Amira Hass has two interesting stories in today’s HaAretz that describe important elements of the stance Hamas has adopted with regard to the two major challenges it faces: forming a Palestinian government and dealing with the international community. (Though actually, the “international” issue is an intimate part of the intra-Palestinian negotiations, too.)
In this piece is about the internal Palestinian negotiations. Hass tells us that Fateh’s Central Committee decided late Thursday not to take up Hamas’s invitation to join a national unity government.
She said that Hamas officials were still hopeful that some of the smaller parties/lists represented in the parliament might join a Hamas-led government. But she indicated that this effort also looked as though it would be unsuccessful, referring to, “The factions’ apparent refusal to join a Hamas-led government.”
She reported that the first of the three successive draft proposals that Hamas presented to the small parties (and perhaps also to Fateh as well?), “discussed considering negotiations with Israel only if the latter first recognizes the rights of the Palestinian people and guarantees a full withdrawal to 1967 lines.”
This accords exactly with what Ismail Haniyeh, Dr. Mahmoud Zahhar, Dr. Mahmoud Ramahi, and Ghazi Hamad all told me on my recent trip, though some of them indicated that this “exchange of recognitions” could also be more simultaneous and reciprocal than Hass indicates.
If Hamas is indeed prepared to commit to a recognition of Israel, even though conditional, and if the international community is truly committed to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, then this Hamas position would surely give a good-faith international mediator a substantial starting point for brokering some kind of a simultaneous, reciprocal exchange of recognitions.
That second “if” there might seem like a big one. But why on earth should anyone in the international community expect Palestinians or anyone else to provide any kind of recognition of Israel having rights outside of its own national borders?
Hass reported the response of the Palestinian parties to Hamas’s political overture as follows:
- Fatah has said it cannot join a government that does not accept the “strategic” principle of negotiating with Israel, and Fayad has said he will not join a government without Fatah.
Other factions did not insist on negotiations, but wanted the basic principles to mention the Palestine Liberation Organization and its status as the representative of the Palestinian people, as well as the international decisions regarding a resolution of the conflict and a Palestinian state.
Fatah and Independent Palestine also want a mention of the 1988 PLO’s declaration of independence, which, like the international decisions, imply recognition of Israel.
When I talked with the Hamas people, they were pretty scathing about the formula that Fateh people like Saeb Erakat have used, about having a “strategic” commitment to negotiations.
In this second piece, Hass reports on two indications of Hamas’s policy regarding the conflict with Israel. She writes about the interview that CBS News conducted with the Gaza-based PM-designate Ismail Haniyeh… Oh, here is the CBS version of that, from which this is an excerpt:
- though Hamas has sent suicide bombers into Israel, Haniyeh says he’s never done any such thing and would discourage his kids from doing so.
“I’ve never sent anyone on a suicide mission,” he said. “If one of my sons came to me and asked me that, I wouldn’t even consider giving him my blessing.”
Hamas hasn’t sent any suicide bombers into Israel for more than six months. But if it restarts its terror campaign, Haniyeh will be at the top of Israel’s hit list. He narrowly escaped assassination once before — three years ago, an Israeli F-16 bombed a house where he was meeting other Hamas leaders.
So what would it take for Hamas to renounce violence and recognize Israel’s right to exist?
“That depends on Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state within the boundaries of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem,” he said. “Only then can there be room for talks.”
Israel calls all that “double talk.” It says Haniyeh is the smiling face of Hamas’ public relations campaign to soften its murderous image in the West.
But when asked if he could foresee a day when he would be invited to the White House to sign a peace agreement with the Israelis, he answered, “Let’s hope so.”
Words of hope and not hatred are a new vocabulary for Hamas.
So anyway, Amira Hass reports on that. She also reports on a speech the Damascus-based head of Hamas’s overall political bureau, Khaled Mashaal, made at a memorial gatherial there Thursday night. (She doesn’t provide a source for this, but I assume it could be in the Damascus or Beirut press… I didn’t see it in Hayat… If any readers can provide a link to an Arabic-language original report or transcript of this, I’d be grateful.)
Here’s what Hass writes about Mashaal’s speech:
- Running the Palestinian Authority will not deflect Hamas from its overriding goal of pursuing a long-term struggle with Israel, the leader-in-exile of the militant Islamist movement said in Damascus.
“Being in power is only a means to an end for Hamas,” Khaled Meshal told a memorial gathering for a deceased Palestinian politician on Thursday night. “Power is not our ultimate goal.
“If it becomes one, let power go to hell. It will not hold us back from our targets which we hold dear,” he said.
“We and the Zionists have a date with destiny. If they want a fight, we are ready for it. If they want a war, we are the sons of war. If they want a struggle, we are for it to the end,” the Damascus-based leader Meshal declared.
“We have more stamina than Israel and we will defeat it, God willing,” he said.
He also took a swipe at Fatah for its interim peace deals with Israel in the 1990s that led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
“Those who talked about setting up a state before liberation lost both country and land,” Meshaal said. “A country can only exist on liberated land.”
Hamas rejected the 1993 Oslo accord and later Israel-PLO agreements which were never fully implemented and which have unravelled further since a Palestinian uprising began in 2000.
Meshal upheld the right of Palestinian refugees and their descendants to return to the homes they lost in the 1948 war – a red-button issue that has bedevilled past peace negotiations.
“I tell all the Palestinians: you will return to your homeland and nobody will stop you,” he said.
“Our fate is to combine resistance and politics, but resistance remains the basis and politics only a branch.”
Hamas has carried out nearly 60 suicide bombings against Israelis since 2000 but has largely adhered to a year-old truce.
It has said talks with Israel would be a waste of time.
Though I still haven’t even started writing the longer piece I’ll be writing on this whole question, I’d say that Hamas’s negotiating position, as articulated (in slightly but not very different ways) by both Mashaal and Haniyeh, is very similar to the one Hizbullah pursued in Lebanon. Both positions feature, in particular, a strong aversion to getting drawn into interim negotiations that have any political content (as opposed to agreements that are merely technical ceasefires), and that could be seen as constraining in any way the organization’s ability to continue its “legitimate resistance struggle” to regain the whole of its claimed land.
But how big is the land that Hamas is claiming? This is a key question.
Many of the Hamas people I spoke to indicated strongly that the pre-1967 boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza have real meaning for them. But I think it would be far better for them to become much more explicit about this so that their own people and the rest of the world could understand more clearly what it is they’re fighting for. I recognize this is not easy for them, given: (1) The large numerical preponderance of 1948 refugees within all the key Palestinian constituencies except the West Bank; (2) the strength and clarity of their own previous claims to all of Mandate Palestine, and (3) the humiliating and abysmal failure of the Fateh-led project to establish a state in the West Bank and Gaza.
But still, as I said above, if the international community is truly committed to helping find a final resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, then there is something in Hamas’s emerging stance to work with.
What’s more, this “something” is completely in line with the position of the international community regarding the illegality of all of Israel’s moves to annex and otherwise incorporate huge chunks of land that remain, 39 years after 1967, occupied territory. So it strikes me that international negotiators have no reason to refuse to engage with (and of course, to probe more deeply into) the Hamas position. Indeed, in the interests not just of local peace, but also of regional and global peace, I think they are duty-bound to do so.
39 years is a heck of a long time for these two peoples to have had to suffer the consequences of the international community’s irresolution on this issue, and the failure of 39 years of Washington’s highly partisan and patently unsuccessful domination of this diplomacy.
very interesting. the implication in haniyeh’s remarks seems to be, as you say, exactly the substance of the international consensus (or, rather, consensus-minus-2: israel & the u.s.) on palestine: there is nothing to talk about while the 1967 occupation continues.
but i’m not sure that these comments have much implication for beyond that – “what it is they’re fighting for” in a real sense.
clearly “the pre-1967 boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza” and east jerusalem (an interesting ommission in your paraphrase) “have real meaning for” hamas. but the difference between their stance and fatah’s is what that meaning is. for fatah, that meaning was victory – say ‘we win’ and stop struggling. for hamas, the meaning seems to be the beginning of the palestinian struggle.
it’s a strategic meaning, and one that they seem pretty explicit about – both how far it goes, and how limited it is.
but it too is exactly in line with the international consensus-minus-2: the 1948 ceasefire line has “real meaning” as a starting point for the exercise of the human rights of palestinian refugees, palestinian citizens of israel, and west bank/gaza/east jerusalem residents. or, put in shorthand, ending the war of 1967 just means the possibility of negotiating an end to the war of 1948.
but for that consensus, as for hamas, it’s ‘how’ to exercise those rights that belongs on the table, not ‘whether’. they’re no more negotiable than any other part of the Universal Declaration.
and that means the right of return for palestinian refugees (whether outside the ‘green line’ or ‘present absentees’ within it), equal rights for all within any state structure between the jordan and the mediterranean, and genuine accountability for israeli war crimes from deir yassin to jericho, among other things.
Re East Jerusalem: under international law it is part of the West Bank, so that was why I didn’t see a need for separate mention there.
I read one scholar, whose name eludes me at the moment, who said that legally, Jerusalem and environs should still be considered the “corpus.” Interesting theoretically, though I really don’t know how useful it is to view such things.
In any event, rozelle’s view of the consensus is wrong. Virtually no one agrees that the war of 1948 has to be resolved, although the plight of the refugees has to be addressed.’
“Right of return” to Israel itself is an absolute non-starter, and everyone knows it.
Calling for “war crimes investigations” for Deir Yassin is a non starter, and everyone knows it. (As is demanding justice for the Palestinian and Arab atrocities).
Calling the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem “the West Bank” is a non-starter, and everyone knows it.
If Hamas makes these demands, they will just dig themselves deeper, not just with Israel, but with much of the rest of the world.
In any event, even if rozelle was correct, she concedes that the “consensus” lacks Israel and the U.S. Since any agreement will have to be reached with Israel, and since the U.S. is sympathetic toward Israel, their objections will have to be recognized and accomodated at least in part.
Joshua, your refrain that all these things are “non-starters”, and “everyone knows it” suggests mainly to me that the universe of people you include in your “everyone” is extremely limited.
Worldwide, the support for the proposition that international law should be equally applied in all parts of our fair planet is extremely strong. Many aspects of the negotiations conducted at and after Oslo departed quite radically from the international law position. If the two sides had been able to reach a negotiated peace agreement based on such negotiated terms, then I am sure that most of the rest of the world would have supported that.
But if there is no such negotiated peace, then for the vast majority of people and governments of the world the fallback would be the international law position. The alternative, that might can anywhere make right (as in, the Bush administration’s position toward Iraq) is surely pretty terrible to contemplate…
But do tell me: Do you, personally, support the proposition that international law should be equally applied in all parts of our fair planet? Yes or no. If not, do tell us why not.
The problem with your formulation is that “international law” does not prescribe a particular result to this conflict. It recognizes that final issues will have to be negotiated, in the area of final borders, refugees, outstanding property claims. So your claim that negotiations would “replace” international law is incorrect. Negotiations are the very foundation of how international law is supposed to resolve the conflict.
I do think that the constant rhetoric that the Palestinian partisans have employed crying that “international law” backs their position has been self-defeating. Generally, every time they have rejected a proposal they end up in a worse position than before.
With respect to your question, however. Yes, I believe that to the extent that international law exists, it should apply equally. Thus, the question of extra territorial settlers should be addressed equally everywhere. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem to work that way. About the only settlers who are being asked and pressured to leave contested territory are Jews from Israel. Virtually every other group of settlers is accepted as a fait accompli (Han Chinese in Tibet, Moroccans in Western Sahara, etc).
Now let me ask you the following questions.
1) Do you consider the Jewish quarter of the Old City to be “Palestinian Land?”
2) Do you think relevant UN resolutions requires the return of the Jewish quarter of the Old City to the Palestinian Authority?
3) Do you think the proposed “Geneva Accords” are contrary to international law?
Hamas imo faces many difficult choices after it takes office and Israeli policy is no longer hostage to electoral politics…some examples:
*Does it recognize Israel and, if not, why should Israel be expected to recognize Hamas?
*Can it continue its traditional policy of uncompromising intransigence and still meet the expectations (economic, social and internal security) of the Palestinians who voted them into office? Would hardliners in their circle accept policies toward Israel shorn of their past purity?
*Does it turn a blind eye to acts which provoke Israel (suicide bombing, Qassam rockets, etc.,) and, if so, how can it expect to implement its domestic agenda without Israeli cooperation?
*Does it take primary responsibility for security in the West Bank or Gaza or permit Al Aqsa, IJ, PFLP to operate as independent agents? Does it disarm these groups? If not, how will the PA under Hamas maintain a semblance of law and order?
*How does it reconcile its Islamist program with the expectations of traditionally outspoken Palestinian women?
*Does it work closely with Iran and Hizbollah and risk alienating the Americans?
*As in effect the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, doesn’t it pose a thorny problem for Egypt and Jordan? What can it do to assuage these two critical neighboring Arab countries that any success it might enjoy would not be threatening to their own internal security concerns?
Joshua, I’m so glad we’re getting somewhere in our discussions here. International law does not totally prescribe an outcome but it does provide a strong baseline of principles, e.g. the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the illegality of implanting your own settlers in land under military occupation– and, too, the rights of peoples under military occupation rule to act militarily against the occupying force. All those principles were strengthened in the aftermath of WW2, with a particular view to rendering inadmissible many of the actions that the Germans had committed in Europe and the Japanese in Asia, and with a view to recognizing the right of people of occupied territories to resist such actions.
The UN Charter also urges the use of a number of different mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, including negotiation, mediation, and authoritative arbitration, any one of which could be used in this conflict.
Most certainly, there is a very strong presumption against any party trying to determine the final outcome unilaterally, by force.
I agree that such principles should be used in an equal-outlook way, wherever there is military occupation and the attempt to incorporate occupied land by force. As for example when Iraq invaded Kuwait, or Indonesia invaded East Timor– and yes, also with regard to Morocco’s actions in the Western Sahara. Regarding the PRC’s presence in Tibet, however, this is not considered to be a military occupation under international law. And my friend the Dalai Lama does not seek an independent Tibetan state, only much stronger guarantees for the autonomy of Tibet which is promised on paper by the Chinese at present.
Your specific questions: (1) If I were advising Hamas, which I am not now and never have done, I would urge them to make a generous concession to Israel regarding the Jewish Quarter and the base of the (exposed portion of) the Kotel, and too regarding visiting rights for pilgrims to various other Jewish Holy Places on the West Bank– which could be done reciprocally with pilgrimage rights for Palestinian Christians and Muslims going to sites inside Israel. (I might also advise them to make various other concessions. And I might advise Israel to make various concessions to the Palestinians above and beyond the requirements of international law, too. But I’m not advising either side.)
(2) Actually, the last time the UN ruled on the status of Jerusalem it was the Partition Plan– which provided as I’m sure you know for it to be a corpus separatum under international supervision. Since the PP provides the birth certificate in int’l law for the establishment of both the Jewish State and the Arab State in Palestine, its provisions should be given due consideration by anyone seeking a resolution through negotiation, mediation, or arbitration.
(3) Quite clearly the Geneva Accord is at variance in many respects with the provisions of international law. It also has no standing since it was negotiated between private groups, not the national leaderships empowered to negotiate. If those national leaderships had reached a negotiated settlement it would have had standing in international law even if at variance with various (preceding) principles of int’l law, and would have superseded them. But they didn’t reach such a settlement, did they.
Helena,
As has been previously discussed “inadmissibility of territory acquired by force” does not mean that, after a war, the sides can demand status quo ante. What it means is that a party cannot unilaterally invade and annex a territory and have it sanctioned by international law. But that does not prohibit later agreed upon changes.
Thus, I would agree that if Olmert wants to “set Israel’s borders” he can’t due it with his proposed unilateral withdrawal. Nevertheless, international law does not mandate, at least in any enforceable way, withdrawal to prior lines, especially when those lines were armistice lines and not borders (which was demanded by the Arab states after the war of independence). Borders can be and are negotiated. Note: I support a plan for further unilateral withdrawal, but not because I think it finally resolves the conflict, but because it takes steps that Israel would have to take anyway when the the parties DO reach agreement.
One thing I want to clarify. You indicate that the corpus has relevance today, though its not clear how. As I’ve said, there are some authorities on this who actually say that the status of Jerusalem –all of it– is the corpus. If so, it’s not “Palestinian.” But it’s not under international supervision right now. Very few people living there would want that, and I don’t think there is any sane international body that would want to take that administration on.
Also, I would quibble that the partition plan is the “birth certificate” of the two states. It was a proposed resolution, accepted by Israel, rejected by the others. Certainly you are not saying that Israel’s borders are those according to partition. As I see it, Israel’s “birth certificate” was when the UNGA voted to admit Israel into it, which would at least mean that it it is accepted according to the armistice lines (including the portions of Jerusalem it gained).
I think the main difference here is that you insist that to the extent that the conflict is unresolved by negotiation, international law has a baseline outcome. I disagree. Relevant international law may prohibit methods undertaken by either side, but does not set forth a “default” outcome. In the case of this specific conflict, I believe the relevant resolutions made this particularly clear, that all issues were to resolved by final negotiation. As such, I don’t think the occupied territory is inherently “Palestinian,” but that doesn’t mean Israel can just take it. I also think that if the Geneva Accords, or Nusseibeh-Ayalon, or Beilin-Rabo, or the Camp David Clinton bridging proposals, were agreed to, they would not supplant international law. Rather, ANY of them would be a valid and anticipated outcome of it.
P.S. Tibet is occupied, and it doesn’t change just because the Dalai Lama is conciliatory enough to not demand independence. He’s the most pragmatic idealist I’ve ever seen. But that’s another debate for another day.