Inflating perceptions of ‘threat’

I’ve just finished a quick scroll through strategic expert Jeffrey Record’s riveting and controversial study, “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism”. I found it meticulously written and carefully argued. It hit many nails exactly on the head.
As reported in many newspapers yesterday, Record’s conclusion is that:

    The global war on terrorism as presently defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate U.S. military and other resources in an endless and hopeless search for absolute security. The United States may be able to defeat, even destroy, al-Qaeda, but it cannot rid the world of terrorism, much less evil.

What’s as significant as these sobering conclusions are Record’s credentials as a professor at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and currently a visiting prof at the Army’s War College in Carlisle, PA– plus, the key fact that the study was published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.
(Actually, I’ve published with SSI myself– 1997, on Israel and Syria. Rather a level-headed bunch of folks there, I would say.)
Along the way, Record makes some very good points. He does a great job showing how the excessively heavy use of the discourse of “(anti-)terrorism” ends up obscuring vitally important distinctions, and creates traps of its own:

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DoD suits scrabbling yet again to find a workable plan

Steven Weisman
writes

in today’s NYT that un-named “administration officials” say the
Bush administration now plans to revise the plan for a handover to
self-rule in Iraq that was agreed on just last November 15.  The revision
is reportedly aimed at “responding to” the firm insistence that Ayatollah
Sistani announced Sunday that any Iraqi self-rule government be the result
of–wait for this shocking revelation!– a fully democratic process.

So does this mean that Baghdad fashion maven Jerry Bremer and his Washington
handlers are now prepared to move away from “the Rube Goldberg process”–
the incredibly unwieldy and undemocratic mechanism agreed back in November
whereby undemocratic “caucuses” and other such gatherings would generate
a new Iraqi leadership?

No, it does not.   As Weisman reports it:

    The new hope in Washington, the officials said, was in effect to make
    the caucus system look more democratic without changing it in a fundamental
    way
    .

So I guess we could call the proposed new system “Rube Goldberg, II”.  That
will make it at least the fourth* of the “strategic” plans the administration
has adopted for the handover since the US forces took Baghdad last April.
 (And the pace at which the administration is falling back from one
plan to the next seems to be speeding up.)

And I have a sneaking suspicion that Sistani, who doesn’t seem to be anyone’s
fool, is not necessarily going to have the wool pulled over his eyes on this
one?

Weisman also reports another aspect of Sistani’s Sunday declaration
that I had not seen reported elsewhere, and that likewise came as a big
shock to Bremer and his backers:

Continue reading “DoD suits scrabbling yet again to find a workable plan”

How NOT to win in Iraq

The NYT magazine has a longish piece by Peter Maass today that demonstrates extremely convincingly why the US is NOT destined to win the counter-insurgency/pacification campaign in Iraq.
(You’ll have to take my word on this, since for now my browser won’t bring the article up.)
The piece is called “Professor Nagls’s war”. In it, Maass provides a generally sympathetic, even laudatory, description of the life, thinking, and current work of a U.S. Army major called John Nagl. Nagl’s “normal” job is as a professor of strategy at West Point. But currently, he’s deployed as the operations officer with an 800-soldier battalion near Fallujah in the infamous “Sunni Triangle” of Iraq.
I guess Maass (or the Army?) picked Nagl to be profiled because he has some credentials as an expert in the theory of counter-insurgency warfare. He did a Ph.D. at Oxford University on the subject, no less. The book that resulted from his thesis studies “Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.”
Nagl himself is presented as having an engaging humility about those credentials:

Continue reading “How NOT to win in Iraq”

Kudos to Yankeedoodle and Juan Cole!

I’m coming up to my First Blogiversary February 6, so I can tell y’all that now, nearly one year into the project, I know that trying to keep a good, lively blog up on the web is a heck of a lot of work!
So hats off to Yankeedoodle and Juan Cole who work tirelessly nearly every darn’ day of the year (barring snowstorms, Yankee) to bring us all the best, most relevant, liveliest, most pertinent news there is on the ongoing US imbroglio in Iraq.
Yankee’s blog, “Today in Iraq” keeps a person just about totally up-to-date with all the breaking developments on the US/’coalition’ side of things, with a minimum of commentary from YD (but that little, totally on-the-mark imho.)
Juan’s blog, “Informed Comment” gives us that erudite, wise professor’s up-to-theminute interpretation of what’s happening on the Iraqi side. Juan evidently gives the Arabic-language media a good reader every morning before he blogs. The rest of us are truly privileged to be able to read his presentation and interpretation of it.
I long ago came to the conclusion that unless I want this blog to take over my whole life, which I certainly don’t (despite what some of my family members occasionally say about me)… well, there is NO WAY I could even think of competing with YD or Juan in what either of them does.
Does that mean that I stop writing about Iraq? No, ma’am. Not at all.

Continue reading “Kudos to Yankeedoodle and Juan Cole!”

Fears of Balkanization in Iraq

Riverbend, the talented Iraqi author of the “Baghdad Burning” blog,
has a very important
new post

up today in which she outlines her fears–and those of all the folks
around her–regarding a possible breakup of her country.

Her bottom line:

    We all lived together before- we can live together in the future. Iraqis
    are proud of their different ethnicities, but in the end, we all identify
    ourselves as “Iraqi”. Every Iraqi’s nightmare is to wake up one morning
    and find Iraq split into several parts based on ethnicity and religion.

Riverbend was writing in reaction to something that Salam of “Dear Raed”
had written, that expressed much the same attitude toward the idea. (Click

here

, then scroll down to the bit that starts, “Have you been noticing…”) His
bottom line:

    Yes I know identity is important but you see my father is Sunni, my mother
    Shia and our neighbors for years Kurds. There are no lines and none should
    exist, the situation in Kirkuk does create lines and make people choose sides.

Tragedy, tragedy, tragedy.

I remember back at the end of April when Martin Indyk, who was at the apex
of Washington’s Middle East decision-making for all of the Clinton administration,
suddenly saw that the post-war situation in Iraq was not going as smoothly
as he and many of his friends had hoped. Suddenly running scared by
that, he
told an audience

at Washington’s elitist Brookings Institution April 23 that, “We’re going
to have to play the old imperial game of divide and rule and the stakes could
not be higher.”

Continue reading “Fears of Balkanization in Iraq”

New CSM column: the U.S. and the rest

My latest column is in Thursday’s Christian Science Monitor. It’s a call for US citizens to start reflecting seriously on our rightful place in the world.
I ask, “How, during the year ahead, do we hope to see the 4 percent of the world’s population who are US citizens interacting with the other 96 percent?”
I look quickly at some of the more egregiously bad aspects of the war Washington launched against Iraq in 2003, then I conclude:

    What’s needed in the year ahead is a serious attempt by all who aspire to US leadership to evaluate what went wrong in the lead up to, and conduct of, the war. How did US leaders get the facts about Iraq’s weapons programs so very wrong? Why was the planning for the aftermath of the war so very flawed? Why was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld allowed to do so much to alienate key US allies overseas, and to undermine the guiding principles of the UN? Why has no one been held accountable?
    At the same time, Americans need to think long and hard about the quality of their nation’s ties to the rest of the world. Global democratization is progressing, and the more democratic the world and its governance become, the more US citizens will have to rely on its nation’s relationship with others for their own security and well-being.
    Americans are, after all, only a tiny minority of the world’s people. It’s time the US government recognized that, stopped trying to throw its weight around, and grew up.

Actually, much of the body of the piece was an accusation that (hawks in the) the administration had unacceptably politicized the intelligence on Saddam’s WMDs, and his ties to Al-Qaeda, in order to build public and political support for the war…

Continue reading “New CSM column: the U.S. and the rest”

Iraq’s Arab Sunnis reaching out to Kurds, Turkmen?

Alan Sipress has an important piece in today’s WaPo about Sunni leaders in Iraq organizing a pan-Sunni coordinating/advisory council (shura council).
If the Shura Council becomes a fixture in its present form– still not known–then it could substantially affect the future balance in the country.
According to Sipress,

    The shura council includes equal representation from each of the three main currents within the Sunni Muslim community: the politically oriented Muslim Brotherhood, the religious puritans of the Salafi movement and the adherents of the mystical Sufi tradition. Within each group, half the seats are allocated for ethnic Arabs and half are divided between ethnic Kurds and Turkmen. Dozens of other council members are drawn from professionals, intellectuals, tribal leaders and other civic groups.
    The council does not plan to exclude former members of Hussein’s government unless they were involved in criminal activities, [said Mohammed Ahmed Rashid, an activist with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which is involved in forming the council.]

Also very significant:

    The council… is demanding that the next Iraqi government be selected by direct election rather than through local caucuses, as U.S. officials prefer.

Sipress also reports that Dan Senor, a spokesman for the never-sharp (except sartorially) L. Paul Bremer as saying that the U.S.-led occupation authority, “was still learning about the Sunni body.”

Democratization as instant coffee?

The NYT has a lovely profile today of someone I have lots of admiration for: the veteran Algerian diplomat (and former Foreign Minister) Lakhdar Brahimi, who has also for the past two years been the UN’s top official in Afghanistan.
The profile is by Carlotta Gall. She gives one tiny vignette that indicates the importance Brahimi has had in the attempt to rebuild Afghanistan almost from scratch. It came from one of last week’s sessions of the country’s just-completed 502-person loya jirga (“big council”):

    [H]e proved his usefulness to the last. He had delayed his departure several times as the loya jirga faltered, and then almost fell apart. Nearly half the delegates boycotted a vote on amendments on Thursday, and tensions were rising as the assembly split along ethnic lines.
    That put the rest of the transition in jeopardy, from the United Nations-run disarmament and demobilization program to elections that, under the Bonn accords, would take place in six months.
    Mr. Brahimi spoke to the delegates boycotting a vote, entering the tent from the side door, slightly hunched in his overcoat. They had shouted down every other official, including their own faction leaders, but had asked for him to mediate. After a day of meetings Friday, delegates were saying that Mr. Brahimi had succeeded in breaking the logjam.

For me, the most significant part of the piece was where Gall was describing a memo that Brahimi recently gave to the still-precarious Afghan government and foreign diplomats in Kabul:

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U.S. Army to expand involuntary service orders

Donna Miles of the Armed Forces Press Service, reported Jan. 2 that the Army would be announcing a further expansion of its existing “stop-loss” program within the next week or two.
No numbers yet.
I wrote more about the “stop-loss” program here Dec. 29. It’s a program of totally involuntary military service imposed on the hard-pressed men and women who are already in the various branches of the armed forces. I titled that post “The draft that dares not speak its name.”
At that point, I was citing press reports that more than 40,000 people had already been affected in the Army program. Plus, an unknown number of members of other branches of the armed forces.

Iraq-Palestine revisited

Yesterday, reader Adel el-Sayed put up a comment onto a post I wrote on JWN Feb. 22 in which I argued against the point of view that, “Anyone who wants a just Palestinian solution should be supporting a war in Iraq… It would be good for Palestinian aspirations.”
Those had been the exact words used by the once-smart (British) Mideast affairs analyst Fred Halliday, writing that week in Salon.com.
Though I have respected Fred’s work a lot in the past, I just could not agree with that assessment. (Read my earlier post for my reasoning there.)
But in general, I think we should all add this whole question of the alleged “Palestinian-Israeli benefits” of a US war to topple Saddam to the Bill of Particulars in which we list the many forms of dishonest argumentation that prior to the March 19 Day of Infamy were used to jerk the US (and UK) publics into supporting the war effort…
The main argument I heard before March 19 from several war supporters was admittedly was a little different from the one that Halliday expressed, though it had the same bottom line: that a US war against Saddam would be good for the Palestinians. It ran roughly as follows:

    (1) The financial support the Saddam Hussein regimes gives to Palestinian “terrorists” is one of the main factors motivating them to continue their actsof otherwise quite inexplicable violence against Israel.
    (2) It is only because of these acts of wanton, quite unprovoked violence that the hard-pressed Sharon is obliged, becuase of its responsibilities to the Israeli public, to retaliate against the Palestinian sources of this terror. Otherwise, this Israeli government—-which is as eager as all Israeli governments are to make peace with its neighbors!–would conclude a reasonable, durable peace with the Palestinians tomorrow.

    Continue reading “Iraq-Palestine revisited”