It has seemed clear to me for some time now that, despite all the protestations of various US officials that what they most want to see is a “unified” Iraqi government stepping forward, in fact, what they most care about is not the ‘national unity” aspect of the government, but rather that the new Iraqi government NOT be one formed on a basis of commitment to a speedy US withdrawal.
In fact, Ja’afari and Muqtada Sadr are very committed to a unified Iraq– and Sadr has done more than any other Shiite politician to try to keep the links between the country’s Shiite and Sunni populations as strong as possible. (A lot, lot more than, for example, Abdul-Aziz Hakim and his SCIRI party, which as we know has been associated with some of the worst of the anti-Sunni death squads in the country.)
Sadr, in addition, is deeply committed to winning a speedy and complete withdrawal of US occupation forces from his country– this is, indeed, one of the main bases of his political relationship with the Sunnis.
The Americans have been using the Kurdish pols, and others, to continue to block the formation of a government led by Ja’afari, who is currently in alliance with Sadr. (The Americans have never withdrawn their “arrest warrant” against Sadr, the issuance of which back in April 2004 provoked some whole new rounds of very destructive fighting, both at the time and later in 2004.) For some reason, they don’t like Sadr! Perhaps it’s because of his consistently Iraqi-nationalist, anti-occupation stand?
I see that 97 days have now elapsed since Iraq’s “landmark” December election. That’s nearly 14 weeks in which the country has had no clear governance structure, and of course in the absence of such a structure the slide toward greater civil strife has only further continued.
Most recently, Washington has started deploying more actors to try to persuade Ja’afari to “do the right thing” (in Washington’s eyes), and to step down in favor of SCIRI’s favored candidate, Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a pro-Washington, pro-privatization person with a very slick political past. These actors have even included, it seems, a group of six US senators now in Baghdad. They were reported by AP to have, “pressured Iraq’s leaders Tuesday to speed up formation of a national unity government, saying American voters were losing patience with Iraqi politicians and increasingly eager to withdraw troops.” (Actually, this last part of the communication probably gave considerable heart to the anti-occupation pols in Baghdad, so it might not have entirely served the Bushies’ purpose… )
But still, the imperial stance adopted by these senators is somewhat breathtaking… That they go trotting off to a foreign country and openly lecture the politicians there on how to run it?
… But of course the really big gun that Washington and its local viceroy, Zal Khalilzad, are now hoping to bring to bear on the Iraqi Shiite pols is political pressure from Teheran. Will this work in the way the US hopes, I wonder? That is, is Teheran going to be both willing and able to pressure Ja’afari to cede in favor of Abdul-Mahdi?
“Willing” is already, in my mind, a big question. And so is “able.” It is probably worth re-reading all the trustworthy sources we have on the relations between Teheran’s rulers and the various strands and personalities within the Iraqi UIA, to gain some guidance on these points.(Help, anyone? Reidar Visser, are you there?)
That AP piece cited above, which is by Vanessa Arrington and not their much more experienced and better-connected Hamza Hendawi, has this interesting tidbit near the end:
- Al-Jaafari’s bid for a second term is opposed by Kurds, Sunni Muslims and many secular politicians who claim he cannot unify the country. The Shiite leadership is under heavy pressure to drop him as candidate.
(Not true, by the way! Ja’afari is opposed by both main Kurdish parties, yes– though a little bit of US palm-greasing could swiftly change that situation. But he is certainly not opposed by all the Sunni Muslim pols, or by all the secular politicians. I think Arrington’s claims here are the result of her listening to too much crude US Embassy agitprop.)
But then, she reports this:
- Yet interim Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi told reporters after meeting Iraq’s top Shiite cleric Tuesday that “Dr. al-Jaafari is still the (Shiite) Alliance nominee.”
The cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, urged Abdul-Mahdi and another Iraqi politician — Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Shiite bloc in parliament — to speed things up.
The aim should be to “form a national unity government as soon as possible,” al-Sistani told the men, according to an aide. “Otherwise the people will not forgive you.”
I have to say that the mendacity and Orwellian double-speak of the Bush administration people whenever they say anything about the Iraqis’ government-formation process never cease to amaze me. They go on and on about claiming they want to see a “unified government”, but are meantime stoking the Kurds and everyone else they have any influence with to resist the formation of the one form of unified government that looks both easily achievable and also democratically legitimate– i.e., one led by Ibrahim al-Ja’afari. And they launch all kinds of accusation about Ja’afari’s “divisiveness” while completely minimizing the bad effects of the anti-Sunni divisiveness perpetrated by SCIRI and its allies, as well as (in his day) by Iyad Allawi.
And… and… and…
Meanwhile, here’s a very intriguing quote I found last night when I was reading the March 6, 2006 edition of The New Yorker. It’s in an excellent article by Connie Bruck on the Bush administration’s various machinations with Iranian expatriate pols over the years, all of which is certainly well worth reading.
Here’s what she writes on p.54:
- James Dobbins, the Bush administration’s special envoy for Afghanistan, told me that in the prewar planning for Iraq “there was an intention that the U.S. would retain troops in Iraq– not for Iraq stabilization, because that was thought not to be needed,[!] but for coercive diplomacy in the region. Meaning Iran and Syria.”
Well, that was then, and now is now. Now, instead of the US being in a position to use “coercive diplomacy” (i.e. diplomacy backed by crude military threats) against Iran, Zal Khalilzad is instead begging Teheran to help him resolve the US’s political problems inside Iraq…
Boy, I would love to be a fly on the wall in these negotiations… But much more than that, I would love to see an empowered, united Iraqi government emerging that is committed to winning Iraq’s real national independence and sending the occupation army home.
is political pressure from Teheran.
Ha-ha, Helena, I said that Iran will be never ever do any thing to Israel and US they work together, what we see with the storm of nuclear program some talk leave them or not is just a scenario to put smoke to the public eyes.
The fact is Iran now doing the job for US, most recent internal news from Iraq say’s there are Iranians troops from Baseej Forces in East Baghdad (just near Ba’aqoba) ready to move and control Baghdad this is a clear that Tehran never ever being a good neighbour for Iraqi neither being a support for them.
The reality is the Iranians with all their sick hatred toward Arabs this very obvious to us as Iraqis they help the Americans to stay the course and occupying Iraq.
In the past US tactic was to build what they call it Iraqi forces which they thought will be replacing the US force and doing US needs, this not happened as we speak and we saw how recently some US officials said that Iraqi forces are less what they announced year ago, the reasons is most those forces are fired by US or they left the job because they realised that US used them against their country and their people.
So the plane now Bring These Iranians (these Ba…) and they doing the job for us on the ground by killing destroying Iraq with help with Al-Hakeem (he is not Hakeem as his name means wisdom) and others so then US will keep at the back holding the Oil fields, productions and the Iraq will be under attack every day under miserable living condition exactly like Palestinians in occupied land by Israeli.
general impression from this impression: murtha is right, US should get out!
general impression from this impression: murtha is right, US should get out!
Not quite right, yes there will be no need for high number of military personal, but there will be 14 or 24 military basis in Iraq the biggest one Al-Assad which is 20 mile and its designed as US Small Town on Babylon Land, there are US Car Reseller yards and a lot of things.
Bush said yesterday that he will keep the troops in Iraq as long as he is president. And that may be quite a long time if this administration continues to shred the US Constitution.
سِفر العبور.. إلى أور
∎ ليس من الممكن أن تمر الأحداث من حول المرء فلا يستقرؤها ويحاول فهماً لسيرورتها ويضع فوق ذلك تصوراً لاحتمال ما سيقع..
لم تكن حرب العراق نزوة أمريكية من رئيس طائش.. ولم تكن أحداث سبتمبر رغم ما يكتنفها من الكثير الكثير من الغموض هي المحرك الأقوى للحرب، ولقد سقطت ذريعة الحرب على العراق بحجة وجود أسلحة دمار شامل فقد أصبح ذلك من الأمور التي تدعو إلى السخرية والتندر بعد أن انكشف كل شيء إلى درجة أن حكاية الأربعين دقيقة التي تحدث عنها رئيس الوزراء البريطاني قبيل الحرب أصبحت نكتة حتى عند تلاميذ المدارس.
ويمكن القول ان هذه الحرب هي في حقيقة أمرها، وإعدادها، حرب «فاقرة» أي التي تكسر فقرات الظهر العربي كسراً يصعب معه الجبر أو محاولة الترميم.. لأنها قائمة على مرتكزات وأسس، خطط لها منذ أمد بعيد.. (يمكن الرجوع أيضاً إلى دراسة أعدتها مكتبة الكونجرس بناء على طلب من السيد لي هاملتون رئيس اللجنة الفرعية عام 1975) حول التدخل السريع في المنطقة.
ولعل من أهم أهداف هذه الحرب السياسية، هو إلغاء الوجود السياسي العربي كعامل مؤثر، أو كأمة مؤثرة في سياسة الشرق الأوسط.. وهذا الإلغاء وتحطيم الدور العربي تحطيماً نهائياً، هو الذي سيفتح المجال أمام تشكل ظهور كيان آخر يلعب دوراً مهماً، وحساساً، وحاسماً في المنطقة وهو الدور الإسرائيلي.. غير أنه ثبت لأمريكا أن إسرائيل لن تستطيع القيام بهذا الدور وحدها، لأنها رغماً عن قيامها منذ أكثر من خمسين عاماً، إلا أنها فشلت فشلاً ذريعاً في أن تسيطر سياسياً وأمنياً حتى في حدود ما تعتبره كيانها الداخلي..!! وأن المقاومة الفلسطينية تربكها ارباكاً خطيراً.. وان سيطرتها على الأجواء العربية، بطيرانها وصواريخها، لا يعني مطلقاً امكانية الهيمنة الفعلية على الأرض…!! ومن ثم فإنه لابد من فك الحصار عن الكيان الإسرائيلي وذلك بتفكيك المنطقة، والسماح بظهور قوى وكيانات تسمح لإسرائيل ان تنفذ مخططاتها، وذلك بإجهاض وشل حركة الفعل العربي – حتى على المستوى الشعبي – وعزله تماماً عن الهمّ الفلسطيني، ومن ثم الرضوخ الجمعي للواقع الإسرائيلي الجديد حتى من قبل المقاومة الفلسطينية إذا عاينت الشلل الرهيب الذي يكسر ظهر الأمة قاطبة..
ولعل حرب العراق تكشف بوضوح عن المخطط الجديد، لرسم الخارطة الجديدة في المنطقة.. إذ لم يعد هناك مجال للشك في أن العراق آيل إلى التقسيم..!! وهذا التقسيم رغماً عن حدته، وفصله وشكله الانعزالي، إلا أنه سينطوي على قيام دولة فيدرالية في بداية الأمر وتكون مهمة هذه الدولة رسم الملامح والحدود للانفصال التام..
إذ لا يستطيع أحد أن يزعم اليوم أن الأكراد سيعودون جزءاً من دولة عربية اسمها العراق.. فالمناطق الكردية، والحركة الكردية، والوضع السياسي، والاقتصادي هناك، يتبلور عن قيام دولة كردية مستقلة، حتى إن اللغة العربية أصبحت ممنوعة في المدارس والإذاعة والتلفزيون..!!
ولم تعد أمريكا كما كانت شيطاناً أكبر..! كما أن إيران لم تعد محور الشر..! وما قيل ويقال عن القنبلة الإيرانية إنما هو من باب الاستهلاك السياسي، فأمريكا في النهاية إذا كان لا يسرها صنع القنبلة الذرية الإيرانية فإنه لن يضرها.. فإيران لن تشكل خطراً شأنها شأن باكستان صاحبة القنبلة الإسلامية..!!
فأمريكا مطمئنة كل الاطمئنان إلى الجانب الإيراني، والذي لو كان يشكل أدنى خطر أو تهديد، على الوجود الأمريكي لأشعل المقاومة العراقية عن طريق المقاومة الشيعية، ويبقى المثلث السني الذي لاشك انه يشكل قلقاً ليس سهلاً على التواجد الأمريكي.. غير أن أمريكا والحكومة العراقية تراهنان على الزمن، وأن الأيام كفيلة بخنق المقاومة في ظل الحصار الشديد، وسياسة الغارات العنيفة التدميرية على مدن وقرى هذا المثلث، ومن ثم فإنه في النهاية سيذعن للاستسلام، والانصياع، وسوف يقبل بأيسر الحلول لإخراجه من التشريد والذبح اليومي، وسيظل هذا المثلث داخلاً ضمن إطار الحكومة الفيدرالية التي هي في النهاية لا يمكن أن تكون إلا كما أريد لها من هذه «الفدرلة»، والتي ستؤول حتماً إلى التجزئة الاستقلالية.. وربما يقول قائل وأين تركيا..؟ الحقيقة ان تركيا لن تستطيع أن تمارس أي عمل سوى إعلان الرفض، والمعارضة لقيام دولة كردية.. والرفض والمعارضة سيكونان شبيهين تماماً بالرفض والمعارضة لقيام دولة إسرائيل من قبل العرب، أي أنها لن تملك من تغيير الواقع شيئاً.. ثم إن تركيا حائرة بين وضعها الإقليمي في المنطقة، وبين تشبثها الشديد بالانضمام إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي وبمجرد إلحاقها بالركب الأوروبي.. فإنها ستضرب صفحاً عن كل شيء، وسوف يكفيها من ذلك كله أنها أصبحت دولة أوروبية..!!
وعوداً على بدء فإن ذلك كله يصب في سياسة التفتيت التي تمارس على العرب بأجندة إسرائيلية.. التفتيت السياسي، والاقتصادي، والثقافي، والإقليمي.
فالأمة العربية تمر بأسوأ حالات التماسك، والتلاحم، وهذه الحالة هي أفضل مناخ لزرع بذور التفرقة، والتحجيم، والتقزيم، وتقطيع أوصال الأرض، وتحويلها إلى دويلات تفرخ المزيد من دويلات أصغر.. ولتبقى محاطة من كل أقطارها، بقوى أصلب منها، وأكثر قدرة على التحرك، والمناورة والإخافة.. وهذه الدول المحيطة يجمعها اتفاق ربما غير معلن على وضع الحالة العربية في هذا الاضطراب من التأزيم والتقزيم، والهشاشة، القابلة للتقسيم والبعثرة.. إذ من المؤكد انه لن يسر إسرائيل أن ترى دولة عربية تتمتع بالتلاحم والقوة، والمنعة، وبالذات في المناطق الحساسة نفطياً.
ومن ثم فإن «بن غوريون» أول رئيس لحكومة إسرائيلية لم يكن هازلاً، ولا مازحاً عندما قال: ان إسرائيل الكبرى لن تقوم إلا على أنقاض خمسين دولة عربية..
المؤكد ان العبور من إسرائيل إلى «أور» أصبح سهلاً وميسوراً..! وبالمناسبة فإن «أور» هذه هي التي أقام فيها الحاكم الأمريكي الأول في العراق «غارنر» مخيمه المشهور.. كما أقام فيها صلوات، حفل عيد ميلاده.. وقال عنها انها بلد إبراهيم أبي العبرانيين وانها من الآن ستكون مزاراً للحجاج اليهود.. إلى أن تقوم دولة إسرائيل الكبرى..!!
http://writers.alriyadh.com.sa/kpage.php?ka=55
Helena, I am as perplexed by this issue as you are. With regard to Tehran’s leverage over the Iraqi factions, I think the configuration of links is exactly as you have suggested here and earlier, i.e. SCIRI has long-standing ties whereas most other UIA players have not. I understand that some efforts were made by Western media to dig up incriminatory (pro-Iranian) matter on Jaafari when he first acceded to the premiership back in 2005 but nothing much surfaced; after all he left his exile in Iran and stayed the last decade or so before the war in Britain. Also historically the Daawa has been the arch-Iraqi of all the Shiite Islamist factions. Similarly, media jumped once Muqtada made a trip to Tehran recently – I think this was his second visit after 2003 – and no doubt Iran would have liked to have him as an ally, but again there are quite a few problems in the past as Muqtada’s father was not on the best of terms with Iran. But I’m sure Iran would be delighted to act as a midwife for the new Iraqi government – they would get their own people in power while at the same time posing as saviours and thus neutralising any suggestion of meddling! With all the arm-twisting that’s probably going on at the moment and the combined resources of the US and Iran taken into account, what is really remarkable is that the slight Jaafari majority within the UIA still appears to exist.
The truly enigmatic bit in this I think is the US insistence on Abd al-Mahdi. I find it difficult to figure out exactly what it is Washington expects to get from him which all the others supposedly are incapable of delivering. Clearly it cannot be related to the federalism issue, where SCIRI is furthest away from the US position. It cannot be the general Islamic character of the new system, firstly because SCIRI does not have any established mujtahid clerics in its own ranks and so in legislative issues they will ultimately have to defer to the opinions of qualified clerics outside their party (probably a mix of Sistani and Khamenei in their case), and secondly because the differences between the various mujtahids are not so great when it comes to the issues that presumably are most sensitive for Washington in the human-rights field, i.e. the rights of women and non-Muslim minorities. So what is left? The assumed free-market attitude of Abd al-Mahdi I suppose, perhaps along with his reputation for professionalism and also fond memories of his very public expressions of thanks to the US during past visits to Washington. But it just seems odd that those issues should be on top of the agenda in a context when fundamental questions about the overall structure of the political system are unsettled.
I recall seeing an “Iraqi leadership profile” in the US MM prior to the December 2005 elections that speculated about the potential prime ministers of a future Iraqi government.
The newspaper article mentioned Jaafari, Hakim, Sadr, etc. but it also pointed out that three other potential leaders, Chalabi, Alawi, and Abd al- Mahdi all graduated from a particular prestigous western-linked (Anglican?) high school back in the 1950s.
Chalabi was apparently a couple years ahead of Alawi and Abd al-Mahdi, but the three have apparently known each other from their high school years, when they all spoke fluent English and shared a common interest in western liberal ideas.
Could it be that there is more than “meets the eye” about the separate partisan affiliations between these three men?
Reidar,
Washington expects to get from him
Sd;
between these three men?
I think its clear enough why US preferred Abd al-Mahdi, first I would mention that US administration many times raised that they preferred Abd al-Mahdi to lead new government and they push toward this right now.
Some points from the past about Abd al-Mahdi, he is one of three Iraqis chosen by Noah Feldman in putting what we call “Iraqi Constitution” which I call it Noah Constitution, also Abd al-Mahdi he had in the last three years regular trips to US which involved meeting with GWB, and Dick Cheney many times in addition to other US administration and cooperates, he is openly addressed that the privatisations specially of Iraqi oil sector its shed be first priority to be done!!! This is naïve if we looking inside Iraq there are more important things should be done and more affecting day life of each Iraq after through the regime out and set new Iraq.
The other point I would make is Abd al-Mahdi he state his politic life as commonest party member and supporters early days then he moved to Ba’ath party then he joined the religious parties and follow Ahmad Aljalabi grope, this indicates that Abd al-Mahdi he knew how to colour himself and who the politics works and US need this type of personality that looking ambition and not holding the national interest just to run to his desire.
Sd,
Your information about the Chalabi/`Allawi/Abdul Mehdi school affiliation is false on its face. Chalabi did not attend, let alone graduate from high school, in Iraq. He left Iraq with his family at age 12 or 13, and did not return until he was airlifted in as part of the American invasion in 2003.
The high school you are referring to is undoubtedly Baghdad College, which was run by Jesuits from Boston.
Shirin,
This report also I read in Arabic in Alshaqr Alawsat, but I agree with you that Chalabi family left Iraq after Abdul Karem Kasim nationalised the banks which Al-Rafedain bank was Chalibi father owned and his son is 12-13 years old when he left.
he never been in Iraq since till the invasion and he was in Jordan and we all know he looted the Batra’a bank with help from Tara Aldaqstani and flee back to London and US despised Jordanians call and Interpol to give them back Ahmad UK and US turned their back to King Hussein despite he is friendship and support from both.
Salah,
CC: Sd
Also, the report says that the three of them graduated from high school in the ’50’s, which is also impossible because the Abdul Karim Qassim takeover was in 1958, and that is when his family left Iraq. So he was 12 or 13 in 1958, and would not have graduated from high school until the ’60’s even if he was in Iraq, which we know he was not.
I did not hear that `Allawi and `Abdul Mehdi attented Kulliat Baghdad. Did you know anything about that?
Reidar,
I agree with Salah. It is no mystery why the Bush administration are pushing for Abdul Mehdi as prime minister of Iraq (I intentionally do not capitalize prime minister here). He is the perfect U.S. puppet, and would cooperate fully with their program to achieve the economic dominance of the country that they need in order to dominate future governments. He would also be certain to “invite” the U.S. to keep those “enduring” (we mustn’t use the word permanent, must we?) military bases they are building even as we speak – you know, the ones that are like small American cities, complete with Burger Kings, bowling alleys, and even an auto dealership.
Shirin, Salah,
I certainly take your points. I suppose I was thinking more about the long-term perspective than about the immediate future. I’m sure Abd al-Mahdi would behave impeccably in a context with a substantial US force presence (except that he would probably work to create a sectarian 9-province Shiite federal entity, to which the US has signalled its opposition). But is it realistic to expect that he (or his party) will remain pro-US in the long run, even in the context of the scenario you outline with military bases?
But is it realistic to expect that he (or his party) will remain pro-US in the long run, even in the context of the scenario you outline with military bases? If the answer to that is “no”, then the difference between Abd al-Mahdi and other candidates is less obvious I think.
Reidar,
Thanks for clarifying your thinking. Certainly there could be a difference between short-term and long-term behaviour. I just don’t think the long term is nearly as significant as the short term when it comes to putting a dependable puppet in place. Here are a few of my random thoughts:
1. Since we were addressing primarily the thinking of the Bush administration in favouring `Abdul Mehdi, it is appropriate to mention that they have not for the most part shown themselves to be very competent in any kind of planning, either long or short term. They also – and this includes the military – appear incapable of learning anything at all since they keep making the same types of mistakes over and over again. Their approach to everything they have done in Iraq seems to be to maintain a high level of ignorance while flying by the seats of their pants and reacting, generally in a knee-jerk way, when things do not go according to their unrealistic expectations. (One of the things I have noted consistently from the beginning is their uncanny ability to find “solutions” to problems that are guaranteed to make the situation worse in every aspect.) Based on this, I question whether they have really thought very much about how `Abdul Mehdi may or may not change his position in the future.
2. On the other hand, I don’t think it is significant whether or not he changes his position in the long term, provided he serves his purpose well in the short term. Even though they showed no foresight in most aspects of the Iraq adventure, they do seem to have thought pretty carefully about the general agenda of gaining military, economic and political control over Iraq. Their number one priority after the invasion was implementing “economic reform” intended to put control of Iraq’s economy in the hands of American interests, and creating a new infrastructure that is dependent on U.S. corporations, technology, and know-how. (Building new U.S.-dependent infrastructure took priority over restoring service rapidly by repairing the existing infrastructure.) There are, as many have pointed out, clear profit benefits here for American corporations, but I think emphasizing the profit motive causes us to overlook the real primary purpose for this “reform” and “rebuilding”. The political purpose of creating this economic and infrastructure dependency should be clear. Once Iraq is dependent upon the United States in terms of economy, infrastructure, and the requisite technology to maintain the infrastructure, the U.S. can control any government that may come into power whether by democratic or any other means. That in my view is the real reason that economic and infrastructure “reform”, and not “liberation and democracy” were the number one priority.
In addition to his other excellent puppet qualities, `Abdul Mehdi is, from what I have observed, by far the best choice in terms of cooperating with the Bush administration’s economic agenda in Iraq. Chalabi has (not at all surprisingly) proven to be completely unreliable, and in any case he could not get allected head pig chaser in the smallest village in Iraq. `Allawi is a more reliable puppet than Chalabi has proven to be, but this opportunist has no ideological ties to the U.S. agenda, and does not see his fortunes as depending completely on the U.S., and is therefore apt to be far too independent. He also has a number of other liabilities attached, including a significant lack of popular support (his main support comes from urban Sunnis and seculars who see him as strong on security – those who insist that Iraqis are sharply divided along sectarian lines should give that some thought). Among all of the opportunists who rode in on the invader’s coattails, `Abdul Mehdi appears to be most ideologically in concert with the Bush administration’s economic goals, including going back to the days when outside interests controlled the oil. He is therefore the most likely to be helpful in completing its implementation. He also has the advantage over the failed puppets Chalabi and `Allawi of not yet having had a chance to fail.
Further thoughts on your comments regarding the desirability of `Abdul Mehdi as the next Bushie puppet PM:
“…the issues that presumably are most sensitive for Washington in the human-rights field, i.e. the rights of women and non-Muslim minorities.”
Reider, I do not believe for one moment that the Bush administration gives a flying rats rear end for human rights or the rights of women and non-Muslim minorities in Iraq. I base this first of all on the fact that as the occupying power the U.S. has been the number one violator and supporter of violations of human rights in Iraq. In addition to its by now unquestionably horrific human rights record in Iraq – random, arbitrary arrests and detentions, documented widespread and systematic prisoner and detainee abuse, torture, and murder, ordered at the highest levels of the military and government, hostage taking (i.e. kidnapping and indefinitely detaining mothers, fathers, wives, children, siblings of “wanted” individuals in an effort to pressure them into turning themselves in), msssive collective punishment – often of entire cities, towns and villages, destruction of homes, fields, orchards, and businesses as a means of punishment, indiscriminate bombing of civilian neighborhoods… – the U.S. is clearly very much involved in terrible human rights abuses on the part of the Iraqi “government” and its agents, including death squads.
As for the rights of women, and religious and other minorities, apart from pro forma lip service for P.R. purposes the U.S. has done nothing, and has indicated to at least some who have approached them on these issues that it just doesn’t care.
“So what is left? The assumed free-market attitude of Abd al-Mahdi I suppose…”
It is more than just assumed. He has openly backed the Bush administration’s economic “reforms”, and has clearly and openly advocated putting control of all aspects of Iraq’s oil industry into the hands of American interests.
“…perhaps along with his reputation for professionalism and also fond memories of his very public expressions of thanks to the US during past visits to Washington. But it just seems odd that those issues should be on top of the agenda in a context when fundamental questions about the overall structure of the political system are unsettled.”
Not in the least odd. These are the issues that have always been at the top of the Bush administration’s agenda. As for the structure of the political system, this is only important to the Bush administration insofar as it serves their agenda of creating in Iraq a dependent, compliant client state. It is not surprising that they see `Abdul Mehdi as the person most likely to put in place the mechanisms necessary to accomplish this.
Shirin, I find most of your arguments persuasive. The context of my comment was that for once I was feeling slightly optimistic about Iraq because of what I saw as a sensible trend in US policy, i.e. the tendency to work to salvage the territorial framework of the state, perhaps by encouraging a constitutional revision towards a better balance between the centre and the regions. With the assumption that this trend was in the ascendancy, I found the strong US preference for Abd al-Mahdi a bit puzzling. But I may have been too optimistic – I have no expertise on US policy-making and it is of course perfectly conceivable that the policy that I’m talking about may ultimately lose out to some of the other trends and priorities that you mention.
Present affairs in Iraq have a way of over-taking commentary
Rival Shia groups unite against US after mosque raid
On a related note, Juan Cole was on ABC World News and PBS NewsHour where he discussed the rise of Muqtada al-Sadr
This might be slightly off-topic, but I didn’t see any better place to get this in. In the last 6 days, I have heard of 4 different alleged massacres by US troops or Iraqi troops with US advisers. The one in Haditha that Time forced a re-investigation of, the one in (I think) Balad that actually happened last week, one more on the weekend (can’t recall where it was but I think the Baghdad area) and the incident yesterday in the Shia religious center. In the first two incidents the police sided with the survivors against the US version of the story, and in the last two the national government seems to be doing the same. The ministry of justice is now claiming the troops arrested, bound and executed 37 men.
Now there are many, many questions this raises. But to stay close to this thread I will stick to the question about the Iraqi government itself: what does it mean that UIA ministers are now willing to openly accuse US forces of My Lai-style massacres, while ignoring the many accusations of same in 2004 and 2005? Is this:
a. just because many of the victims were Shia and it was close to their voter base?
or b. that they are finally fed up with the Occupation and ready to demand our departure?
It’s easy enough to see why (b). Because surely they are frustrated by Rumsfeld’s insinuation that our troops will sit out a civil war yet refuse to go home. Because these same Shia parties demanded that the US and Iran postpone their talks about Iraq until the new government could be formed and select a representative to attend. Because the US is now giving up on reconstruction. But does anyone know if they’re finally ready to give America the heave-ho?
Reidar, Shirin, Salah, Helena,
I have 2 words for you:
post-colonial africa.
Before I read all of these comments I couldn’t put it all together in my mind. Previously I was only able to look at it on the surface as something that seemed plausible.
What I mean is, how many countries in Africa can you name who neither have pro-western(US) neoliberal style governments nor are engaged in pitched/constant “civil wars”?
Particularly given the insight raised here about Abd Al’Mahdi, his penchant for political “flip-flopping” his western, possibly pro-privatization attitudes, etc. The motive seems clear to me.
We need to stop looking at this from a United States vs. Iraq vs. the World perspective. GWB and Cheney do not represent the United States proper. They represent the neo-liberal agendas of transnational corporations. There is little reason to think the efforts of the Bush Administration are as directly related to US World Dominance as they are to the dominance and profit of transnational corporations.
What does it matter if Iraq has a stable democratic popular government if these corporations are able to extract the national resources under cover of “civil wars” and divisiveness and weak central governments?
After reading all of this, I’m tending towards the perspective that the Bush Administration is practically giving Iraq an ultimatum, either you elect al’Mahdi Prime Minister, or you get a civil war.
One or the other, and although the neo-liberal agenda certainly fares better in South Africa and Egypt, among others, Nigeria’s still managing to keep the oil flowing, and let’s not even talk about the so-called diamond coast.
Helena, you seem to know a lot more about Africa than myself, what do you think about this possibility for the future of Iraq?
(and Afghanistan, and possible Iran?)