I’ve been meaning for some time now to write something about the very interesting and wel-informed study that Marina Ottaway of the Carnegia Endowment published three weeks ago about the prospects for stability in Iraq. The study is called Back from the brink: A strategy for Iraq, and you can read the PDF version here
One reason I think the study’s very valuable is that Marina is a very level-headed, non-ideological person who’s done a lot of studies of deep-rooted political transitions elsewhere, particularly in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa. For the past few years she’s been helping to run the Carnegie Endowment’s “Democracy and the Rule of Law Program”, which has focused very heavily on the Middle East, and which publishes the generally calm and informative Arab Reform Bulletin.
Anyway, in Back from the Brink Marina argues, basically, that the constitution/reform process that Iraq has gone through so far has left the country in a very perilous condition:
- The political system that the United States has helped set up in Iraq—not the one it envisaged, to be sure, but the one that is emerging as a result of Iraq’s realities and poor U.S. policy choices—is a house of cards. Iraq could easily splinter, with Kurds and Shias focusing inward on their own regions and abandoning Sunni provinces to turn Iraq into the equivalent of a failed state where nobody is in control and civil war and ethnic cleansing escalate. Before withdrawing its troops, the United States must do what it can to ensure that the political system of weak federalism that has emerged, while not ideal, is at least workable. That means helping to form a viable Sunni region.
She notes that,
- Since 2003, Iraq has undergone a process that has unfortunately become quite common in multiethnic or multireligion countries when an authoritarian regime is removed. Politics becomes not competition among parties advocating different ideas and programs, but conflict among ethnic or confessional groups.
She argues that, whatever you think of this phenomenon, you need to accept it as, now, an existing fact of political life in Iraq– but that its negative consequences (especially for the Sunnis) need to be minimized. In particular, she argues for a strong US role in helping the Sunnis to set up their own viable “super-region” within the emerging “federal” (i.e. highly decentralized) political system in Iraq.
She identifies two critical areas in which the US needs to exert political pressure to this end. One is to encourage Iraqis to revise the approach the present (interim) constitution adopts to the division of of revenues from new (as opposed to existing) oil and gas fields. At present, the constitution gives the newly emerging “regions” control of new oil revenues, while the central government retains control only of revenue streams from the existing– in some cases nearly pumped-out fields.
Ottaway writes:
- The U.S. needs to promote broad negotiations on the issue now so that Sunnis can form their own region and strengthen their autonomy. The issue is too important to be discussed by a small committee or decided by the parliament by a simple majority vote. All Iraqis need to understand the implications of not reaching an agreement on the issue of the distribution of oil
revenue. Without contravening the newly approved constitution, the United States should encourage the Iraqi government to set up immediately a broad-based advisory commission to discuss the issue and make recommendations to the parliament. The new parliament will eventually make the decision, but the discussion needs to start as soon as possible and be as broad as possible. (p.5)
Note that Kanan Makiya had also, in his NYT piece that I blogged about earlier today, argued for the deletion of present Article 109, the one that allocates new (not, as he wrote “extra”) oil revenues to the regions, rather than the central state. As he argued there, “There is no defensible case for imposing special reparations on the Sunni populace for the crimes of Iraq’s former leaders.”
Marina Ottaway, in Back from the Brink, also very helpfully reminds us of the procedure that the interim constitution decreed for the inclusion of any amendments to its existing text:
- The constitution approved on October 15, 2005, is difficult to amend for several reasons. First, amendments must be approved by two-thirds of the Council of Representatives (the parliament) and by the majority of citizens in a referendum and signed by the president. Second, the sections on Fundamental Principles and Rights and Liberties cannot be amended at all for a period of two successive electoral terms—a minimum of eight years. Third, amendments that take away power from the regions can only be amended with the approval of the legislative authority of the region and with the approval of the majority of the region’s citizens in a referendum.
An agreement reached on the eve of the referendum, however, creates a temporary exceptional process to amend the constitution after the December 15 election. On a one-time basis, the new Council of Representatives will be able to set up a committee to draft amendments within four months. The amendments must be approved by a simple rather than a two-thirds majority of the council and then submitted to another national popular referendum.
So basically, for the first four months– after the election? or after the formation of the post-election government? does anyone know?– amendments will need only a simple majority in parliament plus a simple majority in a nation-wide referendum. After that, it becomes harder.
The other key obstacle she sees, in addition to the new-oil-$$ issue, to the emrgence of a viable Sunni “region” is, “the lack of clearly recognized leaders among Sunnis.”
She says, quite realistically, that, “This is not a problem the United States can address directly. In fact it is one that Washington could worsen by embracing—and thus discrediting—particular
leaders and organizations.” But she suggests that the Bush administration could help indirectly by relaxing its attitude toward de-Baathification,
- and by putting pressure on the Iraqi government to do the same…
The line of exclusion needs to be clearly and rather narrowly defined. And if the prospect of a Sunni region where Baathists are influential is unappealing, it is worth considering that the alternative is even more unappealing—that Sunnis would continue to oppose the federal solution or, worse, to directly support the insurgency.
Her bottom line is this:
- The only policy option now is to convince Sunnis to accept federalism and Shias and Kurds to accept that federalism will only work if there is a viable Sunni region.
Then comes this very interesting argument:
- By announcing a timetable for withdrawal, the United States would apply some leverage on Shias and Kurds to make the concessions needed to develop a viable Sunni region. The present Shia–Kurdish government can afford to be intransigent as long as it is assured of U.S. protection. If the prospects for U.S. withdrawal were clearly spelled out, Shias and Kurds would have a greater incentive to make concessions to achieve a political solution.
From a military point of view, announcing a timetable for withdrawal has substantial disadvantages. This is not, however, a traditional conflict but a struggle in which political and security goals are inextricably linked and in which political actions are at least as important as the use of force. Politically, a withdrawal timetable could help divide Sunnis and weaken the insurgency, particularly if it is accompanied by clear support for a viable Sunni region and a new policy on de-Baathification. Sunni politicians would be forced to develop a policy that goes beyond opposing U.S. occupation and to focus instead on how to find their place in the new, decentralized Iraq. Former Baathists and many ordinary Sunnis who lean toward the insurgency
because they do not see a future for themselves in the new Iraq might also be enticed toward a more constructive, forward-looking position.
…Using the leverage of an announced timetable for withdrawal, the United States may be able to push Iraqis to use the agreed upon additional period of negotiating to address the issue of how Iraq can be made viable as a weak federal state. It will not be easy, but there are no other options left.
I have argued, too, that the prospect of an imminent withdrawal of the US troops can do a lot to encourage Iraqis to start think clearly about how they will start to deal with each other once the excuse/distraction/shield of a US presence is absent.
One thing that’s interesting about Marina’s argument, in comparison with the generally fairly parallel one laid out today by Kanan Makiya, has to do with the question of agency. Marina– writing for a primarily US-policy audience– is arguing for a high degree of US agency in trying to shift Iraqi politics in the direction she seeks. Kanan– writing for an undefined audience– is arguing that the existing Iraqi politicans need to take the lead in pioneering these shifts.
But here’s the interesting part: Marina is arguing for this robust US political role very rapidly, in the lead-up to the announced US troop withdrawal that she advocates. But Kanan is much more “resigned to” (or perhaps, desirous of?) a lengthy US troop presence. He writes about a period of ten years being “the time necessary to crush the insurgency, establish properly accountable institutions of law and order and ensure that those applying for such status have met the criteria.”
In other words, though ostensibly he’s arguing for the agency of the Iraqi pols, in actuality he’s envisioning that they’ll be acting from behind the shield of a large continued troop presence, one of whose tasks will be to “crush the insurgency.” Obviously, that is a much more militarized– and pessimistic– course than the one that Marina advocates.
And in Kanan’s model, too, the entire restructuring of Iraq’s legal and political institutions would be carried out under US tutelage.
What I got from reading Marina’s paper is a sense not that she supports what she calls the “ethnicization” of Iraqi politics, but rather, that she recognizes that it has happened; sees it as to a large extent irreversible (which I’m not so sure about); and sets out a fairly intelligent policy that seeks to minimize the damage from it.
Oh, there is one huge additional problem in this whole business, however… namely, the question of the national capital, Baghdad. In a side-box titled “What about Baghdad?” she writes this:
- The constitution states that Baghdad cannot be annexed by any other region but makes no provisions on how it should be governed. If Iraq is divided into a Kurdish, a Shia, and a Sunni region, Baghdad is bound to become a self-governing entity.
It will not be an easy entity to govern. It has more than six million inhabitants, of which an estimated 35 percent are Shia and the rest is divided between Sunni Kurds and Sunni Arabs. In the October 15 referendum, 78 percent of Baghdadis voted in favor of the constitution, showing they accept the idea of decentralized government even if they do not know what it will mean for the city.
With its mixed population, Baghdad could easily turn into the flash point for largescale civil conflict. Or it could become a model of coexistence, if some security can be achieved and some real thought is given to how to govern it—which, so far, is an utterly neglected issue.
H’mm, that means that actually, the population of the city would be almost evenly divided among the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Personally, I doubt the Kurds make up that big a proportion of the city. I would say the city’s population is likely to have a larger Shiite population much larger than 35%.
But anyway, with six million inhabitants and with its enormous historic and symbolic role, Baghdad can’t just be shunted to one side in this whole discussion of “federalization” (which, as I’ve pointed out many times, is quite the incorrect term term to us…. What’s happening is “decentralization”, “breakup”, or “devolution” of the powers of a central state; not the “federation” of a number of pre-existing smaller entities.)
But now, I see that I need to make the rest of this discussion about Baghdad into yet another new post here…
Helena, These ideas sound nice in theory, but I am thinking that the Bushites are not big on theory these days and see things in pretty un-nuanced terms. I do not see the US pulling out of Iraq under Bush or Dems anytime soon, simply because the model they are working with is one that comes from maintaining forces there for many years to come. Pres. Carter said this at West Point the other day. He’s saying that the US will be there for 20-50 years.
Something of the mentality at work among the pols of both parties comes in the following quote of a US congressman, Bill Shuster. Back from Iraq, he’s quoted as saying: “[M]ilitary strategists on the ground in Iraq believe American service members will have to remain in Iraq for at least six more months to complete their objective: leaving in place a secure, democratic society.
But, Shuster said, that time frame could be extended if leaders who share U.S. goals aren’t successful in Iraq’s upcoming national elections next Thursday.
“If we get good quality leaders elected, they can see us withdrawing troops in six to seven months,” Shuster said. But, “If we get political hacks, it may be 18 months.”
So, the gist of American policy in Iraq is not democracy or freedom or self-determination or any of those nice sounding phrases. It’s about whether the US can get elected politicians that suit its interests.
With Israel now on high-alert and prepared to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, the permanence of the US military presence in Iraq will be assured. These troops will act as a buffer of any potential Iranian retaliation against Israeli aggression. Once the facilities are bombed, the US can then claim that it must stay in Iraq to ensure that 1) Iran does not retaliate against Israel and 2) Iran does not re-start its program.
Charles, all of what you say about the US political factors driving nearly all the policy in Iraq is true. But the US troops being in Iraq as a buffer against Iranian actions against Israel doesn’t really work well at all.
The main thing detrring Israel from striking Iran is the fact that Hizbullah has 2,300-3,000 short-range rockets it can put into northern Israel (right up to Haifa.) Hizbullah is pretty fearless and would take even huge casualties in the course of doing that. The US troops in Iraq have zero effect on that. In fact, they and their over-extended supply lines are pretty much like sitting ducks in the event of a big explosion of anti-US feeling in the whole region, such as would most likely be provoked by an Israeli strike on Iran.
There’s a lot of politics driving rhetoric in Israel, too, in case you hadn’t noticed… (Let’s just hope it doesn’t get to the point of driving too much policy there.)
But the US troops being in Iraq as a buffer against Iranian actions against Israel doesn’t really work well at all.
The main thing detrring Israel from striking Iran is the fact that Hizbullah has 2,300-3,000 short-range rockets it can put into northern Israel (right up to Haifa.) Hizbullah is pretty fearless and would take even huge casualties in the course of doing that.
Helena, I don’t agree what you put for many points
1- Iran never ever will attack Israel, I say this and I am certain about this.
2- There is a leakage report that the recent escalation of Iran Nuke program and all the talk about it, in fact in same time there were top Iranian specialised met with Israeli specialists with other from Egypt and Bahrain and few other discussing (for give me I lost the link, in fact it was in Arabic) the enrich process and those things, this give you how much Israel quite about the Iranian program.
3- Israel will never ever stop watching and taking actions, from our experience with Israel it will attacked what ever one will threatening the State of Israel sooner not later, in regard of Hezbollah missiles I think this not an issue distanced Israel of attacking Iran.
I do not but the argument that Israel cares one bit about Hezbollah. After Israel destroys the Iranian nuclear facilities, and then find Hizbullah attacking it in reataliation, they will move massive force to destroy — once and for all — the Hizbullah threat. Call it Israel’s version of the War on Terrorism II. And it would have an arguably rational explanation for doing it. My question is, how much of this is by design and how much by chance? How far ahead do you think folks in the Israeli intelligence think forward?
If you’ll permit me to say it, I think that you all are making too big a deal out of a single article in the Times. Personally, I think that this story was an intentional plant, but regardless, there is a big difference between a military having contingency plans and actual plans to carry them out; and maintaining forces on “high alert” for more than three months also sounds a bit strange to me.
I don’t think that Israel really has the capability to do more than symbolic damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is not the single Osirak reactor. It’s multiple facilities, some of them hardened and deep underground. Israel just doesn’t have the means of making such a strike. Even the F15I, which theoretically has the range to make it to Iran and back, could only do so if it flew in a straight line. Take a look at the map and who controls a good part of the area in between!
I think that the issue of Hizballah is also off the mark. Sure the Iranian proxy doesn’t mind taking casualties, but Nasrallah certainly would mind the loss of prestige and political influence that would undoubtedly follow were he to fire missiles into populated areas of Northern Israel. Hizballah suffered a crushing defeat last month at Ghajar and immediately requested and got a cease fire rather than risk additional damage to their image. I don’t think that they are anxious to suffer a massive defeat while giving the Lebanese government and excuse to demand that they disarm.
Finally, I don’t see the “rhetoric driving policy” arugment as relevant here. There is simply no reason for it to do so. Today’s polls have Kadima and Labour together garnering enough votes to form a government. Shaul Mofaz is out of the Likud race and has moved to Kadima, so he has no interest in making threats on Iran. That leaves Netanyahu who, right now, is barely hanging on to a third-place party. Despite what y’all might think, the biggest turn off for the Israeli voter today would be sabre rattling (that is next to the actual use of those sabres) – and Sharon knows that full well.
If you want a good example of politics driving rhetoric, I suggest taking a look at Ahmedinjad and his calls for ethnic cleansing!
From the Times article:
“Defence sources in Israel believe the end of March to be the “point of no return” after which Iran will have the technical expertise to enrich uranium in sufficient quantities to build a nuclear warhead in two to four years.
“Israel — and not only Israel — cannot accept a nuclear Iran,” Sharon warned recently. “We have the ability to deal with this and we’re making all the necessary preparations to be ready for such a situation.” ”
This is from the man who calculatingly goaded the Palestinians into rioting when he visited the Temple Mount with armed bodyguards in tow. Perhaps such statements by Sharon are more bullying and pressure on Iran. And don’t tell me the Iranians started it. Mossad and Israeli special forces have been in northern Iraq ever since the US invaded. If that’s not provocative I don’t know what is.
“Oil is much too important a commodity to be left in the hands of the Arabs.”
By Henry Kissinger,
Getting back to the Ottaway-Makiya articles…this is very interesting stuff, Helena, about the issue of “human agency.” Thank you for calling our attention to it! You continue doing yeoman’s work by keeping all of us well informed.
How ironic it is to see Kanan’s “mea culpa” — still advocating ten years of US occupation!, juxtaposed with Marina’s very sobering analysis. This comes at a time when even Pentagon officials have started floating 12-18 month withdrawal plans, as the number of Iraqi (100,000+?) and American (2200+) dead continues to mount.
Your argument here says so much about the calling of Kanan and other “humanitarian activists” who were so willing to rely on American military force to end the abuses of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Before the war in March 2003 I had one too many discussions with pro-war Arab-Americans who failed to see how a US invasion would lead to far worse conditions in Iraq. Their trust in American power and “the West’s higher ideals” was mind-boggling.
At one NEA conference it was even suggested to me that “if Iraqis knew what was in their best interest, then they would peacefully accept the presence of American and British troops.” When I predicted that a brutal Iraqi resistance would be formed, and the terrorists’ practice of suicide bombers would become common in Baghdad, I was actually accused of supporting “Islamic militancy”!
From the beginning, the issue dividing pro-war and anti-war stances on Iraq was never about standing up for humanitarian values or ending the abuse of an oppressive regime. (Hadn’t the effect of the first American war with Iraq, and the resulting trade embargo, already created enough death and suffering?) The grandstanding of the pro-war position was so much misapplied historical analogy from WW II. (Now we’re left with the haunting and more recent analogy of Vietnam.) From the beginning, the real issue dividing pro-war and anti-war activists was one of the oldest ethical concerns: the relationship between means and ends in human behavior.
It was never possible for America to enter Iraq and instill the high ideals of “western liberalism” and democratic federalism. The fact that Kanan Makiya did not foresee the deadly spiral of sectarian revenge attacks in his native country shows just how misinformed he was living as a relatively unknown professor at Brandeis Univeristy, and how naive about being used in the service of others’ political aims.
Since the key issue in Iraq concerns means and ends, the Iraqis themselves will have to take responsibility for sorting out their ethnic-sectarian differences. The legacy of western intervention in the Muslim world, dividing lands between this and that ethnic sectarian group, should be clear for all who understand the 20th century politics of lands known today as Israel and Lebanon. Early in the last century came this brilliant British idea, “here we’ll recreate Zion for the long suffering Jewish people, and north of that poorly defined border we’ll let the French create a Christian zone.” The result of “ethnicization,” over-emphasizing ethnic-sectarian group identities, should be obvious for all to see.
It is good to see Marina offer some thoughtful suggestions, but as long as the plan in Iraq remains to create a sustainable federalism between Sunni-Shia-Kurd, then I fear Iraqis will continue to fight over territory and oil (new and old), dragging the region into a deeper pit. In the short term, this may serve the interests of a comforatble majority in the US military-arms industry complex (who have managed to profit nicely so far, despite how “bad” things have turned out), but at some point the vast majority of American citizens will wake up and realize that their common interests are universal ones shared by the majority in “Muslim lands.” When this happens all people will understand the need to avoid the trap of “ethnicizing” politics.
Today’s polls have Kadima and Labour together garnering enough votes to form a government.
JES, your politicians changing their party like they changing their shirts.
Every one run to join Sharoon party himself he was member of five parties.
Did you see this funny politics JES….?
I’m having a hard time understanding how we “develop a viable Sunni region” while bombing the cities and towns of that region into rubble and terrorizing its population with death squads, torture chambers and mass executions.
I’m having a hard time understanding
Its very simple John, there will be no Sunni Towns there will be no Sunni voting, but there are Iranians got Iraqi identity “Originals “Thanks to Jabor Solag Interior Minister also you got Israeli/Iraqi who will vote in Jordan according to the official of voting in Amman/Jordan as she said there are no checks of any dual citizenships only for Iraqi identity check…
Its simple as that, also I miss one thing very important John, Last voting for Constitution there were widespread fake voting or in Mossel the voting boxes high jacked by Bashmarka for more that three hours and they returned the voting box and the official counting the vote fro those boxes.
It’s Just A big Juke John, I dont know when your president will finish this show…
BTW, There was in the news last week a bus bombed and the news put it the bus was carrying Shia’a passengers!!!!!, Yah Iraq now Sunni rid Buss different from Shia’a, Kurds also have different rid so the Turkmen’s and soon and so forth, what the stupid propaganda done by FOX, CNN, and others…sick of this lies…
JES Wrote
“Even the F15I, which theoretically has the range to make it to Iran and back, could only do so if it flew in a straight line. Take a look at the map and who controls a good part of the area in between!
What’s a magician?
In 1981 the F16 or F14 six of them that strike Iraq Research centre were painted by Iraqi Flag JES!!!,
So what’s the problem now….. if the fighters painted by US flags or Afghanistan Flag or Kuwaitis Flags even Saudi, who knows from those dame sleeping friends what’s will be takeoff from there lands….
Israel bluffing? Consider the following recommendations from the Army War College on Iranian nuclear weapons. The group report produced on tnis issue finds bluffing counter-productive and actually producing the effect it hypothetically wishes to defeat.
Recommendations for Iran, from a US perspective, include the following:
[my emphasis] from GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN
John C– I agree with you (and Salah) that your “I’m having a hard time understanding… ” hits the nail exactly on the head. (Sorry about the violent metaphor there.)
Charles– thanks so very much for providing the link to that intriguing-looking SSI study. I went to it and found a v. long but interesting-looking book there in PDF form. Sghall I order a paper copy of the whole book or not, I’m wondering?
I’d really love it if you cd provide page-number references for the recommendation/ analysis there that “finds bluffing counter-productive and actually producing the effect it hypothetically wishes to defeat.”, and also for the list of 7 recommendations that you reproduce….
One consideration is that the volume contains many different contributions. Ch. 1 is the 20-page “report” on the Iranian-nukes issue produced by something called the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, of which Henry Sokolski– co-editor of the broader SSI book– is Executive Director. The book’s other editor is a longtime Likudnik called Patrick Clawson. (Sokolski has been close to the Likudniks, too.)
However, contributors of others of the book’s discrete chapters are people of much more integrity and expertise: Shlomo Bron, george Perkovich, Mike Eisenstadt, etc… So it would be useful and significant to know who authored the parts you pinpoint.
What, pray tell, do you mean when you call people “Likudniks”? Knowing a bit about the history of the Likud, as well as the former and remaining members of the Likud, and a lot of rank and file members, I find it terribly funny that one uses this term to categorize people.
Helena, the quote of recommendations I provided is on pp. 3-4. The reference to “bluffing” is on p. 3.
As to buying a copy… as a pacifist, i understand your misgivings. Yet, I think soldiers are just as likely to hate war as anyone else, if not moreso. I don’t know whether that makes your decision easier…
Charles, thanks for that! Btw, I agree with you about soldiers… My main misgiving abt ordering the book is the # of trees that wd need to be cut down if we all bought all the books we want to see instead of (a) reading the stuff online (though it’s nmot always easy or comfy to do) or (b) getting a copy from a library. Plus, I have gazillions of books in my house and storage is a huge issue!
Actually as a former SSI author myself I feel sure I cd get one without paying. So that’s not the issue!