So Abu Mazen won the Palestinian election No surprise whatsoever there. The turnout was down significantly from the last election, in 1996. (Actually, on the AP story I was reading, it said that Election Commission chief Hanna Nassir refused to release a final turnout figure.
Abbas obtained 62.32 percent of votes cast, streets ahead of his nearest rival Mustafa Barghuti, who won 19.8 percent.
And today, the Sharon-Peres version of a “unity government” in Israel just got sworn in, by 58 votes to 56 in the 120-member Knesset.
The government is committed to a platform mandating implementation of Sharon’s year-old “disengagement” plan, that is, the complete or near-complete withdrawal from Gaza and the dismantling of four so-called “illegal” outposts in the northern West Bank.
Sharon had declared that he would treat today Knesset vote on the new government as a “confidence” vote, i.e., if 61 members voted against it he would resign. As it was, 13 Likud members voted against him and he was saved only by the last-minute decision of some small leftist parties to support him.
But what if Sharon had– like Abbas– gone to the general citizenry to test their support of his approach? The latest “Peace Index” survey of Israeli public opinion, put out by the Steinmetz Center at Tel Aviv University, reports that as of Dec 27-28,
- the majority … supports the disengagement plan (some 60%) and the minority … opposes it (33%), with the rest (7%) having no position on the matter. It is important to note that the support for the plan continues despite, and apparently also because of, the prevalent view (67%) that the plan will constitute a first step toward a far-reaching evacuation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank in the framework of a permanent agreement with the Palestinian Authority… the view of the disengagement plan as less than final crosses the camps, and is held almost equally by voters for the parties that oppose the plan and for those that support it.
So we have some potentially constructive “raw material” to work with there, in peacemaking terms. We have just about 60% of the public on each side that seems to want to give the present leadership a chance to negotiate on the basis of the currently proposed plan, i.e., the disengagement plan.
On the Palestinian side, there is overwhelming support for going considerably further than the disengagement plan. But I would say a vote for Abbas would indicate a readiness to start the negotiations with what’s now there, and then move rapidly forward from there. (Though their definition of “what’s there” might actually be much more the Road Map, than the Sharon Plan.)
And on the Israeli side, we seem to have solid enough support for Sharon to push forward with own plan right now– and roughly two-thirds of that 60% of the people who support his plan do so even though they are of the opinion that that is not “the end” of the withdrawals. Which makes a good basis of 40% of Israelis already ready, right now, to apparently go further than the Sharon Plan.
So, there may be some decent basis in public opinion to support both leaders proceeding in their pursuit of negotiations. That doesn’t mean the peacemaking will be easy. Far from it. On the Israeli side, Sharon seems to face a strong “threat” (though I don’t know if this is also a real “probability”) of intra-Jewish civil war if he proceeds with his plan for a withdrawal from Gaza.
This is almost exactly the same kind of internecine conflict that successive Israeli governments tried to foist onto the Palestinian community just about ever since Oslo, with their insistence that the PA leadership “crack down hard” on Palestinian militants while at the same time they (the Israelis) gave Arafat pitifully few of the real political concessions that would have made his continued engagement in the negotiations much easier for them to “sell” at home.
So now looks as though it’s Sharon who’s going to have the toughest time figuring out what to do with the militants inside his own camp. In a way, of course, he deserves the grief of being the one to face down the extremist settlers. Ever since 1967, after all, he has been the Israeli leaders who has most consistently and most systematically defied international law and the weight of just about the whole international community by house by house, dunum by dunum, implanting the present total of some 450,000 Israeli settlers onto occupied Palestinian land. (That counts the ones in Greater East Jerusalem, as well as those elsewhere in the West Bank, and in Gaza. Many western news media simply refuse to count the East Jerusalem settlers as “settlers” at all.)
A big part of me says, fine, just let Sharon be the one who deals with the settlers; let him be the one who takes the heat.
Realistically, though, he’s going to need considerable help– and, most importantly, considerable counter-pressure on him– from the international community if he’s going to succeed in facing down these violent and hate-filled people who are the settler extremists, and in persuading even greater numbers of Israelis that the time for a real withdrawal from many additional settlements has now come.
How unbelievably unhelpful it was to the prospects for peace when, last April, President Bush gave the settlers the ultra-clear message that their extremism and militancy would be rewarded! That was when he stated publicly that:
- In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines [that existed prior to 1967]”
That one declaration alone was just about enough to disqualify the US from having ever any part in “mediating” a Palestinian-Israeli peace that would have anything in common with the requirements of international law (or simple human decency.)
Oh well, I will keep an engaged but still deeply skeptcial eye on what happens in this negotiation over the months ahead. I haven’t seen anyone yet with any power in the international community pressing for rapid conclusion of a final-status peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis, which I see as the only way of avoding everyone getting led down the same winding, futile, and demoralizing path of indeterminacy that bedeviled the whole Oslo experiment.
The theory of Oslo was always (as propounded by all the “peace processors” inside Israel and the US) that you “needed to build the slowly confidence between the parties before you even started negotiating the final peace.” That was never the case in the history of diplomacy before then. Afterwards, the whole record of Oslo showed how the indeterminacy of the final outcome itself contributed massively to the sense of unease and general insecurity of each of the two sides. (This has also proven equally true in Kosovo since 1999, by the way. Just in general, it seems like a really lousy argument.)
So please, this time, no more going for “interim” arrangements. Everyone knows more or less what the outline of an acceptable-enough (on both sides) outcome would look like: something generally like the Geneva Accords. An outcome like that would involve many “painful concessions” by both sides– concessions that is, from the maximalist positions staked out by the most militant members in each society.
So let’s go straight for the agreement on the exact content of the “final outcome”. Implementation of such an agreement can, as in any peace agreement, come in stages, by mutual agreement.
If we see the diplomats going for yet another “interim” arrangement, though, I think we’ll all have to recognize that that will be death knell for any hope at all for a workable two-state solution.
(Bill the spouse said a number of the Israeli peaceniks he was with in Jerusalem last week expressed the view that Sharon’s real preference is not the one-state solution, or the two-state solution, but– the five-state solution! That is, one Israelis state, and four Palestinian Bantustans. Gosh almighty. What a true tragedy it would be if that really is what he has in mind. Didn’t work for the Afrikaners. Won’t work for Israel. Caused unbelievable grief and human suffering along the way.)
I’m pretty sure the settlements in the West Bank that are being dismantled are not “illegal outposts” but actual settlements. (Note, I understand many people consider all settlements illegal. I’m merely distinguishing between government sanctioned settlements and the “wildcat” settlements).
Regarding “going to the general citizenry.” Does this mean you think there should be a referendum on disengagement? This was talked about, but ultimately, Israel’s laws provide for a representative democracy with authority residing in the Knesset. So that was the route to go. Sharon also probably feared being outmaneuvered again. The opponents of disengagement would have turned out in full force, while the general populace may have been more apathetic.
Finally, I’m having trouble trying to square these two statements.
1) “[Bush’s] declaration alone was just about enough to disqualify the US from having ever any part in “mediating” a Palestinian-Israeli peace that would have anything in common with the requirements of international law (or simple human decency.)”
2) “Everyone knows more or less what the outline of an acceptable-enough (on both sides) outcome would look like: something generally like the Geneva Accords.”
But the Geneva Accords recognize the “facts on the ground” and result in an agreement that does not withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice. So unless the Geneva Accords are contrary to international law and human decency, I don’t see Bush’s statement as disqualifying.
I’m pretty sure the settlements in the West Bank that are being dismantled are not “illegal outposts” but actual settlements.
You’re right. The four settlements to be evacuated – Kadim, Ganim, Sa Nur and Homesh – are relatively small (total population ~550) but are recognized settlements rather than outposts.
Regarding “going to the general citizenry.” Does this mean you think there should be a referendum on disengagement?
The people within Israel who support a referendum most strongly are on the far right, because they hope that (1) a referendum would stall the process for several months, and (2) they could defeat the silent majority by mobilizing more highly motivated voters. A referendum would be very dangerous, not only for these reasons but because it would set a precedent where important decisions of national policy would be removed from the Knesset’s purview. Nobody held a referendum on establishing the settlements; there’s no need to hold one to take them down.
Joshua, hi. You were right to note that what I wrote could imply that I favored a general referendum. I wasn’t intending to advocate that… More, I wanted to note that though the balance in the Knesset gives Sharon only a paper-thin majority for his Disengagement Plan, in fact, out there in the country as a whole the support for it is much stronger than that.
Which means that if what he really cares about is making some kind of decent diplomatic progress he need not be afraid of forcing this issue even to a “no confidence” vote and taking the country into a general election on it.
Of course, in that event, the Likud Party would likely be split down the middle. If he were a die-hard party loyalist, avoiding that eventuality would be his main concern. Actually, I don’t believe that he is. I do, however, believe that his deep, longstanding loyalty to a large version of the settlements project must mean that he feels himself poised on a knife-edge right now.
But thank goodness human beings are open to change. Even, on many occasions, to changes much broader than they once even believed possible… (Q.v. Frederik De Klerk.)
I wanted to note that though the balance in the Knesset gives Sharon only a paper-thin majority for his Disengagement Plan, in fact, out there in the country as a whole the support for it is much stronger than that.
The first reading of the disengagement passed by 67-45, and now that United Torah Judaism has withdrawn its objection, the second and third readings should pass by even larger margins. Sharon is actually much safer in the Knesset than he would be with a referendum, which the settler movement could try to manipulate as it did last year’s Likud Party referendum.