A gift to JWN readers from Professor Sachedina

    Abdulaziz Sachedina is a very experienced scholar of and in the tradition of (Shii) Muslim thought who’s the Francis Ball Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia. He’s the chair of the Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy, which co-sponsored the conference I went to in Iran three weeks ago, and the author of The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2001.)
    Professor Sachedina has visited Iraq a number of times since the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein. For an account of a conversation I had with him about Iraq last January, go here.
    … So imagine my delight this morning when I saw he had sent the following, very important contribution to JWN, which I am of course honored to post here in full. It is worth a careful, close reading.

SHIITE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE IRAQI ELECTIONS
by Abdulaziz Sachedina
In the midst of today’s political turmoil in Iraq there is a ray of hope for the future. There is nothing more exciting for any nation than to be able to democratically elect a government to represent and protect its people’s rights. Yet as the people of Iraq prepare to choose a legitimate government in the elections scheduled for January 30, 2005, the 60 % Shiite majority bears a heavy moral burden. It has to reassure the 20% Sunni Arab minority that it will not be punished for its repression of the Shiites.
It was Imam Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and the inspiration of Shiite Islam, who emphasized the importance of forgiveness and compassion to those in positions of power. It is true that throughout their history in Iraq the Shiites have suffered when the minority Sunnis controlled absolute power. And under Saddam Hussein, powerful Sunni officials committed terrible atrocities against the Shiites. Not long ago, after the war began in earnest in March, 2003, in a meeting with Iraqi religious leaders in Amman, I heard a prominent Iraqi Sunni leader, Professor-Shaykh Qubaisi, urge Prince Hassan of Jordan to take over Iraq, so that the Sunni influence would continue in this “Arab” nation. The call appeared to suggest that if the Shiite majority were to come to power the “Arab” character of Iraq would be lost…


It is not far-fetched to suggest that the Arab world dominated by a Sunni majority has not remained neutral toward the Sunni insurrection in Iraq to destabilize the interim government and sabotage the elections. There is an unarticulated but widespread fear among Sunni Arabs that genuine democracy in Iraq will take away the power from the Sunni minority that enjoyed state protection under Saddam. More importantly, and against the liking of the Sunni-Arab world, real democracy would transform Iraq into a majority ruled “Arab” Shiite nation. The fiction entertained by many Arab scholars is that Shiism is a Persian phenomenon, and, hence, non-Arab. To see Iraq become a Shii-dominated democracy is anathema to many Arab nationalists. This is also the source of unsubstantiated accusation against Iraqi Shiites that they are in alliance with Iran and its traditional animosity towards Arab nationalism. It is important to recall that under Saddam the Shiite Arabs of Iraq adopted a most radical form of secular Arab nationalism against the liking of Iran under the Shah, and later on under the Ayatollahs.
As for the Iraqi Sunnis, it is important to emphasize that not all Sunnis in Iraq share the nightmare of Shaykh Qubaisi. In fact, a large majority of Sunni clerics want to work towards the preservation of Iraqi sovereignty under a democratic system, whoever the people decide to vote for. But given the Sunni conduct in the recent past of Iraq, their fear that the Shiite majority will disregard the rights and interests of the Sunnis is understandable. It is this fear that needs to be eased by the Shiite leadership at this time so that the elections in January could take place with the full participation of the Sunnis. The grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and other Shiite leaders, in the spirit of the ethics of responsibility as taught by Imam Ali, need to explicitly assure the Sunni minority that not only will their rights be protected through legitimate democratic governance but also that through constitutionally guaranteed political power-sharing, they, along with the Kurdish minority, will have the ability to participate meaningfully in determining the future of the nation.
At this critical time in the history of Iraq the perpetuation of the historical divide between the Shiites and Sunnis would be detrimental to the essential need of creating a national culture of citizenship built on equality and justice. The senior Shiite leadership thus far has emerged as a voice of fairness and sound political judgment. It should now assume the lead in providing the national voice of reconciliation between the two Muslim communities in sharing power for the betterment of all the citizens of Iraq. Such a message of reconciliation and forgiveness towards fellow Muslims coming from Ayatollah Sistani and other leading ayatollahs in Najaf will restore the confidence of the once powerful–and abusive–Sunni minority that they will not face reprisals from an elected Shiite majority. No community, however numerous and powerful, has a right to be indifferent to the ethics of responsibility in a democracy. The ball is in the court of the Shiite leaders. If they play it right then they will gain the gratitude of millions of people around the world who wish for peace and justice in Iraq for all.
~ A.S.

5 thoughts on “A gift to JWN readers from Professor Sachedina”

  1. Another facet to the democracy discussion that is worth paying atttention to. As noted in the article, Iran has been a hotbed of constitutionalism since the early twentieth century. Even “westernized” Iranians that I know speak of Mossadegh with respect. Khomeini himself was heavily influenced by this movement, as when he finally wrested power from the Shah, he actually brought the languishing parliamentary structure back to life. It seems that “persian” Iran has a lot to offer the “arab” sunni world, when it comes to this issue.

  2. With all respect to Professor Sachedina, the first paragraph of this piece contains one misstatement of fact after another. In fact, there is not one single factual statement in the first paragraph. This does not encourage me to continue reading the article, but I will try to do so in the hope that it gets better.
    There is nothing more exciting for any nation than to be able to democratically elect a government to represent and protect its people’s rights.
    The January election, even in the highly unlikely event it is “free and fair”, and does not exclude a significant percentage of eligible voters, will not elect a government. It will elect some sort of “assembly” which will ostensibly draft a constitution (which activity will no doubt be closely controlled by American “advisors”), and will choose from among its membership yet another “temporary” prime minister, president, etc. No doubt the Americans will do everything within their ability to ensure that the assembly selects people who are amenable to the Bush administration’s agenda.
    Yet as the people of Iraq prepare to choose a legitimate government in the elections scheduled for January 30, 2005…
    1. As noted above, it is not a government the Iraqi people are preparing to choose.
    2. No election can be considered legitimate when it is conducted under and controlled by a politically motivated foreign occupation that has resulted from military aggression.
    the 60 % Shiite majority…has to reassure the 20% Sunni Arab minority that it will not be punished for its repression of the Shiites.
    The Sunni Arab minority did not repress the Shi’is. The regime of Saddam Hussein repressed the Shi’is. The regime of Saddam Hussein also repressed the great majority of the members of the Sunni Arab minority.

  3. You make some very good points, Shirin. I have been agonizing about my own “position” on these elections for some months now. (Not that my “position” is really important since I’m not Iraqi… I truly believe it is up to primarily Iraq’s citizens to make all these important decisions, and I am horrified when I hear US officials saying in very dictatorial fashion “these elections MUST go ahead according to the schedule.”)
    Back in, I guess, the summer I was writing here that the plan for the elections represented the best way that I could see for a transition from occupation to independence since it seemed to offer a path that was nonviolent and would allow the US a way to exit without total humiliation. The Bushies did not quite “get” the nonviolent aspect of it, as we know; and through their massive, escalatory use of violence in the past six months have done a lot to sully the whole idea of “elections” and “democratization” in Iraq and many other parts of the Middle East…
    I think that on balance I would still like the elections to go ahead as successfuly as possible. If the Sistanist list wins, as seems most likely in any fairly conducted poll, it is committed to speedy negotiations with the US over a timetable for US troop withdrawal. We may at some atavistic level want to see the Bushies “punished” or “humiliated” instead of being able to negotiate an exit; but honestly, for many many reaons I think a negotiated (but very speedy!) exit is the best path, for Iraqis.
    Also, an exit on the terms that, I believe, the Sistanists are aiming for would not at all be a “victory” for the Bushies and their militaristic agenda. It would be a considerable setback for the agenda… Which is exactly what I want to see, in the context of the US finding a much better (i.e. less arrogant, more proportionate) balance in its relationship with the rest of the world.
    But I truly deplore and am disgusted by the amount of violence the Bushies have resorted to in Iraq in pursuit of their desire to control the environment of the election. And of course I fear deeply that they might still try to “steal” it.
    Regarding Prof. Sachedina’s points, you’re right of course that not all the Sunnis repressed the Shi-ites. Still, many Sunnis (and members of other minorities, like the Christians) did gain relative benefits from the “Takriti” domination of the political system under Saddam, so they could perhaps as a group be seen as “beneficiaries” of the system like the Whites in apartheid S. Africa? (Not all the Whites supported apartheid there, either.) I think the bigger point Aziz was making, though, was to point out precisely that group-wide “blaming” and attempts to punish should be resisted, which is a great point to make.
    He argues too that the Shiites should be generous in their treatment of the Sunnis, despite the existence of a broad and continuing (though mainly non-Iraqi) attempt by many Sunni figures to delegitimize the position of the Iraqi Shiites by claiming they are not “really” Iraqis, or not really Arabs. Again, this call for generosity is an excellent point to make…

  4. Christmas greetings from South Africa.
    Concerning the election in Iraq.
    An election would be a demand of any liberation movement. So would the end of occupation. Whether the election should be held up until the end of occupation, or not, is a tactical and not a dogmatic question.
    In this de facto election, there are more than 7,000 names on the single national ballot paper, representing many parties. It is possible that Iraqis will try very hard to vote, meaning that perhaps millions will show their preference.
    In these circumstances it will not help if supporters of the freedom of the Iraqi people start to brand participants in the election as “sellouts”, on the grounds that it should not have been held under occupation.
    Shirin’s warning about the inevitable interference by the US is true, but ignores the problems the imperialists have. It could be said that the US is forced to allow elections (remember that Bremer kept putting them off, and we objected?). Elections are by nature not easy to manage. Quite a lot of truth can come out, in any election.
    Sachedina’s article is welcome because it holds out a picture of negotiation between parties about the future of Iraq. The weak part about it is the suggestion of Sunni guilt and Shia victimhood. Helena wants to pray the South African case in aid of Sachedina.
    The South African liberation movement achieved explicit unity, and subsequent victory, on the basis of the slogan “one-person-one-vote in a unitary state”. There was nothing of guilt and victimhood in that formula. Sachedina may be making a similar point when he advises the Shia to be magnanimous. He may be saying, let’s leave guilt out of it for now. I hope so.
    I think what is needed here is personalities on the democratic rostrum (and less of the priests), and the election can help that. Then the beginnings of a programme must be drafted, and the beginings of a popular front built around parties. There must be no ostracism of people who have taken part in processes, nor of those who have stayed out. When there is a programme it will be seen whether the resistance is with it or against it. All means must be attempted to bring the resistance into a relationship with open political structures, but in the end, the military cannot rule the political.
    Armed struggle is not the highest form of struggle.

  5. Helena,
    Thanks for your comments. I have continued to read the Professor’s piece, though it is very annoying, particularly as he seems in the first part to repeat verbatim some of the Bush administration’s very divisive falshoods about Iraqi Sunnis, and about supposed conflicts between Sunnis and Shi`is in a country where most tribes and many families are not one or the other but mixed, and where sectarianism is not an issue in most areas of life. But I should hold my comments, and my opinion, until I have read the whole article.
    I can appreciate your agonizing over the election issue, and many of your points are well taken. My position remains unequivocal. There can be no legitimacy to an election under a purely politically motivated foreign occupation that resulted from a war of aggression. There is even less legitimacy when that election has been designed and is being manipulated and controlled by the occupying power and its agents, and where there will be effectively no international monitoring. (In my opinion “monitoring” from a distance is worse than no monitoring at all, and UN monitors should refuse to participate in such a charade.)
    Add to all this the fact that, if the elections are even held, it is likely an entire segment of the population – i.e. the majority of Sunni Arabs – will be excluded from voting, and you have an election the results of which no one in their right mind would consider legitimate no matter what the result.
    Unlike some analysts and commentators, I do not for one moment believe that the election scheme was intended as part of an exit strategy – I think that is wishful thinking. I think that on the contrary it is only the latest attempt by the Bush administration to fulfill its agenda of a permanent controlling presence in Iraq while trying to make it appear the legitimate will of an Iraqi government chosen democratically by the Iraqi people (democratically being their characterization of the system they have set up, not mine).
    I agree with you that a negotiated, and VERY speedy departure of the U.S. is in the best interest of Iraq and Iraqis (and, of course, the American people, too). However, I think you are being too optimistic if you believe a Sistani list-dominated election result would bring this about. I anticipate that if the assembly that is elected insists that the U.S. leaves, the Bush administration will find a way to remain, no matter what it takes. They have proven very well their ability to manufacture reasons to do whatever they want to do. If that involves provoking a series of incidents with “insurgents” (sic), they will not hesitate to do so.
    I have a good deal more to say on this subject, but it is late and I am tired, so I will defer it for now.

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