Some thoughts on Megrahi and Lockerbie

There is currently a huge amount of over-heated rhetoric on the airwaves and in the blogosphere, in reaction to the Scottish court’s decision to release convicted Libyan mass-bomber Abdel-Basset al-Megrahi before the end of his sentence, on compassionate/health grounds.
I think the court has done the right thing. This very sober analysis from the BBC makes quite clear that huge question-marks still hang over the issue of Megrahi’s actual criminal responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. It concludes thus:

    Megrahi was charged as a member of the Libyan Intelligence Services – acting with others.
    If he was involved, the Libyan government, once a sponsor of worldwide terrorism, including support for the IRA, must have been involved too.
    But with Britain and America doing big business with Libya now, perhaps it is in no-one’s political interests to have the truth emerge.
    Megrahi is now dying, but he may have been a convenient scapegoat for a much bigger conspiracy.

The warm welcome he got on his return to Tripoli indicates the high probability that he was indeed a Qadhafi-provided scapegoat.
In which case, all the angst and venom that has been directed against him personally, including by some but not all of those bereaved by the bombing, has been largely misplaced.
Of course, as always, it would be excellent to see even one-tenth as much US media attention paid to the sadness of such people as those Americans bereaved by the 1967 Liberty incident, or those Palestinians, Lebanese, and others bereaved by US-supplied Israeli weapons in more recent years.
Or even more so, the families of those scores of thousands of Iraqis killed by the US and as a result of the US outrageous and illegal invasion of their country in 2003.
The WaPo had a fascinating article Friday that described two Washington-area residents, both bereaved by the Lockerbie bombing, who had come to very different conclusions.
One was Anastasios Vrenios, 68, a singing teacher in Northwest Washington:

    Vrenios, whose son Nicholas was a passenger on Flight 103, is unbothered by the release of Megrahi, who was convicted in 2001. Vrenios said the terrorist merits a special mercy because of his grave prognosis. And continued imprisonment does nothing to eradicate terrorism, he argues.
    “I am thinking as a decent human being,” Vrenios said. “Let the man go and die in his own country — he’s dying anyhow. I am not going to say: ‘How dare you? Let’s go blow his head off.’ It’s the ill that has to be cured, and that’s a far more serious matter. I am just so disillusioned by man and the kind of thing he can resort to in this world.”

The other was Stephanie Bernstein, 58, a Bethesda rabbi, whose husband, Michael, a lawyer with the Justice Department’s Office of Special Investigations, was killed in the attack. (The OSI is a special unit of the Justice Department that for 30 years or so has been dedicated to hunting down Nazis around the world and bringing them before the courts.)
According to the WaPo reporter, Rabbi Bernstein

    worries that flying Megrahi home to Libya so he can live out his final days with family violates both a biblical sense of justice and a promise made by the court system that convicted him.
    Bernstein has been tracking Megrahi’s case for weeks, trying to persuade the Obama administration to strong-arm the Scottish government to keep Megrahi imprisoned.
    “Releasing him sends the wrong message,” she said. “It will be seen by [Libyan president] Col. Moammar Gaddafi as a sign of weakness. If we don’t try to work towards a just world, what good is this release?”

The very different reactions of these two people indicates very vividly that not “all” Americans– and not even “all” the families of those bereaved– are “incensed” by Megrahi’s release.
Indeed, families who are bereaved through acts of terrorism go through very different processes as they struggle with finding the best way to think about their bereavement. One of the best books on this subject is this one by Susan Kerr Van De Ven, daughter of Malcolm Kerr, the president of AUB who was killed by a terrorist, suspected to be a Shiite– on his campus, in 1983.
Van De Ven’s mother, Ann Kerr, is a dear friend of mine. The family has wrestled hard, for many years, with how to respond to Malcolm’s killing, and her daughter’s book is an excellent, intimate record of that.
In the work I’ve done on (anti-)death penalty issues here in Virginia, one thing that has surfaced again and again has been a feeling by some of those who have been bereaved through acts of violence that in order to honor the memory of their departed loved one it is somehow “necessary” to seek the harshest possible vengeance against the killer– and that if you don’t do that, then somehow that dishonors the lost loved one or diminishes his/her memory.
Of course, plenty of people in the legal system, the media– and even among pastors, rabbis, and other religious leaders– are eager to validate and amplify those kinds of arguments.
Such arguments do, however, depart very radically from traditional Christian (and Buddhist) ideas of forgiveness. Also, how about the Old testament’s strong witness regarding “Vengeance is mine, said the Lord”–meaning, presumably, that vengeance should not be for mere mortals to dole out but should be left to the hereafter… And there are plenty of social activists and community leaders here in the US who urge a much less vengeful, calmer, and more constructive response to violently induced bereavement. Including, the people who work with the fine organization Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation.
In sum: No, it doesn’t diminish the memory of someone killed in violence by one iota if their surviving family members deal with the tasks of grieving in a non-vengeful manner.
Indeed, quite frequently, just the opposite.

Reading Sari Hanafi on refugees, spatiocide, Jerusalem, etc.

I had a few good research experiences this morning. The first was that I was looking for something else online but ended up reading this chunk out of a chapter the brilliant Palestinian researcher Sari Hanafi wrote on the sociology of a Palestinian return, in Rex Brynen and Roula Rifai’s 2007 book Palestinian Refugees: Challenges of Repatriation and Development.
The 25-page chunk that Google Books gave me there had a lot of really interesting, thoughtful material in it. Hanafi talked about the advantages of using the term “return migration” rather than repatriation, given that repatriation (which is the technical term used in most refugee studies) is really an entire “migration” of its own… He talked about the important concept of “enduring transnationality” for many Palestinian refugees, whether they return or not… He drew on huge amounts of both sociological and economic data, gathered both by the Shaml institute that he headed in Ramallah for several years and by other organizations.
Wow.
So anyway, the chunk that Google Books gave me ended before the end of the chapter and without giving me any of Sari’s footnotes. But I clicked on “Find it in a Library” and yes, indeed, the whole– very expensive!– book is available in the U.Va. library, which is around 2/3 mile from where I am now sitting.
Okay, so finding that chunk of text, and finding that the whole book can– I hope!– be in my hands before nightfall were two good experiences…
I had originally been doing a Google search on Sari because I know he was the originator of the important concept of spatiocide (aka spaciocide) and also, I think, of the important term biopolitics…
Googling for “spatiocide” I then found these two pages (1 and 2), which are both about a 2006 book titled City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism.
Since I am very interested in both Jerusalem and urban planning issues, this books looks fascinating! Sadly, however, the nearest library that it’s in is 4100 miles away, in Frankfurt. I think I’ll have to buy it and then maybe donate it to U.Va., which has a huge architecture school…
Okay, I’ve just made that purchase. (Stop me before I buy more books!)
Now I need to go back and read the review essay by Oren Yiftachel that I was reading before I got distracted by the whole Sari Hanafi thing.

IPS piece: ‘Republicans Attack Obama on Palestine Policy’

… is here, and also archived here.
It deals primarily with Huckabee but also with other important US pols who went on partisanly sponsored junkets to Israel and the OPTs in recent weeks (Cantor, Hoyer, etc.)
I had some quotes in the piece from the J. Post’s Herb Keinon. He had an excellent piece of reporting in Thursday’s paper. It seems like he had accompanied Huckabee on some of his trips around various (completely illegal) Jewish settlements– including ones in occupied E. Jerusalem and one “unauthorized” settlement outpost.
He’s clearly making a bid for Evangelical grassroots support in the US and assuming that evangelicals are overwhelmingly pro-settler.
Herb Keinon is worth reading. It seems that he (in the form of the un-named “Israeli journalist” he refers to) couldn’t believe that an ultra-rightist like Huckabee might actually be someone with some influence/following in US politics…
Also definitely worth reading on Huckabee are Spencer Ackerman and Matt Duss (1 and 2.)

Does Afghanistan’s election matter? How, exactly?

The only thing that really matters about the presidential election held in Afghanistan yesterday was whether it will generate a nationwide government that has enough political credibility with the country’s 33 million people that it is able to govern.
This seems to be in severe question. And the question may not be answered for many weeks, or even months, yet.
From this point of view, the statement Obama made yesterday lauding the election as a success was both (a) beside the point and (b) inappropriate. Oh, and also distinctly (c) premature.
It is not for him, the president of the foreign country occupying Afghanistan, to declare the election a success. It is for the Afghans. That is, if we are all to believe the official US narrative about Afghanistan now being a “sovereign nation” in which the US and other NATO forces are deployed just to help the Afghan government…
There are two major ways (and a host of lesser ways) in which the election could fail to generate a “credible enough” government.
Firstly, the whole process of voting may be judged by Afghans to be non-credible, as evidenced either by very low turnout or by widesread and credible reports of voter fraud.
It may well be possible that the recorded turnout among the 15-16 million registered voters was so low– due to the intimidation of the anti-government insurgents, disillusion with the governing system, or other factors– that the whole voting exercise is inherently non-credible.
We should know that when we gain an idea of raw turnout numbers, apparently tomorrow.
Or, the turnout figures may be sufficiently high to allow for credibility– but the reports of fraud could be so widespread and credible that even (or perhaps especially) those high raw turnout numbers don’t look credible.
Secondly, even if the voting process has some initial credibility, the reported results of either yesterday’s first round or the runoff that mandated in the event of no clear winner could come under serious contest from one or more of the losers…
We are seeing before our very eyes, in Iran, the debilitating effect that such a contest to electoral legitimacy can have on a governance system.
I imagine, though, that the US military will not allow a prolonged-deadlock situation to go on very long in the event of a contest arising in Afghanistan… And they will intervene in some way… But of course, that would only undermine the legitimacy of the resulting president even more!
But anyway, let’s say that Hamid Karzai or Abdullah Abdullah manages to emerge as the winner after a first or second round, and this victory meets with no immediate serious contestation from other candidates. Then, the lucky winner goes and forms a government…. that does what?
Well, one thing I’m assuming it can almost immediately do is sit astride a rather bloated stream of foreign (US-mobilized) funding. Which it then gets to deploy. Yoohoo! (Why do you think most of these guys are runnng in these elections, anyway?)
But will it be able to provide enough basic services– including that most vital government service of all, pubic security– to enough Afghans to be able to keep and expand its legitimacy?
Who know? The odds look rather grim..
Bottom line, though: It is far too early to call yesterday’s election a “success”– for any of the candidates, or for the process itself.
… By the way, I’ve been pretty disappointed so far in the AfPak Channel of news and commentary that Foreign Policy mag and the New America Foundation got up and running a couple of weeks ago.
Maybe it’s still early days for the people there. But if you want a good, up-to-date source on the election that aggregates news and reports from a wide range of sources, then Wikipedia’s page “Afghan presidential election, 2009” looks far, far better to me.
It provides an amazing range of excellent links. Including one to this great August 19 piece by my fellow IPS contributor Gareth Porter.
Gareth quoted former US ambassador to Afghanistan Ron Neumann as saying that the odds of the election tending up as “good enough” in the eyes of the Afghans was “50-50”.
He also quoted Australian COIN specialist David Kilcullen as saying, “The biggest fear is Karzai ends up as an incredibly illegitimate figure, and we end up owning Afghanistan and propping up an illegitimate government.”
Chapeau, Gareth!

Sam Bahour on economic realities of occupation

The prominent Palestinian-American business executive Sam Bahour has an op-ed in today’s WSJ that gives the lie to all the hasbara that Netanyahu, Oren, Friedman, etc have been putting out regarding the alleged “amazing green shoots” of the West bank’s economy.
Bahour knows whereof he writes:

    I was the manager who oversaw the establishment of the first modern mall in the West Bank—the Plaza Shopping Center in El Bireh. I can attest that the success of a West Bank mall rests on a thin layer of elite consumer privilege poised precariously over a chasm of widespread disempowerment. Until West Bank Palestinians gain free and open access to the world economy, beyond the markets of the occupying power, major enterprises in Palestinian towns will suffer.
    Objective analyses by the World Bank suggest that Israel’s repressive practices will not permit the Palestinian economy to develop meaningfully…

He has more data and examples there.
His conclusion is particularly sobering if you keep in mind that he is someone who has worked hard for 15 years to try to make the “economic peace” approach work:

    Peace talk is cheap; actions by Israel that would make real peace—even economic peace—a reality are still the exception rather than the rule. I do not disparage any progress that has been made but, viewed in context, it is no more than window dressing.
    Meanwhile, the continued brutal subjugation of Gaza and coerced Judaization of Arab East Jerusalem call into serious question Israel’s true intentions. Absent a political framework to secure Palestinian freedom and independence, “economic peace” initiatives only facilitate the crime of occupation.

Btw, it looks as though there’s a concerted campaign by the hasbaristas to stack the comments board linked to Bahour’s piece. (At one point, one of them even writes: “this apologist has gotten short shrift here. nicely done folks.”)
So maybe instead of, or in addition to, posting comments here, JWN readers should go over and post some comments there.

‘Afghanistan worse than Vietnam’

Fascinating post at FP’s AfPak channel today, comparing Afghanistan with Vietnam, elections and all.
Not favorably for Obama’s policy in Afghanistan, it has to be said. The headline said it all: “Saigon 2009.”
The authors are:

    Thomas H. Johnson [who] is a research professor of the Department of National Security Affairs and director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, [and] M. Chris Mason [who] is a retired Foreign Service officer who served in 2005 as political officer for the PRT in Paktika and presently is a senior fellow at the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies and at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, D.C.

So they appear to know what they’re talking about.
Here’s their bottom line:

    For those who say that comparing the current war in Afghanistan to the Vietnam War is taking things too far, here’s a reality check: It’s not taking things far enough. From the origins of these North-South conflicts to the role of insurgents and the pointlessness of this week’s Afghan presidential elections, it’s impossible to ignore the similarities between these wars. The places and faces may have changed but the enemy is old and familiar. The sooner the United States recognizes this, the sooner it can stop making the same mistakes in Afghanistan.
    … It doesn’t matter who wins the August elections for president in Afghanistan: he will be illegitimate because he is elected. We have apparently learned nothing from Vietnam.

Salafist extremists lash out at Hamas

Scott Sanford of Jihadica has helpfully collected and summarized some of the early reactions from salafi extremists to last Friday’s confrontation between Hamas and the salafist Jund Ansar Allah group in southern Gaza.
By the application of vastly superior force, Hamas won that battle, though at some cost. The JAA’s leader and several of its fighters were killed and the movement has now, presumably been effectively suppressed.
One of the salafist strategists Sanford cites is Akram al-Hijazi, a Palestinian who yesterday launched this tirade against the Hamas leadership on Al-Fallujah Islamic Forums yesterday.
Three days ago, Hijazi posted this tirade against Hamas on the forum.
I haven’t had time to read these texts in detail. But Sanford tells us that Hijazi argues that the present Hamas leadership has abandoned the “true path” that was established by Hamas founder Skeikh Ahmed Yassin and the movement’s second leader in Gaza, Abdel-Aziz Rantisi.
In this way, Hijazi is making a play for the sympathies of Hamas rank-and-filers who may be disgruntled with the diplomatic-political tack taken by the current leadership.
Of course, Yassin was the originator of the idea that it would be a good idea to have a “hudna” (truce) of some possibly lengthy period with Israel, during which the Palestinians could run their own government in the post-liberation territories of the West Bank (including E. Jerusalem) and Gaza. That is still the version of the “two-state solution” advocated by the Hamas leadership.
Yassin also cooperated with Israel in several ways during his life. Much more than Meshaal and the rest of the current leadership ever have! So the idea that salafists somehow represent the “true path” of Yassin does not have a lot of prima facie credibility…
However, the potential attractiveness of the salafists to Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere– who see themselves confined by Israel in the open-air prisons that are what Gaza and the West Bank have become, and who see their just claims for liberation, national independence, and the settlement of decades-old refugee claims all just endlessly denied, derided, and shunted aside as Israel’s colonization of the West Bank continues apace– cannot for a moment be denied.
Nehemiah Strasler had a good piece in Haaretz on this topic on Tuesday.
He wrote,

    During the entire period of our rule in the territories, we have destroyed the existing leadership, which led to the rise of more extreme leaders. We destroyed the Palestinian Authority and Yasser Arafat, who had agreed to a two-state solution and was capable of “delivering the goods.” And we brought about Hamas’ seizure of the Gaza Strip. Now we are cultivating the third stage: Al-Qaida.
    That’s because on our side people don’t want to understand that when the oppression increases and there is nothing to lose, the adversary doesn’t surrender and grovel. Just the opposite. He becomes more radical. Hate wins out and the desire for revenge becomes the only hope. So when poverty in Gaza increases and unemployment is on the rise, Al-Qaida will take control. It will happen either in a coup or through elections, and we will long for that terrible Hamas.


By the way, just a small geographic note. I know there’s a Fallujah in Iraq, and there’s also a Fallujah in southern Palestine (maybe now in Israel?), which was one of the limits that the Egyptian army reached in 1948. Was one of them named after the other? Does anyone know?

‘Rumors’ of settlement freeze just that

Steve Clemons blogged this morning that,

    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be using his skills as a crafty political executive to sidestep some of his more bureaucratic and recalcitrant allies in cooking up a deal with George Mitchell and Barack Obama on settlements.

Not so fast, Steve.
Richard Silverstein has an excellent commentary on the latest spate of rumors about some kind of a Mitchell-Netanyahu deal on settlements.
He quotes an Israeli friend as noting that the word used in Hebrew to describe what the Israeli government is contemplating is hamtana, meaning “waiting”– or, as Richard comments, maybe more like “the pause that refreshes.”
Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Attias (Shas) is reported as saying “There is no freeze”– but there is some hamtana.
For its part, the PLO’s Negotiations Affairs Department has said that,

    the terms so far made public fail to comply with Israel’s obligation to implement a comprehensive and immediate freeze on all settlement activities as stipulated in the 2001 Mitchell Report and the 2003 Road Map.

The PLO-NAD also points to a report in the Israeli business press as saying that,

    the Israeli department of government properties is expected to invite tenders for a bid to build 450 residential units in Pisgat Ze’ev, a neighborhood on the Palestinian side of the 1967 borders in internationally recognized East Jerusalem.
    The magazine’s Wednesday edition said the department was relaxing some of its earlier requirements for bid so the project can get going in the next six months.

So altogether, it looks as though the settlement freeze is (a) not going into operation in any meaningful way, but is (b) being “played with” by Netanyahu in his interactions with the Americans, just as Efraim Inbar predicted would happen…

Obama, Afghanistan– and St. Augustine

Pres. Obama gave a speech to the veterans of Foreign Wars annual convention on Monday in which he spelled out his view of the US’s now-declining strategic stakes in Iraq and its continuing strategic stake in Afghanistan.
His words were considered and important.
On Iraq, he said,

    In Iraq, after more than six years of war, we took an important step forward in June. We transferred control of all cities and towns to Iraq’s security services. The transition to full Iraqi responsibility for their own security is now underway…
    But as we move forward, the Iraqi people must know that the United States will keep its commitments. And the American people must know that we will move forward with our strategy. We will begin removing our combat brigades from Iraq later this year. We will remove all our combat brigades by the end of next August. And we will remove all our troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. And for America, the Iraq war will end.
    By moving forward in Iraq, we’re able to refocus on the war against al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan….

From one viewpoint, of course, what the US military has been doing in Iraq has been moving back, not forward, despite all of Obama’s uses of the term “forward”.
It’s forward, I suppose, if you understand that he means that the US has been proceeding with its commitments under the November 2008 Withdrawal Agreement. And his mention of the end-of-2011 deadline buttresses that interpretation.
Also, if he wants to describe– for this presumably very nationalistic US audience– this very necessary move out of Iraq as a move “forward”, let him do so, I say.
And then, remembering what he has just said about Iraq, let’s see what he said about Afghanistan. He described his administration’s “new, comprehensive strategy” in Afghanistan in the following terms:

    This strategy acknowledges that military power alone will not win this war—that we also need diplomacy and development and good governance. And our new strategy has a clear mission and defined goals—to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies.
    … These new efforts have not been without a price. The fighting has been fierce. More Americans have given their lives. And as always, the thoughts and prayers of every American are with those who make the ultimate sacrifice in our defense.
    As I said when I announced this strategy, there will be more difficult days ahead…
    But we must never forget. This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defense of our people.

Steve Walt had an excellent critique of Obama’s “war of necessity/ al-Qaeda safe haven” claim on his FP blog yesterday.
I want to take a slightly different tack. I want, first, simply to point out a few important things; and then I want to get more deeply into launching a “Just War theory” critique of the whole US military venture in Afghanistan.
So, the prefatory points I want to make:

Continue reading “Obama, Afghanistan– and St. Augustine”