Olmert on peace prospects, etc

Somebody seems to be spinning the line to AP’s Matti Friedman that Olmert’s response to the Arab Peace Plan is generally positive. But it is quite weird for Olmert either to hail the Arab states’ current restatement of their support for this five-year-old plan as marking a “revolutionary change”.
It is also bizarre that Olmert should try to claim that the proceedings of the Arab summit now underway in Riyadh– to which the Iranian Foreign Minister has also been invited– show that the Arab states now judge they “may have been wrong to think that Israel is the world’s greatest problem.”
Does Olmert not have information at all about what has been going on in Riyadh? And wWhy on earth would an ASP reporter not seek to insert a little fact-based reality of his own into his reporting of the PM’s spin?
Anyway, it is interesting that Olmert, who along with the rest of the Israeli political elite damned and/or ignored as quite irrelevant the Arab Peace Plan when it was issued back in 2002, now feels obliged to try to find something faintly positive about exactly the same plan.
So I’ve been reading the English-Haaretz version of the current Olmert pressathon. Basically, he’s been giving long interviews to the major Israeli print media, “to mark the first anniversary of his tenure as PM”– but also, presumably, to try to reverse the sag in his political fortuned that has taken his ratings down to around 3 %.
Olmert expresses some basic confidence in the stability of current governing coalition. And Israeli friends whose judgment I respect generally agree with this assessment… the argument there being that most of the other, smaller parties that re in Olmert’s current coalition have so much reason to fear the outcome of any imminent holding of another election that they prefer to hang in there with Olmert.
There is this:

    Olmert opened the policy section of the interview with an optimistic declaration: “Gentlemen, I believe that in the next five years, it is possible to arrive at a comprehensive peace agreement with the Arab states and the Palestinians. That is the goal. That is the effort, the vision.”

But then, almost immediately, this:

    This week Olmert hosted the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He rejected ideas of making rapid progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, of a shortcut to the final-status settlement, and committed himself only to biweekly meetings with the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), at which confidence-building measures will be discussed. Rice had hoped to leave Jerusalem with a dramatic declaration on the revival of the peace process, but had to make do with a lukewarm statement.
    “There was no real disagreement between us and the Americans,” the prime minister explains. “There were very interesting and very productive discussions. All told, we said that there is no point in a bypass route, and that we have to confront the Palestinians and oblige them to fulfill commitments.”

“Confidence building measures”!! After 40 years of military occupation, this is all they are discussing? (While the Israeli concrete mixers and bulldozers continue their relentless work of transforming the human geography of the entire West Bank… How about the question of fulfilling past promises– or holding to the requirements of international law– as being equally applicable to both sides, Ehud??)
Then, this:

    Olmert believes that various factors in the past year – the Second Lebanon War, the growing fear of Iran, and extremism – have pushed Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, into a different perception of the regional reality. “A bloc of states is emerging that understands that they may have been wrong to think that Israel is the world’s greatest problem, and that maybe it is worthwhile to reach an understanding that includes acceptance of Israel’s existence,” he says. “I very much hope that the conference of Arab states will contribute to this.”

Does he have any idea of history and causality? The very same Arab Peace Plan that without a doubt will be endorsed and reconfirmed by the current Riyadh summit is five years old. So how, exactly, does he conclude that the events of the past year have pushed the Arab states into any kind of a downgrading of the priority of the Palestine question??
The journalists there, Aluf Benn and Yossi Verter, press him a little on the fact that nothing his government has done militarily regarding Gaza– either taking military actions or refraining from taking them– has yet stopped the firing of Qassam rockets from northern Gaza into Israel…
Then, there is this:

    Did you miss an opportunity to renew the talks with the Syrians?
    “I want to make peace with Syria. Unequivocally. But we all know – and the Palestinian experience also shows us – that there is a disparity between declarations and a credible process, which can also bring about a correct outcome. It is not enough for someone to make a vague declaration through some court journalist. I want to arrive at the possibility of peace with the Syrians, and when I believe that the conditions are right, I will not miss the opportunity.”
    What are those conditions?
    Olmert is mysterious: “Conditions that make negotiations possible, and everyone with any experience of negotiations with the Syrians knows about them.”

“Mysterious” is one word for it. “Evasive” would be another.
More intriguingly, Olmert clearly implies that it was soon after he assumed the acting premiership, four days after Sharon had his debilitating strokein January 2006, that he started orchestrating the changing of the strategic plan for Lebanon to focus it on the “massive retaliation” approach we saw in July:

    “I have dealt with the Lebanese issue since January 8, 2006 – four days after Arik [Sharon] fell ill and I assumed office. We deployed for the possibility that what happened in the end, would happen. Throughout these discussions, there was total across-the-board agreement, by all the security elements and by the civilian echelon, that it would be impossible not to respond differently from the way we did in the past. Some said that the absence of a response would cause strategic damage to Israel.
    “All these processes led to determination of a position well before July 12. When I was asked by the army why I wanted to see the plans, and why I wanted to consolidate a clear position far in advance, my answer was very simple. I didn’t want to reach that day and then start from scratch. I wanted to know where I stood, the considerations for and against, what was on the agenda, what the damage would be in each scenario – and then to reach a conclusion.
    “All these matters were presented to the cabinet in great detail, and the entire cabinet, 24 ministers, voted unanimously in favor. It is true that I am the prime minister and I bear supreme responsibility, but still, there were 24 ministers there, and they voted unanimously in favor. What they told the Winograd Committee later, what they said or didn’t say, I don’t know.

Anyway, lots of interesting points there… But I don’t have time to comment any more.

10 thoughts on “Olmert on peace prospects, etc”

  1. Why would it be at all “weird” or “bizarre” that Olmert would say these things? He’s a politician giving interviews aimed primarily at a domestic audience, so of course he feels compelled to portray the Riyadh summit as an Israeli accomplishment and to give some reason why he’s reacting differently from five years ago. He’s also being pulled different ways by his coalition partners, so he’s probably still formulating a policy and he doesn’t want to give too much away to the media. The surprising thing would be if he answered any other way.
    In any event, I’m not sure the 2007 rollout of the Arab peace plan can be characterized as “exactly the same” as 2002. The words haven’t changed, but the Saudis are now presenting the proposal as a baseline for negotiation rather than an absolute demand, and the “Arab side” has dropped a lot of hints that it will show flexibility on the potentially deal-killing refugee issue in the event that negotiations get started. Sometimes context is everything.
    Anyway, I hope this initiative works. The region has come heartbreakingly close to peace a couple times, and it’s about time someone made it happen.

  2. Remember the Gaza withdrawal? The impetus for that was the corruption investigation of Sharon that was approaching an indictment. The planned Gaza withdrawal made Sharon the “indispensible man” so indictment plans had to be shelved. The current corruption investigations of Olmert are now reaching a critical stage also, according to Haaretz, so he must come up with some distraction. This is probably a bigger worry for Olmert these days than his weak coalition and low public standing. Imminent charges with a real possibility of imprisonment does focus the mind. The new Labor leader , to be chosen soon, will not be the pushover Peretz, and Olmert’s troubles will mount.

  3. “”Confidence building measures”!! After 40 years of military occupation, this is all they are discussing?”
    Yes, because that comes during a period of nearly 60 years of non-recognition. In addition, when Israel has taken steps that would have ended the occupation in its entirety (final status negotiations such as Camp David and Taba) or in part (removing every single Jewish resident from Gaza), such steps have been met with MORE hostilities and an even MORE rejectionist (and explicitly racist) Palestinian leadership. This has, unfortunately, required Israel to continue its military occupation, in some cases even more stringently than in the past, when there was no peace process.
    You repeatedly make the mistake of placing “the occupation” as the central problem.

  4. Olmert’s optimism is probably to do with the widely reported meetings a few weeks ago between Saudi and Israeli diplomats. Also, in an unprecedented move, an official representative of the Israel press was invited to the summit. This is a signal of de facto recognition.
    Saudi diplomacy needs to be placed in the context of the prodigious efforts Egypt and the Gulf States made to mediate the Galid Shalit kidnapping and the Palestinian unity govt and their combined efforts to buttress the Siniora government. Events are moving apace.

  5. Confidence building would be for the Saudis to get on a plane and go to Jerusalem and have some friendly talks with turkish coffee on the table. What is their mental block with normal dialogue, transparency, and dealing with other human beings openly.
    They may have to deal with non-moslems, but Israel is their cousin as they share the same imperial uncle.
    Any Saudi on the board can explain that?
    I mean a real Saudi, not a western mouthpice on the Saudi payroll.

  6. Isn’t this just more of the “rehabilitation” we saw in the last year of Sharon’s consciousness? Even today you’ll read people all over the Net deploring Sharon’s demise because, according to them, he was the only Israeli who could have brought peace to the region, completely ignoring his execrable record of human rights atrocities, the targetted assassinations he launched every time it looked like a little progress might be made, not to mention his repeated statements, well-reported in the Israeli press, that he would NEVER cede a single dunam of the West Bank Settlements — *his* West Bank Settlements — to the Palestinians.
    Just as with Sharon, it’s important for the Israeli Right to muster as much support in the U.S. for Olmert as they can, especially considering how unprecedentedly unpopular he is in Israel and the fact that all of his rivals are either even older than the comatose Sharon, batsh*t crazy (Netanyahu), bumbling and incompetent (Perets) or under indictment for crimes even AIPAC can’t whitewash (pretty much everyone else).
    Just watch: Bush will be acclaiming Olmert as a “Man of Peace” some time before the end of the year. And conscience-stricken American Jews will comfort themselves that he’s not THAT bad.

  7. The Israel Right has no interest in boosting Olmert. They hate him. The Israeli right is hoping that Bibi Netenyahu will get back into power.
    It was difficult to figure out what Sharon was up to, not just because of his past record but because he had different advisors and spokespeople who said different things. In retrospect, it seems that whatever Olmert actually said came to pass.
    Olmert basically reflected not an Israeli rightist feeling but a general consensus feeling. Specifically, the occupation would have to end, but that there was no one reasonable to deal with on the Palestinian side. The disengagement was the result of that thinking.
    Not everyone knew where it was going to go. Some people may have thought that they’ll just get out of Gaza, then parts of the West Bank, then be done with it. Others thought that this would eventually lay the ground for negotiations.
    The disengagement is looked upon disfavorably by many Israelis, in part because it was met with heightened violence from Gaza, and the capture of soldiers from both sides. So Olmert’s initial talk of “more of the same” from the West Bank isn’t going to go anywhere. On the other hand, the dissatisfaction with Olmert’s performance hasn’t resulted in overwhelming sympathy for the settlers or a renewed “Greater Israel” mentality.
    The Saudi/Arab League proposals at the very least are an improvement from the prior “three no’s” but there is still a lot of distrust on the Israeli side, because when Israel has tried to unilaterally leave, it faces more violence. And when Israel has tried to negotiate, it faces more violence.
    Under such circumstances, there will inevitably be popularity for the Netenyahus and Liebermans in Israel, because at the very least they tap into that discontent. But ultimately the Israeli people still seek peace, even if they don’t think that it can really come under these circumstances. So even if a right wing party is elected, they will find that any Greater Israel desires are at least partly constrained by both domestic and international constraints. Netenyahu and his kind can whine and moan a lot, but ultimately can’t do very much different.

  8. Hard to believe there are still individuals to be found flogging that long-dead “there was no one reasonable to deal with on the Palestinian side” horse, code for “the Palestinians won’t agree with everything we want.” The only people who believe that old chestnut can be found only in Israel, New York and maybe Barney and his master from Crawford, Texas.

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