Juan Cole’s defense

So this morning, Juan Cole replied to my post of Thursday, in which I challenged the grounds he’d adduced for arguing against the announcement of a deadline for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq.
His first counter-argument was this:

    She can’t understand why I think things could get worse if the US withdrew precipitously. I can’t understand why it would be hard to understand. The Baathists would begin by killing Grand Ayatollah Sistani, then Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, then Ibrahim Jaafari, and so on down the list of the new political class. Then they would make a coup. Once they had control of Iraq’s revenues, they could buy tanks and helicopter gunships in the world weapons bazaar and deploy them again against the Shiites. They might not be able to hang on very long, but it is doubtful if the country would survive all this intact. The Badr Corps could not stop this scenario, or it would have stopped all the assassinations lately of Shiite notables in the South, including two of Sistani’s aides.

I guess the unspoken premise there was that he thinks it is solely the US military presence in Iraq that is preventing this dreadful scenario from taking place? Juan adduces no evidence whatsoever for such a proposition. Appropriately, because I don’t believe there is any.
But if that proposition isn’t true, then Juan’s argument that the US military presence has helped and is necessary in order to continue to help to preserve the security of these Shiite leaders has no basis at all.
He is, however, willing to admit that,

    The failures of the Fallujah campaign made it amply clear that the US armed forces are unlikely to make headway against the guerrilla insurgency, and in the meantime are just making hundreds of thousands of Iraqis more angry.

Yes, indeed. So it’s hard to see how the US presence is actually contributing to the sense of security of the majority Shiite population in the country. Indeed, in recent days, tragically, we’ve seen yet more truly heinous attacks launched against Shiites in and near their places of worship… Including one in which the assailants had packed an ambulance with explosives.
I honestly don’t believe that any Shiite community leaders inside Iraq feel that the Americans’ presence there gives them any sense of security at all. (Except perhaps Iyad Allawai… But it’s probably stretching it too much to call him a “Shiite community leader”.)
Juan also writes, conveying somewhat of a sense of being privy to important insider information:

    I was told by a US observer of the scene in Najaf that a member of the marja’iyyah asked the US to take care of the Mahdi Army for them last summmer.

Just “a US observer of the scene in Najaf…”? Frankly, I am not impressed. Juan doesn’t tell us whether his source is someone who has reason to know anything at all about the subject. He doesn’t tell us, either, whether perhaps there was an incentive for a person in this position to make this claim. He doesn’t tell us anything about this person. Why heck, my dog’s veterinarian could qualify as “a US observer of the scene in Najaf.”
No, Juan, definitely not a convincing argument.
He also writes,

    You will note that Sistani, who is not shy about these things, has not demanded an immediate withdrawal of US forces.

Well, Sistani may not be shy, as such. But he is– as Juan has noted many times– a political “quietist” who rejects the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (the doctrine that earthly rule should be under the control of the leading theologian). Sistani is against the domination of politics by theologians; so, being himself a leading theologian, he speaks on overtly political matters extremely rarely indeed.
However, he has always been very intent on the procedural matter of holding elections for a popularly-mandated Iraqi leadership at the very earliest possible date, and with the goal that this will facilitate a speedy end to the US occupation.
Abdul Aziz Hakim, the eminent, hawza-connected SCIRI head who is #1 on the Sistanists’ UIA electoral list, has gone considerably further. In two encounters with the British media over this weekend, Hakim spelled out a strongly pro-withdrawal position.
Talking with Hala Jaber of the London Sunday Times (one of my former employers) Hakim said that,

    it will be the duty of the new [Iraqi] government to demand the withdrawal of American forces “as soon as possible”.
    “No people in the world accepts occupation and nor do we accept the continuation of American troops in Iraq,” said Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
    “We regard these forces to have committed many mistakes in the handling of various issues, the first and foremost being that of security, which in turn has contributed to the massacres, crimes and calamities that have taken place in Iraq against the Iraqis.”

(Thanks to JWN commenter Dominic for the heads-up on that one.)
Yesterday, Hakim was quoted in The Guardian as saying:

    As a matter of principle it is very clear that no nation accepts an occupation. It should be the Iraqi government that sets a timetable for the withdrawal of multinational forces. The Iraqi government and the occupation forces should cooperate together to find a suitable timetable in which they can work to have Iraq clear of any occupation forces.

Juan was also quoted in that same piece, bringing up his familiar India/Pakistan and Palestine 1948 examples.
Actually, I’ve been thinking about this topic quite a lot these past few days. My own arguments that the US should announce, and then implement, a speedy schedule of withdrawal go ahead at two levels. One is the level of facts and analysis, such as I engage in here and in Thursday’s post. But at another level, too, I just feel very deeply that the US presence in Iraq is so illegitimate, because it was the result of a quite illegal war, that it should end, anyway.
If I could see any strong evidence that–despite the illegality of the “original sin” of the invasion of March 2003– the present US military presence in Iraq was nonetheless doing worthwhile things, I might have to swallow hard and say, “Yes, the invasion was wrong, but at least they are doing X,Y, and Z worthwhile things there these days.”
That would be a hard call to make. I would have been prepared to make it. But the proportion of “worthwhile things” the US presence has brought about in Iraq is so very, very tiny compared with the very harmful things they’ve done there that my conscience and my intellect can march happily hand-in-hand in urging a speedy and total US withdrawal.
And as for what comes next? Probably, members of the US citizenry– who after all recently re-elected the aggressive war initiator George W Bush to be their/our president– should be the very last people in the world to be consulted on “what comes next” in Iraq.
Personally, I would say, some form of serious UN transition mandate– that is, something much stronger than the role that a grand total of seven UN employees are playing in “supporting” the upcoming elections– could be helpful in easing the handover to genuine national independence.
But that is totally a call for an Iraqi leadership enjoying genuine popular legitimacy to make.
All that I, and 295 million other Americans can rightfully do for Iraqis at this point is say, “We are sorry. We are sorry. We are sorry. And what can we do to help make up for the wrongful acts of our government?”

58 thoughts on “Juan Cole’s defense”

  1. Hi
    This is USA big problem HOW they like to win Hart and Mind of Iraqis, on the ground the things going worse.
    This fails due to US planning from the start till now (for almost now 18 months), yes I quite agree the difficulty of the rebuilding on the ground and the looting ect

  2. The way around this was to put the occupation on the ballot. Let the Iraqis vote it up or down. That would have ended the insurgency, because the insurgents could have got what they wanted by peaceful campaigning. It would have enforced better behavior by the US, to try to win popular support from the Iraqis.

  3. I have the feeling that Juan Cole is going out of tracks on the subject of withdrawal. His last entry sounds like bad politic fiction, where he doesn’t take in account the positive effects that a withdrawal would have on the Sunnis communities and takes the worst scenario as granted.
    He points to the fact that the Badr militia hasn’t been able to prevent attacks on high ranking shiites leaders, but ignores that the US troops didn’t prevent them either.
    The US occupation has dangerously played on ethnic differences, but failed to achieve anything nevertheless. Salah Alamin and Riverbend testimonies show deepness of the failure. US has been waging a failed politic in Iraq, but Juan Cole is only arguing for more of the same (aka the prolongation of the occupation).
    I’m pessimist concerning the possibility of a larger implication of the UN. On one side, the Iraqis don’t like the UN for two reasons : 1) the UN applied the sanctions after the first Gulf war; 2) both the US and the puppet government (especially Chalabi) never missed an occasion to smear the action of the UN whom they never wanted to grant a leading action in the rebuilding of Iraq. On the other side, the UN has been : 1)traumatized by the bombing of its quarters and by the death of Sergio de Mello; 2) put off by the continual pressures of the US who at the same time don’t want her to have a leading role. So any implication of the UN would be difficult.
    I see much hope in the fact that the Shiites community didn’t answer to the provocations. Suppose that the US withdraw, then the dialogue between moderate Sunnis and Shiites authorities may resume and united they could take care of the fundamentalists (who would probably loose any popular support).
    The international community (aka the UN) should condamn the US to pay the right and fair compensations for all the destructions they have achieved and let the Iraqis take care of their infrastructures themselves, without interferring.

  4. The problem in this debate between Helena and Juan Cole is that Cole is misinterpreting the nature of the Sunni revolt. Some days ago he said he agreed with Scott Ritter that the insurgency is Ba’athist and Salafist. A Ba’athist underground left over from Saddam. Well, this is conspiracy theory. It is pretty obvious that the Sunni revolt is basically a popular one, perhaps with some Ba’athist leadership, and certainly some Salafist elements. If it was really a Ba’athist conspiracy, they would have got going a lot sooner, being ready prepared. It is not so, they were not ready to go. The Sunni position should be compared to that of the Protestants in Northern Ireland: a community losing the power they have known for generations may well look in part to extremist leaders.
    Cole is demonising the Sunnis, exaggerating the risks of a Sunni coup. He says they could use Iraq’s oil wealth to buy weapons on the world market. Well, the answer is, so could a Shi’i elected government, to defend themselves. I don’t see why a UIA government should be described as helpless sheep in face of monstrous Ba’athist conspirators.
    I am all for an immediate US withdrawal. It is the US that is causing the problem, and it is unable to maintain security. Iraqis are quite capable of resolving their own problems, and they know it. It is only we Westerners who imagine that they need us to sort things out. There might be a small bloodbath after the withdrawal, but it would be over quickly and that would be all.
    Alastair

  5. PuRGaTor, I have no idea whether or not Juan Cole is “bending under pressure”. If he is I can sympathize. As a standard-bearer in the opposition to Bush’s policies, and particularly as a public critic of Israel, he must be under quite a bit of pressure. Most of his peers have not been willing to take the same heat. If it were later in the day I’d offer him a toast.

  6. No Preference, It maybe makes it clearer if I say that Juan is one of my few favourites. I even have a link to his blog and read it every day. I acknowledge that he’s under great pressure from almost all sides. Being one of my favourites makes me so sensitive about some of his misinterpretations. That’s the reason I said “almost the same path”. I can

  7. No Preference, It maybe makes it clearer if I say that Juan is one of my few favourites. I even have a link to his blog and read it every day. I acknowledge that he’s under great pressure from almost all sides. Being one of my favourites makes me so sensitive about some of his misinterpretations. That’s the reason I said “almost the same path”. I can

  8. Juan Cole supported the war, albeit with serious reservations. I don’t therefore regard him as someone whose political line I would follow, however I respect his local knowledge and analysis. He has been right about a lot of things over the past couple of years and whether he has hard evidence or not, his “Sunni coup” prognosis should be taken seriously.
    Take away the detail over “close air support” etc and Cole’s actual line on US withdrawal is this:-
    “…if the elected Iraqi parliament asks for a withdrawal timetable, I think the US has an absolute duty to comply.”
    I’m not sure that this position actually differs very much from Helena’s.
    However some people are advocating an immediate unconditional withdrawal. To do this without making some attempt to hand over to a stable government with popular support would be to invite a repetition of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and we all know where that led.
    What scenario do the immediate withdrawal, anti-election advocates have in mind? Handing over to Allawi? Putting Saddam back in power? Letting the various factions fight it out? Next week’s elections seem by far the least bad option available.

  9. I think Chris hits the nail on the head, and I think it shows that there is very little difference between Juan’s views and Helena’s views.
    The elections, however they turn out, will occur at the end of the month. The U.S. can then work out a withdrawal with the newly elected authority.
    Such government may not be perceived as “legitimate,” perhaps rightly, perhaps not rightly. But that’s what will be running Iraq, and the U.S. will have to work with it.
    And of course, there is the possibility that this government might want the U.S. to stick around in some shape or form because it has all the guns and soldiers. The bottom line is that the new Iraqi authority will be just that, the new Iraqi authority, and the U.S. will have to work with them.

  10. Chris,
    Helena’s and Juan Cole’s positions are quite different :
    1) Cole states that a withdrawal would be a bad thing because it would cause a civil war. He didn’t address the type of withdrawal he was envisaging. Helena (and I agree with her) thinks that the US occupation do more harms than good to the Iraqis.
    2) Cole says he would nevertheless support a withdrawal if the future “elected” Iraqi government asked for it. But Helena proposes that the US prepares that decision anyway. Of course it should be prepared, because 150’000 troops can’t leave in one day, one week, or even in one month.
    Last but not least, the US/Pentagon has never said that they were willing to leave Iraq; on the contrary, the Pentagon has hinted to the fact that they wanted to keep US bases in Iraq (how many ? it was a lot of them, but I can’t remember their number : 15, 7 ?); even if it was only a small number, it’s still too much for a stable Iraq IMO.
    I’ve read many many times that the Pentagon had no exit strategy in Iraq. But I think that they had two alternative plans : 1) a quick victory and goodwilling Iraqis and everything OK in one-two years. Or 2) the chaos we see actually, which allows the justification to keep a lot of US troops in Iraq. In the second scenario, if the situation got too bad, the neocons hopes that the other Western countries, especially the EU get frightened enough by the chaos to come and help the US. Untill now, France and Germany have been very reluctant to join in. But what if the oil ressources were really threatened ? I think that the neocons bet these EU countries would join in.
    To sum up, the alternative strategy previewed by the neocons doesn’t seem to be an exit strategy, but rather a strategy to extend the conflict and implicate other allies along with the US. I just hope that the EU governments will stay firm in their refusal to wage aggressive wars with the US.

  11. Well, at least once we get out (sooner rather than later) we will have the troops necessary for George’s Excellent Iran Adventure. Just about the same time that Iraq’s Civil War explodes – hoo boy.

  12. “a US observer of the scene in Najaf…”? Frankly, I am not impressed.
    Given the spectacular level of ignorance displayed by Americans in Iraq, and given the reliability that if an American says it, it will prove to be wrong, I am shocked that anyone takes their word for anything at all anymore.
    I am also, as I said before, disappointed that Juan seems to taken hook, line, and sinker, the Bush administration’s latest characterization of the “insurgency” as being Ba`thists.

  13. that is totally a call for an Iraqi leadership enjoying genuine popular legitimacy to make.
    Which is NOT under any circumstances what will emerge from the charade they are calling an election.

  14. As a standard-bearer in the opposition to Bush’s policies
    I don’t think that is an accurate characterization. Unless I am remembering incorrectly, he was in favour of attacking and occupying Iraq.

  15. You may be right, Shirin. I didn’t start reading Cole until after the invasion. But he certainly has been a sharp critic of the administration since.
    Also, don’t underestimate the courage it takes for him to be so critical of Israel. Israel’s US supporters can bring very heavy cannon to bear on any critic. It doesn’t speak well of us as a society that one of the most prominent critics of our unfortunate relationship with Israel is a mere university professor, but there it is.

  16. “Also, don’t underestimate the courage it takes for him to be so critical of Israel. Israel’s US supporters can bring very heavy cannon to bear on any critic.”
    Yeah, they may just kill his first born son and use the blood to bake matzoh! Your insane hatred of Israel, which crops up even on unrelated topics, is really shameful.

  17. The topic is Juan Cole. His risk of attack from supporters of Israel is very real. Keep your absurd comments about first born son’s blood and matzoh to yourself.

  18. “The topic is Juan Cole. His risk of attack from supporters of Israel is very real.”
    The topic was Juan Cole’s assessment of withdrawing forces from Iraq. Only you felt that you had to stick your snout in demonstrating your hatred of those who support Israel.
    Just as Juan Cole likes to label anyone he disagrees with on Israel as a “neocon Likudnik,” there will be people who criticize Juan Cole, perhaps in vituperative terms. If other people agree that such criticism is accurate, and have less respect for him for it, that’s not a “heavy cannon.” That’s the result of debate.
    Cole is doing just fine, as are plenty of other critics of Israel. Pat Buchanan hasn’t lost any work. David Duke does just fine on the white supremecist crowd. True, neither Cole nor those other critics of our “unfortunate relationship” with Israel will be elected president. That’s because the American people, have a tendency to elect officials who support a strong America-Israel relationship. I’m sorry if that democratic decision doesn’t meet with your approval.

  19. You’ve really covered the entire gamut of pro-Israeli smears here, from suggesting that I believe that Jews bake blood in their matzohs to associating Juan Cole with David Duke. One couldn’t ask for a better, more concentrated example of their characteristic sleaze.
    The issue isn’t whether people will criticize Cole, even in vituperative terms, but whether people will try to get him fired from his job. That’s the goal of the likes of Daniel Pipes with his Campus Watch organization.

  20. I don’t like Pipes either. But he can express his view that Cole is not fit for academia, just as the Muslim community can, and did, express their view that Pipes was not fit for government service, which I in fact agreed with.
    Pipes does have a legitimate gripe though, in that some parts of the academic world are basically outposts for Israel bashing, where dissent is not tolerated. Personally, I don’t think we have to get obsessive as to whether there is 1 for 1 equivalence in each academy. It’s ok for some schools to have different views.
    Cole is a tenured professor, which means he is not going to lose his job any time soon. As someone whose work has included defending academic freedom, I am acutely aware of government intrusions on the academy. I also recognize that people can express their opinions as to whether someone is fit for their job. If Cole actually were fired because of political views, I would be outraged. But it is perfectly legitimate to point out that he, and much of the academy, have strong anti-Israel, and in some cases anti-semitic, biases.

  21. Joshua, NoPref’s comment about, don’t underestimate the courage it takes for [Juan] to be so critical of Israel. Israel’s US supporters can bring very heavy cannon to bear on any critic was perhaps a little bit diversionary from the main topic of the post, but not totally, since the general topic is looking at Juan’s standing as a commentator on matters Middle Eastern. (Of which I, in general, happen to be a strong admirer.)
    But I think with your comments about snouts, first-born sons, baked in matzoh, etc, you seemed to be (1) engaging in distinct rhetorical escalation, and (2) exemplifying exactly the problem NoPref was referring to– namely, the fact that it’s often hard for anyone to engage in calm, sane discussion of– or even make a mention of– Israel without some strongly pro-Israeli Americans seeming immediately to fly off the handle.
    Also, I really didn’t like the slur-by-implication you engaged in when you wrote, it is perfectly legitimate to point out that [Juan], and much of the academy, have strong anti-Israel, and in some cases anti-semitic, biases.
    What is your precise accusation there? that Juan is “anti-Israel” (quite untrue), or “anti-semitic” (quite untrue). Or, that “much of the academy” has one or either of those attributes? (Again, imho, untrue on both counts, though “some” of the academy might have the first attribute.)
    But by elliding that whole mish-mash of accusations into one indeterminate sentence you end up seeming to make two outrageous accusations against Juan; just as, earlier, you’d engaged in distinct rhetorical vehemence against NoPref.
    As for the broader issue of whether the extremist, pro-Israeli speech suppression organizations in the US can harm people’s livelihoods I can certainly tell you, from years of personal experience, that the answer is Yes.
    We should probably leave this discussion for another place. (After, perhaps, some expression of contrition on your behalf for distinct lack of courtesy to another commenter, and to Juan?) But I do just note that for someone to make the claim that extremist pro-Israel/pro-Likud organizations work at, and sometimes succeed in, suppressing the free exchange of information and ideas in the US is absolutely not in itself an anti-israeli or “anti-semitic” action– since the claim does, indeed have a strong basis in fact.

  22. the Muslim community can, and did, express their view that Pipes was not fit for government service
    Joshua, that is a gross, unfair and very dishonest characterization of the position the Muslim community took on Bush’s outrageous decision to appoint Pipes to a very sensitive position – one he is eminently unsuited for. Nothing in the position of the Muslim community can reasonably be interpreted as a view that Pipes is not fit for government service.

  23. The United States has a strong relationship with Israeli policy, which is good. In this country, people can agree or disagree with that, which is good. The people who disagree with it generally have not suceeded in reaching higher political office. And they may be criticized publicly for their positions, just as pro-Israel speakers may be criticized for their positions.
    If such people are held in lower esteem because people find their anti-Israel rhetoric objectionable, that is the result of public debate and discussion, not repression.
    There has been plenty of “suppression” of pro-Israeli speech too. Daniel Pipes, whom I have little admiration for, has been shouted down when he comes to speak at college campuses. For that matter, the government refused to renominate him to the Institute for Peace as a result of pressure from groups such as the ADC and CAIR. Personally, I didn’t really think that was such a bad thing because that’s precisely what the political process was about. Under the logic of others here, ADC and CAIR are engaged in heavy-handed suppression tactics. I disagree.
    Just north of the U.S., Bibi Netanyahu was prevented from speaking by a violent mob at Concordia University, and Ehud Barak’s invitation to speak was rescinded because Concordia could not guarantee a secure forum. That is suppression of speech.
    Juan Cole is a tenured professor who has more job security than most people could dream of. Good for him. I actually thought that his assessment of the situation, while not in complete congruence with mine, was significantly more accurate than yours.
    It was the laughably named “No Preference” who twice snidely commented, with no factual basis, that Juan Cole was oh so courageous in criticizing Israel (but he’s not anti-Isreal, really!) because those nasty Zionists are out to “suppress” him.
    As for “slurring” Cole, perhaps if he, like “No Preference,” could go a week without complaining about the “neocon Likudnik controlled White House,” then there wouldn’t be a basis for considering him anti-Israel and possibly anti-Semitic.
    You don’t have to worry about the direction of this discussion, Helena. I have seen on this board that vitriolic attacks on Israel, or those who express support for it, can go by and be considered legitimate discussion but responses to them are rhetorical escalation. I don’t have an interest in participating in that, and I will make this my last post. I don’t consider myself being suppressed or censored. Your blog, your rules, and that’s fine. Unlike other people, I’m not going to try to tie myself up on the cross like Neil from “The Young Ones” and pretend I’m a martyr by crying censorship.

  24. After calling me an antisemite (on what evidence?) and putting Juan Cole in the same class as David Duke, you leave because you feel unfairly accused of “escalation”.
    If such people are held in lower esteem because people find their anti-Israel rhetoric objectionable
    Right. Our country is held in lower esteem around the world because of its pro-Israeli policies. But that’s not something that can be discussed much in public thanks to the kind of tactics you have used here.

  25. Getting back to the important topic of US withdrawl and the coming elections in Iraq, I’d like to mention a December report on the Reuters news service which received little attention. It contained the following statement which took me aback: “A U.S. official [in Baghdad], who declined to be named, said he did not know of a deal to bring Allawi back, but said it was clear any Iraqi prime minister would have to be palatable to Washington.”
    It’s remarkable, but the Americans evidently believe they hold veto power over who will govern Iraq after the vote. (Some exercise in democracy!)
    What would make for an unpalatable leader is one who demands a timetable for a US exit. In my estimation, the Americans still have no intention of leaving Iraq, not this year or this decade. Their strategy, and the think tanks in Washington like CSIS talk about it all the time, is Iraqisation – getting Iraqis to fight other Iraqis while staying in the background as advisors.
    It appears that Bush administration has yet to abandon its main strategic goal, which is a friendly client running Iraq and large permanent military presence in the country for the long term. While it seems probable that this will fail, I’m not convinced they have given up or have developed a fall back plan. The likely result: an interminable conflict.

  26. if I may reroute the discussion from the alleged anti-Semitic tilt in American Academia…almost as hot a topic on campuses these days as the alleged mysogynist views of a certain Ivy League President… back to Professor Cole’s newfound concern over the possibility of a premature withdrawal of Coalition forces…echoed by a statement made this weekend to the Guardian by Abdel Aziz Hakim, the Shiite leader of the favored election list.
    “Insurgent” leader al-Zarqawi The Beheader is telling Iraqis that Democracy is evil, would be voters infidels and Sistani a Satan!…he directs sectarian violence of the vilest sort in the hopes of fomenting civil war…How will his dark message resonate with the Iraqi people…We will soon find out.

  27. Patrick,
    To confirm your statement, the US military has just announced that about 120’000 troops will stay in Iraq for the next two years. Is this supposed to show how much independance the future Iraqi government will have ? The Iraqi elections were already looking like a farce, but they have managed to make them looking even worse.

  28. It doesn’t take much courage to be critical of Israel, in fact it is quite fashionable in many circles. What takes courage is to be critical of Islam, as the Coptic family just murdered and mutilated in New Jersey proves.
    So much for the peace loving religion. I know, it is just a few bad apples, a million or two out a billion people.
    Why is it that Pipes needs a body guard and Cole doesn’t?
    E. Bilpe

  29. come now…It’s not just Pipes that needs a bodyguard…What about Salman Rushdie?…and shouldn’t the slain Dutch filmmaker have taken precautions?

  30. I think Patrick may be right about the aims of this administration.
    Those of us who oppose the course of indefinite occupation should communicate our Senators and Representatives. I think that it’s particularly important for Democrats to stay in touch Democratic Congressmen/women.

  31. I’ve read Juan Cole’s blog frequently since the invasion because I thought he did a generally good job of identifying the many US mistakes in its occupation of Iraq. However, I’m puzzled by his position regarding the timing of the US withdrawal. What his argument seems to lack is an explanation of what steps he thinks need to be taken either by the new Iraqi government or the US forces to prepare for withdrawal if the scenario he’s imagined under immediate withdrawal is to be avoided. If nothing changes but the passage of time, wouldn’t the status remain quo even after one, two, five years or more? His argument needs this detail for it to have even a shred of credibilty. As much as I respect Prof. Cole’s knowledge, I’m not inclined to just take his word on such an important point. Let him lay out what he thinks are the requisite steps and then we debate whether his position has any validity.

  32. Professor Cole, altho viscerally opposed to American policy in Iraq, is a realist…he has intimate knowledge of the socio-political situation in Iraq and its environs…like most here, he would love to see Bush fall on his face…but he loves Iraq more than he hates Bush imo.

  33. Hammurabi, you describe Juan Cole as “viscerally opposed”, a “realist”, and “socio-political”. You damn his politics with faint praise and rightly so.
    Like many US adults, Cole has an extreme distaste for any reference to class politics. He simply won’t abide it.
    Cole is a religious man and an ethnic or geo-political scholar (“Middle East Affairs”) and is relentless in his insistence that the ethnic and confessional dimensions of Iraq are the dominant or even the only relevant dimensions.
    This ethno-confessional view, and its corresponding political blind-spot, are conventional (not oppositional) in the USA. This is the basis of the increasing convergence between Cole’s ideas and those of the US imperialist regime.
    Cole refers today to “post-Baathist” Iraq, an extraordinarily presumptuous turn of phrase. Contrariwise, when it pleases him, he often characterises the armed resistance as Ba’athist (without direct evidence).
    The Ba’athists of course have not evaporated or raptured. More to the point, the class base of Ba’athism and similar class phenomena in Iraq is still there. Even if the organisation (Ba’ath) were expunged, this base would generate new structures to carry its interest forward. Cole does not want to know about all that.
    Likewise, he discounts the Iraqi Communist Party, and more so the working-class interest which underlies the ICP.
    For all his erudition, then, and his liberal sentiments, Cole has fallen into the pit of projection where he lies side-by-side with the whole imperial propaganda machine. Imperial propaganda, now just as much as for centuries past, relies upon the treatment of the natives as backward, and secular politics as being ours, and not theirs.
    As far as I know the political history of Iraq, especially, has been characterised by a confrontation with this imperialist projection. Cole does not want to know about that.
    Our (South AFrican) President, Thabo Mbeki, has written in the past about a “normal” political situation in our country. By this he means the transaction of democratic politics between the competing interests, which in modern society are, mainly, labour and capital.
    Western Europeans usually understand this, but US people, not. In the USA, from Academy to tabloid to shock-jock, there is only what GW Bush calls “FREEMANAMOCRACY”, which in all their minds, you can be sure, excludes any kind of class politics.

  34. Dominic, I find your comments on Juan Cole quite illuminating, and they fit very well with some of my impressions.
    That’s all I have time to say for now.

  35. Well Shirin et al, the doctoral dissertation on Cole still begs a simple question on how come Cole does not need a body guard and any voice critical of Islam does.
    Helena and Edelstein also posted some rather profound pieces (upon her return from Iran) on the endless possibilities of customizing democracy for Islam. Simple minds like mine think that FREEDOM OF SPEECH is incompatible with the word FATWA, and until FATWA is removed from the islamic religion and culture, all talk about Arab democracies is just intellectual onanism.
    E. Bilpe

  36. Dear Bilpe,
    Thank you for your most recent, and also most crystal clear revelation of the breadth and depth of your ignorance of Islam.

  37. Shirin, I’m thinking, in the infantile US political language, that “it’s the economy, stupid”. Professor Cole is preoccupied with whether Sistani is going to force a Lebanese-type confessional arangement on Iraq. Presumably Cole feels that when all the religious players have been squared off, the reconstruction of the country will follow like a lamb’s tail following a lamb. Whereas the national bourgeoisie’s interests and those of the US imperialists will still be opposed, and not ameliorated at all by any confessional dispensation. You know better than me about this. Am I right? If I am, then will the struggle continue?
    This Bilpe person really has bad taste, not so? Why go fishing for details of Cole’s security arrangements?

  38. Bilpe, you really are outdoing yourself. “Any voice critical of Islam” needs a bodyguard? What planet do you live on?
    Dominic, I disagree with yr supposition that Juan ignores the history and legacy of colonialism. You may have a point about him and most other Americans ignoring class politics. On the other hand, class politics in oil-ocracies are very different than those in Europe, say, or the US.
    I can’t speak much about SA. But that’s why I’m really glad to have your voice here!

  39. Religious belief does not preclude acknowledgement of class differences, Dominic. I don’t think that Cole’s viewpoint is as one dimensional as you suggest. Putting the Iraq conflict into a class template may itself be one dimensional. If the Ba’ath resistance represents the bourgeoisie, what does Allawi represent?
    Saying that Cole “does not want to know” that “the political history of Iraq, especially, has been characterised by a confrontation with this imperialist projection” seems to me to be borne out by statements like this, from Cole’s blog on September 17, 2002:
    The U.S. would have to avoid attempting to micro-manage the new government, and would have to acquiesce if a party and prime minister came to power it did not like. A post-Saddam Iraq would have a Shi`ite majority that might favor Iran or Hizbullah. A populist Arab nationalist able to put together a coalition of Sunnis and Shi`ites might be an outspoken critic of U.S. policy on the Palestine issue. Such a voice would have to be allowed, and heard. Covert U.S. manipulation of elections or undue pressure on Iraqi politicians would backfire badly. The U.S. has yet to demonstrate that it can foster democracy in the Muslim world.
    . . .
    The American Right’s romance with small, powerful elites, with dictators or renewed monarchies, and with heavy-handed U.S. influence in the region may lead Washington to repeat the catastrophic mistakes of the age of colonialism.

  40. Oil-ocracies and micro-management?
    I fully agree that the bourgeoisie is complicated, fragmented, lethally faction-ridden, and so forth. That is a large part of the problem. I would guess that most Iraqi “religious” politicians are also a manifestation of bourgeois interests. In other words the secular/religious divide masks a common class base.
    The national bourgeoisie is the leading anti-imperialist force in nearly all liberation struggles. In Iraq, its main vehicle in the past has been the Ba’ath “Socialist” Party, which is in no way a proletarian party.
    I don’t think there can be any peace or development unless and until the national bourgeoisie regains some coherence and direction, with or without the Ba’ath Party.
    Needless to say I am in general a partisan of the working class, but to me it seems obvious that the problem of peace in Iraq and its solution lies within the national bourgeoisie (using bourgeoisie fairly loosely to include local capitalists, petty bourgeoisie, farmers, bureaucrats and professionals: the proverbial “middle strata”).
    Bremer left decrees to smash all the institutions this class had created over the years for its own purposes, so as to open up Iraq to US capital.
    Even if the Ba’ath Party as such had been truly liquidated, this Bremer offensive would have produced an endless struggle. It is the attack on the class, not on the party, which is significant and which is generating the resistance. You can’t just ruin a whole middle class like that! This is the class that makes all the trouble in the world, even when it is not riled up by the destruction of its whole social and economic position in society. This is a class that is used to leadership and organisation. It is an educated and resourceful class.
    US transnational capital is not just after the oil, but also the water, and then the agriculture, and everything else that has any prospect of making substantial profit. On the other hand, common services like electricity are neglected.
    Reading your quote from Juan Cole again after writing this, No Pref, makes me feel even more vindicated. He is talking about pet issues, where I’m talking about bread and butter and property. He takes it for granted that economic life will go on. But that is just what is not happening, and unless the Bremer decrees are reversed or ignored, it cannot happen. And then the middle classes of Iraq will be ruined without any prospect of redress. Then they will fight for ever.

  41. I wouldn’t feel all that vindicated if I were you. Here is what Cole had to say about the Bremer decrees:
    The American infatuation with small government and privatization of everything is not shared by Iraqis (there is good recent opinion polling on this, by the way). They think a government is there to take care of them. So Bremer’s fixation on Polish style shock therapy was a very poor match for the country he ruled, and by May 2004 the favorability rating among Iraqis of his administration was 12%.
    I agree with your basic critique of the US handling of the economy, including our probably illegal attempt to privatize everything. However, I don’t think that the US doesn’t want to provide basic services. I believe that the US relied far too much on US companies, rather than using existing Iraqi assets, to make repairs. Then on top of that the insurgency makes keeping the wheels turning very, very difficult.

  42. No Preference, Pipe says his life has been threatened. Is that surprising to you? Feel free to contact Pipes and convince him otherwise. I am sure he’ll be happy to save the money.
    Shirin, your responses are, as always, empty yet insulting. So tell me about the role of FATWAs in the context of a pluaristic and democratic society, please educate me for once.
    Helena, you are right I might have over generalized in trying to make my point. My point remains on the table for anybody willing to address it. Feel free to opine on the gruesome killing of the Coptic family in New Jersey, which started just like this dialogue, over opinions on internet bulletin boards.
    E. Bilpe

  43. Bilpe, you are way off topic. If you want to hold your own discussion, why don’t you start your own blog?

  44. No Pref, you say: “I believe that the US relied far too much on US companies”.
    The mind boggles.
    Are you joking?
    The US and US companies are one and the same. There is never going to be any restraint. I wish you wouldn’t force me to spell things out like this. You probaly think it’s empty, yet insulting!
    Your new quote from Prof. Cole is another vindication for me, I must also say. He is talking about what a shame it is that Bremer’s approval rating was only 12% at the time.
    No electricity or water, no work, bombs going off all the time, US Rambos bursting into houses in the middle of the night and carting people off for torture, and Cole wants “metrics” of the situation in the form of a popularity rating on Bremer. What can I say?

  45. Cole says a lot more than that in other places, Dominic. That excerpt was to make the point that Cole has said, as you have, that the CPA’s privatization campaign was a failure. If you suppose that he ignores those other problems that you mention, I think you should read him more carefully.
    I agree that the US reconstruction of Iraq was driven by US corporate needs and wants, and this helped create the disaster there.

  46. No Pref, there is no “US reconstruction of Iraq”. You have sucked that tendentious phrase out of your thumb.
    There is US destruction of Iraq.
    I have been reading Cole for two years now. Not for nothing, because the guy knows a lot. You seem to want to claim that he is omniscient. He is not.
    Just because I have been reading him so long, and even exchanging the odd e-mail with him, is the reason why I think I can offer some degree of criticism now. It is not a loose or facile criticism.
    In what sense is the US “privatisation campaign” in Iraq a failure? It has succeeded in dispossessing a whole class of the institutions that class created for its comfort and security.
    Do you and Cole think that was not intentional? Then I am opposing your view. I think that it was the intention of the US to dispossess that Iraqi middle class and the US has succeeded, for the time being.
    It remains to be seen whether the dispossessed can work out some kind of unity-in-action so that they can drive out the invaders and reconstruct their institutions.

  47. “No Preference” is the first interlocutor to invoke Helena’s new regulations to end a conversation. I’ll open my own blog and you change your handle to “No Answers” :).
    E. Bilpe

  48. Bilpe, that was rather witty.
    I’m not at all interested in getting into a general discussion of “how vicious are Muslims?” in a thread about the pros and cons of setting a deadline for US withdrawal from Iraq. In fact, I’m not interested in getting into that discussion, period.

  49. But that is Bilpe’s favourite kind of discussion, and he is great at surfing the anti-Islam websites and copying and partial, out-of-context quotes from ignorant anti-Muslim bigots in order to bolster his points.

  50. No Preference, I was disputing the statement about Cole’s courage, and I was doing so with factual data, but I respect your interest and position.
    Shirin, I don’t surf much, the ugly Islam enters my house through the daily newspaper, that is where I read about the New Jersey murder-mutilation, about Mr. Van Gogh, about Fatwas and cyber-Muftis, about honor killings of daughters and sisters, about the UK muslim community being the only community to boycott the celebration of the 60th year of the liberation of Auschwitz, about the desertion of the Lebanese marine now officially accused of treason (Juan Cole’s muslim american idol), about conspiracy theories attributing the Tsunami to US actions, about Iraqi insurgents blowing to pieces other Iraqis, and about the deafening silence of moslems when unspeakable wrongs are done by other moslems.
    Somehow, Shirin, you may be immunized and this Islam doesn’t enter your house, as you have vented your spleen against the US for every minor nit, like the electoral outcome, but never spoke in criticism of your own. In your heart of hearts, do you never ever introspect?
    E. Bilpe

  51. Bilpe,
    Helena has quite rightly asked us to try to stick to the topic of the post the comment thread is associated with – something you have never respected, preferring to post your random anti-Islam bigotry wherever and whenever you please – so I am not going to engage you in a lengthy discussion. In fact, I should not have responded to you at all. I will simply point out that your claim that you don’t surf much is belied by your own well documented habit of copying and pasting material from anti-Islam articles posted on the web by totally unqualified fellow anti-Islam bigots.

  52. It seems to me that the essential aim and the material result of the US aggression on Iraq has been no more or less than a “Structural Adjustment Programme” (SAP) imposed by force of arms.
    For a large view of the world shaped by SAPs see Mike Davis, “Planet of Slums”, at http://www.newleftreview.com/NLR26001.shtml

  53. This may all be a bit too far down the line now, but just to respond to (I think) Dominic… I don’t really give a toss what the US government’s plans in Iraq are. I’m sure they are essentially selfish but I think the real issue is what the Iraqis’ attitudes are, in particular Iraqi workers, and how their aspirations can best be realised. And further to that, what line we (the “peace” movement) should take.
    Sistani obviously calculated that the best way of getting rid of the Americans while also putting Shi’ite’s in power instead of a Sunni elite was the recent election. The results so far emerging indicate that he was correct. What I suspect we will now see is a more or less civilised power struggle between the new government and the US.
    I am sure we all want self-determination for Iraq and the US out as soon as possible. However, supporting the insurgency (Sunni) and not the elections (most everyone else) does not seem the best way to do that.
    You can’t compare an insurgency based on a minority of a minority to Ho Chi Minh’s movement which had overwhelming popular support, or Sistani’s crowd to the US sponsored South Vietnamese regime. The situations are not even similar.
    If you want a historical comparison try South Africa where the British left the Black majority at the mercy of powerful white settler-descendants. The correct anti-imperialist line would surely have been to insist that the black majority was enfranchised before independence.
    I am entirely in favour of seeing class politics develop in Iraq, however the indications are that both the CP and the WCP are very weak at present. The insurgents have already brutally murdered one CP leader and there seems little doubt that they are not well-disposed towards workers power. None of the workers parties in Iraq are calling for an immediate withdrawal, and all are strongly against the insurgency.

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