On Saturday, December 10, the British Stop the War Coalition hosted a very significant gathering of some 1,400 anti-war organizers from around the world, including from Iraq, the US, and many other countries. (Thanks to Dominic for nudging me to post about this. It’s actually much more important than the Iraqi elections.)
If you scroll down on that page, you can see the text of the principal statement issued by the conference. I shall paste the operative parts of it in at the end of this post. Crucially, the conference called on all opponents of the war around the world to start, now, organizing
- international demonstrations on March 18-19 2006, the third anniversary of the war and invasion, calling for the immediate withdrawal of troops and an end to the occupation.
You can read a fuller account of the conference here.
I really salute our friends and colleagues in the British antiwar movement for the focus and organizing savvy that has enabled them to take the lead in coordinating global opposition to the war at this time. And I’ve been reflecting a little on why they have been so much more effective than the anti-war coaltion(s) in the US, which are currently in a situation of some chaos.
Two crucial reasons for the relative effectiveness of the British coalition are:
- (1) Their clarion-clear focus on the central goal of stopping the war and ending the occupation, and
(2) Their organization cohesiveness and integrity.
In this latter regard, as you can see from this page on their website, the Stop the War Coalition (STWC) is run by a committee consisting of some 50 named, British-based individuals, some of them very distinguished, along with representatives of around eight organizations. This is a classic British organizing method. It makes for transparency, accountability, and a relatively high degree (and speed) of responsiveness to events.
As for the situation here in the US, I think I need a whole new post to address that in…
Anyway, here are the operative parts of the statement adopted by the December 10th conference:
- This conference … demands an immediate end to the occupation of Iraq, as called for by the majority of the Iraqi, British and American peoples. It demands the withdrawal of the occupying military forces and the return of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people, who should be allowed to determine their own future free of external interference.
We salute the struggle of the Iraqi people for national freedom and the worldwide movement against the war and the occupation. We pledge to step up our campaign against the occupation until it is ended. To this end, we call on the anti-war movement in all countries to:
* Organise international demonstrations on March 18-19 2006, the third anniversary of the war and invasion, calling for the immediate withdrawal of troops and an end to the occupation.
* Campaign for a full international public inquiry into the assault on Fallujah last year.
* Give full support to the campaigns of military families in the US, Britain and the other occupying countries.
* Develop an international coordination from this conference to plan further events.
* Campaign against the privatisation of Iraqi oil.
* Oppose any attack on Iran or Syria.
Addendum, Dec. 15, 10 a.m.:
Here’s a link to David Swanson’s account of some of his time in London for the meeting
The comment below was made regarding certain concrete situation with Russian liberals. Nevertheless, IMHO, it makes sense for the US/UK anti-war movement as well.
There is an important distinction between social analyis and social activism. Analyst always wants to make a picture of what is going on. Activist usually wants to change this picture the way he finds necessary.
In conflict situations, activists often confuse hostile analysts to limit the damage from hostile actions. This, in turn, means that any advanced social analyis needs to take care of possible distortions.
So, I notice that this discussion is rich with well-intended activism. But what about concrete analysis, is it strong enough to take care of inevitable in conflict situations confusion? I can’t say I am sure about it.
Peter Lavelle. The Advent of a Liberal-Patriotic Agenda? http://www.untimely-thoughts.com/index.html?cat=3&type=3&art=2035
Attention: “left” neocons!
BRENDAN SIMMS. History: Neoconservatism by Douglas Murray; Anti-Totalitarianism by Oliver Kamm: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-1910964,00.html
Oliver Kamm. Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign Policy http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/190486306X/026-5046694-5012411
Oliver Kramm’s blog: http://oliverkamm.typepad.com/blog/2005/12/sunday_times_re.html
Douglas Murray. Neoconservatism: Why We Need It: http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1904863051/026-5046694-5012411
One thing I think is missing from the various calls for withdrawal is a call for engagement by the UN. And I think that’s due to the impression that the UN is weak or ineffective. It’s true, that as an opposition to American aggression it’s been weak. It’s true that while a war is ongoing, the UN has proven somewhat impotent. But, when the sides in a conflict are ready to settle, the UN can facilitate the settlement.
In cases of withdrawals by an occupying force, the UN has been particularly successful. Examples abound.
As Vietnam was withdrawing the last of its forces from Cambodia, the first of several Paris Conferences were being held under UN auspices. During the next few years agreement among the various Cambodian factions was achieved to hold elections. The next few years saw heavy involvement by the UN, and eventual elections. Although it was far from perfect (the Khmer Rouge resumed fighting for a time, elections have not been totally free), Cambodia is arguably a much safer place to raise a family than prior to UN involvement.
I won’t give any more long-winded examples of successful UN-supervised settlements. But there were others: South African withdrawal from Namibia, Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, integration of the rebel FMLN into the political process in El Salvador, etc.
In each case, the UN was able to act as a mostly independent monitor that acted as a soft guarantor of the agreement. One of the most difficult part to any agreement is the lack of trust between the parties. After a conflict, there’s usually a lot of paranoia among the settling parties. A party will often believe the other parties are violating an agreement, and use that assumption to justify its own violations. The UN can investigate whether violations are taking place and propagate their conclusions to all parties, to combat the paranoia. The UN also brings experienced mediators into the process.
So what does this have to do with Iraq? Upon an announcement of US withdrawal, citizens should vocally encourage the UN to get involved to offer its offices for mediation and monitoring between the parties. It might be the best chance for avoiding a civil war.
Kevin Zeese has written a description of the conference at
http://www.counterpunch.org/zeese12132005.html