I was reading Paul Rogers’s latest contribution to Open Demcracy, at the end of which he considers the question of whether Tony Blair will be able to have any impact at all in his new role as the envoy of the “Quartet” to Palestinian reconstruction and reform effort. In it, Paul lays out a fairly long list of things Blair ought to do if he wants to succeed, including being “prepared to engage in around five years of low-profile, media-averse effort”, etc etc… And then he concludes that “Under such circumstances, it is just conceivable that Blair might have a useful role to play.”
There are a number of structural problems in Blair’s role that Paul fails to mention, however. These include:
- 1. The fact that Condi Rice and others US officials have made quite clear that Blair’s “mandate” (hah! evocative word in this context, don’t you think?) from the Quartet does not extend to Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking but only to overseeing and boosting some aspects of internal Palestinian reform.
2. The intractability of these internal Palestinian reform efforts so long as (a) the (US-goaded) Fateh leadership continues to refuse to share power with Hamas, since Fateh itself is in a shambolic state of internal disarray and quite incapable of building any functioning national institutions on its own; and also, Hamas remains a potent force in Palestinian politics in the West Bank and the diaspora– not just in Gaza.
3. The utter intractability of these internal Palestinian reform efforts so long as (b) the Israelis do nothing significant to dismantle the West Bank chokepoint/checkpoints that prevent the West Bank’s economy from functioning at any even minimally acceptable level.
4. The pointlessness of these internal Palestinian reform efforts so long as (c) the Israelis make no significant engagement with serious, final-status peace diplomacy. Various ‘peace processors’ over the past 40 years have imagined you could build a tractable and functioning Palestinian leadership in a vacuum, quite insulated from the repeated smash-ups in the peace diplomacy. You can’t. If there’s no progress visible towards final-status peace you might have a functioning Palestinian leadership– but it won’t be “tractable.”
5. This diplomacy doesn’t have five years to wait. If the overlords of the Israeli settlement project continue pouring their concrete over the West Bank for even the next 1-2 years at the same rate they’ve been going, there won’t be any viable two-state peace. Indeed, the whole region might be in an uproar.
Re the first point above, I was in a conversation with a couple of very savvy people last week in which they were speculating as to why one earth Blair would even think of taking a job with such a very, very limited “mandate.”
“Blair has to know he can go to Bush any day he wants and get his mandate changed,” one of these guys said. “It doesn’t make any sense for him otherwise? Why on earth would he take on the job if he can’t take on the crucial, Palestinian-Israeli aspect of it?”
Well, it is true that Bush owes Blair… big time!
But for Blair to elbow his way into the diplomatic portions of this job and then to hope to succeed at it– well, he has to be prepared to take on not only Condi but also Cheney and the whole ranks of maximalist pro-Israelis who are so deeply embedded within the whole US political system, not just the White House.
Does he have the guts as well as the smarts required to do this? I remain unconvinced. For all that he seems– especially by comparison with our own head of government here in the US– to be something of an intellectual “genius”, he is still someone who evidently lets his heart (or who knows what) rule his head when it comes to vital matters Middle Eastern. I mean, as I wrote a number of times in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Brits should— given their long and frequently harsh experience in Mesopotamia– have known much better than to give any support at all to Bush’s criminally ill-conceived invasion and “transformation” plan there…
So why should we think Blair could be any smarter over Palestine, today, then he was over Iraq five years ago?
Especially, given that he has done absolutely nothing to signal any second thoughts, reflectiveness, or real self-awareness about the terrible, terrible mistakes he made in 2002-03.
It would be great if he could rise to the moment and do something helpful in Palestine. But this man? Given his track record, I doubt it.
You are right, it continues to be a puzzle why Tony Blair accepted the role of envoy of the Quartet. He is unlikely to succeed, except in prolonging the present situation, which I myself would not call success. It is highly likely that whatever reputation he continues to have may well be ruined.
So why, if seen from his own personal point of view, did he accept? I really cannot see the logic. The only thing that one can say is that the decision conformed to that taken over the invasion of Iraq. A decision taken as requested by Bush, against his own personal interests, and against those of Britain (which has never been likely to benefit from the Iraq war).
It is one of the great mysteries of our time.
Of the arguments trotted out, you can prefer the psychological if you like – his religion, his preference for right-wing regimes, his mania for publicity. His psychological need to be in front of the cameras is certainly important, but still difficult to see why that would make him do something that is quite likely to wreck his reputation as a statesman. If I were such a person, departing from prime ministerial office, I would do anything to keep the gravitas of the elder statesman. But it does not seem to bother him.
I still think the closest logical explanation is simply blackmail. Bush-Cheyney hold something against him, which keeps him in line. I have no particular reason to suppose that such a situation exists, and it seems unlikely. But it is the only explanation I have for really quite bizarre behaviour.
“He is unlikely to succeed, except in prolonging the present situation, which I myself would not call success…” Nor would I but Blair might. As Helena points out the strategy is to keep people distracted while the settlement process accelerates and the “facts on the ground” blot out the 2-state option. Blair is good at keeping Europeans and Americans distracted because they identify with him. The fact that the rest of the world regards him as a puppet is irrelevant: the views of the rest of the world have never been taken into account (check out those General Assembly resolutions)nor will they be. The essentialy colonial nature of modern Zionism is exemplified in this disregard of the “natives.” To them the challenge is clear: “You may be right but what are you going to do about it?” In order to understand the phenomenon of terrorism it is necessary to recognise that the strategists in Washington and Tel Aviv (London and Paris too) welcome it. The last thing they want is a “mental fight” a logical and well informed discussion within the parameters of civilised debate. That they would they lose but massive military force versus naked humanity striving for justice is, they believe, a cakewalk. That is their real mistake.