Realism from the generals (and the ICG)

Back in April, I published a CSM column in which I argued for two key changes in US policy toward Iraq.
Now, very belatedly, key portions of the west’s decision-making apparatus seem to have become persuaded of the value of these changes.
The first change I advocated was that, “The Bush administration should issue an authoritative declaration that the US has no claims of its own on Iraq’s territory or natural resources…” (That would include for permanent military abses.)
Today, the WaPo’s well-connected columnist David Ignatius, acting as the carrier of a set of crucial messages from the generals who head US Centcom to the broader US public, tells us that,

    Centcom chief, Gen. John Abizaid… [and] his top generals … don’t want permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. Indeed, they believe such a high-visibility American presence will only make it harder to stabilize the country.

Right.
The second change I advocated back in April was that Iraqi and US policymakers should consider tweaking the plan for the transition to Iraqi self-rule, “so that what is drafted and voted on this year would be only an interim constitution, rather than the final thing…”
Today, the International Crisis Group– a well-respected global think tank that acts as a sort of policy-advice shop to the “better behaved” western governments, like the Scandinavians, the Canadians– has issued a report that states bluntly that the constitution-making process in Iraq has “gone awry”.
The report notes (probably rightly) that it is now too late to revise any further the terms of the constitutional text that will be voted up or down in a referendum October 15. But it urges the US to,

    embark on a last-ditch, determined effort to broker a true compromise between Shiites, Kurds and Sunni Arabs that addresses core Sunni Arab concerns without crossing Shiite or Kurdish red lines. This would require that… the U.S. sponsor negotiations to reach a political agreement prior to 15 October concerning steps the parties would commit to take after the December elections, whether through legislation or constitutional amendment.

In other words– as now seems very clear from the terms of the present constitutional text itself– this text would be subject to very rapid amendment, and would therefore function only as an “interim constitution”, anyway. But the Crisis group report spells that out a lot more clearly.
The Crisis Group also urged two other key changes: that the number of present Iraqi provinces that could agglomerate into new “regions” should be four or less– to lessen fears of the emergence of a single, 9-province Shiite “super-region”; and to exclude low-level members of the old Baath Party from any future administrative or other sanctions.
Now, I know the International Crisis Group is not nearly as powerful as the US military. So I’ll leave you to follow up on the rest of their report and its conclusions on your own.
What was much more interesting to me was David Ignatius’s reporting from his high-level embedment with Gen. Abizaid and his supporting generals…


I must confess, I always thought Abizaid’s oft-touted “reputation” as an “intellectual among the generals”, someone who “speaks Arabic and knows the Arab mind”, etc etc., was more than a little overblown.
But maybe he’s just naturally cautious, and until now has been careful not to make too many public waves?
By inviting David Ignatius into the “commanders’ huddle” he held over this past weekend in Doha, Qatar, Abizaid was very evidently trying to get his own word out to the US political elite.
David writes of Abizaid and his generals,

    Most of all, they don’t want the current struggle against Iraqi insurgents, who are nasty but militarily insignificant, to undermine U.S. efforts against the larger threat posed by al Qaeda terrorists, who would kill hundreds of thousands of Americans if they could.

What a welcome does of military realism!
He then wrote the piece about the generals stating they prefer not to have permanent military bases in Iraq.
So why, I ask, doesn’t President Bush just come out and plainly and simply state that the US has no aspiration to have any permanent military bases inside Iraq?? (I suppose he and his people might think that to say that could be seen as “rewarding the insurgents”. But why should they let that fear hold them back from doing what is, anyway, the right thing to do?)
David reports that the figures the US generals are using tell them that,

    There were 412 suicide bombings in Iraq from January through August, killing about 8,000 Iraqis, according to U.S. statistics. The number of suicide attacks in August was eight times higher than a year before.

He tells us that the main response to this situation on the part of Gen. George W. Casey Jr., commander of all the US troops in Iraq, has been to, “move to joint U.S.-Iraqi operations, such as the recent offensive in Tall Afar in northwestern Iraq.”
I would just note that this is not a new approach, as David implies here somewhat breathlessly. They been trying to “Iraqify” the military operations since late 2003, at least. And indeed, they’ve tried using “Iraqified” forces to take and retake Tel Afar itself, a number of times before. But each time, after they “take it”, it somehow slips out out of their hands again.
Then this:

    As part of this Iraqification approach, Casey has embedded 10-man U.S. adviser teams with every Iraqi brigade. The advisers can mentor Iraqi troops but, perhaps more important, they can call in U.S. air support — so that the Iraqis aren’t fighting just with AK-47s but with F-16s and smart bombs.

Well, they’ve been doing this “embedding US advisers” thing before, too; though I recall that earlier the “US adviser teams” each had two people in, not ten. So is this a step backward, I ask myself, that now they have to have put in that much heavier of an “adviser” presence into each “Iraqi” brigade than earlier? Also, wasn’t it the work of US “military advisers” in Vietnam in the early 1960s that drove the whole subsequent build-up of US forces there? … Just asking!
And here are David’s last two paras:

    President Bush and other administration officials continue to speak about Iraqi democracy in glowing terms, but you don’t hear similar language from the military. After watching Iraqi political infighting for more than two years, they’re more cautious. “I think we’d be foolish to try to build this into an American democracy,” says one general. “It’s going to take a very different form and character.” The military commanders have concluded that because Iraqis have such strong cultural antibodies to the American presence [whatever that means–HC], the World War II model of occupation isn’t relevant. They’ve sharply lowered expectations for what America can accomplish.
    What Abizaid and his commanders seem to fear most is that eroding political support for the war in the United States will undermine their strategy for a gradual transition to Iraqi control. They think that strategy is beginning to pay off, but it will require several more years of hard work to stabilize the country. The generals devoutly want the American people to stay the course — but the course they describe is more limited, and more realistic, than recent political debate might suggest.

And so the realism of the generals– and their (reality-based) willingness to acknowledge that the US’s ability to influence political matters inside Iraq is far, far less than what the neocons had dreamed– continues to gallop ahead…
Ahead of Juan Cole. Certainly ahead of most people in the leadership of both big political parties inside the US… Ahead of Tony Blair… Far, far ahead of anything that anyone in the Bush administration is prepared to get his or her head around at this point…
Just not quite so far ahead– yet– as those of us in the antiwar movement whose rock-solid realism about the nature of war and its intense disutility in the modern era is being confirmed more and more each day.
So let’s hear it for:

    * US troops out of Iraq now! Iraq for the Iraqis!
    *An end to US exceptionalism! Human equality now!

Shucks. I wish I’d gotten back from Europe in time to get to the antiwar protest in DC over the weekend.
I see Cindy Sheehan got arrested outside the White House this morning. I admire her so much, and hope her treatment is not too horrible.
The best way most of the rest of us can help her, I think, is by supporting her call for all US troops– including military “advisers”– to be brought home from Iraq as soon as logistically possible. And by continuing to put the lie to the argument that the US military “fox” has any “moral duty” whatsoever that requires it to be the one left to try to repair the badly war-ravaged Iraqi hen-house.
True reparations, yes. Continued US military control there: NO!

42 thoughts on “Realism from the generals (and the ICG)”

  1. I’m more amenable to Abizaid’s reputation. I know Abizaid personally (not well, just personally) and I think the reputation is more sound than overblown. The ‘Arab mind’ thing is a construct that I doubt he would himself buy into.
    In between the lines of the cross-current between Bush/Rumsfeld and the generals, you will find more than a modicum of realism. What prevents that from becoming more pronounced is the Bushies’ politicization of the military role; most generals are being cautious, lest their 30 years in uniform be rendered moot at a time when their experience is more important than ever (defering the merits of this approach to another post ….). It’s the most important thing in a generation, but no one wants to be Shinseki’d … even when their mentors might have objected to the ‘careerism’ of the senior ranks back in 1970. So, I think Ignatieff and ICG are listening on the right channel.
    The question of permanent bases in Iraq is one they will all hear alot of from the administration since, if you de-construct the mixed messages of why they invaded Iraq in the first place, the idea of having a long term presence is one of the only truly enduring ones.

  2. Helena quotes Ignatius and comments :
    “Then this:
    As part of this Iraqification approach, Casey has embedded 10-man U.S. adviser teams with every Iraqi brigade. The advisers can mentor Iraqi troops but, perhaps more important, they can call in U.S. air support — so that the Iraqis aren’t fighting just with AK-47s but with F-16s and smart bombs.

    Well, they’ve been doing this “embedding US advisers” thing before, too; though I recall that earlier the “US adviser teams” each had two people in, not ten. So is this a step backward, I ask myself, that now they have to have put in that much heavier of an “adviser” presence into each “Iraqi” brigade than earlier? Also, wasn’t it the work of US “military advisers” in Vietnam in the early 1960s that drove the whole subsequent build-up of US forces there? … Just asking!”
    What the generals describe makes me think to the recent position taken by Juan Cole’s and his “exit solution” (aka withdraw the ground troops and support the Iraqis army with airpower, special operations forces and advisers when needed). What the generals are now saying shows clearly the weakness of the Cole solution : it’s nothing new either, only more of the same. How he can think that this could improve the situation is above my understanding.
    Concerning the permanent bases : windinthewhistle is spot on, Rumsfeld and co never had the intention to get out of Iraq and Juan Cole’s proposed solution just plays in the hands of the Bushies. For them, the first important step was going there. Now the argument of “preventing worse casualties and disorders” allows them to justify a longer stay.

  3. The Iraqi consitution is a joke. The goal of the Iranian-backed and financed carpet-baggers currently running the Iraqi goverment is to create a puritanical fundamentalist Islamist state.
    The limited voting, sham elections, and worthless ‘constitution’ are all a game played for the benefit of the US Forces occupying the country.
    The assertion that the US must stay in Iraq untill “the Iraqis” have an army large enough and strong enough to fight their own battles fails to account for the fact that this army will be controlled by SCIRI/BADR/AL-DAWA [the guys running the current puppet government].
    With an full-fledged army all it’s own and Sharia-law in place SCIRI is free to say, “We don’t need no stinking elections.” What’s the US going to do? Bomb Iraq and invade all over again?
    ============

  4. As though what any General says means anything! Of course they say they ‘don’t want bases in Iraq’! What else are they going to say, ‘We want to stay in Iraq for 50 years’?
    In America the military is controled by civilians, in this case meaning Chaney, Rummy, and Bush (in that order). The generals do as they are told, they don’t make policy. Of course the civilians want permanent bases! After awhile an ‘invitation’ will come, probably under a scenerio similar to Cole’s ‘air support’ idea and the generals will ‘reluctantly’ go along.
    Like wind said,
    ‘the idea of having a long term presence is one of the only truly enduring ones. ‘
    .

  5. I’m not falling for this Ignatius sucker play. He is just relaying a standard stay-the-course morale booster, dressed up as a phoney report of some new and improved military “realism”. But there is nothing really new in the latest tablets come down from Mount Abizaid. Here’s the clincher:
    What Abizaid and his commanders seem to fear most is that eroding political support for the war in the United States will undermine their strategy for a gradual transition to Iraqi control. They think that strategy is beginning to pay off, but it will require several more years of hard work to stabilize the country. The generals devoutly want the American people to stay the course — but the course they describe is more limited, and more realistic, than recent political debate might suggest.
    But the strategy of making a gradual transition to Iraqi control is the strategy that has been in place since the invasion! There is nothing new here. Ingnatius himself seems unsure whether there is really a new, more realistic strategy in place, or whether the same old strategy is just more realistic than “recent political debate might suggest.”
    Of course. There has always been a gap between Bush administration words regarding Iraq, and the constantly evolving policies and operations that they have actually been carrying out on the ground. Accordingly, there is no difference at all between the approach just articulated by these huddled Generals’, and the actual policies that have been carried out for lo these many months. I see no evidence of a fresh appraisal here. They are planning, as always, to stay the course: that is, defeat the insurgency with an increasingly Iraqified force, stabilize the country and get out. The “lowered expectations” Ignatius mentions were lowered many, many months ago.
    Ignatius says the generals “described a military approach that’s different, at least in tone, from what the public perceives.” In other words, they aren’t really trying anything new; but what they have been doing for a long time is different from what the public perceives it to be. Which public? Where? It has been evident for a very long time now that, rhetoric aside, the Bush administration and its defense department have given up on the goal of establishing a vibrant democracy in Iraq, and have just been desperately trying to cobble together something stable and workable. I wonder what percentage of the public still “perceives” the administration’s “glowing terms” about Iraqi democracy to be an accurate reflection of their actual policy.
    Where Ignatius does describe the strategy as new, he doen’t say it is that new, but just “an important shift in U.S. military strategy on Iraq that has been emerging over the past year.”
    Of course Bush will continues to spout the Neverland agenda for the benefit of the wingnuts, the fanatics and the Foxified idiots who don’t have a clue – in other words, his dwindling base. And the generals provide the “realistic” wink-wink version to the somewhat better informed public who read newspapers such as the Washington Post, and might fall for the tactic of having their intellectual vanity flattered. Their message: “Don’t listen to the Prez. What he’s saying is just for political cover. We wise ones know what’s really going on and have a much more realistic plan. We’re on top of things. So, don’t waver … stay the course!”
    Announcing that “there will be no permanent bases in Iraq” does not strike me as the big deal people make it out to be. Talk is cheap. There are now well-fortified American bases in Iraq. And so long as they are there, whenever someone says “That’s a permanent base!” the generals can always say “No, it’s not permanent … it will be gone eventually.” The fact that some general says: “we don’t want permanent bases in Iraq” doesn’t move me. No doubt we have no designs on permanent bases in Japan either. After all, Okinawa will be dismantled some day.
    With the help of Ignatius, and his “inside look” at the high level Penatagon Pow-wow, bits of conventional wisdom and substanceless platitudes are dressed up new thinking. Here’s one of the insightful gems from the “new realists”:
    Most of all, they don’t want the current struggle against Iraqi insurgents, who are nasty but militarily insignificant, to undermine U.S. efforts against the larger threat posed by al Qaeda terrorists, who would kill hundreds of thousands of Americans if they could.
    I suppose this is a bold departure from the old view of those who…what… do want the current struggle to undermine the war against al-Qaeda?
    Then there is this:
    As part of this Iraqification approach, Casey has embedded 10-man U.S. adviser teams with every Iraqi brigade. The advisers can mentor Iraqi troops but, perhaps more important, they can call in U.S. air support — so that the Iraqis aren’t fighting just with AK-47s but with F-16s and smart bombs.
    Are we to understand that previously Iraqi brigades were operating in meaningful ways without embedded US babysitters … um, I mean advisors?

  6. Abizaid:
    I have never been in the least impressed. If he has any kind of understanding of the Arab world or the so-called “Arab Mind” then he is doing a great job of hiding it. I certainly haven’t seen it.
    why, I ask, doesn’t President Bush just come out and plainly and simply state that the US has no aspiration to have any permanent military bases inside Iraq??
    Well, the reality that establishing a permanent military presendce in Iraq was one of the primary reasons for the invasion comes to mind immediately.

  7. …the reality that establishing a permanent military presendce in Iraq was one of the primary reasons for the invasion….
    Seems to be a recurring theme here, yet I don’t recall ever hearing anyone in the administration saying anything remotely resembling the idea that the establishment of permanent bases in Iraq as a primary objective (or even a secondary one for that matter) of the invasion. I’d be please to see evidence about the basis of this argument.
    Of course, “Wind in the Willows”, is very clear that we must “de-construct” the mixed messaging to get to this message. Interesting. Without too much “de-construction” of his mixed messaging, one can see that Saddam Hussein was very clearly saying that he wanted to control the entire region by whatever means, including the threat of non-conventional weapons, he deemed necessary. I recall, for example, one message that he sent where he very clearly threatened to “burn” me and my children like a dried out leaf. I find that to be a pretty “enduring” message.
    So, I submit, why does the administration have to come out and declare that it has no claims on Iraqi resources or intention of establishing a permanent presence, military or otherwise when it never said that this was its intention in the first place. Perhaps all the Iraqis and the rest of the Arab world need to do is “de-construct” the US messaging, and they’ll come to that conclusion themselves.

  8. I don’t recall ever hearing anyone in the administration saying anything remotely resembling the idea that the establishment of permanent bases in Iraq as a primary objective (or even a secondary one for that matter) of the invasion.
    And if you actually believe their stated objectives, why I have some prime oceanfront property in Baghdad that you are going to want to snap up right away before anyone else hears about it.
    Look, JES, if you want to know what the objectives of any government are, and particularly a government as consistently mendacious as the Bush administration, do not listen to their words, look at their actions.

  9. Well, then Shirin, I guess we are in agreement about one thing: It is pointless even to suggest that the US administration declare that they have no interest in a permanent military presence in Iraq!

  10. threatened to “burn” me and my children like a dried out leaf. I find that to be a ‎pretty “enduring” message.
    Can you tell us what your country did from 1948 till now with the Arab in Palestine?‎
    Can you tell us what your PM “mass Murder” did in Sabra & Shatilla?‎
    Can you tell us what the 150 Mosad doing in Iraq from day one of the invasion till ‎now?‎
    So what the Arab can do? ‎

  11. JES, you seem to have a hang-up about my use of the term “de-construct”. Feel free to substitute “parse”, “demystify” or any other synonym if it will help reduce your confusion.

  12. Whistle,
    No hang-up. Haven’t even mentioned it before. Just looking for some substantiation of the claim that “the idea of having a long term presence is one of the only truly enduring” messages “of why they invaded Iraq in the first place”.
    Can you please show us where this message appears without the need for “de-construction”, “parsing”, “de-mystification”, pontification or pure speculation.
    As I see it, the administration has never even suggested such a presence as being an objective or even a desireable outcome. Having a neutral buffer – if not a friendly ally – between Syria and Iran (i.e. implementatio of the Carter Doctrine), perhaps, but I haven’t seen any indication of a desire to maintain troops or military bases in Iraq indefinitely.

  13. No hang-up. Haven’t even mentioned it before.
    And yet, it shows up three times in quotes in your first post and again here. Sounds like a hang-up to me.
    I suggested in my original comment that it was necessarily to (parse, demystify) in order to get at what showed up consistently as objectives. You are now saying, ‘show me something that doesn’t require parsing, which you said was necessary’. See the problem?
    Sorry, JES, but there are no short cuts. Getting to the bottom of things is not like buying a can of beans at the supermarket. You have to assemble the evidence from multiple sources, see what fits and what doesn’t and not take everything at face value. Maybe you consider that speculation or pontification. I call it “inquiry”.
    As I see it, the administration has never even suggested
    You seem to rely heavily on what the administration offers as its sales pitch(es) for the war. So, really, if Bush says the war was about WMDs, or bringing democracy to the middle east, or as revenge because Saddam was behind 9/11, or because Saddam and Osama were in cahoots, then that’s all there is to it? Might there be more details that the administration is not offering to the public? Think about it. You don’t even have to believe in anything criminal or conspiratorial … just that the administration would want to control the message and keep it simple, as it has in every other sphere.
    Establishing bases is not an “objective” of anything. Bases support the pursuit of other objectives, and some objectives require fixed long term (what we call “permanent”) bases rather than temporary, expeditionary facilities. So, you have to examine the objectives and see what’s consistent (and enduring, as I said before), and you have to look beyond the (exceedingly weak, in this case) public rationales. Here’s what I had in mind:
    When Bush originally ‘suggested’ (he backtracked when it didn’t get any play) that invading Iraq was part of the GWOT, he was echoing the thinking of NSC and DOD geostrategists who argued (I’m summarizing here) that US efforts would be hamstrung by a lack of intelligence coordination and logistical support in the region (from Saudi Arabia in particular), and that forward-deploying a significant force in the region was necessary. This would also have a psychological effect, obviously. Iraq was the most strategic piece of ground, and would serve as staging ground for GWOT force-projection and special operations. Invading the country, toppling Saddam and setting up a puppet regime would further the goals in pursuit of GWOT.
    There are some differences among the writers as to what those actions would be, what kind of support they would require, and whether the same effect could be had by increasing the military presence in Kuwait and Qatar, but all were, to my reading, wooed by the boldness of the Iraq idea. All believed this would be a long-term campaign for which temporary bases would not be suitable (a point of debate in DoD since Rumsfeld was then trying to convert most every overseas US base into a temporary expeditionary base).
    Hence, setting up permanent bases in Iraq as a reason (you said “objective”, I didn’t) for the invasion, from the perspective of the overgrown “Risk” game players. You can look at other versions of this idea and compare them against what was actually initiated, and you’ll find consistency. You can look at the public rationales and compare them to what was actually initiated, and you’ll find inconsistencies. The in/consistencies remain even if you factor in chance, incompetence and other factors.
    In 2002, these debates were all out in public and available on government websites, but they have since been removed. You can find references to them in Rand corporation reports (do a search on the site), probably also in FP or http://www.tnr.com (though I haven’t looked), and several good summaries of the thinking at http://www.stratfor.com. I would start with the last. You might also find Anthony Cordesmann at CSIS expressing the opinion that this was a really bad idea, as I saw him do (in an indirect reference) on a TV interview.
    None of these will prevent you from having to engage in the seemingly distasteful practice of inquiry, demystification, parsing or whatever, alas.

  14. Whistle,
    I’ll ignore the seemingly condescending tenor of the initial paragraphs. I know what I was saying. I believe you know what I was saying. And I do not think that I was advocating that we dispense with inquiry (or that this is a distasteful process).
    You seem to rely heavily on what the administration offers as its sales pitch(es) for the war.
    Not at all. I simply don’t buy the “sales pitch(es)” of the anti-war left as an alternative. They are, by and large, every bit as simplistic as those of the administration. So, for example, how is it consistent to argue that the war was fought to secure Israel (implying that Iraq presented a threat to Israel), while maintaining that Saddam did not pose a threat to his immediate neighbors?
    As a matter of fact, I do think that the war in Iraq is part of the Global War on Terrorism – or whatever you want to call it – irrespective of whether George Bush or anyone else may have decided to back-pedal and change the spin here.
    To maintain that the war must be fought because Saddam had WMD is simplistic and, as it turns out, untrue. (I think that Paul Wolfowitz stated this very clearly immediately following the invasion.) But by the same token, I think it is pure fantasy to argue from this that Saddam did not have the intention and the means to obtain these weapons. Why else would he be pilfering billions from Oil-for-Food, bribing members of the Security Council, concealing plans and infrastructure and, most importantly, denying to the end that he had done any of this?
    To claim that Saddam was behind 9/11 (which I don’t think anyone in the administration ever really said), is surely an exaggeration. But to claim that he had no connections and did not provide logistical support, safe haven and funds to terrorists – including Zarqawi and Zawahiri – appears to be inconsistent with the facts. To then argue some nonsense about secular Ba’athists and fanatical salafis not cooperating with each other is, in my opinion, ridiculous. Realpolitik is just as alive and well in the Middle East as it is in the West.
    Arguing that the war was fought to liberate Iraq may be questionable. But the reality is that the Iraqis themselves were making little or no progress in toppling a 30-year regime that was growing increasingly corrupt, violating its agreements with the UN, had invaded two of its neighbors and attacked two others with missiles, and was continuing to explicitly threaten various nations in the region and, thereby, the energy supplies of the rest of the world.
    Now, if you will allow me to “parse” the mixed messages of the sane portion of the anti-war left, here is what I come up with:
    9/11 and other attacks against US targets were carried out by al-Qaeda, an ideologically based criminal organization. Therefore, this is primarily a criminal matter and should be dealt with as such, by those who investigate and try criminals. Any attempt to take military action against a state or states is, therefore, not a legitimate response to these acts perpetrated against the United States and is, prima facie, an assault against Islam and Muslims, a cynical imperialist projection of power an attempt by a pro-Zionist neo-conservative cabal to further the interests of Israel (at the expense of those of the United States), or, more likely, a combination of all three.
    …from the perspective of the overgrown “Risk” game players….
    This is an argument that I love. It’s the “chicken hawk” argument and goes like this: All those behind the war were simply immature, middle-aged men living out their pubescent fantasies.
    If you take a close look, you’ll find that the last few threads have been full of arguments by “overgrown ‘Risk’ game players” trying to impress with their “strategic” acumen. We have talk about “boots on the ground”, “forward deployment”, “operational depth”, “unit and command cohesion”. As someone rightly pointed out, this sounds like a university faculty meeting. The only difference is that the former group of “players” has to take some sort of responsibility for the results of the games they play, and I’d like to believe that most of them understand this.

  15. JES,
    Offering the benefit of the doubt, here is something that might reduce the confusion: if in my original post you substitute the word “reasons” for the word “why”, you’ll see that I meant the modifier “enduring” to apply to the reasons, and not the messages. Many of your objections seem to be about whether or not the administration offered permanent bases as a rationale, and that was not what I meant. Sorry if that confused things. I’ll tighten it up next time.
    Your roundup of different anti-war arguments is illuminating, but kind of a non-sequitur, don’t you think? Unless you just want to change the topic. If you do, here’s a response: any administration has to offer the compelling case for war; the burden was on Bush to persuade the nation why it was necessary to spill blood and treasure, not on the anti-war movement to talk the administration out of it. The question was “Why?” … not, “Why not?”
    All those behind the war were simply immature, middle-aged men living out their pubescent fantasies.

    Sorry, were you attributing that argument to me? You’re mistaken. Actually, what I made was a characterization, and I think it follows clearly from the context of the original post.
    If you want the more substantive version of your straw man argument, it would go something like this: Wargames and simulations are a useful way to assist planning by abstracting away the details and concentrating on higher level dynamics. The problem with that is in the abstracting away of the details. Details are important, especially in war. You have to deal with them, and not just by talking about “known” and “unknown unknowns”.
    Unfortunately, wargames and high-level strategies can discourage any such considerations. Planners and executives fall in love with the strategy and try to bend the details to the desired result, or ignore them: after all, details are boring compared to grand strategy. This is an organizational problem that commonly occurs outside the military as well. The maturity or fantasy life of the planners does not matter, and much as you would like to think they bear in mind the human costs, they often do not. The result is a series of fatal assumptions that seem absurd after the fact, but which everyone buys into at the time … soldiers welcomed with flowers and song, no insurgency, Iraqi petroleum up and running in 90 days, etc. I’ve witnessed this myself more than a few times, and we’ve all just witnessed it in a grand fashion from afar.
    In the military case, the uniformed services are supposed to provide a sanity check on the civilians. The invasion of Iraq is not the first time that reality check as failed; as in Vietnam, the politicization of promotions and list-making of loyalists as well as public rebuke and scorn of dissenting officers contaminated the process; this has all been written about in the media (e.g. in the runup to the war, and when Abizaid took over Centcom and insiders spoke of how he was the only one who would stand up to Rumsfeld).

  16. ‎”Bush used ceremonies marking the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II to ‎say ‎that the Iraqi oil industry – and the wealth it could create – must not fall under the ‎‎control of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida forces in Iraq led by Abu Musab al-‎‎Zarqawi.‎
    ‎”If Zarqawi and bin Laden gain control of Iraq, they would create a new training ‎‎ground for future terrorist attacks.‎”‎
    So as long the War on Terrorist going then Iraq under US command, as GWB said, ‎do we need more evidence? Do we need plainly words from GWB to make JES agree ‎that US in Iraq its a long term and for the favour of Israel and support for their dreams ‎in ME.‎
    Thanks windinthewhistle.‎

    1. Issue of your sloppy wording in your original post noted.
    2. No. My objections had to do with (a) your interpretation of, or speculation about the reasons for the US invasion of Iraq and (b)your assertion that I “rely heavily on what the administration offers as its sales pitch(es) for the war”.
    3. You seem to ignore the fact that not going to war, in many cases, may also result in spilt blood and lost treasure. (I believe that both Nevile Chamberlain and Charles Lindburgh discovered this.) Neo-isolationists do definitely have to explain why not!
    4. Maybe you and Helena can do the war planning next time around.
  17. …and for the favour of Israel and support for their dreams ‎in ME.
    Nice touch Salah. Mabruk. You’re absolutely correct, you know. We’re taking over. There are actually 150,000 Mossad agents in Iraq, and we’ve diverted the candy with the impotence hormones in them from Palestine to the Sunni triangle. Even worse we have 1,000 Jew lawyers actively working on recovering our property confiscated in 1950. Hope you enjoy living on Golda Meir Avenue![irony alert]

  18. JES,‎
    Read the Iraqi history well, I think in your comments you tried to ignore Iraq history ‎and you paly with the history as an expert in ME history, understandable how you ‎used your expert for.‎
    Just for your info, Israel State in the history not lasting less than 100 years, and you ‎and others got the world stand up for your claims in the holy land, but Iraq its ok not ‎exists and should be defragmenter in favour of Israeli in the ME, isn

  19. Salah,
    I think you misunderstood my post. Ancient history is not the issue. The fact is that today there are over six million Israeli Jews and close to 30 million Iraqis.
    We have no intentions or designs on any other part of the Middle East, and if you maintain otherwise then you should be prepared to prove it. Unlike some people here, ibn ‘ami, I relate to you as an equal, and I expect that you will substantiate what you say,as I expect it from anybody else, and as you are entitled to expect from me.
    As it stands, I’m not blaming you for my problems, and I think we’d both be better off if you stopped blaming us for yours and concentrated on solving them in the least painful and bloody way possible for all Iraqi people.

  20. JES,‎
    There is no misunderstanding here but I think the six million Israeli should learn to ‎live in peace with the Arabs and Muslims in facts there are never been any ‎humiliations or hatred against the Jews in Arab region from the Babylonian time till ‎now.‎
    I can tell you some from Iraq in 1998, I was in the university and we had a Jews ‎student they are happy, there isn

  21. ‘Passover in Baghdad’
    “As they dithered I asked them what they wanted me to tell the organizers of the airlift. They told me they wanted to stay. Ishak was outraged. ‘You will be corrupted or they will make you convert,’ he told them. Then he said to me, ‘Once a man in a desert found people who were dying of thirst. They said, “give us water!” so he did. Then they said, “this is warm, we want cold water!” So the man could do nothing and left them. So let’s go. They are crazy.’

    while he browsing in one of the shops some one ‎approach him and asked him if he is from Iraq, from that area, he a answered YES, ‎That man start crying and hug him, he is the owner of that Shope, he took him to his ‎family on a dinner and he specks about the father of the guess how he saved his ‎family from the killers and looter you talking about before in Baghdad in 1948.
    Many of us have had similar experiences. Iraq is a land that grabs your heart and will not let it go. I have met children of Iraqi Jews who have never been to Iraq themselves, but who feel very connected to the place. Once I met online the son of Iraqi Jews. They were living in Israel. He told me his family was very upset about what was happening in Iraq, though like most Iraqis they were very glad to see Saddam gone. He longed to visit Iraq, though he had never been there. His mom was from Mosul and I told him something to say to her in Mosul dialect, and he said she began to cry when she heard it.

  22. “Many of us have had similar experiences. Iraq is a land that grabs your heart and will not let it go. I have met children of Iraqi Jews who have never been to Iraq themselves, but who feel very connected to the place.”
    If so why the hell were the Iraqi diaspora residing in Isreal was the only one actively prevented from voting?
    David

  23. A miserable response, David. Shown evidence of affection between ordinary Jews and Muslims in Iraq, you react with fury (What the hell!). You reach for something to throw. Sequitur, non sequitur, who cares. Anything, just so long as it quickly sours the atmosphere.
    Those whom the Gods wish to destroy they first make mad. The madness of settler colonialism is ripening in Israel. That wall is going to carry on making you crazier and crazier, you’ll see.

  24. Abizaid’s oft-touted “reputation” as an “intellectual among the generals”, someone who “speaks Arabic and knows the Arab mind”,
    I dont think so Helen, he is just holding Arbic name that’s it.
    Abizaid

  25. Salah and Shirin,
    I do appreciate your postings. Many of my neighbors and friends, including close friends were either born in Iraq or are the children of Jews born in Iraq. Many of them did live through the farhud, and the son of one family I know was arrested and tortured by the Ba’ath on trumped up charges in 1969. But all in all, those who I know have many positive things to say about the country and its people.
    This, however, is all water under the bridge, in my opinion. I have nothing at all against the Iraqi people, and I believe that this is true for almost all Israelis, particularly those born in Iraq.
    Saddam Hussein is a different matter. I hate him and have since the moment I stood in line to pick up gas masks for my two daughters and fully understood what that meant. This does not say anything, however, about the Iraqi people as a whole.
    One humorous note. In 1991, during the first week of the war most of the missiles fell on two neighborhoods with large Iraqi populations. The people there said that it was because the missiles homed in on the smell of the ‘amba.
    Perhaps we will all live long enough to sit down together over istikan shai and eat kubbeh bamya!

  26. If so why the hell were the Iraqi diaspora residing in Isreal was the only one ‎actively prevented from voting?
    David,‎
    In any measure the Iraqi election not fitt the minimum standard, but GWB &Co ‎pushed and used the election for his own internal politic gain, for Iraqis meant nothing ‎we saw the outcome its worse.‎
    So the Iraqi/Israeli prevented from voting its just related to the whole staged up ‎election and I think you may agree that Iraqi fears mostly to the massive interference ‎especially from Iran the massive waves of Iranian entered Iraq that influenced the ‎Iraqi society, it

  27. ” Prince Saud’s comments are deeply disturbing. First, the prince decided to make these ‎statements to the press in Washington. That means the normal channels into the White ‎House are deaf

  28. JES,
    Issue of your sloppy wording in your original post noted.
    I didn’t say my wording was “sloppy”, you ass. I was giving you the benefit of the doubt and trying to be graceful since you don’t seem to be able to follow the argument. Obviously that was a waste of good will. And you wonder why you detect condescension in my responses? Try to pay attention to what

  29. JES,
    You seem to ignore the fact that not going to war, in many cases, may also result in spilt blood and lost treasure.
    No, I don’t ignore that. You could have sold me on a war to oust Saddam, if it had satisfied the conditions that a war was the right way or only way to accomplish that objective. The most careful case for war that I read was Pollack

  30. Maybe I need to… start my own blog and just cross-post here…
    No, Wind. Stick around. (Of course, by all means start your own blog. But your input and expertise here really enrich JWN.)

  31. Firstly, no one speaks for all Americans, no one speaks for all Israelis, and no one speaks for all Jews. However, leaders of organizations hold a power as if they spoke for all their members. And some organizations have worked to seize control of America and Israel, and as they have gained power they have crushed dissent through smear campaigns and intimidation, to create the illusion that they speak for all Americans and Israelis. No surprises here. Thus it is irrelevant if JES claims he has no designs to enslave or exterminate the Arabs, or that his friend Bush Junior doesn’t have any either. We are ruled by elites, and new organizations with new agendas have muscled their way into the elite. The Israeli settler movement claims a right to all the gobbledygook placenames in the Old Testament that they can hire academics to support; then they call all Israelis who don’t back them traitors. The Christian Right supports the settler movement, and they are Bush’s voter base bullying America. Bush’s intellectual base is the PNAC; the first and overwhelming agenda of the PNAC from day one was American global domination as the only acceptable state for humanity, and the geopolitical leverage of bases in Iraq was always claimed to be the road to that happy condition. (Of course geopolitical experts claim lots of whacky things, but leaders keep believing them, don’t they?) So do Arabs have cause to believe that the current dominant organizations in the Christo-Judean alliance have permanent designs on Iraq and imperial designs on the Arab world?
    Furthermore, it is not unreasonable for Arabs to define threats to their existence based on their history. In a compassionate world we would be equally able to see that our own past actions forced others to violence, but Arabs are apparently as lacking in that ability as every other race. America and Israel are majority white societies where Euro-descended whites are clearly in charge; ironically those are about the only countries left where establishment whites have not abandoned the madness of aggressive monotheism allied to capitalism (the Afrikaaners had to throw in the bloody towel). Arabs well remember what white Europeans were like when they embraced that same power-hungry theology; British, French, Spanish and Italian, they all came, and if they’d known how much oil there was they would have fought all of World War II there instead of their own burnt-out industrial wastelands. Instead the world wars burnt Godly aggression out of most Europeans, eventually, and the fear of nukes made most of them hate war and the tired lies that support it. So that leaves America, Israel, and yes, the Arab nation as the ones whose high priests still think that this world isn’t big enough for two or three Gods who demand monopoly thru violence (see: Old Testament). But the Arabs have learned what to expect from white capitalists commanding armies of holy rednecks, and they are slowly waking up to us spewing the same old lies as the British, even if they haven’t read about what American settlers did to native Americans (or Hawaii, or Mexico).
    I haven’t gotten into Peak Oil because that can’t be a motivation for Arab “paranoia” about oil executive Dick Cheney’s intentions; their tyrants will never allow Peak Oil to be discussed, and that’s fine with us. When they do find out from the Internet, things will get worse.

  32. the geopolitical leverage of bases in Iraq was always claimed to be the road to that happy condition
    Can some one answer, To Whom be happy Condition? and Why?

  33. Super390 (interesting name – are you a building superintendant or just superior?),
    I’d like to point out three things:
    First of all, the settler movement in no way controls what happens in Israel today. The majority of Israelis have consistently (and increasingly) supported policies that are antithetical to those of the settler movements (formerly Gush Emunim, then Va’adat Yesha and now, I guess, Va’adat Yesh?). To imply, as you do, that Israel’s “elite” desires to “enslave or exterminate” Arabs belies your lack of understanding of Israeli society.
    I suggest that you take Shirin’s advice and try to understand government policy by actions and not words. Since 1967, the populations of the West Bank and Gaza have consistenty exhibited growth rates of between 3% and 4% annually, which are among the highest in the world. Hardly evidence of a policy of “extermination”.
    …it is not unreasonable for Arabs to define threats to their existence based on their history.
    Well stated. It is also not unreasonable for Israeli Jews to define existential threats based on their history. I would say that the ethnic cleansings of Kfar Silwan and Hebron in 1929, the uprising and other pressures on the British Mandatory Government that stopped immigration, preventing the saving of perhaps several hundred thousand Jewish lives, and the overt collaboration of the Palestinian Arab leadership with the Nazis (which resulted in the indictment of Haj Amin al-Husayni for war crimes) are all a part of history by which Israeli Jews define threats against their existance.
    America and Israel are majority white societies where Euro-descended whites are clearly in charge….
    Is that so? The majority of the Jewish population of Israel is not as you say (in what I see as an overtly racist statement) “Euro-descended. The leadership of the country includes a President, Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff who are all “Iran-descended”; a Foreign Minister, Minister of Transportation and Minister of Housing and Construction who are “Africa-descended”; A Minister of Infrastructure and Minister of Communication who are “Iraqi-descended”.

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