I think, the US Marines’ withdrawal from
Beirut were also both, unlike the Israelis as they slunk out of Lebanon
that time, accompanied by short ceremonies of “handover” of the
relevant area to the relevant governmental forces. I certainly
saw a short newsclip of a slightly perfunctory-looking handover
ceremony in Basra on yesterday’s TV news: the whole decolonizing thing:
the Union Jack comes down, the national flag goes up, there is a bit of
saluting, and out the colonial forces roll…
Of course all of that– not just the handover ceremony but also the
withdrawal in good order, in general– requires some measure of
pre-negotiation to achieve in any minimally assured way. That is
what the post-Rabin generation of Israeli leaders have all hated.
Barak would slink out Lebanon, and Sharon out of Gaza… But they were
darned if they would negotiate, or be seen as negotiating, those troop
withdrawals with anyone.
So how, I wonder will the US approach the question of planning its
upcoming troop pullouts, even if only partial ones, from Iraq?
Will there be negotiations and little handover ceremonies here and
there? I do believe they’ve tried that in many places, and the
whole idea has probably lost a lot of its luster by now…
Anyway, Washington– and both political parties therein– will most
likely be eager to avoid any suggestion that this is a “defeat”.
Will they be able to pull off that feat of legerdemain? I highly
doubt it.
Also, how the heck will they actually get out of the country?
Even harder to do so if the Brits are no longer in Basra.
Anyway, big thanks to Reidar for letting me use so much of his
piece here. (In the parts I left out, you can learn some really
interesting further details of the political situation in the Basra
region.)
Riverbend just updated her blog.
in the south, the British have largely maintained a neutral position,
I doubt, Britt’s likes to play “the Man in the Dark” they are very diplomatic and softly doing there job out of the watching eyes.
Helena,
also found themselves having to deal with the whole range of Sunni groups,
Come-on Helena keeping the drams of Sunni Shiites its very boring song here as if its Iraqi faul yah?
US lost the hearts and minds for most of Iraqi because their ignorance and bad behaviours they demonstrated very well and the good prove Abu Graib saga,, or you telling us all those in Abu Grab are Sunni?
Just to remind you Helena if you forgot Tom Fox words he write Sanded In Baghdad:
I have to assume the racist attitudes of the security contractors stems from the necessity for a human being to dehumanize and marginalize another human being in order to kill them. Dehumanization is a mind game military-leaders the world over have used to indoctrinate recruits with and it also seems to be the case with these mercenary soldiers.
The colonialist attitudes are harder to grasp. Is colonialism something unique to white, male Westerners? (And I include myself in this category.) Do we see Iraq the same way as Kipling saw India, that of being “the white man’s burden” to bring Western civilization to the uncivilized Arabs and Kurds?
Those three days at the airport are woven deeply into my spirit. I’m wondering if I have swallowed poison that will harden or embitter me. Or perhaps I have been blessed with a homeopathic remedy of absorbing just enough poison to begin to cure me of my own subconscious racist and colonist tendencies and then be able to help others cure themselves. Time will tell.
“Do we see Iraq the same way as Kipling saw India…”
This reminds me of an ongoing “conversation” I have had with a young (I think), and apparently thoughtful, if terribly misguided, American military officer. In trying to convince me of the dedication of the Iraqi forces (i.e. the proxy occupation forces – my term, not his) he actually told me how in battle Iraqi troops will throw themselves in front of American troops and take bullets for them. I suggested that he go read Gunga Din, and see whether he could understand the colonialist racism in that, and then rethink what he had just told me.
The recent flurry of feature articles on Anbar has been quite entertaining. It is clear there has been some progress there, but Bush was not exactly on a visit to downtown Ramadi.
الجيش الامريكي يقتحم اذعة (العهد) في بغداد
2007-9-5
اقتحمت القوات الامريكية بقوة السلاح ،صباح اليوم الاربعاء ، مبنى اذاعة (العهد) في منطقة البلديات شرق العاصمة بغداد ، وقامت باحتجاز كل من كان فيه من صحفيين و فنيين و قطعت البث الاذاعي .
قاسم نعمان مدير العلاقات العامة في اذاعة (العهد) ، ابلغ مرصد الحريات الصحفية ، ان القوات الامريكية قامت وبشكل مفاجيء ، باقتحام مبنى الاذاعة وحطمت اثاثه وعبثت بمحتوياته ، وقال نعمان ان القوات الامريكية عمدت الى احتجاز كل من وجد في البناية من صحفيين واداريين وحراس امنيين بعد مصادرة اسلحتهم ، واضاف ان القوات العسكرية الامريكية اعتدت بالضرب على بعض الصحفيين و اغلقت مرسلات البث لمدة تزيد عن الساعتين ، اضافة الى تصويرها جميع العاملين في الاذاعة .
واوضح نعمان ان اغلب الصحفيين الذين تم احتجاز و الاعتداء عليهم من اذاعة (العهد)، هم اعضاء في نقابة الصحفيين .
وتاتي عملية اقتحام مبنى اذاعة (العهد)، بعد مرور اقل من خمسة ايام على عملية مداهمة تعرضت لها من نفس القوات ،
مرصد الحريات الصحفية يستغرب تصرفات القوات الامريكية ، التي تتعامل مع المؤسسات الاعلامية ايا كانت توجهاتها بانها وكر لمجاميع مسلحة ، و تقوم دائماً بحجز الصحفيين الموجودين في مؤسساتهم ويتم تصويرهم بوضعيات مختلفة شبيه بتلك التي تاخذ للمجرمين والمشتبة بهم . وهو امر يرفضة مرصد الحريات الصحفية ويجد انه لايتلائم اطلاقا ومبدئي الديمقراطية والحرية الذين تتدعي تلك القوات تبنيهما والتعامل على اساسهما . وبالتالي يطالب مرصد الحريات الصحفية القوات الامريكية بايقاف ممارساتها المهينه ضد المؤسسات الاعلامية العراقية وان تحترم الصحفي العراقي ولا تتعمد اهانته.
http://nahrain.com/d/news/07/09/05/nhr0905h.html
http://www.jfoiraq.org/Default.aspx
Basra: The soldiers’ tales
A sense of relief tinged with loss as troops reflect on a brutal campaign
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2927085.ece
I wish Americans would get over this idea that you can only either win or lose a war. Is it something to do with Americans’ attitude to sport? Perhaps they should play more soccer and cricket. Is it something to do with “The Frontier Spirit” we are starting to hear about again these days? There is a third alternative which is a draw . Think of how much better the world would be if in late 1914, after failing to capture Paris, the Germans had announced that they were prepared to retreat from all recently captured French territory and pay compensation to the French. Think of how much better the world is because Mikhail Gorbachev had the sense to realize that the Cold War was pointless and that it no longer served the purposes of Russia to prolong it. But, oh no, the bloody Americans had to crow on about how they had won the Cold War (which isn’t over yet!) and then ignored all the promises that they had made to keep out of Eastern Europe if the Russians withdrew. Think of how much better the Middle East would be if the Israelis accepted that the only way they can win against the Palestinians is by going all genocidal on them, that while one Palestinian remains resisting them, the Israelis have not won.
Any claim by the Mahdi Army that they drove the British out is crap, but why not give it a go, there might be a few idiots who believe it. From the lack of attacks on the withdrawing British troops, I suspect that even the most hardline members of the Mahdi Army don’t believe that claim and as to some last minute deal to allow the British to leave peacefully, I have very strong doubts. It is in the interest of all the militias operating in Basra to let the British go peacefully, why waste valuable manpower attacking the most potent “militia” in Basra when they want to get out. Far better to preserve your forces for the coming battles with the remaining militia. As one of the British soldiers said after the trip back to Basra Air Station, they could have hung on in there for years and killed an awful lot of Iraqis in the process. What would be the point? None whatsoever, they would just end up shooting at more and more people. It is just a shame that the British didn’t have the sense to pull out as soon as Saddam Hussein had been captured.
Back to Helena made comment when she said:
also found themselves having to deal with the whole range of Sunni groups,
First, I think we should realised that West Iraqi provinces were the first of Iraq Army who accepting US troops and their historical stand when the commanders form Ramady had agree to cooperated with US troops early time and continued that for awhile. This fact I don’t know how this went off from Helena mind?
Then today comes in the news telling us the new development happing with US hearts toward West Iraqis:
Yesterday’s Insurgents Are Today’s Allies in Iraq
U.S. officials see Sunnis’ shift as a sign of progress
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070909/17iraq.b.htm