Just World News with Helena Cobban

There are many hotspots of confrontation in Iraq these days–let’s say, in practically every major city. But easily the most politically potent, right now, is the one in Najaf.
In today’s (Sunday’s) WaPo, there was a long story about how the still-rebuilding Iraqi forces were going to be taking the lead in fighting the Sadrist forces in Najaf. Then, on AP at 20:26 this evening, I read this:

U.S. tanks and troops rolled back into the center of Najaf and battled with Shiite militants Sunday, reigniting violence in the holy city just as delegates in Baghdad opened a conference meant to be a landmark in the country’s movement toward democracy.

Okay. First question: What happened to the supposed “Iraqi” forces? Did they refuse, at the small-unit level, to do the job the US had assigned to them? Or, did the orders for them not to undertake the mission come from higher up their chain of command?
Quite possibly, it was some fairly chaotic combination of the two things?
Or maybe Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s account in Monday’s WaPo of the “election-prep” conference in Baghdad gave the best explanation of what had happened in Najaf. (This seems like some really world-class reporting he has there, by the way.)
Chandra wrote that early in the conference:

dozens of Shiite delegates jumped to their feet in a loud protest of the interim government’s decision to mount military operations to evict followers of the cleric, Moqtada Sadr, from a Shiite shrine in the holy city of Najaf. Chanting “Yes to Najaf!” and raising their fists, the Shiite dissenters demanded that the participants call on the interim prime minister and Sadr’s followers to refrain from violence and for a special committee of delegates to negotiate a solution to the crisis.
The outburst triggered a succession of events that quickly reshaped government policy toward Najaf and instilled the first measure of checks-and-balances in Iraq’s nascent political system. The Shiite protesters, along with several non-Shiite participants, caucused and drafted a letter to interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his cabinet that called for a dialogue with Sadr and “an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all military activities in Najaf and other Iraqi cities.”
A four-person delegation from the conference then met with Allawi. When the meeting was over, the government announced that its plans to use force to expel Sadr from the Imam Ali shrine were on hold. In a reversal from its position a day earlier, Allawi’s cabinet issued a statement pledging to refrain from military action against Sadr’s militiamen and to keep an “open door” to a negotiated settlement.
“This is democracy in action,” said Ibrahim Nawar, a U.N. adviser who helped organize the conference. “For now, at least, they have succeeded in changing the government’s approach toward the situation in Najaf.”

Okay, so maybe it was Allawi, under pressure from the conference delegates, who changed the policy on the Iraqi forces intervening.
But then, what were the American forces doing going ahead to intervene on their own account??
This seems like a completely politically suicidal decision.
If indeed they did send US forces into Najaf without any “cover” from Allawist forces–then Moqtada Sadr indeed has the Americans exactly where he wants them… If US forces go ahead and storm the Najaf shrines complex, then even Iyad Allawi will find it hard to stay in any kind of a political relationship with them.
What the heck body part are the US commanders “thinking” with? Their elbows?
Anyway, here’s some more of Chandra’s great reporting from the conference:

Continue reading “Eyes on Najaf”

** Newsflash!** While I was writing the following, the first reports came in of the breakdown of the Sadr-Allawi peace talks. That doesn’t alter much of the following, and I’ve commented on some possible implications of the talks breakdown at the end of the post.
Following up on this post here Thursday, it now seems clear to me that in forcing the confrontation against the Mahdi Army in Najaf, the US-Allawi forces seriously overplayed their hand. And over the next few days we will see what consequences they have to take for that.
My evidence for this judgment is the continuation/acceleration of the same process of political erosion of Allawi’s support that I wrote about Thursday.
(A note to US strategic planners in Iraq–if indeed, there are any: “It’s about the politics, stupid!” Another note: “Ever read Clausewitz?”)
The prime evidence I saw Friday for Allawi’s political erosion was twofold:
Firstly, some fascinating AP photos on my AOL feed showing a massive, anti-Allawi pray-in that the Sadrists had organized at the gates of the Green Zone in Baghdad. They didn’t say how many thousands of Sadrist men had joined the action, but it looked like many thousands. To get there, they had had to walk, many of them, in from Sadr City (ever wonder why there’s no massive urban neighborhood in Iraq called Allawi City?), cross one of the bridges across the Tigris, and then get to the place where they prayed. Disciplined, in straight rows, they prayed, as Muslim men and boys learn to do at a young age.
I can’t put in a link to these photos from my AOL feed. I looked for them in today’s WaPo and NYT, but couldn’t find them. Why not? I guess the editors there don’t understand the importance of that story… They mentioned the pray-in only ways, ways down in a story dominated by the military confrontation… Maybe they should read Clausewitz, as well?
Secondly, news on Aljazeera.net, also on various western newswires, saying that Sayed Muhammad Bahr al-Uloum, the respected, Najaf-based Shi-ite cleric whom Bremer had put on the IGC, said that because of the US attack on Najaf, he has lost his trust in the Americans:

“The Americans have turned the holy city into a ghost town. They are now seen as full of hatred against Najaf and the Shia. Nothing I know of will change this,” the former president of the now defunct council said on Friday.
“I do not understand why America craves crisis. A peaceful solution to the confrontation with Muqtada could have been reached. We were hoping that Prime Minister Iyad Allawi would lead the way, but he sided with oppression.”

Well, friends, I don’t understand why the people currently ruling the US crave crisis in Iraq, either. But that certainly seems to be the case.
Today, there has already been more news indicating the collapse of Allawi’s political-strategic position. AP reported that,

Thousands of demonstrators descended on Najaf to show their support Saturday for Shiite militants battling U.S. forces in the holy city as the provincial governor expressed optimism that the crisis would end within the next two days…
About 10,000 demonstrators, some in buses, others on foot, arrived in Najaf on Saturday to show their solidarity with the militants and act as human shields to protect the city.
Many of the demonstrators arrived from as far away as Baghdad, as well as the southern cities of Amarah and Nasiriyah, demanding the interim government’s resignation and an end to the offensive here.

This, remember, after the US/Allawists called early last week for civilians to leave Najaf. And after the US claimed that its forces had placed a complete security cordon around the city.
… Well, I have just read the latest reports of the breakdown of the latest peace talks over Najaf.
This means the election-planning conference the Allawists were planning for Sunday will be either rescheduled or a fiasco–or both. It means there are probably about 10,000 more people inside Najaf willing to fight the US forces than there were on Thursday…

Continue reading “US/Allawi have overplayed their hand”

One week into the present Battle of Najaf it seems clearer than ever that Allawi and his US backers are determined to win this battle in a way that imposes a humiliating defeat on Moqtada Sadr and his Mahdi Army.
From his side Moqtada also seems to have dug in his heels. The possibility of a face-saving-all-round outcome seems to have almost disappeared.
It is not yet clear who will “win” this showdown. Militarily, of course a large, very well-armed US force, backed up by extremely lethal airpower and augmented by some local Iraqi forces would seem to have a large advantage over a few hundred– perhaps 1,500 at most–lightly armed Mahdi fighters. (Urban fighting, however, can be really brutal. Do the US Marines there really have the guts for it?)
But as every first lieutenant should understand, the “Battle” of Najaf will not be won on the military battlefield. It will be won in the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, and in that arena the US/Allawi forces are almost bound to lose any all-out showdown.
This morning, Najaf’s deputy governor, Jawdat Kadam Najim al-Kuraishi, resigned in protest at the US/Allawi actions in his city. The governor, Adnan Zurufi, is a former Iraqi exile who was installed as governor by Bremer, back in early May. He has not resigned. But today, according to this story in Aljazeera.net a majority of the members of the provincial council also joined Kuraishi in reisgning.
Aljazeera also reported that,

the director of tribal affairs at the Iraqi Interior ministry announced his resignation through Aljazeera and said he could no longer work with the interim government in good faith given the ‘carnage and barbaric aggression of the US-led forces in Najaf’…
Meanwhile, Basra’s deputy governor for administrative affairs, Hajj Salam Awdeh al-Maliky, warned that he may openly join al-Sadr’s fight if his offer to send 1000 Iraqi police, special security and national guardsmen to Najaf is refused by the interim government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.
Some national guardsmen in Basra had even said they would not hesitate to join al-Sadr’s militia if al-Maliky’s offer was rejected.

On the BBC-TV news tonight, we saw Iraqi Vice-President Ibrahim Jafaari decrying the violence… And on the religious-affairs front, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is quoted on the BBC website as saying (through a spokesman) that, “he would not have left Najaf if he knew how bad things would get.”
Altogether, I would say, extremely inauspicious circumstances for Iraq to be holding its nationwide, 1,000-person confab on how the next step in preparing the elections gets organized. That confab is scheduled for this Sunday! It has been delayed once; but this time Allawi is insisting it go ahead without further delay. It seems truly bizarre and extremely politically counter-productive to be doing that in the middle of a confrontation as momentous as the one in Najaf.
Sistani, I should note, is probably one of the best hopes left for helping to mediate a negotiated climbdown from the present escalation (if such is still possible)…

Continue reading “Najaf: turning point for whom?”

The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (to which recently started linking on the sidebar here) has a great-looking quartet of new stories up today from their reportorial trainees there:
(1) This, from Aqil Jabbar, reporting from Najaf and Kufa, titled Fallujah fighters provide military training for Sadrist forces. I haven’t seen anyone cover that angle before. And he has some good details there.
(2) This, from Zainab Naji in Ana, western Iraq, writing on the theme, An unofficial court imposes harsh sentences on Iraqis who work for the Americans and their allies.
That piece was really interesting. The court in question has, she writes, been operating since late 2003. It’s basically under the auspices of local clerics there.
A couple of other aspects of the story struck me as notable. It’s the first time I’ve seen IWPR’s Iraq program using material from ma female trainee. Hurrah! And secondly, Naji quotes a LOT of local people, on the record, who seem very familiar with the working of this court–which has even beheaded at least one alleged collaborator with the occupation. That indicates to me that the people she quoted have just about zero fear of retribution against themselves on the behalf of the US authorities or the Allawi people.
And then, (3) and (4), there are two interesting stories written by young (?) journos associated with a youth publication called “Liberal Education”, in the Kurdish city of Suleimaniyah. This one is about the discrimination some Kurdish students say they have experienced in various majority-Arab cities in the country. And this one is about the experiences various ethnic-Arab Iraqis report having had during sojourns in Iraqi Kurdistan: some good, and some very bad.
I think it’s great to have the young journos work on both sides of that issue. The general picture that emerges, however, is of increasing ethnic polarization.
Anyway, I’ve got to run. I just wanted to share those with y’all. Check them out.

Well, first, it really couldn’t have happened to a nice pair of guys! How are the mighty fallen, eh? From schmoozing with Laura Bush at the State of the Union to international ignominy within a bare seven months…
Having said that, I should add that I actually feel rather sorry for Uncle Ahmad Chalabi… I can’t believe I am writing these words… but it turns out the amount of counterfeited “old dinars” they are charging him for is around 30,000 old dinars, or about $2.
Truly, with all the problems Iraq is facing these days, the idea of launching a court case, extradition attempt, etc., around that charge is quite mind-boggling.
Or, dare I say it, plainly political?
Uncle Ahmad is now in Iran, having no doubt greased his way in there with a few well-placed donations… Actually, I’m sure they’re delighted to have him. (1) They can maybe carry on milking him for good, ‘insider’ info about the Bushites and their current acolytes in Baghdad. (2) They can keep an eye on him. (Surely no-one in the world would any longer trust this guy further than they could throw him?) (3) If the price is right, they can “give him up” to the highest bidder, should they choose to do so.
It’s young Salem, though, whose situation seems really intriguing.
(1) The case that Iraqi judge Zuhair al-Maliki has brought against him is much more serious than the one against Unca Ahmad. He’s accused of murder in the case of the death in June of Haithem Fadhil, director-general of the Iraqi finance ministry, who’d been looking into Chalabi family finances.
(2) He’s been the lynch-pin in organizing Saddam’s trial there in Baghdad. So now, evidently, the whole course of that trial is in question, too.
(3) He’s in London. We’ll have to see what the British authorities decide to do about him.
Well, I’m too tired to write much more about all this right now. Sometime this week, when I have the energy, I want to write a longer post here about all the many ways in which the situation in Iraq seems to be imploding. So fast… So tragic…
I know it doesn’t help any to say this, but maybe it’s worth reminding ourselves anyway: It didn’t have to be like this. George W. Bush and the ignorant bunch of ideologues you have around you: you all have a lot to answer for.

Juan Cole’s had a couple of link recently to pieces from Iraq in the Guardian by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad. Somehow, I believe that’s Salam/Pax’s friend ‘G’, but I may be wrong. Anyway, he’s a fine reporter and a pretty fearless one too.
This is the piece he had in today’s (Monday’s) paper. It’s a great piece of reporting from a couple of days spent covering the (recent? ongoing? who knows?) fighting in Najaf…
After describing nine corpses of pro-Moqtada “martyrs” he saw stacked up in “one of Najaf’s oldest religious schools … a few yards away from the main Imam Ali mosque”, he comments:

The injuries to the dead said a lot about the precision of American snipers, but there was more argument over the precision of their counting.
While the Americans claimed 300 of the Mahdi army had been killed, no more than a dozen wounded and the nine dead were to be seen.
“If they had killed 300 that means we have at least another 1,000 injured,” said Ahmad al-Shaibani, the militia’s leading commander. “How many fighters do they think we have?”

The kind of tactics he describes seemed like the classic hit-and-run members of a small mobile force would use:

Continue reading “Ghaith, from Najaf”