Annotated Lieberman


Why We Need More Troops in Iraq

By Joseph Lieberman
WaPo, Friday, December 29, 2006

Text HC notes
A.

I’ve just spent 10 days traveling in the Middle East and speaking
to leaders there, all of which has made one thing clearer to me than ever:
While we are naturally focused on Iraq, a larger war is emerging. On
one side are extremists and terrorists led and sponsored by Iran, on the
other moderates and democrats supported by the United States.
Iraq is
the most deadly battlefield on which that conflict is being fought. How we
end the struggle there will affect not only the region but the worldwide war
against the extremists who attacked us on Sept. 11, 2001.

Holy Joe is now playing a big role in helping to
propagate the terms of the new, quite content-free, “moderates versus extremists”
discourse being used by the Bush administration with reference to the Middle
East and other areas like the Horn of Africa.

Where administration people used to speak about the main battle-lines
being drawn between (good) “democrats”and (bad) “terrorists”, it’s become evident– even to them– that those lines and categories have become blurred and are no longer as useful as they were.  Um, some
of the people most invested in the “democratic” process turned out to be
Hamas and Hizbullah? And many of the US’s staunchest allies in the Middle
East are strongly anti-democratic; and they’ve even on occasion engaged
in acts of violence that looked strangely, um, terroristic? Finally, the
administration people started to notice facts like these!  Hence, the
segue to the more content-free terms of “moderates”  and “extremists.”

You can see Holy Joe easing the transition between these two discourses
here by conjoining the terms used on each side of this fence.

Suggestion from very good friend who’s also a M.E. specialist: “Couldn’t
we just stick to ‘white hats’ and ‘black hats’?”

B.

Because of the bravery of many Iraqi and coalition military personnel
and the recent coming together of moderate political forces in Baghdad,
(1)
the war is winnable.
(2) We and our Iraqi allies
must do what is necessary to win it.

(1) What on earth is he talking about here?  Did
he draft this article before he understood that the  political maneuver
of forming a new, anti-Moqtada political coalition had failed?

(2) Nonsense.  Nonsense on stilts.  Extremely dangerous nonsense.

C.

The American people are justifiably frustrated by the lack of progress,
and the price paid by our heroic troops and their families has been heavy.
But what is needed now, especially in Washington and Baghdad, is not despair
but decisive action — and soon.

The most pressing problem we face in Iraq is not an absence of Iraqi
political will or American diplomatic initiative, both of which are increasing
and improving; it is a lack of basic security. As long as insurgents and
death squads terrorize Baghdad, Iraq’s nascent democratic institutions cannot
be expected to function, much less win the trust of the people. The fear
created by gang murders and mass abductions ensures that power will continue
to flow to the very thugs and extremists who have the least interest in
peace and reconciliation.

D.

This bloodshed, moreover, is not the inevitable product of ancient
hatreds. It is the predictable consequence of a failure to ensure basic
security and, equally important, of a conscious strategy by al-Qaeda and
Iran, which have systematically aimed to undermine Iraq’s fragile political
center.
By ruthlessly attacking the Shiites in particular over the past
three years, al-Qaeda has sought to provoke precisely the dynamic of reciprocal
violence that threatens to consume the country.(2)

(1) Here, what he intentionally conjoins
are al-Qaeda and Iran, both of which are subsumed into his general category
of “Islamic extremism”.  Doing this, (a) intentionally excludes the
importance of the indigenous Iraqis who make up the vast bulk of the Sunni
resistance forces; (b) paints all Sunni resisters as simply part of the worldwide
network of “al-Qaeda”; and (c) implies that there is some fiendish confluence
of interest between Iran and al-Qaeda.  All of these are serious analytical
mistakes that obstruct Joe’s ability to understand what’s going on in Iraq
and help lead to his very misleading policy prescriptions.

(2) True. But note point 1a above.

E.

On this point, let there be no doubt: If Iraq descends into full-scale
civil war, it will be a tremendous battlefield victory for al-Qaeda and
Iran. Iraq is the central front in the global and regional war
against Islamic extremism.

Iraq is a vital locus for a much broader regional
contest, certainly.  But this contest is not simply– as Joe implies– a
two-sided power struggle between “our” side (a.k.a., the “moderates”) and
“Islamic extremism”.  It’s a much more complex and nuanced struggle
for regional influence involving a larger and ever-shifting caste of characters.
 Inside Iraq right now the main actors are, on the one hand, the US and its allies, and on the other, Iran and its allies (who are not all Shiites, and do not include all the Shiites.)  Other significant actors in this power contest include: a range of Sunni groups spanning a broad and probably still fairly fluid spectrum from secular nationalists of a more Arabist or more Iraqist orientation, through indigenous-Iraqi Islamists, through a small number of foreign Islamists; the well-armed Kurdish parties; tribal networks, some of which cross national boundaries and even sectarian fault-lines; Israel (which should not be thought of as acting always with the same
motivations as Washington); Turkey; various Saudi interests; and several other smaller powers and interests.

Joe misses all this nuance and simply lumps all the “Islamic” actors together.  And he argues
on the basis of the assumption that there is no possibility for “the west”
to reach any form of accomodation with Iran over Iraq.  But the US
has been able to maintain a sustained accomodation with Iran in Afghanistan,
so why not in Iraq?  Why the strong desire to sustain this– actually,
deeply unsustainable– posture of “global and regional war” against Iran
there?

F.

To turn around the crisis we need to send more American troops while
we also train more Iraqi troops and strengthen the moderate political forces
in the national government. After speaking with our military commanders
and soldiers there, I strongly believe that additional U.S. troops must
be deployed to Baghdad and Anbar province
— an increase that will at
last allow us to establish security throughout the Iraqi capital, hold critical
central neighborhoods in the city, clamp down on the insurgency and defeat
al-Qaeda in that province.

At the present stage of the breakdown of the pro-US
order in Iraq, I judge that even doubling the number of US troops there
could not achieve the tasks he delineates, and I don’t know of anyone whose
opinion on strategic matters I admire who reaches any different conclusion.

I know Holy Joe is a man of strong “beliefs”, but let’s have a facts-based
not a beliefs-based approach to this question?

G.

In Baghdad and Ramadi, I found that it was the American colonels,
even more than the generals, who were asking for more troops. In both places
these soldiers showed a strong commitment to the cause of stopping the
extremists. One colonel followed me out of the meeting with our
military leaders in Ramadi and said with great emotion
, “Sir, I regret
that I did not have the chance to speak in the meeting, but I want you to
know on behalf of the soldiers in my unit and myself that we believe in
why we are fighting here and we want to finish this fight. We know we can
win it.”

This is an interesting vignette, actually, since
it strongly implies that this colonel had been sitting in a meeting in
which his military superiors had been painting a far less than rosy picture
of the military situation to their senatorial visitor.

And then, this question of the pro-surge lower ranks who stand in contrast
to the largely surge-reluctant top brass?  Well, it depends who you
talk to, doesn’t it?  AP’s Will Weissert
wrote

from Baghdad yesterday that “Many of the American soldiers trying to
quell sectarian killings in Baghdad … say the temporary surge in troop
levels some people are calling for is a bad idea.”  Basing his report
on “dozens of interviews” with infantry soldiers as they patrolled the
streets of eastern Baghdad, he found that,

many said the Iraqi capital is embroiled in civil warfare
between majority Shiite Muslims and Sunni Arabs that no number of American
troops can stop.

Others insisted current troop levels are sufficient and said
any increase in U.S. presence should focus on training Iraqi forces, not
combat.

But their more troubling worry was that dispatching a new wave
of soldiers would result in more U.S. casualties, and some questioned
whether an increasingly muddled American mission in Baghdad is worth putting
more lives on the line
.

These guys seem very realistic to me.  I wonder how much
recent patrolling experience Joe’s colonel there had had?

H.

In nearly four years of war, there have never been sufficient
troops dispatched to accomplish our vital mission. The troop surge should
be militarily meaningful in size, with a clearly defined mission.

More U.S. forces might not be a guarantee of success in this fight,
but they are certainly its prerequisite. Just as the continuing carnage
in Baghdad empowers extremists on all sides, establishing security there
will open possibilities for compromise and cooperation on the Iraqi political
front — possibilities that simply do not exist today because of the fear
gripping all sides.

I saw firsthand evidence in Iraq of the development of a multiethnic,
moderate coalition against the extremists of al-Qaeda and against the Mahdi
Army, which is sponsored and armed by Iran and has inflamed the sectarian
violence.(1) We cannot abandon these brave Iraqi patriots
(2)
who have stood up and fought the extremists and terrorists.

(1) See B (1) above.  Yes, I guess he did
draft it before Sistani and Hakim
threw a monkey-wrench

into the isolate-Moqtada plot. Also, note the highly inaccurate use of the “moderates vs. extremists” discourse in this sentence. Is there any evidence at all that the coalition the US was trying to assemble ten days ago against Moqtada was more “moderate” or “multi-ethnic” than the anti-occupation alliance he has been trying to assemble? No. But the pro-US forces have to be called “the moderates” and the anti-US forces “the extremists”. That is the only real content of these terms in the official US parlance.

(2) This concern expressed for the wellbeing of the puppet forces is exactly
analogous to that expressed in pre-2000 Israel for the wellbeing of the
puppet SLA people.

I.

The addition of more troops must be linked to a comprehensive
new military, political and economic strategy that provides security for
the population so that training of Iraqi troops and the development of a
democratic government can move forward.

In particular we must provide the vital breathing space for moderate
Shiites and Sunnis to turn back the radicals in their communities. There
are Iraqi political leaders who understand their responsibility to do this.
(1)
In Anbar province we have made encouraging progress in winning
over local Sunni tribal leaders in the fight against al-Qaeda and other terrorists.
With more troops to support them, our forces in Anbar and their Sunni allies
can achieve a major victory over al-Qaeda.(2)

(1) See B (1) above.

(2)  Again, the Sunni insurgents in Anbar are described as mainly
“al-Qaeda terrorists”, though with the one small, vague reference to “other”
terrorists, as well.  By ignoring the deeply Iraqi roots of
the anti-occupation forces in Anbar (and elsewhere), Joe seriously mis-states
the situation.

Also, where is that “enocouraging progress” in Anbar?  Show us, Joe!

J.

As the hostile regimes in Iran and Syria(1)
appreciate — at times, it seems, more keenly than we do — failure in Iraq
would be a strategic and moral catastrophe for the United States and
its allies.(2) Radical Islamist terrorist groups, both Sunni and
Shiite, would reap victories simultaneously symbolic and tangible, as Iraq
became a safe haven in which to train and strengthen their foot soldiers
and Iran’s terrorist agents. Hezbollah and Hamas would be greatly strengthened
against their moderate opponents. One moderate Palestinian leader told
me
(3) that a premature U.S. exit from Iraq would be a victory
for Iran and the groups it is supporting in the region. Meanwhile, the tens
of thousands of Iraqis who have bravely stood with us in the hope of a democratic
future would face the killing fields.(4)

(1) On what basis does he describe the regime
in Syria as “hostile”?  The U.S. is not in a state of war with Syria.
 Syria maintains a full embassy in DC, and the Syrian president repeatedly
requests the US to resume the role it played in the 1990s in brokering a peace
agreement with Israel. The Syrian regime has given non-trivial  support
to the US military campaign in Iraq and has cooperated in the broad campaign
against jihadist terror groups– including by torturing suspects rendered
to it by the US.

Describing Syria as “hostile” is technically quite untrue– but it helps
to fan the flames of  US hatred and belligerency against it.  Not
coincidentally,  a sizeable group of US neocons is still agitating for
a US campaign of “regime change” in Syria.

(2) The US has already failed in Iraq, though Holy Joe is unwilling to acknowledge
this.  This failure can still, however, be handled in a number of different
ways: through serious, good-faith international negotiations that can minimize
the damage suffered by the US and all other parties; or by delaying such negotiations,
and thus making some kind of “catastrophe” all the more likely.  The
course he advocates is of the latteer type.

(3) Unsubstantiated hearsay.  I wonder which “moderate Palestinian
leader” this was and why such a character is dragged into the argument at
this point?  Could it possibly be that Joe hopes that attributing this
warning to a “moderate Palestinian” gives it more credibility than attributing
it to one of the many friends and relatives Joe Lieberman has in Israel?

 Come to think of it, it’s altogether very weird that this particular
senator, writing about the Middle East, doesn’t even mention Israel and its
interests even once.  This seems like a rather clear case of “the dog
that didn’t bark.”  Are you trying to hide something here, Joe?

(4) See H (2) above.

K.

In Iraq today we have a responsibility to do what is strategically
and morally right for our nation
(1) over the long term — not what appears
easier in the short term. The daily scenes of death and destruction are
heartbreaking and infuriating. But there is no better strategic and moral
alternative for America than standing with the moderate Iraqis(2)
until the country is stable and they can take over their security. Rather
than engaging in hand-wringing, carping or calls for withdrawal, we must
summon the vision, will and courage to take the difficult and
decisive steps needed for success and, yes, victory in Iraq.(3)
That
will greatly advance the cause of moderation and freedom throughout the
Middle East
(4) and protect our security at home.

(1) In general, I agree.  However, the content
of  “what is right… for our nation” should certainly be open to discussion.
 I am strongly convinced that ending the occupation and entering into
a new, more productive, respectful, and egalitarian relationship with all
the rest of the nations of the world is to do “what is right for our nation”– as well as for the rest of the world.  I judge, too, that if we follow the
escalatory course Joe advocates it will be disastrous for us and for everyone
else involved.   So let’s have a little less of the certitude-based
sermonizing here, and a bit more real analysis and reflection on, actually,
what kind of a place do we want the US to occupy in the world.

(2) Ah, those “moderates” again….

(3)  Okay, so the senator is asking Americans to make a large-scale commitment
to this escalation in Iraq.  What is he, personally, prepared to contribute
to this?  Does he encrouage all his younger family members to enlist
in the armed forces?  Does he forthrightly tell his constituents
that we will have to seriously raise taxes and cut government funding for
social programs in order to sustain the military escalation he seeks?  If
I see him do these things, then I will have more respect for the sincerity
of his views.  Haven’t seen it yet.

(4) “Moderation” (again)… and this time allied to the kind of  “freedom”
that’s exported on the tip of a cruise missile.

8 thoughts on “Annotated Lieberman”

  1. Helena
    This guy has been smoking whatever Mr Blair was smoking two weeks ago and they are singing from the same hymn sheet.
    I drew your attention to Mr Polks piece on Juan’s website where he is picking up the same noises the FT was picking up a couple of weeks ago.
    I mentioned that I hadn’t seen the signs that preceded major military action when you worried out loud. Now I am starting to see them.
    I suspect Victor Bulmer Thomas Chatham House paper and the British Ambassador’s piece in the World Today mean that the FCO professionals are attempting to decouple the UK from whatever Tom Clancy Goetterdaemmerung plot is emmanating from Pennsylvania Avenue. The archbishop of Cantebury was regretting that he hadn’t been on the stop the war marches in 2003 this morning on the radio.
    This is beginning to feel like the plot of Dr Strangelove.

  2. Lieberman’s interest in foreign policy begins and ends with his support for the Zionist State of Israel. If he were a private citizen, there would be nothing wrong with that. However, when a US Senator promotes the interests of a foreign power over that of his own country, especially in matters of war and peace, it amounts to Treason.

  3. Helena,
    Due to the respect I have for your work, I would say you are wasting your valuable time dissecting and critiquing Joey Liar-man’s palaver. I have a simple rule of thumb: if I read an “analytic” piece in the US media that sounds like it could have been written by Bibi Netenyahu or Avigdor Lieberman (even if it were written while trying very hard not to mention the ‘I’ word), I don’t waste my time. It is so clear where he is coming from. As the French expression goes, he may be standing at this grave, but he sure is crying for someone else.
    I am not sure I agree with the comparison of the Maliki government with Sa’ad Haddad’s SLA.

  4. Now this is another one of those op-ed pieces that a lot of people are talking about, surprisingly ending with the conclusion that “bombing Iran” will make it all better.
    How to Save the Neocons By Joshua Muravchik — Foreign Policy, November-December 2006
    ”The invasion of Iraq was the neoconservatives’ pet project. It now looks like a colossal mistake. To remain influential, the neocons must admit their mistakes, embrace public diplomacy, and, yes, prepare the case for bombing Iran.”
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=3602&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com
    Also, please see Larisa Alexandrovna’ s piece on her blog on the Iran campaign

  5. David, I thought this text was worth engaging with because it expresses, in a fairly articulate way, several arguments that we hear a lot of in the mainstream culture here. This transformation of the discourse from that of the classic GWOT or pro-democracy discourse to one of “moderates vs. extremists” is a significant recent development. Ditto, his arguments about our “responsibilities”; his casual elision of Iran with al-Qaeda, etc. It’s good be able to recognize and deal with these arguments when we hear them (unless we want to continue just talking to people who think like us.)
    Batting practice, really. Plus, I wanted to try something out in this format and see if it works… And Holy Joe happened along today.

  6. Helena,
    I wholeheartedly agree with you that we “pinko”s in the US, as our opponents like to call us, are often guilty of enjoying preaching to the converted. That is one thing that is in stark contrast to what one sees in Europe or the Mid-East. There, you often hear heated debates, and not theatrical ones like on Faux News, but real ones in colleges and on street corners, between, lets say a Druze and a Shi’ite student in Beirut, on the merits of alliance with the US or Iran or what not. That kind of dialogue is largely lacking in this country, and I do think that we are partly to blame.
    When I said you are “wasting your valuable time”, that was a rhetorical line, meaning to imply that JL’s pseudo-analysis is so slanted, that it is hard to fathom how anyone can read it and not end up with a dislocated jaw. His ilk (C.Krut, Kristol, Perle, Norquist, …) are basically on such a planet of their own that they make Tony Snow look like Plato (a bumbling Plato though !). And, IMHO, the format works well, and is easy to follow.
    My comment on the comparison between Maliki and Sa’ad Haddad was not rhetorical though.

  7. Love the format and grid Helena. Couldn’t help but catch your invocation of the famous “nonsense upon stilts” slam. ;-}
    To the uninitiated, it’s better known as among the memorable phrases in Jeremy Bentham’s attack on the French Revolution. Yet he had used the same phrase 15 years previously (via John Lind) in a blistering Crown sponsored rebuke of the American Declaration of Independence – and its reliance on “natural law” and “natural rights” theory.
    I rather think the phrase applies better, at last, to Lieberman than to Jefferson! (he said w/ much *tic :-}

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