Efraim Halevy, who was head of the Mossad 1998-2002 and Sharon’s National Security Adviser for a year thereafter, has an important article in this week’s New Republic in which he argues that– given the “dire straits” in which the Mahmoud Abbas camp finds itself, and the “dire straits” the Americans find themselves regarding Palestine– it will likely soon be necessary for a “Plan B” that involves concluding some form of “a long-term ceasefire” with Hamas (in Gaza) and Fateh and Hamas (in the West Bank.)
You can read the fulltext version of Halevy’s article here.
I find this article particularly interesting because if, as I suspect, Halevy represents a significant body of opinion in the Israeli security establishment, then we might indeed see Israel returning to some form of the intentionally “unilateralist” approach to the Palestinian question that marked its policy under, in particular, Sharon… and see this, moreover, in the context of a working agreement with the predominant trend in the Palestinian body politic– that is, Hamas– that would “allow” Hamas also to pursue its project of Palestinian rebuilding in a parallel but also unilateral fashion.
Which is where things looked as if they might be headed back in early March 2006, when I was able to spend a few days in Gaza and interview some Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Zahhar, and emerged with the clear sense that the project they sought there was to be able to pursue their own form of unilateralism in parallel with the Israelis. (See most that reporting pulled together in this mid-2006 Boston Review article. You can find some more detailed field-reporting of the interviews there here and here.)
In the BR piece, I wrote:
- Over the past nine months, the Israelis and the Palestinians have each witnessed far-reaching political upheavals. The specifics have been different, but both resulted from strong shifts in popular opinion against the concept of a negotiated peace. This repudiation was confirmed for Palestinians by Hamas’s surprise victory at the polls in January and for Israelis by the waning of the Labor Party and its former allies in the peace camp and the swift rise of Kadima, whose rallying cry has been the pursuit of unilateralist “solutions” in Gaza and the West Bank.
In the best-case scenario for the next few years, we would see each side forming a stable administration (with the Palestinians able to control all the unruly factions) and in parallel deciding to focus on domestic matters while postponing the conclusion of a final peace.
Certainly, inside both societies, many, many people are ready to simply turn their backs on the members of the other nation…
So here is Halevy, today:
- in the likely event that the joint Israeli-American plan worked out in Egypt to support Abbas and isolate Hamas fails, it will be necessary to move to Plan B. This plan is predicated first and foremost on accepting realities on the ground and turning them to the best possible advantage. Hamas has demonstrated that when in distress, it is pliable to practical arrangements on the ground. Therefore, parallel to maintaining pressure on Hamas on a daily basis, isolating it regionally and internationally, contacts should be established with Hamas to see if a long-term armistice with it can be obtained. It must be a tough eyeball-to-eyeball exercise in which Hamas is brought to a point where its self-interest dictates such an understanding. An armistice will entail provisions for maintaining security, ending arms smuggling into the Strip, et cetera. Until this is achieved, constant military pressure must be maintained. In scope, this could resemble the original armistice agreements negotiated and agreed to by Israel and the Arab states after the War of Independence in 1948-1949. At that time, too, the Arab states refused to recognize Israel–just as does Hamas today–but they nevertheless signed binding agreements with it. Armistice would not be a political determination of the conflict but a down-to-earth method of reducing tensions–a goal most essential, inter alia to American interests in the Middle East at large.
Parallel to this, identical agreements should be negotiated with Fatah in the West Bank. Fatah cannot pretend to represent Gaza, and it would be hard put to acquiesce in accepting Hamas, again as a limited player. Yet, should it refuse to do so, Fatah might face a West Bank implosion. This it cannot afford. Inter-Arab support for this construction must be sought. Both Fatah and Hamas must commit themselves to this arrangement at the highest Arab state level. It must ultimately be consecrated at the U.N. Security Council with strong U.S. support…
Should current policy in Washington and Jerusalem and Ramallah flounder, Plan B should be on the table for consideration six months from now.
Of course, history can never simply be respooled and replayed. If Zahhar, Haniyyeh, and Co. sounded strongly as though they might be ready for such a vision when I spoke with them in March 2006, that doesn’t mean they would be equally ready now. Between then and now, a lot of additional harm has been inflicted on the Palestinians, quite deliberately, by Israel and the US, with the express intention of trying to persuade the Palestinians to turn against the Hamas leadership that had emerged as the result of a free election campaign and fairly conducted elections… And then, there was the arming, training, and activation of the Palestinian ‘Contras’ under Dahlan’s command (and doubtless with the planning help of the Svengali of the original Contras scheme, Elliott Abrams.)
Hamas and the broad networks of Palestinians who support it showed that neither the lethal, anti-humane pressure of the economic siege nor the military pressure of the Dahlanists could force them to cry “uncle.”
Also, the US position in the whole region has deteriorated quite significantly from what it was 15 months ago.
But still, it is interesting to see Halevy coming back with that proposal there.
Interesting, too, to see the clear-eyed way in which this very well-informed Israeli securocrat challenges the Bushists’ ignorantly perky assessments of the situation in the region with his own battalions of facts:
- Hamas is indeed in dire straits. But, unfortunately, it is not the only party to be experiencing a tough predicament. Whereas Mubarak initially condemned the Hamas takeover, naming it a military coup directed against Abbas, he clearly changed his tune a day after the summit and said he would be sending back his military mission to Gaza the moment things cooled down. He even hinted that there might still be room for reconciliation between the rival Palestinian factions. Similar sentiments were echoed by Qatar (the Arab states’ representative on the U.N. Security Council), Russia, and others.
The Ramallah government of Salam Fayyad is apparently also in dire straits. In recent days one commander after another has been dismissed for incompetence in the recent Gaza debacle. There have been arrests in the West Bank of Hamas operatives by government forces, but all know that, were it not for Israel’s almost daily incursions, security cannot be maintained. Israel wishes to move “hard and fast,” as Livni said, in tandem with Abbas; but what timetable can Abbas offer for establishing complete and effective control of the West Bank? When and how can he restore authority in Gaza? Can he negotiate a political settlement with Israel ignoring Gaza? How many real divisions does he have here and now? How many will he have in six months’ time? And if, as he said this weekend, he will hold new general elections isolating and banning Hamas from participation, what credibility will the results have in the eyes of the public? Can he hold credible elections in the West Bank alone if, as is clear, he cannot restore any vestige of his authority in the Gaza Strip. His call this weekend, in Paris, for the dispatch of an international force to take over control of Gaza and to facilitate the participation of the Gazans in the planned elections is testimony to the world of fantasy in which he is now functioning. Nobody will send troops into Gaza to uproot Hamas, and Abbas must surely know this because his French hosts made this clear to him.
Further afield, the United States is similarly in dire straits…
On a related note, in this earlier post I wrote about the shambolic state of internal disarray inside Fateh since the debacle in Gaza two weeks ago. How deep is that disarray? I would say, very deep indeed, with the main piece of evidence on that coming from the fact that Fateh co-founder and longtime leader Hani al-Hassan felt obliged to criticize those Fateh factions (read Dahlan) that had taken money and weapons from the US and Israelis in order to fight Hamas… And then, Abu Mazen felt obliged to fire Hassan from his role as “presidential advisor.”
The tireless Badger has helpfully given us more details, in English, of what Hassan said on Al-Jazeera on June 28:
- Moderator: In statements on the program “No boundaries”, Hani al-Hassan, a member of the Fatah central committee, accused a faction within the [Fatah] movement of associating itself with the plan laid down by General Keith Dayton, the American security coordinator between Israel and the Palestinians, the gist of which plan was to ignite the fires of internal fighting. But he also said Hamas went [beyond what was necessary] in its reaction to the events in Gaza.
Tape of al-Hassan interview: “What Dayton was trying to accomplish was to find a faction that believes in internal fighting; but what was surprising to us in Fatah was that Hamas went beyond reacting to the Dayton faction, and this was a big surprise, because the actual takeover of power in Gaza did damage to the democratic idea”.
Moderator: Hani al-Hassan also stressed that what happened in Gaza was the collapse of the plan of the American general Dayton.
Tape of al-Hassan interview: “What really collapsed was the Dayton Plan, and what collapsed with it was the small group of his collaborators who believed in the American point of view. As for the Fatah movement, the Fatah movement did not collapse in Gaza, because 95% of it has no relationship with that Plan.”
If Abu Mazen really has broken definitively with Hani al-Hassan– or, the other way around– then that is huge. At this point, and given his very long history in the Fateh movement (which you can read about in my 1984 book on the early years of Fateh, still in print today!) Hassan probably has a lot more credibility among Palestinians both inside– and perhaps even more crucially, outside– the homeland than anything Abu Mazen can muster.
I shall watch with interest the further fallout inside Fateh… Or maybe, I’ll go back and re-read my December 2005 lament to the “current, cascading collapse of Palestinian secular nationalism.”
Helena, I propose the following-Israel current move to release tax monies collected from Palestinians is, so largesse. Should the interest earned on this tax revenue also be returned to the Palestinians as well?
This seems reasonable to me-
KDJ
Don’t you know that collecting interest is haram?
From Halevy’s article: “It must be a tough eyeball-to-eyeball exercise in which Hamas is brought to a point where its self-interest dictates such an understanding. An armistice will entail provisions for maintaining security, ending arms smuggling into the Strip, et cetera.”
I don’t think that he is talking about the formula suggested by Hamas, in which Israel comply to Hamas preconditions concerning borders and the right of return. We’re probably beyond that point now and, as you say, “history can never simply be respooled and replayed.”
KDJ,
What makes you think that the tax money won’t be returned with interest? It’s been held in escrow, and I think that returning the interest is standard procedure. What do you think: That we held their money for the interest?
If you prick us, do we not bleed?
if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison
us, do we not die?
What makes you think that the tax money won’t be returned with interest? It’s been held in escrow,
JES, Can you give us prove for what you stated?
could you name for that trust holding the money?
Helena, speaking as a relative latecomer to your site – that Dec 2005 article was simply excellent, so informed and so (to me) heartrending in many ways. The comments exchange between you and Jonathan Edelstein provided even more illumination, especially when reading it all for the first time in light of recent developments.
I would dearly like to know your assessment of the Salam Fayyad emergency cabinet? Is this cabinet representative of the oft called “third way”? What is Fayyad’s relationship with Abbas and the PLO/Fateh old guard? How many points of consensus would there be between Fayyad’s cabinet and Hamas? What possibililty is there of a coming together on strategy, tactics and providing competent government in Palestine?
Am reading that Hamas has taken custody of Galid Shalit. My feeling is this is a very positive step all round, but would very much like to read your perspective?
What makes you think that the tax money won’t be returned with interest?
Foreign Minstry spokesman Mark Regev announced the escrow balances would/i> pay interest when the boycott was announced in Feb 2006:
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1139395445429&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
Of course he knows that Islam prohibits the receipt of interest altogether. Perhaps it’s a trap!
What is wonderfully revealing about this debate is the nerve struck here-rather than attempting a rational discussion, petty, irrelevant issues are raised-such as whether interest is relevant to Muslim religion-interesting given that not all Palestinians are Muslim, moreover, not all Palestinians are religious-thus a spurious argument indeed-
JES, and others-A question-given the extremism and history of the Likud, i.e. Livni’s status as a former Sharon aide (Sabra and Shatilla), should aid be withheld to Israel?
While I deplore Hamas’s ideology, I also deplore the utter violence of the Likud-what are your thoughts?
KDJ,
First of all, I believe it was you who brought up the original “petty, irrelevant” issue by questioning whether Israel would pay interest accrued on funds it held on account for the PA. I’ll write this off to ignorance on what is generally accepted in such matters. Of course it strikes a nerve when you imply that we would intentionally try to profit from the freezing of PA assets. Who do you think we are, the United Nations? (BTW, that’s humor, as was the quote from “Merchant of Venice”.)
In response to your question, first of all I am a member of the Labour Party, and I oppose most of the Likud’s positions and their basic ideology, and have done so even before there was a Likud. But then, I know what those are. I’m not certain that you do, or that you even know what the Likud is.
You then bring up this – wholly irrelevant, I believe – issue of Tzippi Livni’s having been an “aide” to Arik Sharon. Just for the record, Livni was 24 years old, and probably a student at the time of Sabra and Shatila.
I would suggest that before bringing up the history of the Likud, you actually take the trouble to find out what that history is. You might learn, for example, that the Likud party is not monolithic – either in its ideological underpinnings or in its membership. So, I’m not certain what you mean by the “utter violence” of the Likud. There are some pretty non-violent types and personalities in that history. I would also remind you that the Likud is not in power today, but that is another issue.
I would also remind you that the Likud is not in power today…
That’s only because the present members of the Knesset won’t call new elections and risk losing their parliamentary privileges.
For better or worse, Kadima is finished (Bush has an approval rating that Olmert would die for)…and Netanyahu is virtually certain to be the next Prime Minister.
The growing strength of the Yisrael Beiteinu Party moves Israeli politics to the right and Bibi, like Sharon before him, will be the centrist.
Truesdell,
You may want to take a look at these survey results:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/878894.html
The Israeli electorate is very fickle, and a lot can change between now an elections. When push comes to shove, people neither like nor trust Netanayhu – particularly because of his economic policies.
As for Yisrael Beiteinu, I haven’t seen anywhere that they are gaining popularity.
jes
I’m sure you know much more about Israeli politics than me, an outsider.
My assumptions, perhaps mistaken, were that Kadima without Sharon has no constituency, particulary given the demonstrated incompetence of Olmert…that sephardic jews with their larger families and russian immigrants, given their experience with “socialism”, tend to tilt right…that Barak is admired as a general but lightly regarded as a politician…and that many Israelis, rightly or wrongly, are now inclined to give more credence to Netanyahu’s past expressed views regarding the withdrawal from Gaza.
Personally, I think it mistaken to try and apply the types of demographic models used in the US to Israel elections. As I said, the electorate tends to be fickle, and that fickleness tends to run across blocs. (Even the two groups that do have some tendency to vote en bloc – haredim and Arabs – have been known to go against expectations.) To speak of “spharadim” today as a separate electoral group simply has no basis in fact, and Russian immigrants have historically tended to spread out over the spectrum as they integrate generally into society.
Now, if Kadima’s constituency had been solely based on Sharon, the party would not have done as well as it did in the last elections, after it was quite apparent that Sharon was not coming back. True, Olmert had a terrible approval rating as a result of the war, but he has survived and, as the article I linked above cites, his recent approval ratings have grown significantly. A lot can change, and a lot will depend on the Vinograd Committee report due out shortly.
I will say that the Kadima leadership made two brilliant political moves that may impact the next elections, when they come around.
The first was when Sharon made Netanyahu an offer he could not refuse to become Finance Minister. This placed him in a no-win situation. If he failed in improving the economy as he had the last time he was Prime Minister, then that failure would end his political career. Succeeding meant fairly draconian moves that would seriously impact the middle and lower income groups in Israel. This is what happened, and he is certain to suffer from being portrayed as an uncaring Thacherite in the next elections. (I saw him a few months ago, and the idiot is still delivering lectures where he expounds on the Laffler Curve – a tautology that no one buys any more, I think.)
The second brilliant move was by Olmert right after the war when he brought Lieberman and Yisrael Beiteinu into the coalition. Lieberman, who initially formed his party as a stalking horse for Netanyahu, was, I believe, completely taken in here. Olmert’s only intention was to threaten Labour with a move to the right (again, with Lieberman as the stalking horse) should the party bolt the coalition. The ploy appears to have worked. Today, Lieberman has no influence whatsoever in the government, and his occasional threats to leave the coalition have been met with yawns. I would not be surprised if, when elections finally do come, many Yisrael Beiteinu MPs simply defect directly to Kadima to keep their seats. Lieberman has a good chance of going the way of Raphael Eitan.
I don’t think that Netanyahu’s pre-withdrawal stand on Gaza will be at all effective. I think that most people understand that this is just campaign talk, and that he really doesn’t believe what he says. Furthermore, apart from a very small group of extremists, I don’t think that anyone is at all unhappy about Israel not being in Gaza. To use an analogy from the Hamas Covenant, if Palestine is “the navel of the globe”, most Israelis see Gaza as being slightly south and round on the other side.
issue of Tzippi Livni’s
Perfect family history tells more!
“Stagnation works against those who believe in a two-state solution,” Livni said in our first conversation. The West, she suggested, needs to tell Hamas, the Islamist movement battling Fatah for control of a Palestinian movement now split between Gaza and the West Bank, that it must not only recognize Israel’s right to exist but also “the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, which is not that obvious anymore.”
The Jewish state has been tied to the Livni family with a special bond since zero hour. For Livni, personal history is national history. Her parents were among the first couples to marry in the newborn state, the day after its foundation, on May 15, 1948. Her father, Eitan, served as operations chief for the Irgun, the Zionist guerrillas who used what would today be called terrorist methods to blast the British out of Mandate Palestine. Her mother, Sarah, was also an Irgun fighter; she suckled her daughter on visions of Eretz Israel, the biblical “Land of Israel,” including Judea and Samaria on the West Bank. Territorial compromise for peace had no place in the family lexicon. It was the weak talk of the peaceniks.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/magazine/08livni-t.html?ref=world
I don’t know if one adopts political positions from “suckling”, but the article goes on to state the following (which speaks to KDJ’s original comment about Livni – and Sharon):
It was with Sharon that Livni made her fundamental ideological break: from a defender in the right-wing Likud Party of an Israeli state on all its biblical land to the idea of land for peace, embodied in the evacuation of Gaza in 2005 and the promise of a further withdrawal from the West Bank.