How likely is a dramatic Bush shift on Iran?

In the post I put up here in the wee hours of this morning, I was writing about the (perhaps fairly divergent) assessments that the secretary of Iran’s Expediency Council, Gen.Mohsen Rezai, and the US reporter Michael Hirsh have of the likelihood that President George W. Bush might, within the 18 months remaining in his presidency, enact a “dramatic” shift towards de-escalating the US’s currently still high level of tension with Iran.
This morning, I just went back into that post to clarify the paragraph dealing with that issue a little bit.
I started to add in my own assessment of the likelihood of such a shift, but then I realized that was fairly diversionary from the main thrust of the post. Plus, it meant that my own assessment got buried ways down near the bottom of the post. Bad idea!
So here’s my assessment of the likelihood of such a shift. I would it put it at above 50%, for the following reasons:

    1. With every week that passes there is still a fairly high chance of either a fairly catastrophic event befalling some portion of the US forces distributed widely throughout Iraq, or a much broader catastrophic collapse of the entire US position in Iraq (through collapse of the supply lines, or whatever.) In the event of such a catastrophe, which could– if it occurs while the US troops are remain as widely and vulnerably distributed as they have been under the “surge”– directly threaten the lives of many hundreds of US soldiers, the US authorities will feel a strong need to do whatever it takes to stabilize the situation in Iraq and find a way to concentrate their forces back within more easily defensible perimeters prior to extracting a good portion or perhaps all of them completely.
    It is important to “realize” at this point that the US citizenry really doesn’t believe in this “mission” in Iraq any more, whatever it is. That means they (we) would be very upset– to put it mildly– by any further large-scale US losses at all. We are also now deep into the next election.
    “Whatever it takes” most certainly could (and in my view, should) include talking seriously to the Iranians about all the outstanding matters at issue between the two nations. (The agenda of the whole Grand Bargain, that is.)
    2. The faction now becoming more powerful within the Bush administration is not composed of neoconservative ideological numbskulls like those who controlled the presidency from 2001 until recently. Condi Rice might continue to reveal herself as an intellectual (and moral) lightweight. But Cheney’s influence has been waning appreciably, while Defense Secretary Gates– who is a realist in strategic affairs much more than he’s an ideologue– has quietly been increasing his degree of control over the levers of strategic decisionmaking. (He was even able to force the early exit of Joint Chiuefs Chauir Peter Pace. That was a good sign.)
    I would wager that Gates and those who are working with him are acutely aware of the risks described in #1 above. From Gates’s point of view, as someone who presumably wants to do the best possible job he can under the lousy circumstances he agreed to take on last November, avoiding those kinds of catastrophe would be far, far better than responding to them.

I should also note that there’s another aspect of this question to be addressed, linked to the dynamics of next year’s phase of the US election, when the contest may really heat up in a polarized, party-political way.
We absolutely should not assume that the Democrats would be more dove-ish, on issues relating to Iran, than the Republicans. This, because of the much stronger role that pro-Israel lobby money has within the Democratic Party than in the GOP.
That is, the Dems might be more noticeably more dove-ish than the Republicans on issues linked to Iraq alone; but put Iran’s strategic weight into the mix there as well and the matter becomes far less clear-cut.
So the pro-Grand Bargain Iranians (such as Rezai seems to be) may well prefer to at least start the talks on the GB agenda as soon as possible, so that the Bushites (Gates-ites?) don’t have as much fear that by sitting down with “the mullahs of Tehran” they might get badly mauled next year by the mutually competing Democratic candidates. By then, the Bushites might even hope to have some significant achievements they could point to, from their diplomacy with Iran.
For a US administration that has as few achievements as the Bushites currently have– especially after their immigration reform plan went down in flames last week–I am sure the attractions of pulling off some kind of a “Nixon to China” diplomatic/strategic coup with Iran must seem pretty alluring to at least some of the more intelligent and visionary people inside the administration? But I think they’d better get this underway pretty fast.
Maybe Rezai should put just a little more on the table to tempt Washington to act quickly?

18 thoughts on “How likely is a dramatic Bush shift on Iran?”

  1. If Bush tries to reduce tensions with Iran, the Democractic candidates Clinton or Obama will be the first to criticize him and insist the US take a more militant stance. If the GOP candidate in 2008 proposes any moderation or primary recourse to diplomacy, Hillary Clinton will ask him why he dare coddle an enemy of Israel and, to offer voters a choice, promise to go to the brink and bring the mullahs to their knees, blah-blah-blah. The question is not whether she will go as far as possible to out-hawk the hawks, but whether her likely secretary of state, Dennis Ross, would be able to pull back the reins and institute some pragmatism.

  2. Yes, I gather that Dennis is making a bid to be named Hillary’s Sec of State… However, I don’t think that is very likely. He really doesn’t have the strategic or conceptual heft for the job…
    On the big issue you raise, I do believe that after US voters’ experience of having been jerked (by the Israel lobby, along with some others) into the horrible war with Iraq, their (our) susceptibility to this kind of actively belligerent political manipulation with regard to Iran will be a LOT less effective.

  3. Mao welcomed his nemesis, Nixon, because he wanted to scare off the Soviets. Nixon shared Mao’s desire to weaken Soviet influence. By piercing the vail of monolithic communism, Nixon also disarmed the domino theory to allow disengagement from Vietnam. Vietnam’s strategic import was marginal to the USSR, China, or the Soviet Union. The ideological solidary was meager. The big ussues were IBCMs, MIRVs, ABMs, and nuclear submarines.
    By contrast, there are no Fausian bargains to exchane with Iran. The regime needs the patriotism inspired by external confrontaiton, or it will disolve due to domestic conflicts. Ahmadinejad could not be on TV kissing Bush unless Iranians were convinced this was necessary to avoid the threat of a Greater Satan. None of Iran’s neighbors, other than Shiites in Iraq, will take any comfort in normalization. Iran cannot deliver any peace in Iraq or demobilize the Shiite militias. Afghanistan, likewise, is beyond Iran’s control. Both neighbors will go on smouldering. There are two other elephants in the room: oil and Israel. Neither dictates any specific outcome, but both are strategic interests unlike Vietnam’s primary export, coffee. The caffeine lobby is far less ideological, geographically concentrated, or oligopolistic.
    Something else: Mao and Nixon were both cynics. They knew how to use ideas and fears to wage ideological wars, but both were coldly skeptical about people’s root motives. Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad and Bush both have their own self-flattering ideas of a true faith and expect their opponents to suddenly join the ranks of believers. If spurned, they are both too apt to revert to a “wid us or agin’ us” or “forces of light and forces of darkness” mentality. There is too much that the correography of a summit would founder over some witless remark or preachy confrontation.
    In other words, there is no assurance that any grand 9th inning peace gesture by Bush would yield anything. As in the case of the immigration reform package, it might well cause everyone to be upset and earn nothing but ridicule.

  4. Very interesting points jkoch, even as I don’t subscribe to your take on AN or broader Iranian foreign policy “culture.” First, patriotism in Iran is hardly inspired only by external threats. Iranians would be overwhelmingly delighted at reductions in external tensions, provided they got respect in the process, both locally and on the world stages. (That’s called “nationalism” — and it’s at work regardless of one’s position within Iranian “factional” struggles.)
    Second, AN is hardly the key cog in the Iranian foreign policy apparatus… (though AIPAC & co are desperate now to portray Iran as now “AN’s regime” — so they can tag the “nazi label” on the entire system as “ideological” or “irredeemable”)
    That said, AN for his own reasons realizes he’s in deep domestic political trouble; even hardline Iranian papers are now inclined to write him off as a lame duck (for a series of policy problems at home, including the recent gasoline shortages)…. Yet I can see AN calculating political gain to be had were he to somehow be given some credit for reducing the fires from Iraq & the US, without, as he so often says, “giving up Iran’s rights.” (it’s a long shot sure, but not inconceivable.)
    But rather than AN, I’m more inclined to see key go-betweens called in to pull this US-Iran “grand-bargain” off — among the realists on both sides…. (from Bush I to Rafsanjani eras, if not those particular names, then several key lieutenants to both come to mind….)
    I also am puzzled by your reference to none of Iran’s neighborhood (other than Iraq’s shia) favoring a lessening of the US-Iran tension level. (The Pakistanis are quite peeved over it, as are the Indians; and surely the Saudis & the GCC players would heartily prefer “jaw jaw” over a sectarian bloodbath and disruption of oil shipping spreading to their side of the Gulf… Then too the Turks & Iranians share intense concerns about Kurdistan….)
    Much more possible here….
    As for Iran not being able to pull strings with Shias or assorted allies in Iraq or Afghanistan, it seems like a damned if they do, or don’t scenarios…. US generals are again (today) trying to pin the tail of Iraqi trouble on Iran…. and the phrase “pro-Iranian militants” is being lamely bandied about to excuse US troops from firing into convoys where Iraqi civilians get killed…. (that’ll only work w/ the US media)
    Remember too Iran’s critical role in setting up the Karzai’s compromise government for Afghanistan — or Iran’s role (via Rafsanjani then) in resolving the US hostage mess in Lebanon. (via a belated re-insertion of IRanian $$ & influence)
    It seems Iran gets frequently blamed as mythically “behind all regional problems” — but then the same critics don’t want to see Iran has having any potential role in defusing the same problems (that they supposedly are major players in….)
    Again, the possibilities are much worth exploring here…

  5. Re the attitudes of the Sunni Arab majority state leaders to a de-escalation between Washington and Tehran, I can report quite unequivocally that based on the conversations I had in the Middle East earlier this year– with well-connected people from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, (Sunni Kurdish) Iraq, Jordan, and Syria– that ALL, without exception were extremely worried by the prospect of any further deterioration in US-Iran relations, and they definitely supported the moves being made by Saudi National Security advisor Prince Bandar and others to de-escalate those tensions.
    The whole claim the Israelis and their friends have been trying to pump up, that the Sunni Arab-dominated states are all eager to join a US-Israeli coalition against Iran, has zero basis in fact. (I have written about this, here on JWN and in the CSM, etc.)
    Yes, the SAD states do have some concerns about getting (once again) “left out of the regional picture” in the event of a purely bilateral US-Iran Grand Bargain. (As I mentioned in my earlier post here.) But those concerns can be met in ways other than impeding the progress of the GB, as I had indicated there. And certainly they are not strong enough to push the SAD states into a US-Israeli war coalition against Iran.

  6. Excellent reminder Helena. And here’s the quick exclamation point I put on your CSM essay earlier this year: https://vintage.justworldnews.org/archives/002376.html
    I also think your point for the Iranians not procrastinating this time is worth emphasizing — that even if the Democrats win, the next administration might well be every bit as hawkish and/or even more difficult to deal with, especially during what BQuandt so well chronicled as American Administrations’ long “learning” curves and sluggishness in getting up to speed on Mideast realities. (e.g., it took Clinton over six years — and his near breakthrough came AFTER Ross left….)
    Recall too with Bush I… he came into office saying to Iran, “goodwill begets goodwill.” Wise words – never seriously tested. But then a few events intervened — Berlin wall came down, Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush got “firm” with the Israelis…. while the economy stalled…. and in came Clinton, in part beholden to “the lobby”….
    So yes, you’ve raised an important point – one that I hope Iranian players are also considering….
    Iranians have gotten burned before playing waiting games with US politics…. (e.g., the presumed thesis of “October Surprise” – circa 1980)
    Alas, the temptation may still be there to await for the departure of both Bush & AN (Iran’s elections are presently slated for early 2009)….
    But that again assumes that AN “runs” the foreign policy show in Iran…. which he doesn’t.
    By the way, to throw out another idea, I’m wondering too if Rice needs to become history before this can happen…. Maybe Stanford can make her President for us.
    So then who would become SOS? Hadley, Burns – both disasters. I’d prefer Sen. Chuck Hagel… ! If anybody could pull off a solid negotiation with Iran – it’d be CH.
    Dream on. Cheney would likely have his office bugged.
    As Helena and I have both repeatedly suggested here, both sides have compelling interests in a “grand bargain,” sooner rather than later.

  7. I’m sorry, this would all be lovely but it isn’t going to happen until 2009. Just today, a bloke who was on the Presidential staff until June has been pointing at Iran as the cause of that grab-and-execute operation that killed 5 GI’s. That’s an act of war and I’ve been seeing things like that all summer and in a crescendo. IMHO, Gates isn’t to be trusted. He will follow a direct presidential order and Cheney is effectively our President, our Shogun as Scott Horton put it recently. If we’re really lucky nothing will happen until the next Administration but I’m not feeling real lucky. A grand bargain with Iran would be a rational thing to do, which means Bush will never allow it. He and Cheney are crazy.

  8. Scott,
    As for Iran not being able to pull strings with Shias or assorted allies in Iraq
    I think you missing things here Scott?
    Iran flooded Iraq with thier Iranian’s Shiites, what we see in Basra, Omarra, Summwa, Dewanynia now and Nasyriah, most southern Iraq cites, its all battles between Iranian and Iraqs unfortunatlly this confilicted suppoered by vary Iraian alid power in Green Zone and here forced which is veri Iranian as know.
    Just last thing here remember last battle in Karbala when (The Solder of Sky) its was between Iranians and Iraqi you need to under stand whats going inside Iraq very carfully Scott….

  9. There is a ZERO chance of a China type reproachment towards Iran. ZERO. My guess of the chances of an ATTACK on Iran are about 70% that we DO. And when it happens the democrats will cheer along with the neo-cons.
    Helena, once again you are projecting your own desires on the administration, as though they are reasonable, thoughful people. They are not! We will bomb Iran for the reason you say there is a chance we won’t. In an attempt to grasp victory from defeat. They REALLY believe Iran is behind all our troubles in Iraq. So as a last ditch effort to ‘win’, they will attack Iran.
    Once again, I will ask it; Has nobody here been paying attention to these people? They live in bizarro world, where everything is the opposite. War brings peace (in their world view), destruction is ‘birth’.
    You people should read Glen Greenwald.
    .

  10. Yes, it appears that war with Iran figures highly into the presidential aspirations of Hillary and O’bomba (lebanon)…If the contest came down to Rice versus either of the 2, I would support Rice anyday of the week.

  11. Or, perhaps it is simply time for the reactionary regime of the mullahs to simply disappear from the pages of history.

  12. Salah, never mind your tone, do you really buy the al-qaeda line that all the hell in Iraq is just a replay of Karbala? Or the neocon line that all the violence in Iraq is somehow fed by Iran?
    If so, were you a source for Michael R. Gordon’s latest Judith Miller nomination: (this one obviously was written in advance with insider, embed cooperation with the US military)
    http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/world/middleeast/02cnd-iran.html?_r=2&hp&oref=slogin&oref=login
    I have a hunch that the new NYT ombudsman yelled foul and they forced a mild, more defensive re-write today, with John Burns as co-writer:
    http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html?hp=&pagewanted=all
    Notice this quote in the fifth paragraph of version 2:
    “But some critics said the evidence was circumstantial and charged that the Americans appeared to be offering a new rationale for maintaining or increasing the military commitment in Iraq.”
    This is a long story, but nowhere are those critics named, nor are the reasons behind the doubts explained….
    The New York Neocon Times at its worst….

  13. Salah, never mind your tone
    How irony by some people get talking like this way in a discussion, likewise many talking about Iraq in same talking we can say their tone should be very concerning isn’t?…
    Don’t put your thoughts and your media propaganda in my mouth.
    As before Iraq war when your same media with all propaganda machine makes you believes the lies and launched a war against Iraq which killed hundred of thousand damaging a complete state and rune 25 millions of life because your media and those “very intelligent writers and analysis’s” put their lies in your media, how sick was that…keep your media links for you don’t lecturing others by your links we knew them very well we had the experiences for more than 30 years if not more..

  14. Sorry Salah, but I can’t follow your meaning or substance of your latest run-on, particularly the last bit about “keep your media links,” so I won’t even guess on the tone.
    Michael R. Gordon indeed was one of the key “psuedo-journos” (as Helena called him) who was a loud “tub thumper” for the neocons in getting us into the war against Iraq.
    I’m no doubt among many (of various persuasions) this time determined to at least expose his tendencies, and yesterday’s example was another “fine” one.
    One media analyst of good repute has now caught it too:
    http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/columns/pressingissues_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003607047

  15. Mr. Koch finds a reasonable place to begin,
    None of Iran’s neighbors, other than Shiites in Iraq, will take any comfort in normalization. Iran cannot deliver any peace in Iraq or demobilize the Shiite militias. Afghanistan, likewise, is beyond Iran’s control. Both neighbors will go on smouldering. There are two other elephants in the room: oil and Israel. Neither dictates any specific outcome….
    A good start, but there is a whole herd of other missing elephants that are a little smaller than Petroleum and Zion, but also more immediately connected with the idea of a grand bargain between the Gatesites and the Islamic Republic. I am flabbergasted that the words “nuclear” or “nuke(s)” do not occur in HC’s original with eighteen comments. Neither do “HizballĂĄh” nor “HamĂĄs.” There is no mention of that $75 million that Congress seems to have authorized for the subversion of Iran.
    Perhaps somebody would spell out what this “bargain” is to be and what makes it so GRAND?
    It is nice to find Dr. Cobban taking some account of the militant Republicans for a change, but she rather falls off the other side of the horse by suggesting that they’ll make a deal with the Islamic Republic for reasons of domestic politics exclusively. It’s true enough, I’d say, that the GOP geniuses have recently been reduced to legacy-hunting, but there are certain limits to what sort of Success and Victory they can plausibly parade after painting themselves into the particular corner they are in. I can’t myself imagine Dubya doing it — or imagine America buying it if he did.
    Mr. Koch once again seems sounder when he doubts that Nixon in China has anything much to do with the present case.

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