Looks a lot like apartheid to me

WaPo reporters Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru had a great piece in today’s paper. Shadid, who speaks Arabic, went along with one of the newly forming “Iraqi” fighting units, and Fainaru, who doesn’t went with the Iraqis’ American military “handlers”.
This is one little excerpt:

    Last week, U.S soldiers from 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, and Iraqis from 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, clambered into their vehicles to patrol the streets of Baiji. The Americans drove fully enclosed armored Humvees, the Iraqis open-backed Humvees with benches, the sides of which were protected by plating the equivalent of a flak jacket. The Americans were part of 1st Battalion, 103rd Armor Regiment of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.
    As an American reporter climbed in with the Iraqis, the U.S. soldiers watched in bemused horror.
    “You might be riding home alone,” one soldier said to the other reporter.
    “Is he riding in the back of that?” asked another. “I’ll be over here praying.”

Here’s another:

    The [Iraqi] men are housed at what they call simply “the base,” a place as sparse as the name. Most of the Iraqis sleep in two tents and a shed with a concrete floor and corrugated tin roof that is bereft of walls. Some have cots; others sleep on cardboard or pieces of plywood stacked with tattered and torn blankets. The air conditioners are broken. There is no electricity.
    Drinking water comes from a sun-soaked camouflage tanker whose meager faucet also provides water for bathing.
    “This is the shower of the National Guard, Baiji Division,” said Tala Izba, 23, a corporal, as others laughed.
    “Mines, car bombs and our duties, and then we have to come back to this?” said another soldier, Kamil Khalaf.
    Pvt. Aziz Nawaf, 23, shook his head. “At night, I’m so hot I feel like my skin is going to peel off,” he said.
    Almost to a man, the soldiers said they joined for the money — a relatively munificent $300 to $400 a month. The military and police forces offered some of the few job opportunities in town. Even then, the soldiers were irate: They wanted more time off, air-conditioned quarters like their American counterparts and, most important, respect. Most frustrating, they said, was the two- or three-hour wait to be searched at the base’s gate when they returned from leave.

Well, it doesn’t seem like they’ll be sticking around long. Here’s how that excerpt continues:

    The [Iraqi] soldiers said 17 colleagues had quit in the past few days.
    “In 15 days, we’re all going to leave,” Nawaf declared.
    The two-dozen soldiers gathered nodded their heads.
    “All of us,” Khalaf said. “We’ll live by God, but we’ll have our respect.”

And right up at the beginning of the piece, the reporters wrote about this:

    An hour before dawn, the sky still clouded by a dust storm, the soldiers of the Iraqi army’s Charlie Company began their mission with a ballad to ousted president Saddam Hussein. “We have lived in humiliation since you left,” one sang in Arabic, out of earshot of his U.S. counterparts. “We had hoped to spend our life with you.”

I guess that’s what you get when all you try to do to enroll soldiers is to pay them (relatively) big bucks, rather than giving them a political vision that seems worth fighting for.
It strikes me that, given that the Iraqi units the US has been training seem to have dissolved away time and time again (as “Charlie Company”* seems on the point of doing), and given that the US forces themselves are in the midst of a massive recruitment shortfall… the only halfway workable thing to do at this point is to organize a complete US withdrawal from Iraq. As speedy and as honorable and in as good an order as possible.
That is one of the three key points Raed Jarrar is calling for, in this important Wednesday post on his blog Raed in the Middle.
Here are all his three points:

    (1) Issue a Public Apology and hold responsibility for the destruction of Iraq…
    (2) Announce A Schedule For Complete Military Pullout From Iraq; a full withdrawal that leaves no permanent bases behind. I think a timetable of one year is more than enough for all the troops to leave safely without being attacked by the resistance…
    (3) Start fixing the mess caused by the war and occupation by both Paying Compensation And Bringing War Criminals To Justice…

That looks like an excellent, very clear list.
—-
* Over on Today in Iraq, I saw that Shirin commented that even just calling this unit in the “Iraqi” army “Charlie Company” showed an incredibly arrogant American mindset.

38 thoughts on “Looks a lot like apartheid to me”

  1. Here are all his three points:
    (1) Issue a Public Apology and hold responsibility for the destruction of Iraq…
    (2) Announce A Schedule For Complete Military Pullout From Iraq; a full withdrawal that leaves no permanent bases behind. I think a timetable of one year is more than enough for all the troops to leave safely without being attacked by the resistance…
    (3) Start fixing the mess caused by the war and occupation by both Paying Compensation And Bringing War Criminals To Justice…
    I agree this is all IRAQI

  2. Quote of the Day
    “The things that will destroy America are prosperity at any price, peace at any price, safety first instead of duty first, the love of soft living and the get rich quick theory of life.”
    –Theodore Roosevelt

  3. “In reality, the electoral process was designed to legitimize the occupation, rather than ridding the country of the occupation … Anyone who sees himself capable of bringing about political reform should go ahead and try, but my belief is that the occupiers won’t allow him.”
    – Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
    Exit strategy: Civil war
    By Pepe Escobar
    http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GF10Ak03.html

  4. I don’t agree with Raed’s #3 point about providing compensation to the Iraqis after we pull out. We’ve already spent way too much American money in Iraq. This money could have been better spent on social programs in the USA. Enough is enough.

  5. I don’t agree with Raed’s #3 point about providing compensation to the Iraqis after we pull out. We’ve already spent way too much American money in Iraq. This money could have been better spent on social programs in the USA. Enough is enough.
    The money that should have been spent on social programs in the USA is the hundreds of billions that you spent on deliberately, calculatedly destroying things – including entire cities – and killing and maiming people. Once you have broken it, you are obligated to pay for the repairs.
    Oh, and you are by no means and in no way entitled to make a single decision about or a penny’s profit from any of the repair/rebuilding of what you destroyed.

  6. Aside from the bizarre second sentence in Raeed’s point 2, I don’t have any problem agreeing with all the points. Why not? None of it will ever happen. We’re on the distant and abstract plane of ‘shoulds’ that seem sharply divorced from the horrifying reality.
    Since we’re in the realm of ‘possible worlds’, I want to extend some ‘shoulds’ along the opposite slope of time into the past:
    I think the US’s system of democracy should not have fallen into the disrepair that allowed it to be compromised and, to borrow Shirin’s phrase, ‘deliberately, calculatedly’ destroyed by an ideologically driven band of lunatics. I’d like to see that reversed, and fixed, at once.
    I think that had war actually been necessary or inevitable (which we know it wasn’t), that this should have been decided as a result of honest and open discourse with citizens and their representatives, that the ‘executive’ (cf. Clausewitz) would have made their case honestly, and that the military would have produced a workable plan that accomplished the political objectives of the allegedly inevitable war quickly, within the confines of the laws governing war, and that a proper post-conflict reconstruction, minimizing the opportunistism of war profiteers, would have been swiftly and energetically accomplished. I think that ‘we’ should immediately define a process to … oh, wait, nevermind, it’s already there, but (see above) …
    I think that in the failure of either of these, those responsible should be held accountable to the greatest possible extent, including impeachment, international criminal proceedings, and proper apportionment of disgrace upon their entire extended enterprise (well, one can always hope).

  7. Forgot to add my assent to Shirin’s suggestion that nobody be allowed to make a single decision or make a penny’s profit from the reconstruction. This one (no sarcasm, believe me) is near and dear to my heart. Some will say that forcing people to work without profit is a form of slavery: i would prefer to think of it as community service, working off the burden of prior bad deeds.
    I’d be inclined to assign it some greater weight of likelihood, but that is probably even more wishful thinking.

  8. Looks a lot like apartheid to me
    Apartheid was a system of racially-based separation and discrimination. The situation in Iraq is quite different. The white South African government did not organize a large black army to stabilize South Africa, but in Iraq the government and the US is organizing a majority army to cement democratic rule.
    The Iraqi situation suffers from a lot of problems, but calling it apartheid is just deliberate misdirection and incitement. The idea you can demonstrate racism by listing some of the equipment problems of the Iraqi army is too naive for words.
    There’s an old saying that generals are always fighting the last war. The Left is always seeing a previous war when it looks at Iraq, or indeed, anything the US does. The Left these days is always looking back to South Africa or Vietnam.
    A great deal of the damage in Iraq is caused by the pointless Sunni/Baathist insurgency and the efforts to combat it. Helena’s whole point is to defend the insurgency by sniping at it’s opponents without admitting that she is supporting the insurgency. This is quite obviously dishonest and fools nobody. I call upon Helena to admit she supports the insurgency and is in favor of rule by terror rather than democracy.
    Calling for reparations by the US only, and not by Saddam or the insurgency, is not an attempt to support the Iraqi people, but an attempt to roll back the democratic revolution all over the world.

  9. Actually, Warren, I think you should look back so long as there are lessons to be learned from the past. They are never a perfect fit, but it is up to us to make sense of how they do and do not fit the current reality.
    I’ve been arguing publicly since late 2001 that Vietnam is a good case for the US to look back at, and the reasons to do so have multiplied quite a bit since then. Can you really, honestly, refute the analogies? Other than by citing ‘desert’ and ‘jungle’, I mean.

  10. Yankeedoodle,
    Nice condensation of the issues about “Charlie company”. About the weapons, I don’t know. I’ve never seen an AK-47 jam, ever. This despite being thrown down a cliff, buried in mud, resurrected and then, ultimately fired.
    Not to say that the Iraqi army is not underequipped. But I think the issue of equipment is a red herring; one could reasonably say that, given how the US has not been successful at adequately supplying its own troops, what would be the logic for suddenly supplying the Iraqi army with new equipment when there are stores of maintained and/or captured equipment available?
    But I think the piece lays out a falsehood from USG about training that should be pretty clear: if ‘training the Iraqi army and security forces is a top priority’, then you would not send in any NG units to do it. Special forces yes, because (media lovefests notwithstanding), that is their bread and butter job. Not enough SF to do the job? Fine, send in TRADOC elements who could start by training (Iraqi) trainers and then take over the job. Or even a regular TO&E combat unit that was on a second rotation, after proper planning & guidance from TRADOC, JFKSWC or others.
    Not to take away from the NG/Reserves, but frankly they are as far away from the core of that mission as I can imagine. So much for first priorities!

  11. Thanks for you comment about the naming convention. It only serves to underscore the reality that the so-called “Iraqi” military is not there to serve Iraq, but to act as proxy forces to do the dirty work – and take the bullets – for the Americans.

  12. WarrenW, you claim ‘the left’ is always looking back, but then you use the tired old ruse ‘A great deal of the damage in Iraq is caused by the pointless Sunni/Baathist insurgency and the efforts to combat it.’ the right is constantly falling back on. First of all, it’s not ‘pointless’. Its ‘point’ is to drive American’s from Iraq. Secondly, NONE of that damage would be there if America had not invaded in the first place. International law does not blame native insurgents when they attempt to throw out invading/occupying forces, it blames the occupiers. You must get most of your news from the administration and Fox news, because that ‘ruse’ is the only remaining position they use. Well, besides calling Iraqi’s that fight American soldiers ‘terrorists’.
    The term ‘apartheid’ is also commonly used to denote a ‘tiered’ economic or social structure, which Helena demonstrated with her article. It’s not used only as a racial term. But then you know that. You just want to use ANOTHER tired old ‘right’ ruse, of accusing someone of mis-using racial terms to cause hysteria, thus silencing them. Both ‘ruses’ work with ‘ditto-head’ types because they are not all that informed and prefer a ‘yuk’ over a good discussion, but fall flat in informed company.
    .

  13. windinthewhistle:
    I agree that US policymakers are not serious about properly training or equipping Iraqi soldiers. But tasking Guardsman with the training mission isn’t a matter of choice – there is nobody else available. The Army is broke.
    Shirin:
    Your comment is spot-on. You said what I was trying to say, but much better. Thanks.
    WarrenW:
    When are you going to see the Army recruiter and enlist for service in Iraq? If you refuse, I call upon you to admit are a loud-mouthed pussy without the courage of conviction, just like your right-wing heros who shot off their big mouths supporting the quagmire in Vietnam while ducking the draft with student deferments and cushy Guard slots as the rest of us fought their war.
    Otherwise, shut your simpering cake hole, you miserable coward. Men and women better than you are bleeding in a war you started. You haven’t earned the right to criticize anybody.
    YD

  14. but in Iraq the government and the US is organizing a majority army to cement democratic rule.
    This not quite right, there is a lot of criticism about the goal of creating what they call Iraqi Army.
    As shirin said most Iraqis see this as a proxy to US, one of US military commander working in this mission he said it is the most difficult task to make Iraqi fighting Iraqi.
    You (WarrenW) can not deny there is a resistance to the American from day one, this due to
    1-Iraqis had very strong nationalism inside despite they are different ethnics or religions and groups, this clear that the resistance it

  15. mpvrb
    I don’t agree with Raed’s #3 point about providing compensation to the Iraqis after we pull out. We’ve already spent way too much American money in Iraq.
    You can not get with this excuse, when Colonel Gaddafi paid US$1.4 Billion to US for Lockerbie bombing crime, he is the only criminal should be hold for this but he used Libyan citizen money to pay US and US accepted, is it this money from social programs of Libyan citizens?
    Colonel Gaddafi still demonstrate his criminal behaviour again when Saudis caught one diplomat planning for another crime.
    In case of Iraq you (US) destroyed a country on claims of regime change to WMD and so we all now knew its was lies.

  16. Salah,
    Nice point with the Gaddafi comparison.
    Shirin,
    I don’t even think THAT is the reality, the Iraqi army is not EVEN proxies for the US; I think the whole exercise (as it is being executed) is a facade, an insubstantive prop for Bushco back home.
    Yankeedoodle:
    I get your point, but I’m not sure having the NG in the lead is just an out-of-options choice. Obviously it’s a bigger topic than we can cover here, but if training the Iraqi army was such a priority (and we agree that it is not), would the Army be, in fact, broke …?

  17. Fundamentally, nothing about the current occupation of Iraq really makes any sense at all. We say we are training and equipping an “Iraqi army,” but we aren’t really, because we don’t really want to do that. Whose army would it be? How would it be used, and against whom? For the U.S. government, there are no comforting answers to those questions. We’re not going to give heavy weapons and armor to a force we know has been infiltrated from top to bottom. Since there is no group within Iraq to whom the U.S. would willingly cede power, the only option is to try to prevent any group from acquiring enough power to overcome the others. This is neither an exit strategy, nor a victory strategy. It is a stalemate strategy. Of course, in a stalemate, the foreign aggressor is the loser. There is no evil genius behind this plan, just arrogance, stupidity and incompetence.

  18. windinthewhistle: There are a few similarities between Vietnam and Iraq. Less than first rate leadership on the US side, an insurgency on the other, local leadership in the larval stage.
    The Vietnamese Communists had more experience and military knowledge (think Gen. Giap) and more international support (China, USSR) compared to paltry smuggling for the Iraqi insurgents. The Vietnamese Communists had publically acknowledged leaders and a well-defined ideology, the Iraqi insurgents do not. The US public saw no US interests in Vietnam, but they see huge interests in the Mideast. The South Vietnamese government was very tyrannical, the Iraqi government is democratic. The early South Vietnamese government was an ethnic minority (Catholics) but the Iraqi government is aligned with the majority (Shiite Muslims). The US was fighting an enormously popular movement in Vietnam that had street creds for fighting the Japanese and French and fought in a sophisticated manner. The Iraqi insurgents have no broad support and attack the general public as it fills its gas tanks. The US is seen as having a previous success when it deposed Saddam, a dictator. Iraqi insurgent weapons are very similar to what the Vietnamese Communists were using, whereas US weapons have progressed 40 years. And yes, there is the difference between hiding in the desert and hiding in the jungle.
    Iraq is a unique situation and deserves its own analysis. The battle is not yet won nor the outcome decided, but history does not repeat itself unless we make it, or unless we are fatalistically leading it into repetition.
    Those who cry “Quagmire” have a bad track record. The venerable New York Times was calling it a quagmire when the US troops paused for a dust storm on the road to Baghdad in the third week of the war. If you dig, you can find the “Quagmire” claim for the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait.
    Yankeedoodle: It is moot, I am too old to be accepted into the active military. Men and women better than I are bleeding, but I did not start the war. I can criticize who I please.
    And your personal comments fail the courtesy test.
    Salah: Most of the destruction of Iraq is a result of combating the insurgency and direct actions of the insurgents themselves against Iraq. The insurgency keeps more US troops in Iraq than would otherwise stay. Patriotic Iraqis support their democratically elected government and help build the new Constitution.
    The only remaining obstacle to rebuilding Iraq is the insurgency, which kills innocent truck drivers and other important economic workers, and prevents the repair of what is broken. The insurgents are mostly unable to reach the US forces, so they attack random civilians, both Iraqis and guest workers. The insurgency is also slowing down foreign investment and aid money.
    Warren: Pointless because it cannot overcome the Iraqi government and the Shiite majority. Pointless because it cannot remove the US support for the Iraqi government. Pointless because it cannot remove UN and European support for the Iraqi government. Now that there has been an election, the Iraqi government is the legitimate ruler of Iraq, and the “Resistance” is to the Iraqi majority, not to an “Occupation”. And “Apartheid” is a term describing racial discrimination of a very particular sort, it is an Afrikaans word. I have never ever seen the word Apartheid used in a way that does not imply racism, except by Helena.
    All: There is no good reason for the Sunni leaders to continue to refuse to join the government, all they are doing is arguing about how many votes they will get in the Parliament. See this article for a description of the effect of the insurgency.

  19. There is no evil genius behind this plan, just arrogance, stupidity and incompetence.
    And that has been the case from the first second of the first minute of the first hour of day one.

  20. the Iraqi army is not EVEN proxies for the US; I think the whole exercise (as it is being executed) is a facade, an insubstantive prop for Bushco back home.
    Yes, that does make sense.
    Something I thought of the other day in connection with how poorly equipped and unprotected they are. Some weeks ago Wolfie the humanitarian was crowing about the great progress they were making in Iraq as evidenced by the fact that U.S. casualties were down while “Iraqi” forces casualties were up. I would not suggest that they are underequipping and under-protecting “Iraqi” forces in order to have more dead Iraqi soldiers to crow about, but someone of them must understand that this particular side effect is beneficial to them P.R.-wise.

  21. WarrenW,
    Thanks for responding to my post about the Iraq-Vietnam parallels. I agree with you that the situation requires its own analysis; to be clear, I did not use the word ‘quagmire’ because it is now too loaded with exactly the kind of misplaced baggage you describe. At the same time, analogies are a useful way of approaching the analysis, not as a means to apply a cookie cutter template that either does or does not fit, but at getting to a deeper understanding of the situation.
    The VN analogy still holds water. I might quibble with your account, but what I had in mind was something different, which was how the administration approached the war from the beginning, and how they put in place the structure that they cannot escape from now.
    There, the parallels are not perfect but they are telling. Almost forty years after the Tonkin Gulf resolution and little more than ten years after facing the same attempt on the part of a sitting executive (including one same face, Cheney), Congress abrogated its responsibility under the consitution to declare war (or not). The executive again relied on fallacies to press its case, but the main result was that they did not substantively gain the commitment of the American people. They (the civilian ‘strategists’ in the DOD) also ran roughshod over the military who was charged with developing a successful plan, in both cases, though the particulars were different (e.g. the military sold out in the first, and initially stood their ground but were bureaucratically swamped after the fact in the second ). They did the exact same thing with the state dept in the Iraq case in a similar manner, with similar results.
    After VN, the US Army made a detailed study about what went wrong, and paid attention to these very aspects (which they derived from Clausewitz). They didn’t blame the media, or Jane Fonda, but took it on the chin: those lessons formed the basis of training at the NWC for the next two decades and played a part in formulating the Powell (actually the Weinburger) Doctrine.
    If we were going to learn any lessons, you think these would be the ones. But here we are again, in a situation which, from the perspective of military solutions is irremediably lost and cannot be retrieved. Sorry, but the battle *is* lost, and it’s been lost for a long time.

  22. Shirin,
    I’m glad you don’t think that’s the case: neither do I. I don’t think anybody up the food chain would lose much sleep over it if it was, but there are some people lower down, the ones who would actually be providing or withholding such support, who I really don’t think see it that way.
    I don’t think Wolfie’s comment was itself a great PR move. It makes a kind of logical sense to say to a certain audience that increased Iraqi casualties implies a greater burden shouldered by Iraqi security forces. But more Iraqis dying is not great PR, no matter what.
    If they’d actually gotten a boost from it, I don’t hesitate to think that some idiot would have said, hey, it’s working, let’s get some more Iraqis killed. But they didn’t, and I think the door is closed for anyone to face that particular moral decision. Of course, I would not take any bets on the outcome of the next such decision.

  23. “Pointless because it cannot overcome the Iraqi government and the Shiite majority. Pointless because it cannot remove the US support for the Iraqi government. Pointless because it cannot remove UN and European support for the Iraqi government.”
    “There is no good reason for the Sunni leaders to continue to refuse to join the government, all they are doing is arguing about how many votes they will get in the Parliament.”
    WarrenW, I think an important point of misunderstanding (on many people’s parts) is illustrated by these two juxtaposed lines of yours.
    We sometimes speak as if the most important factors all live at the macro-level, but in the end they come down to politics that are more local. We like to see things at an international, regional or sometimes ethnic or religious level of agglomeration. But what often matters are the politics that drive people’s lives at a neighborhood, family, village or tribe level; those are the immediate sources of the political goods that matter most to them. They are the factors that move people to act, and often dictate which way they will go.
    Sunnis in the north (from the same clan, or from clans that have their own history of dealing with each other, with particulars that matter) are not arguing over how many votes they are getting, they are arguing over their survival as a minority, and what is the best position they can win. The instability of the situation invites others to angle for position as well, and to win crucial ground.
    If you’re an American and you grew up in the South, these kinds of politics would be familiar to you, but their level of sophistication in much of the Middle East (and in other parts of the non-Western world) is far, far more advanced. Ignoring them is sheer stupidity.

  24. Salah wrote
    “when Colonel Gaddafi paid US$1.4 Billion to US for Lockerbie bombing crime, he is the only criminal should be hold for this but he used Libyan citizen money to pay US and US accepted, is it this money from social programs of Libyan citizens?”
    Ah, but Gaddafi is a dictator, you see, who uses his money to keep himself in power and to fight bloody wars, not to help his people. Georgie Bush on the other hand is a Compassionate Conservative, who uses his money to aid the poor (Bill Gates), give the illiterate a place to study (Donald Rumsfeld), and to teach the infidels christian morality (by sending Condi Rice around the world).
    Completely different, you see. He needs his money to do Good Works.

  25. windinthewhistle makes points that have some weight, especially about not getting a commitment from the US public before getting into a war. But the idea that the war in Iraq is now alread lost is just foolishness. The insurgents simply cannot stand up to the combined US-Iraqi forces.
    But wiw is wrong to say the insurgency has won. They can never win over the Shiite majority no matter what the US does. In the worst case, Sistani, the main Shiite leader, could call for help from Iran, or could just massacre a large enough number of Sunnis.
    A premature US departure might result in a general Shiite vs Sunni melee with massive importation of help on both sides and millions killed.
    There was a time when Iraqi elections seemed an impossibility. Now they are working toward a new constitution. The US took over 20 years to form the US Constitution, living through the “Articles of Confederation” first.
    By and by, Iraq will have a new Parliament. In a few weeks there will be a big international meeting in Europe with the new Iraqi government. Things are forming. The insurgency cannot win, all it can do is commit murder after murder. The insurgency will go on for as long it does, but will not take down the government. QUESTION: Do you want it to?

  26. WW, what I said was that from the perspective of military solutions, it’s over. That may strike you as foolishness, but it is the case. In a conflict like this, the govt has to win decisively in order to prevail. Guerrillas only need to avoid decisively losing. Their survival is enough for a stalemate, which is the same as the govt not winning. I’ll make my case for how bad the situation is, below. I apologize for the long post, but the issue is complex and the details important.
    Since we are comparing Iraq with Vietnam, here is an informative parallel: The US military never lost a significant engagement against the VC or NVA. From 1965-67 they steadily eroded the leadership of the VC through attrition, and seriously degraded the flow of supplies from north to south. The Tet Offensive still kicked off in 1968. The offensive degraded the VC still further, and took a large part of the NVA out of the action for months. Analysts noted at the time, with significant statistical evidence, that Tet was a disaster for the NVA and especially for the VC. Who won? Despite the widespread belief that there was no way they could prevail against the US and other forces operating in theater, Tet was the beginning of the end for the US and the South Vietnamese.
    Militarily, the Iraqis are incapable of defeating the insurgency. The US does have an advantage in mass, firepower, and technology. That mix will allow them to tactically degrade the insurgents’ capability, and to destroy the cities that are key to insurgent’s logistical support. They won’t win by accumulating such ‘gains’, or through attrition. We didn’t do it in Vietnam, the Soviets didn’t do it in Afghanistan, the Nazis didn’t do it in Greece, etc, despite the same superiority in firepower, training, and material support. And of course, the US’ doctrine is conventional and the means are blunt; counter-insurgency requires, among other things, high-quality intelligence and a very precise application of force. And, logistical support of guerrillas can be repositioned quickly. Fallujah is a glaring example. With every such ‘victory’, the insurgency’s setbacks are temporary and their ability to obtain recruits, intelligence, logistical support and concealment, grows.
    Here is another reason the situation is even worse in Iraq. There is not one insurgent group but many. The govt would have to prevail against all of them, for the same reason I listed above. Playing them off against each other won’t work. The govt has little capacity to accomplish it, the US is incapable of it, and insurgent groups are linked with outsiders pursuing their own agendas, who will sustain each group for as long as it is useful.
    Like most wars of any kind, the insurgency will end in a political settlement. It is not going to be forced by Americans, and certainly not by the EU, which has no common foreign policy and whose driving members have no will or capability to do so. The settlement will be made by Iraqis, under their own terms and on their own schedule.
    Watching the difficulty of getting the Sunni factions to agree is a preview of how long and difficult such a settlement will be to achieve. And, they don’t live in a bubble; it’s not just the US that is intervening in the process, and a united, stable autonomous Iraq is not necessarily what outsiders have in mind. Sistani might well turn to Iran for help (as will the US, again): in return for what? with what response?
    The instability has also brought other armed factions into existence, and getting a settlement from them will also be difficult. Assuming a settlement, who will guarantee that they live up to the terms? In the absence of a national army capable of enforcing the agreement, it will be still other armed factions, maybe the first ones to reach a settlement. The problems arising from this ‘solution’ alone are enormous: See Afghanistan. Add to that, these ‘guarantors’ will have to retain their militias in order to fulfill this role, which means they will continue to have other options and the means to opt-out of their own agreements.
    I’ll return to the Vietnam analogy to answer your final question. The withdrawal of the US and the fall of the South was a catastrophe for the Vietnamese, and went on to become a catastrophe for neighboring Cambodia. The level of human suffering was unspeakable. You might recall that it wasn’t particularly good for the US, either.
    So, do I want the government to fall to the insurgents? Hell, no. I would have wanted a very different outcome from anything that looks likely now: but neither the outcome that I wanted or the one you want are in the cards. To pretend otherwise, and to back solutions based on still more wishful thinking is, to use your words, “just foolishness”.

  27. Ha – well, after I got done putting down those thoughts rendered above, I found an article over on Today in Iraq saying essentially the same stuff. It was published in the State, a paper down in that bastion of liberalism South Carolina, quoting senior US Army officers who must also be secret insurgency lovers hoping all their efforts will fail.
    So, if you’re inclined to give my long post a pass (hey, ‘wind’ is not in my username by accident), there’s a more digestible version here:
    http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/nation/11881007.htm

  28. WarrenW
    “A premature US departure might result in a general Shiite vs Sunni melee with massive importation of help on both sides and millions killed.”
    This in your dream WarrenW, this claims truth less, just let you know Iraq never had, and have any internal conflicts between the groups but I think this is same symphony that US keep playing all the time to the world to show them they are doing good job!(Destroying, killing, fraudster, free oil, ….)
    I don know why you are very passionate in your comment about the all setup of the Iraqi government, the fact is Iraq under occupation you like it or not this is fact.
    what you call them Shiit these guys most of them Puppet came on the US tanks and they not up to the job, these are opportunistic guys, Iranian background most of them, take them and elected them to represent you in in your house or council what ever you like, Ahammad Aljalabi I believe he is US citizen (and most of them hold US or UK citizenship )we are Iraqis WE DONT WANT THEM.

  29. windinthewhistle:
    Your arguments are all based on general principles that apply to any insurgency or rebellion whatever. There is little in your argument specific to Iraq. So you are arguing that no insurgency can be defeated anywhere, anytime. History shows us the opposite.
    The Lassiter article mainly says that in the end there will be a deal, rather than a massacre of all the Sunnis. The article also implies the US can move the insurgency around to the less important areas of the country. Apparently, there are some US officers who are too tired of fighting to continue leading, this is unfortunate. A military leader is supposed to be able to take the long view and not be bogged down by the daily stress of war.
    The whole insurgency has taken on the character of an ethnic war, the Kurds and Shiite on one side, the mixture of Sunni/Baathists and some foreigners on the other. The Kurds and Shiite will never let the Sunnis take over, even if the war lasts a hundred years.
    In those parts of Iraq where the war is little felt, the economy is booming. The currency is remarkably stable, and Iraqis are returning to Iraq from all over the world, in contrast to the Hussein era, when they left. The Iraqis have spoken, they voted for a new government over the wishes of the insurgency. Don’t let democracy die in Iraq.

  30. Warren W, since you are so passionate about this issue, and know so much about how the U.S. should be fighting this war, allow me to join Yankee Doodle in urging you to quit flappying your jaw, join up and go put your own ass on the line for a change.

  31. “Currency is remarkably stable”
    There was a joke in Iraq during Saddam regime when all reconstruction done by Iraqis after 1991 war. Hussein Kamel (Saddam son in law) went to Saddam telling him he builds Iraq again with a REEM OF PAPER (at that time the bank notes were printed by him).
    When the U.S. cleaned out the Saddam Hussein regime, not only did the Saddam statues disappear, so did his picture on the Iraqi money. So the Americans did the same thing after one year thinking and struggling to get rid of Saddam photo from Iraqi bank notes, they did copy same Hussein Kamel act ….
    New paper money was printed Oct 2003, Paul Bremer introduced it. That move cost as I recall US$72 millions.
    There is a new currency in Iraq, but there’s no market for it anywhere els
    Tell us now, any country in the world its bank notes for sale through internet! With any amount millions or billions, what you talking are just ridicules.
    Iraqi bank notes featuring Saddam Hussein’s image are proving to be hot property
    http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/16/1050172623633.html
    http://www.portaliraq.com/buy-iraq-dinar.php

  32. WarrenW,
    I want to alert you to the fact that your other commitments in this issue have affected your ability to read properly.
    You misread the Lassiter article, and you misrepresented my argument. I did not ‘only provide general principles’ with ‘few specifics about Iraq’. I also did not argue that an insurgency ‘can never be defeated’, only that the conditions for defeating one have not been met. Most cannot be met at this point; we don’t get to start over every month. Also, your comment about ‘ethnic war’ is off-base; see my other post to you about how illusory this view can be. Or, ask for more and I will give it to you.
    About the post you responded to, though: I was clear the first time. Read it again.
    I have to say too that it is galling to hear your ‘disappointment’ about the alleged failures of military leaders. They know alot more about what is going on than you do. Please explain the basis for your ‘superior’ viewpoint on this.
    Good news: the US Army is now taking enlistees over the age of forty. If you have any prior service (ah, but you don’t, do you?) you can get a waiver that will allow you in even in your fifties. Now’s your chance.

  33. WarrenW,
    Since no one else has challenged you on this yet, I wanted to bring up another point: There is no ‘democracy’ in Iraq right now. You can’t just hold an election and call it finished, or even underway, as you’ve suggested. There is more to democracy than elections: the Soviets had ’em right up until the end.
    Comments?

  34. There is no ‘democracy’ in Iraq right now.
    Thank you for that. I think I get so numbed out from repeating over and over and over again “what democracy”, “there is no democracy in Iraq”, and “the elections did not meet even the minimum requirements to qualify as ‘free and fair’ ” that I stop noticing when people keep going on about “first free and fair elections in 50 years” (not sure where they get that number), and “democratically elected government”.
    For what it is worth, Special Correspondent goes through periods of unjustified optimism (it’s called “I can’t deal with reality, so I will buy the propaganda for a while so I can gather strength to deal with reality again”), yet even at his most euphoric points he is very clear about one thing: There is no democracy here. And speaking of no democracy, he has constantly to remind me that our conversations may very well be monitored, and we simply cannot speak freely – and this is in Kurdistan. As they say in Iraq, this is the freedom.

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