MoDo ignores my “Namibia” plan

Maureen Dowd (also known as MoDo) is a smart, often hilarious, and nearly always very savvy columnist for the NYT. Unfortunately, like all their columnists, she is currently locked up in a little orange box on the NYT.com website, so even though I’m a subscriber to the print edition of the paper I can’t figure out how to unlock her online persona.
She has a column about Iraq today titled Lost in the desert, in which her main point is that in Washington “no one, and I mean no one, really knows where to go from here”.
She cites Dick Cheney. She cites Henry Kissinger. She cites Kofi Annan, Anthony Zinni, Lt.-Gen. Raymond Odierno, Gen. John Abizaid, Peter Beinart, etc., etc.
But she doesn’t cite me. I have a plan. It ain’t perfect, but I’ve thought long and hard about the tricky conundra around political legitimacy, public security, and regional interests that are entangled in Iraq and I’ve come up with what I honestly think is the best chance there is for a workable plan.
I described it most recently here. You could call it the “Namibia option.” It is a way to think through how to achieve a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq that is speedy, total, orderly, and (I very much hope) generous to Iraq’s long-suffering people.
I’m really peeved she didn’t say anything about my plan. After all, all the “experts” and pundits etc whom she cited were of a certain, frequently testosterone-soaked gender. And her latest book was titled Are Men Necessary?
In thinking through how to actually move from the present, horrendous situation in Iraq to one of orderly US withdrawal and a restoration of public order, calm, political legitimacy and political hopefulness in Iraq, then perhaps men aren’t the most helpful types of people to have around right now…
Meantime, as I’ve noted fairly frequently over recent years, the public discourse in the US ever since 9/11 has been one of extreme rollback of women’s voices on matters of national security. Condi Rice in positions of high authority? That is just “cover” for the rollback of allowing the great mass of female specialists to have much meaningful input. Really, look at all the “experts” who get air-time, fat contracting salaries, etc etc in commentating about the war these days: It is nearly all members of the very same gender that got us into this horrible mess.
So Maureen, go read my “Namibia” plan. And stop saying that “no one” knows what to do in Iraq.

45 thoughts on “MoDo ignores my “Namibia” plan”

  1. Via Cursor.org, I came across an interesting post by Tom Hayden at Huffington Post. It is supposedly the “exit strategy” being contemplated by Washington:
    It is made up of five key “events:
    First, James Baker told one of Saddam Hussein’s lawyers that Tariq Aziz, former deputy prime minister, would be released from detention by the end of this year, in hope that he will negotiate with the US on behalf of the Baath Party leadership. (…) Second, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice personally appealed to the Gulf Cooperation Council in October to serve as intermediaries between the US and armed Sunni resistance groups [not including al Qaeda], communicating a US willingness to negotiate with them at any time or place. Third, there was an “unprecedented” secret meeting of high-level Americans and representatives of “a primary component of the Iraqi resistance” two weeks ago, lasting for three days. As a result, the Iraqis agreed to return to the talks in the next two weeks with a response for the American side, according to Jordanian press leaks and al-Quds al-Arabi. Fourth, detailed email transmissions dated November 16 reveal an active American effort behind the scenes to broker a peace agreement with Iraqi resistance leaders, a plot that could include a political coup against Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Fifth, Bush security adviser Stephen Hadley carried a six-point message for Iraqi officials on his recent trip to Baghdad …
    You’ll have to go to the source for this last bit.

  2. Well, Bush is heading over to have another deep look into Maliki’s eyes, to see if he’s still agreeable to Bush’s gut. If not, then it’s coup time. Poor Maliki – how do you prepare for a test like that? What if Bush has indigestion that day?

  3. Helena, I do think you have an admirable plan. I think we could all profitably use it as a basis for further enlightened discussion. However, as the late great historian Barbara Tuchman wrote in The March of Folly: “Once a policy has been adopted and implimented, all subsequent activity becomes and effort to justify it.” So while I congratulate you on your sincere desire to arrive at a solution — which I believe we could construct if we really wished to — I must admonish you that in dealing with full-blown Folly, or “the pursuit of policy contrary to self-interest,” you have run up against an interlocking league of lunatics who only seek to justify their own previous mistakes, whether military, political, corporate, diplomatic, academic — or journalistic. Any real solution to the problem they have jointly created and perpetuated would only make them look worse by comparison with sane people. So they continue to “teach the controversy,” as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “because controversy equalizes wise men and fools alike — and the fools [like Dick, Cheney, Henry Kissinger, and Maureen Dowd] know it!”

  4. The mention of Henry “we have to humiliate them” Kissinger always fills me with an atavistic loathing: something like what Indiana Jones must have felt when he looked down into an Egyptian crypt and saw that it contained a writhing mass of poisonous snakes all over the dusty floor …
    Recovering from one such vision of the vain and venal Visigoth, I wrote:
    “Peace with Horror”
    A leper knight rode into view
    Astride his mangy steed
    A harbinger of violence
    A plague without a need
    An apparition of discord
    Upon which fear would feed
    His unannounced arrival meant
    He’d lost his leper’s bell
    And yet his ugly innocence
    Could not conceal the smell
    His good intentions only paved
    Another road to Hell
    With mace and lance and sword deployed
    He vowed in peace to live
    Through rotting lips he promised not
    To take, but only give
    He swore to only kill the ones
    Whom he said shouldn’t live
    He did not speak the language and
    He did not know the land
    So why the healthy shrank from him
    He could not understand
    Why did they want the water when
    He’d offered them the sand?
    So onward to Jerusalem
    He staggered as he slew
    In train with sack and booty that
    He only thought his due
    For spreading freedom’s germs among
    The last surviving few
    Michael Murry, “The Misfortune Teller,” Copyright 2005

  5. The usually rational Juan Cole has become an enthusiastic admirer of the Democratic Party’s 2008 flavor-of-the-moment, Senator Barack Obama, who apparently agrees with Professor Cole’s already discredited conventional cop-out for a “phased withdrawal” of [who knows how many, by when?] American military forces from Iraq. In response, I took the dictionary-definition approach to analysing Professor Cole’s “Obama-and-Me” plan as follows:
    “Phased Withdrawal” —
    (1) An Orwellian euphemism designed to beguile the American population into buying a discredited “stay the curse” occupation of a foreign country long past the point when the American population has unequivocally demanded that it end immediately.
    (2) Vietnam Redux Deja Vu All Over Again One More Time — only faster because of substituting the Worst and the Dullest for the Best and the Brightest.
    (3) A slippery synonym for “watching the grass grow,” meaning an imperceptible interlude of inconclusive indecision indefinitely infringing on the infinitesimal intellect of the easily intimidated.
    (4) The operative adjective, “phased,” implies but does not actually specify “measured” (meaning, subliminally “non-hasty” — after almost four years) movement meandering mindlessly toward some vaguely alluded-to noun, “withdrawal,” itself a tortured tautology coined carefully to avoid the only understandable antonym anyone actually wants to hear: i.e., “leaving by yesterday.”
    (5) A whipped-dog, whimpering waffle of an attempt by Democratic Party politicians to AVOID THE BLAME for a Republican-defined “retreat” instead of aggressively TAKING CREDIT for an expeditious, Democratic-defined “redeployment” in complete compliance with the recently expressed demands of the exasperated American electorate.
    (6) Glacier Race. Somewhat akin to cutting the ballooning budget deficit “in half” or landing an astronaut on Mars two decades after the current spendthrift gambler of a “national leader” absconds from office with his get-out-of-jail-free card and no forwarding addresses for the offshore banks in Switzerland and the Bahamas where all the loot landed.
    (7) Irrelevant non-sequitur ironically, leisurely — and fatally — neglecting the obvious encirclement of America’s Foreign Legion marooned at the precarious end of a fragile supply line stretching halfway around the globe. Think Germans at Stalingrad; the French at Dien Bien Phu; or the British “phasing” their way through the Khyber Pass — never (except for one wounded doctor) to arrive at their destination.
    (8) Callow, conventional catch-phrase for still-wet-behind-the-ears Democratic politicians like Barack Obama (the Fallacy of the Mean personified) who sounds like he has as much occupational combat experience or “stand-em-up” advisory duty time as my five-year-old grandson.
    Barack Obama???? Really! I know more about this Parkinson’s Law, Peter Principle, just-get-Dubya-Barack-and-You-Know-Her-past-2008 Vietnamization of the Iraqis than Barack Obama will — or could — ever know. And I don’t agree with either Barack Obama or Professor Cole or Senator You-Know-Her on this Buy Time Brigade rendition of my old Fig Leaf Contingent. A little real, bitter experience with this stupid “scream English at ’em till they monkey-do-mimic-you” stuff ought to count for more than just the usual focus-group-tested lizard language.
    My Tested and Approved Plan (hereafter known as MTAP): The same as the one that finally ended our previous humiliating national disaster in Southeast Asia thirty-five years ago. (1) Revoke the ludicrous “Authorization of Force” obtained under false pretenses (2) Cut off the money for any US military operations in and over Iraq other than withdrawal of our forces within 4 months (if not 4 weeks); and (3) Force the resignations of the corrupt Vice President and law-breaking President who perpetrated this needless tragedy.
    We did it before and we can do it again. We have to. Full speed ahead. No prevaricating or procrastinating; no dawdling or dragging-our-feet; no strolling or stalling; no Michael Jackson moon-walking; and no “phasing” required or allowed. Too many more innocents will die while we dither. As Napoleon Bonaparte said about the direct approach: “If you want to take Vienna, you take Vienna.” If you want to get out, you get out.

  6. Michael, I love your plan. In particular, I think your number 2 is really important and I can’t for the life of me imagine why the Democratic leadership started taking even the threat of cutting the money for the war completely off the table back on November 8.
    Talk about senseless unilateral disarmament.

  7. Dear Helena: A comment on your admirable call for “a restoration of public order, calm political legitimacy and politcal hopefulness in Iraq.” How can you “restore” conditions that have never existed in Iraq? You’re invoking a past that never was. Can you recast your rhetoric to look towards the future?

  8. Helena
    You probably wont like what I am about to say.
    I do a bit of troubleshooting from time to time.
    Often I have to ask if there is a plan and am generally handed a Gannt chart of dubious validity that doesnt stand up to scrutiny.
    So I have to go back to basics and explain that a plan is
    Written
    Detailed
    Distributed and
    Agreed
    I followed the link to your piece and it doesnt explain to me how to get 150,000 troops out along with 20,000 contractors and untold friendly forces.
    Despite Ms Beckett sliding the details out yesterday when nobody was looking, the British withdrawal has a plan. Everybody now knows which bits are being abandoned first and who the unfortunates who have to hold the airport until the final mad dash to the ramp of the last Herc (C-130) are.
    Kim Howels the foreign office miniter will apreciate the last point. His helicopter was fired on as they left Basra earlier this week.

  9. Helena,
    I understand and share your disbelief that the Democrats would “unilaterally disarm” even before engaging in their first battle with Vice President Cheney and his “propaganda catapulter” President Bush over our necessary withdrawal from Iraq. Pre-emptively giving up the Power of the Purse and the Power of Impeachment before even assuming office sounds a lot like what President Bush calls “negotiating with yourself” — and gladly accepting the raw end of the deal before the other party even disdainfully offers it. I suppose twelve years in the Congressional minority have pretty thoroughly cowed the Democrats and left them accustomed, like Lewis Carroll’s White Queen, to internalizing six impossible Republican memes about “liberals” before breakfast.
    Actually, though, I have heard that the Democrats fear cutting off funds for a war the country doesn’t want and can’t afford because they fear that the Republicans will accuse them of not “supporting the troops.” The Democrats also fear, so some tell me, that impeaching Vice President Cheney and President Bush would make them look “mean” and “partisan.” How getting our troops needlessly killed “supports” them and how anyone could look more mean and partisan than the Republicans, well, I simply cannot imagine such impossible things, before OR after breakfast.
    We have to keep bucking up the Democrats, Helena. It will take them some time to clear their psyches of all the mnemonic garbage about their “liberal” selves that the Republicans, Holy Joe Lieberman, and the two Clintons have labored so long to deposit there.

  10. Frank, the plans that i produced in July 2005 are slightly longer on logistical details… E.g., “head south” was a major component for “how” to get out. Then, I imagined the british-held south as providing the main exit point. Now, the Brits appear to be axing that possibility. This will considerably complicate any withdrawal that also involves taking large amounts of the military materiel out of Iraq.
    Interesting.
    But look, in general, I can’t hope to produce a completely detailed plan. (I’m only one, almost completely unfunded person.) I just want to keep reminding people– as I have since before the invasion– that there are completely conceivable ways to de-escalate the tension and build better relationships among nations. My hope is that this might start to remind people that there’s no reason to succumb to the logic of feeling”trapped” into acting violently, a logic that fuels most of the violence and wars in the world… the logic of “But we have no alternative at this point!” Yes, there is always at least one de-escalatory, problem-solving alternative…

  11. Well, Helena, at least YOU have a plan of some kind, but I must repeat that unlesss I have missed something, a plan to enlist everyone on the planet except Iraqis to help the U.S. decide what to do with Iraq is not a plan that can be of much interest to Iraqis. As for involving Iraq’s neighbors in the “solution”, that basic idea has been suggested, and in my view is simply a recipe for a new kind of disaster.
    Personally I don’t mind seeing the Americans run from Iraq in messy disarray with their tails firmly between their legs. Personally, I don’t mind what any of this does to America’s standing in the world, or its economy, or anything else. What I do know without question is that the more American stays in Iraq under any pretext at all, the more things are guaranteed to deteriorate. Nothing can ever begin to get better until America leaves Iraq, and reliquishes all its ambitions concerning Iraq.
    And by the way, 100% of all Omani cab drivers surveyed personally by me agree completely.

  12. Shirin, Hi.
    I would love to see the US forces “run through the bushes and run through the brambles where a rabbit wouldn’t go”, if you know the song.
    The trouble I have is that all of this terrible passage of history has resulted from the folly of people who thought in terms of unconditional and absolute victory, and one has been trying to send the message that there is no such thing.
    All war has to end in negotiation, including just war, or self-defence. That is why I mentioned the Cubans. They had the sense to turn their military advantage into negotiation. I do believe it’s the only way.
    Now that the USA has reached the point of military exhaustion, those who now have the advantage must conduct, tacitly if necessary, or through proxies, a negotiation.
    The abandonment of the US rear by the British is an amazing development, if indeed it is going to be the case. This is an opportunity, not to go for broke, but to go for the possible. What is possible is what can be negotiated, no more and no less. The military advantage is only useful insofar as it can forestall a double-cross, or in other words to keep the opponent honest.
    I can’t remember the subtle words of the Cuban commnder who was asked if he would guarantee not to cross the border. He refused. The South Africans stayed honest, and the Cubans didn’t cross.

  13. Helena
    BBC radio said yesterday that the remaining Brits would provide escort and security for the truck convoys from Kuwait.
    Apparently there are 2000 trucks a day coming out of Kuwait.
    One of the interesting points about the Brits pulling out will be that there will be nobody to interface with the Iranians along the Shatt Al Arab.
    The US withdrawal will present an enormous flank to the Iranians.
    I suspect a Truce will be required,
    Thank God, I am not going to be with the guard force on the Bridge at Nasariyah or any of the other choke points.
    The whole exercise is a major logistics nightmare. It is 800 km from Mosul to Al Kuwait. The tanks need a gallon of fuel a mile and an hour’s maintenance per hour tracked manouver.

  14. Mid-1988
    ‘For the South Africans and Americans the burning question was: Would the Cuban troops stop at the border? It was to answer this question that President Ronald Reagan’s Assistant Secretary for Africa, Chester Crocker, sought (head of the Cuban Civilian Mission in Angola, Jorge) Risquet. “My question is the following,” he told him: “Does Cuba intend to halt the advance of its troops at the border between Namibia and Angola?” Risquet replied, “I have no answer to give you. I can’t give you a Meprobamato [a well-known Cuban tranquillizer] – not to you or to the South Africans. … I have not said whether or not our troops will stop. … Listen to me, I am not threatening. If I told you that they will not stop, it would be a threat. If I told you that they will stop, I would be giving you a Meprobamato, a Tylenol, and I want neither to threaten you nor to reassure you … What I have said is that the only way to guarantee [that our troops stop at the border] would be to reach an agreement [on the independence of Namibia].”[15] On August 25, Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz: “Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace … We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground.”[16]’
    From “The Massacre of Cassinga”, Piero Gleijeses, Professor of American Foreign Policy, John Hopkins University

  15. Early 1976
    Then, the campaign started known as Operation Carlota, code name for the most just, lengthy, large scale and successful internationalist campaign undertaken by Cuba.
    The empire could not achieve its aim of dismembering Angola and robbing it of its independence. The long, heroic struggle of the Angolan and Cuban peoples stopped them in their tracks.
    We now know much more than we did then about how Washington thought and acted, based on official documents declassified in recent years.
    At no time did the US president, or his powerful Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, or the US intelligence services, even imagined the possibility of participation by Cuba. Never before had a Third World country acted to support another people in an armed conflict beyond its geographical neighborhood.
    By the end of November, enemy aggression had been halted in the north and in the south. Complete heavy armored units, substantial land and anti-aircraft artillery, armored infantry units up to brigade strength, transported by our merchant fleet, accumulated rapidly in Angola, where 36,000 Cuban troops launched a furious offensive. Attacking the main enemy in the south, they drove South Africa’s racist army 1,000 kilometers back to where it came from, Angola’s border with Namibia, the racist’s colonial enclave. The last South African soldier left Angolan territory on March 27. In the north, Mobutu’s regular troops and the mercenaries were driven back across the border with Zaire.
    The truth is that Cuba was in favor of exacting a heavy price from South Africa for its adventure: the application of UN Resolution 435 and the independence of Namibia.
    On the other hand, the Soviets, worried about possible US reaction, were putting strong pressure on us to make a rapid withdrawal.
    After raising strong objections, we were obliged to accede, at least partially, to the Soviet demands. Although not consulted about our decision to send troops to the Republic of Angola, the Soviet Union had subsequently decided to supply arms for the emerging Angolan army and had agreed to some of our requests for material aid during the hostilities. Angola’s post-victory prospects without the political and logistic support of the USSR were non-existent.
    Dr Fidel Castro Ruz, December 2, 2005, 30th Anniversary of Cuban Military Mission in Angola, and 49th Anniversary of the landing of the “Granma”

  16. Late 1987 to 1988
    History repeated itself. The enemy, greatly emboldened, advanced strongly, towards Cuito Cuanavale, an old NATO airbase. Here it prepared to deliver a mortal blow against Angola.
    Desperate calls were received from the Angolan government appealing to the Cuban troops for support in fending off presumed disaster; it was unquestionably the biggest threat from a military operation in which we, as on other occasions, had no responsibility whatever.
    Titanic efforts by the Cuban political and military high command, despite the serious threat of hostilities which hung over us as well, resulted in assembling the forces needed to deliver a decisive blow against the South African forces. As in 1975, our homeland rose to the occasion. A flood of troops and weaponry rapidly crossed the Atlantic, landing on Angola’s south coast in order to attack in the south west, in the direction of Namibia. At the same time, 800 km to the east, special units advanced towards Cuito Cuanavale, where they joined up with retreating Angolan forces to set up a lethal trap for the powerful South African forces heading for that large airbase.
    This time, Cuban troops in Angola numbered 55,000.
    So while in Cuito Cuanavale the South African troops were bled, to the southwest 40,000 Cuban and 30,000 Angolan troops, supported by some 600 tanks, hundreds of pieces of artillery, 1,000 anti-aircraft weapons and the daring MIG-23 units that secured air supremacy, advanced towards the Namibian border, ready to literally sweep up the South African forces deployed along that main route.
    A great deal could be said about all the engagements and incidents in that campaign.
    Here with us are Comrade Polo Cinta Frías, the bold commander of the Angola southern front at that time, and many comrades who took part in the actions of those glorious, unforgettable days.
    The resounding victories in Cuito Cuanavale, especially the devastating advance by the powerful Cuban contingent in southwest Angola, spelled the end of foreign aggression.
    The enemy had to set aside its usual arrogance and sit down at the negotiating table. The talks culminated in the Peace Accords for Southern Africa, signed by South Africa, Angola and Cuba at the UN headquarters in December 1988.
    The accords were designated as quadripartite, since the Angolans and the Cubans sat on one side of the table with the South Africans opposite; the United States occupied a third side, given its role as mediator. In reality, America was judge and party, an ally of the apartheid regime. Its rightful place was alongside the South Africans.
    The head of the US delegation, undersecretary Chester Crocker, for years opposed Cuba’s participation. But given the seriousness of the military situation for the South African aggressors, he had no choice but to accept our presence. In a book he wrote about these events, he was quite right in observing that when the Cuban delegates entered the conference room, the talks were about to change for good.
    This Reagan administration spokesman was well aware that with Cuba at the negotiating table, dirty tricks, blackmail, intimidation and lies would not succeed.
    Dr Fidel Castro Ruz, December 2, 2005, 30th Anniversary of Cuban Military Mission in Angola and 49th Anniversary of the landing of the “Granma”

  17. Re: Democrats, Arianna Huffington summed it up quite well awhile back when she observed that both political parties are ruled by fear: The Republicans fear reality, and the Democrats fear perception.
    Welcome back, Dominic.
    Happy Thanksgiving, everyone.

  18. Dominic, thanks so MUCH for your contributions re Namibia, which I need to go back and read carefully.
    Shirin, I completely understand your criticism that I haven’t addressed the Iraqi dimension of the pullout plan, which does need to be kept front and center.
    However, I have two feelings about this: (1) I feel pretty strongly that Americans– of all people!– have no standing at all to “tell” the Iraqis what to do or not at this point, and I shy away completely from all those techno-control-freak types among US commentators who say things like “We need to split Iraq” or “We need to finetune the balance between Sunnis and Shias”, etc etc. It is absolutely none of our damn business how Iraqis choose to rule themselves. (2) Inasmuch as I did address the internal-Iraq aspects of the pullout, I did so back in July 2005, and the thoughts I expressed then still largely stand. Mainly, that was based on the idea that once the US announces its timetable for a complete withdrawal and its readiness to negotiate with any and all Iraqi parties as to how to effect that withdrawal that will completely transform the dynamic inside the country and the US will then, surely, have a large majority of Iraqis eager to help facilitate this withdrawal… And this will most likely also involve all the Iraqi parties involved working in a new way with each other, to coordinate this.
    Tell me what you think of this?

  19. All war has to end in negotiation, including just war, or self-defence.
    Or perhaps it ends with evacuations by helicopter from the roof of the embassy.
    But herein lies my argument with Helena’s proposal as I understand it. It appears to me that everyone is negotiating with everyone else EXCEPT IRAQIS about what American should do with Iraq. It is simply not acceptable to Iraqis to have America deciding, with or without the “help” of the rest of the world what to do with Iraq while Iraqis once again sit by without a thing to say about it. Admittedly there is a real dearth of Iraqis with whom to conduct negotiations. The so-called “Iraqi” Make-believe “government” has no real legitimacy. The so-called, misnamed “insurgency” also does not have legitimacy, although those among them who are legitimately resisting the occupation and its “Iraqi” agents have at least that much legitimacy going for them. As for so-called “reconciliation, it was the Americans who created the so-called “sectarian” problems in the first place by making sectarian and ethnic divisions the basis for nearly everything they have done in Iraq, and they clearly still do not understand Iraq, and never will. Therefore they are in absolutely no position to promote any kind of “reconciliation” or whatever you want to call it.
    The bottom line is that no one has the right or the ability to make decisions about Iraq except Iraqis, and in my opinion, it will be quite messy for awhile, but the only chance of things working out ever is if the Americans are not involved. As long as they stay involved they will continue to mess things up.

  20. Helena,
    It seems probable that I did not understand your proposal clearly. Based on your last comment, it seems you were referring only to the American’s withdrawal, when I had the impression you were talking about something else entirely.
    I agree completely with your point number one, and in fact adamant is not a strong enough word for my position on that issue. In fact, I would add something to what you said. Not only do Americans have no standing to tell Iraqis what to do (they never did and never will), they have neither the standing nor the ability to “help” or advise in any way, shape, form, or manner. They must have exactly 0% involvement in anything to do with Iraq except how fast they get the hell out, and I mean out completely – no official presence whatsoever until and unless invited by a real Iraqi government. When it comes to Iraq Americans have the reverse Midas touch – everything they touch there, hardly surprisingly, turns into steaming, stinking pile of s***.
    I think the project of “assisting” the Americans out of Iraq has a good chance of helping to bring Iraqis together, although those who benefit from the American presence, or whose position depends on the Americans remaining are hardly likely to join in any effort to rid themselves of their benefactors. I really have confidence in Iraqis’ ability over time to heal their own situation. It will not be pretty at first, but it will happen.

  21. “Or perhaps it ends with evacuations by helicopter from the roof of the embassy.”
    Ja, well, no, fine, as we say in Johannesburg.
    The trouble with that particular situation was that the US did not accept it, and kept up a vindictive and destructive stance for decades afterwards. Ask the Vietnamese about it.

  22. Shirin, and Helena-
    I agree with your two mutual conclusions 1) that the “solution” for Iraq must involve Iraqis themselves, and 2) that the only role the US has to play in this “solution” is the full and speedy withdrawal of its troops.
    I also agree, Shirin, that #2 may bring the Iraqi people (as opposed to the US supported Iraqi elite) together. It is perhaps the one thing that most Iraqis of all backgrounds can actually agree on, so it is a good place to start.
    Concerning the “reconciliation” process, I have been under the impression that different Iraqi players on the domestic scene have been trying to foster a reconciliation process through their tribal networks, but the US and its “US supported Iraqi elite” do not support this process. The US objects because the process appears to aid the position of the Sadrists as opposed to SCIRI, and the Muslim Scholars group and Islamic Accord as opposed to the secular western-friendly ex-Bathists like Allawi. Is this correct?
    In my mind “reconciliation” means holding Iraq together as one nation, and this would seem to frustrate the designs of those American strategists who have been planning partition or at least a loose confederation in Iraq. Is it not the case that “reconciliation” efforts have primarily been organized by the anti-occupation elements?
    I remember Sadr and perhaps some elements in Daawa trying to reach out to Sunni groups, behind the back of US forces, because they recognized a common interest in an American withdrawal, just as they recognized a common interest in the spring 2004 uprisings in Najaf and Falluja.
    In my reading of various Iraqi press reports, it seems that SCIRI, the Badr militia, and perhaps some peshmerga attached to the Kurdish leadership have conspired as “strange bedfellows” with the US in order to maintain the awful sectarian Sunni-on-Shia fighting that we have seen for 12+ months.
    Is “reconciliation” or “sulh” a bad word in the Iraqi context? I thought it went along with the idea of “kicking the Kafar out.”

  23. Well, IMO before the administration even starts to consider what changes they need to make “on the ground” they need to do a massive mental readjustment:
    1. First, without a very clear understanding of the very complex situation (political, religious, tribal, etc.) in Iraq, in the region, and across the mid-East, the decision-makers will be handicapped. This would seem to be self-evident and one would expect it to be a sine qua non that the decision-makers would be cognizant of at least the the basic facts e.g. the difference between Sunni and Shia, which groups belong to which sect, etc. However, just by reading the newspapers, watching television, listening to radio commentary, etc. it is clear that many of the decision-makers (and newscasters, “pundits”, etc.) have NO idea re some of the most basic issues. This is a recipe for disaster… when any of these folks make stupid statements in public they need to be slapped down and humiliated… perhaps that will send them back to their studies…
    2. The administration needs to better understand the centrality of religion in the every-day life of Iraqis and the core role that it plays… One would expect a leader (President Bush) and an administration which supposedly base their actions on religious values to have a better understanding of this, though one apparently would be wrong…
    3. President Bush and the folks in Washington need to ‘get over’ the fact of Iranian influence in Iraq. They need to quit making up stuff wholesale i.e. the whole “Iran is interfering in Iraq” meme. By eliminating Saddam Hussein, removing the Sunni from power, and giving the Shia their rightful voice in Iraq, it is ** the United States administration** that has brought about this situation and has ensured that Iran has (and will continue to have) more influence in Iraq than the United States. This is a direct consequence of U.S. actions and is not due to Iranian ‘meddling.’ It’s not meddling that has al-Maliki, Chalabi, et al. visiting Teharan, but a natural affinity. The U.S. needs to have more confidence in the Iraqi Shia – although they are strongly influenced by Iran they are not Iranian patsies (after all most of them stayed ‘loyal’ to Iraq in the 10-year war with Iran…)
    4. The administration needs to get over its reluctance to deal with Iran and Syria. Recently, when in Vietnam for the AIPEC meeting, President Bush was asked about the lessons from the Vietnam war… Perhaps one lesson that should be drawn is that if the U.S. can now have normal relations with a communist country with which it was in a shooting war for years (with over fifty thousand U.S. casualties and over a million NVA casualties) then the U.S. ought be able to talk to a country where the biggest problem was the hostage crisis during which the Iranians took 63 U.S. diplomats and 3 other U.S. citizens hostage, holding some of them for 444 days… And what’s with the refusal to talk to Syria? True, Bashir Assad has a weak chin, stupid-looking mustache, and is prone to making announcements that tweak President Bush, but why does that make Syria one of the very few countries in the world that the U.S. will not talk to?
    5. The administration also needs to show more maturity – it should not allow itself to be so easily tweaked by pronouncements of the ‘enemy’ or other world leaders that they do not approve of, or so easily offended by criticism (even very robust criticism)…. Why should anything that al-Quaeda might claim be a factor in any decision or dictate any U.S. action (i.e the ‘we can’t withdraw because al-Quaeda would claim victory’ theory of statesmanship)? And if a foreign leader insults the President, surely personal pique should not dictate international policy?
    Bottom line: if you don’t see these mental adjustments taking place you should have ZERO confidence in anything that these folks come up with! Unfortunately, the chances of President Bush understanding these points vs. his ‘frat-boy’ approach would seem to be very low…
    Dumbass

  24. I agree with all those who rightfully claim that America has no business in Iraq, period. Also, no one can do a wrong thing the “right” (meaning, correct — or even “phased”) way; although America can usually do a wrong thing more wrong than most by extending the agony (i.e., “phasing” it) long past its rightful expiration date. [For an excruciating example of this Orwellian “Catastrophic Gradualism,” see Richard Nixon’s ludicrously awkward “phases” of restoring market capitalism to America after stupidly imposing Soviet-style “wage and price controls” to combat the inflation he casused by his un-funded “Peace with Honor” Vietnamization policy.]
    All exemplary digression aside, only immediately ceasing to bang our heads against a brick wall will offer us any chance of healing the headache. As an old joke has it: A man goes to the doctor and says, “Doctor, it hurts when I do this.” The doctor then sensibly replies: “Then don’t do that.” America needs to stop doing that — meaning everything it has tried and failed to do in almost four bloody years of bungling in Iraq.
    Unfortunately for both America and Iraq (not to mention Afghanistan) a deadbeat gambler and boorish bumpkin has somehow gotten into a position of absolute power over America’s [formerly formidable] military and the nation’s credit card as well. Spectacular blunders and surreal public relations stunts have ensued, not the least of which recently occured in Hanoi, Vietnam, when our dimwit Deputy Dubya disconnectedly got things predictably and precisely backwards about American wars to reimpose a discredited colonialism long past its historic demise. “We only lose if we quit,” Bush babbled to those who had fought for decades to make first France and then America quit trying to colonize them.
    To the contrary, in our failed War on Vietnam and currently failing War on Iraq, we lost ourselves the day we started. Only when we quit did (and do) we win the opportunity to regain a little bit of our better selves again. Having never served in (or reflected upon) either post-colonial quagmire, Dubya’s dysfunctional disquisitions about both richly deserve the derision they routinely receive.
    As the legendary comedian W. C. Fields used to say about fanaticism: “If at first you don’t succeed, try again. Then quit. No sense being a damn fool about it.”
    Alas, we have not only a Republican fool to fail us, but a Democratic flock of freelancing fowl foolishly financing (as distinguished from “funding”) the further “phasing” of his folly.

  25. Helena,
    Subscribing to Times Select is gnarly. You have to have a NYT user id and password, and then link that to the enrollment in Times Select that establishes you as a print subscriber (your paper’s label # or your credit card #).

  26. Helena,
    Subscribing to Times Select is gnarly. You have to have a NYT user id and password, and then link that to the enrollment in Times Select that establishes you as a print subscriber (your paper’s label # or your credit card #).

  27. Reading on Juan Cole’s blog his somewhat naive-sounding query about the location of the American Army after almost four years of watching it lurch about in Iraq like a gargantuan chicken with its head cut off sounds almost too … well … I suppose I really shouldn’t try to characterize it.
    In reading this pathetic plea, I thought back to the opening days of the doomed occupation when America’s vaunted legions stood around haplessly watching an entire society collapse in widespread looting all around them. I immediately thought of the operative epigrammatic quotation from Frances Fitzerald’s Fire in the Lake: the Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. To wit:
    “Like an Orwellian Army [the Americans] knew everything about military tactics, but nothing about where they were or who the enemy was.” And, furthermore:
    “There was a timeless quality to the American effort — which is not to say that it was static but that it was constantly moving over the same ground.”
    From the very outset of 2003, Deputy Dubya’s debacle in the desert has seemed like little more than a postcript footnote to Fitzerald’s classic analysis of the [now-generic] “American War on …” One should not even have to bother discoursing with defenders of the rapist whose case rests entirely on the fact that his victims had differently colored hair and wore different size dresses, et cetera.
    Anyway, to vent my Groundhog Day frustration with another American government too stupid to stipulate, I began composing poems, one of which I have today updated because of the recurrent misunderstanding about what the American military presence in Iraq really means. Hence, once more into the Breach at Ascalon with the new, improved:
    “Peace with Horror”
    A leper knight rode into view
    Astride his mangy steed
    A harbinger of violence
    A plague without a need
    An apparition of discord
    Upon which fear would feed
    His unannounced arrival meant
    He’d lost his leper’s bell
    And yet his ugly innocence
    Could not conceal the smell
    His good intentions only paved
    Another road to Hell
    With mace and lance and sword deployed
    He vowed in peace to live
    Through rotting lips he promised not
    To take, but only give
    He swore to only kill the ones
    Whom he said shouldn’t live
    He did not speak the language and
    He did not know the land
    So why the healthy shrank from him
    He could not understand
    Why did they want the water when
    He’d offered them the sand?
    Committed to commitment he
    Committed crimes galore
    As steadfast in his loyalties
    As any purchased whore
    A mercenary madman like
    His slogan: “Peace through War”
    His slaying for salvation masked
    An inner, grasping greed
    A lust for living good and well
    While looking past his deed
    A dead man walking wakefully;
    A graveyard gone to seed
    He planned to leave in “phases,” so
    He said to those back home
    Who’d heard some nasty rumors rife
    From Babylon to Rome
    Of murders in their name meant to
    Exalt their sacred tome
    But still he needed to “protect”
    Some pilgrims on the road
    Who for “protection” glumly paid
    A portion of their load:
    For this decaying derelict,
    An object episode
    When asked to give a summary
    Of what he had achieved
    He shifted to the future tense
    The gains that he perceived
    And spoke in the subjunctive mood
    To those he had aggrieved
    “The future life to come portends
    More suffering than now
    Only through me can you avoid
    What I will disavow:
    The promises I never made
    While making, anyhow.”
    “I unsay things that I have said
    And say I never did;
    Then say them once again to pound
    The meaning deeply hid,
    Down where the lizard lives between
    The ego and the id.”
    “I’ve given you catastrophe
    And called it a success;
    If you want other outcomes then
    Step forward and confess
    That you believed a pack of lies
    With no strain, sweat, or stress.”
    “You know the meaning of my words
    Lasts only just as long
    As sound takes to decay in air
    So that you take them wrong
    If you assign significance
    To my sly siren song.”
    “A ‘propaganda catapult’
    I’ve called myself, in fact;
    A damning human document
    Which I myself redact
    At every opportunity
    With no concern for tact.”
    “If you think what I’ve done before
    Has caused me to repent
    Or dream that I, in any way,
    Might let up or relent
    Then I’ve got wars for you to buy,
    Or maybe just to rent.”
    “I’ve little time to live on earth,
    So why should I reflect
    Upon the dead and dying souls
    Whose lives I’ve robbed and wrecked?
    I care not if they hate, just so
    They know to genuflect.”
    And thus the ruin of a world
    Continued in its course
    With witless workers waiting for
    The great man on his horse
    To give them bad to save them from
    What they feared even worse
    Then onward to Jerusalem
    He staggered as he slew
    In train with sack and booty that
    He only thought his due
    For spreading freedom’s germs among
    The last surviving few
    Michael Murry, “The Misfortune Teller,” Copyright 2006

  28. Helena,
    have no standing at all to “tell” the Iraqis what to do or not at this point, and I shy away completely from all those techno-control-freak types among US commentators, etc etc.
    With your plan every one invited to talk but no a single Iraqi listen to!! What this means?
    You as same as other US telling Iraqis Helena, or plan for Iraq without any damn even talk to a single Iraqi in what you call your Plane To Withdraw US Troop.
    Helena takes your troops out and leaves turn back and get out with shame and stupidity.
    Iraqis they knew very well what to do, whatever happen to Iraq and Iraqi will not be disastrous like what happening for more than three years each day killing, kidnapping and torturing by your troops, with help from them and under their supervisors….
    Iraqis they knew how to clean your miss Helena better than you and other us Damn-Tank

  29. According to credible Iraqi sources in London and Amman, a secret story of America’s diplomatic exit strategy from Iraq is rapidly unfolding. The key events include:
    First, James Baker told one of Saddam Hussein’s lawyers that Tariq Aziz, former deputy prime minister, would be released from detention by the end of this year, in hope that he will negotiate with the US on behalf of the Baath Party leadership. The discussion recently took place in Amman, according to the Iraqi paper al-Quds al-Arabi.
    http://www.afterdowningstreet.org/node/15750
    In one or Arabic newspaper leaked that in recent Arab league meeting, Saudis put proposal for vote which put the Arab ministers in a complete surprise, asking Arabs states to backed a call for immunity to Saddam from death penalty and release him and sent out side Iraq!!
    Is this Saudi initiative call or its backdoor orders by……?
    So this inline what the a above articles suggesting

    In the Vietnam era, President Richard M. Nixon went on a well-armed, years-long hunt for something he called “peace with honor.” Today, the catchword is finding an “exit strategy” that can “salvage U.S. prestige.” What we want, it seems, is peace with “dignity.” In Vietnam, there was no honor left, only horror. There is no American dignity to be found in Iraq either, only horror. In a Washington of suddenly lowered expectations, dignity is defined as hanging in there until an Iraqi government that can’t even control its own Interior Ministry or the police in the capital gains “stability,” until the Sunni insurgency becomes a mild irritation, and until that American embassy, that eighth wonder of the world of security and comfort, becomes an eye-catching landmark on the capital’s skyline.

  30. Helena, you for got in your plan to include the freak Hussein Nasrallah, just recently some his folk s caught in Al-Ameriyah district (West Baghdad) they contested that they sent by Nasarallah to kill the religious and Imams of the Masques in Baghdad after….
    Don’t forget to put in your plan Israeli Mussed also…

  31. And MoDo.. please stop writing about the Middle East.
    “…failure to comprehend that in the Arab world, revenge and religious zealotry can be stronger compulsions than democracy and prosperity.”

  32. Todd, if Maureen Dowd really believes that appalling bit of typical American ignorant, racist bullbleep you quoted then she should indeed stop writing about the Middle East (and so should 99% of the Americans who write about it).
    I get so deathly sick and tired of the crap that gets passed off as based on some kind of “Middle East expertise”.

  33. Todd, Shirin:
    Suggested light reading: Orientalism by Edward Said.
    Case in point: Any and all of Bernard Lewis’ compilations of drivel.
    Cheers

  34. “the stylist and polemicist in Edward Said very often runs away with the systematic thinker ”
    -Sadiq al- ‘Azm
    David, if you never read and appreciated Said & Lewis’ exchange in the NYRB, I’d recommend this piece by the late Malcolm Kerr (an orientalist! eep!):
    http://www.geocities.com/orientalismorg/Kerr.htm
    Short version: Said (who was an excellent pianist and first-class expert on Jane Austen) gets an ‘F’ in Mideast scholarship.
    The book contains many excellent sections and scores many telling points, but it is spoiled by overzealous prosecutorial argument in which Professor Said, in his eagerness to spin too large a web, leaps at conclusions and tries to throw everything but the kitchen sink into a preconceived frame of analysis.
    Some things never change!

  35. Yes Vadim, I have that NYRB, and know Mr. Lewis well. He is the famous “nutty professor of Princeton”. He is the one with the famous prediction of an Iranian nuclear holocaust this past August:
    http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110008768
    And the love of Hitchens, Bibi, Perle, et al. Well if you are in their club, I am sure you thought that the piece was a slam-dunk for Bernie.
    The piece from Kerr is a classic hatchet job, again from the same “pundit” class. Let us not forget that he was the president of the American U. of Beirut, and longtime Mossad ally, and …. What exactly do you expect him to write about Said?
    And that great website, orientalism.org, well if this is a sampling of their thought:
    “If we are to show sympathy, rather, it should be for the brave souls in that region who are struggling under perilous circumstances, and against formidable odds, to nudge fundamentalist Islam out of the Dark Ages and to turn rogue states into respectable members of the community of nations”
    And this is what they say about Prof. Said:
    “Said who plays unworthy rhetorical shell games, avoids uncomfortable truths, and (while frequently insisting on his opposition to terrorism) seeks to cultivate sympathy for the murderers of innocents.”
    And in defence of Bibi:
    “Benjamin Netanyahu’s claim that “the root cause of terrorism is terrorists,””
    Well if you are of this school of thought, I concede the mantle to you, lock, stock and barrel. Let me simplify Lewis and Kerr’s thesis, since they don’t have the honesty to say it as they mean it:
    “There is no such thing as Orientalism. The Westerners have done nothing but good to the people of the Orient, especially Arabs and Muslims. They are mostly fundamentalist idiots, stuck in the Dark Ages, waiting for the helping hand of the white man to save them from their own savagery. Our imperial schemes have all been to their benefit, and they should be eternally grateful. But since they are not, we will beat their primitive asses into submission, and teach them the lessons they will only learn by force, since that is the only language that their barbaric religion has taught them.”
    I could go on, but you get the idea. I am sorry to say this, but if you are of the ecole that does not agree that the 3000 people senselessly killed on 9/11 and the more than 1/2 million killed in Iraq since 2003, are all victims of terrorism, and that state terrorism is no better than non-state terror, that terrorism is a symptom not a disease, you will not understand or agree with any of the above. Succinctly, Said was way over your head, so don’t even bother.

  36. Let us not forget that he was the president of the American U. of Beirut, and longtime Mossad ally
    So affiliation with AUB = Mossad ally? This may surprise Helena, who described Kerr on this site as “someone who had tried to understand the Arab viewpoint and worked for balance and fairness in US Middle East policy.” I doubt she’d go for the vicious slander of her good friend’s murdered husband — even by reknowned scholar/commentator “David”– but hey, it’s her dime.

  37. I fear this David is laboring under a number of misapprehensions about Malcolm Kerr.
    I agree with a lot of what Malcolm (and Sadeq al-‘Azm) wrote about Edward Said. Malcolm was by no means an “orientalist”. There is no way you could ever put him in the same boat with B. Lewis…
    Additional note to this David: could you possibly give yourself an additional identifier (e.g. Tall David, David G., David son of Mary, or whatever) so we can distinguish you from the “David/Davis/Dviid” person who lurks here occasionally? Thanks!

  38. Vadim:
    Your equation is a typical example of the age-old fallacy “ad hoc ergo propter hoc” (with this therefore because of this); in short, a logical mind should not confuse two thing that occur together with a cause-effect pair. Your being an Arab with blue eyes doesn’t mean that those two findings are cause and effect, or related at all.
    Helena:
    If you have any personal ties to Malcom Kerr’s family (as Vadim implies), I did not wish to make a personal or hurtful remark, and for that I apologize. I did not equate Kerr with Lewis; god forbid! Yet Kerr is far from controversial in his deeds and effects (positive, and negative, as is Said). His great achievements, one of which is MESA, should not be taken for granted. His main flaw, IMHO, is that he soemtimes looses sight of the forest for the trees in the highly politicized world of Middle East politics. He takes Said’s book to be something it never intended to be: an academic treatise, addressed to people like himself or Hourani or Abu-Lughod. Well it is clear to the reader that this is not the case. The book is by nature a political essay, addressed to the interested yet educated public; its intention is to expose the caricature of the Near Eastern man as a fundamenatlist savage as an image used by colonial and imperial powers. He is not writing a critical anthology of all prior works on Middle-Eastern scholarship. Said’s critique of the “good” scholars is summarized very well by Kerr:
    “It may fairly be argued that our contemporary scholars have been too passive, too smothered by the urge for collegial harmony, too intimidated by the fear of being tagged as troublemakers, to offer the needed degree of resistance to the strains of anti-Islamic prejudice that indeed abound in American society. It is unfortunately true, as Said says (p. 301), that there has been no equivalent among Middle Eastern specialists to the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars that was formed during the Vietnam war. Nor have Israeli policies and attitudes toward Arabs received the consensual condemnation that is found among our Africanists of white supremacy in southern Africa. The Middle East Studies Association, to the dismay of some of its more radically inclined members, has consistently tended at its annual meetings to avoid rather than to air political controversy. All of this preference for good behavior may indeed be reprehensible, sweeping under the carpet as it does a generation of scandal concerning the contribution of American media and pressure groups to the public’s understanding of issues in the Near East. Our prejudices are real ones, as Professor Said has eloquently pointed out in some of his other writings and as many scholars in the field will agree.”
    But Kerr does not forgive him for the sin of not including the names of all the “good” scholars, and dissecting each of their contributions. I would be surprised to think that he, the sharp person that he was, is not aware that the work he is requesting is not a 400-page political essay on Orientalism, but an 18-volume encyclopedia of Middle-Eastern studies, all of the works presented, dissected and analyzed (Can MESA work on that, by the way?). And even if Said could have single-handedly produced such an encyclopedia, it would not be useful to the audience that Said was addressing.
    I cannot talk for Kerr’s intentions. But as the famous line about intentions and the road to hell goes, intentions really don’t matter here. Chomsky and Said are perhaps the two most widely read eye-openners on US campuses in the past 30 years. As anyone in the world of politics, they have had their fair share of controversy; as no one is a saint, we are all prone to mistakes. But their immensely positive net effect, again IMHO, is clear to all of us who claim to adhere to the progressive cause. And on this topic, one of Said’s crown achievements was bringing to the front-stage of progressive discourse, the toxic effects of imperial Orientalism. Kerr’s slashing of the work, has been extensively (and jubilantly) quoted by Likudniks and their apologists (see above!). To offer constructive opinions regarding this effort, would be commendable. To dismiss it as “professional football players compete[ing] in swimming” and an “effort misfired”, is irresponsible at best, and ultimately plays into the hands of the Orientalists to whom he avows aversion.
    Regarding the David “who lurks”, I assume I am not him since I have only posted comments for the past few days. I was under the impression that you could see who is who based on their email addresses. I appreciate the reponse.

  39. Your equation is a typical example of the age-old fallacy
    I wasn’t aware that calling Kerr “a longtime Mossad ally” as you do above meant anything but that he was a longtime Mossad ally. Or that Kerr viewed Muslims as “fundamentalist idiots” worthy of beatings as you clearly state above, or that he thought Islam a “barbaric religion” as you’ve also claimed for him. What I suspect is that you’re totally ignorant of the late Dr. Kerr and his scholarship, and are now trying to backpedal where you should be dismounting and running.
    You also -clearly- haven’t read Kerr’s review carefully enough. His criticism (and that of many other critics from the left including Hourani, Rodinson, and Al-Azm) wasn’t that Orientalism was too narrowly focused…. just the opposite, that Said’s thesis was overbroad and his style polemical and unconstructive (Rodinson called it “Stalinistic”) In this last respect — lashing out at your perceived “enemies” as you do here — you seem to have much in common. I hope that you find relief from whatever psychological torment is causing you to spread these ignorant and malicious slanders.
    {By the way, these afactual and insulting smears (along with your claim that I’m a ‘Likudnik’) are ad hominem fallacies… since sophistical refutations is on hand you might revisit that chapter.}

  40. Vadim, As it seems that your response is almost completely about me (ad hominem?) and my psychologically tormented soul, which I don’t think is of any interest to anyone other than my therapist, I refuse to make this forum into a personal shouting match. I am quite amused how you have so much fury over ‘smears’ when you are doing anything but that to Said. And I wonder if you would like to quote Maxime Rodinson on Israel and Zionism (the C word?). Thank you for wishing me relief from my ills.

  41. “This David”: you’re right, I can tell who is who from the email addresses, IP addresses, etc. But the general readers can’t. We’ve had various “John” confusions, “Warren” confusions etc here in the past but they got more or less sorted out; and it’s just easier on everyone if you could choose and pick a distinct handle. (And preferably a constant one, unlike the other chap, David/Davis/Dviid… )

  42. David@5:07, I’m happy to synopsize Rodinson’s views on Israel for you, especially if it helps avoid further misunderstandings. You seem to know that he considered Israel a colonial settler state; maybe you’re unaware of his view that “the time for questioning its wisdom is past.” At no time did Rodinson challenge Israel’s current right to exist as a Zionist state, as so many here continue to do. Rodinson – as with JES, Joshua, myself and every other so-called ‘Likudnik’ plaguing Helena’s comments section – advocated a negotiated two-state solution to the I-P conflict.
    You might also note that Rodinson was a lifelong friend of bogeyman Bernard Lewis, & described himself without shame as an ‘orientalist.’ He favorably reviewed Ibn Warraq’s “Why I am not a Muslim” & may be credited with inventing the much-derided term “Islamic Fascism” in reference to Ayatollah-era Iran. On these grounds -in your narrow vocabulary- he’d probably deserve the label ‘Islamophobe.’

  43. Vadim:
    No, I did not know about his friendship with Lewis. It does surprise me, in light of the latter being an icon and darling of the right wing (despite his remote flirtations with Marxism in the 50s) and Rodinson being a self-avowed “Marxist without a party”.
    His other views, about the Arab-Israeli conflict, are well known. Although he did change his poition considerably from calling Israel:
    “a heterogeneous collection of gangs of occupiers who could be sent back where they came from with the greatest of ease”
    to this later perscription:
    “If there are two or more ethnic groups in the same country, and if the danger of the domination of one by the other is to be avoided, then both these groups must be represented as distinct communities at the political level, and each must be accorded the right to defend its interests and aspirations.”
    He was outspoken about Israel’s exceptionalism:”I urge the Israelis to stop pretending to be part of Europe and accept to be part of the Middle East, then, Israelis have to learn to live with [their] neighbors, by reckoning the injustices made against the Palestinians and adopting a language of conciliation and compromise.”
    My understanding was that he considered himself a lifelong anti-Zionist, but since he was a humanist and (obviously) not an anti-Semite, he did not advocate violence against either Jews or Arabs, and a harmonious state, not a Jewish State or Arab State, was his solution to this miserable mess.
    I don’t think he was an Islamophobe, as much as he was a secular humanist: he advocated the absolute cleansing of the socio-political decision making process from all religious thought, hence his opposition to the concept of a “Jewish State”.
    About most of Helena’s readers rejecting Israel’s right to exist, this has not been my impression. I, for one, am not of that stripe. Whether a two-state solution can now be implemented with all the “facts on the ground”, is a whole other story.

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