Darfur: negotiators close to peace agreement?

African Union mediators who have been convening peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, between representatives of the Sudanese government and the two main Darfuri opposition groups have put forward a draft peace agreement for consideration by the parties. (Hat-tip to Jonathan Edelstein for that news.)
The foregoing link goes to the Sudan Tribune‘s account of the content of much of the peace deal. That account says that the “Security” portion of it still has to be worked out. VOA’s account of the draft presented by AU chief mediator Salim Ahmed Salim says, however, that the draft contains provisions in all spheres, including security.
Reuters’ Estelle Shirbon writes in this very informative report that the AU-proposed draft includes a requirement that Khartoum disarm the Janjaweed militia.
As the April 30 target date for the final conclusion of the peace agreement approaches, there have been recent reports that both sides have been taking some worryingly escalatory moves.
IRIN reported from Nairobi today that,

    A recent spate of attacks in South Darfur State seems to constitute a new military offensive by the Sudanese government and puts the lives of tens of thousands of people at risk, regional analysts have warned.

And in Friday’s Christian Science Monitor, Katharine Houreld has a very troubling report saying that “various Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups” have been kidnapping men– and even some children– from the refugee camps strung along the Darfur-Chad border, and impressing them into their own forces.
Houreld writes:

    Although the exact number is unknown, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that around 4,700 refugees in Chadian camps were abducted last month. Most were taken in the span of three days in mid-March from the camps of Treguine and Bredjing, when unidentified rebels went from tent to tent looking for potential fighters, according to refugees and the UNHCR. Women who tried to cling to their men were beaten back mercilessly, say witnesses. Some men who resisted were tied up at knifepoint and carried off in vehicles. Many of those taken say they saw people tied up and left in the sun for days, or witnessed beatings. Some were killed.
    Among the dusty tents and straw shacks of the refugee camps, the clumps of frightened people do not even know who attacked them, although most of the refugees who escaped agree their kidnappers spoke with Sudanese accents. At least four rebel groups – some Sudanese, some Chadian – are now active along the chaotic border between the two countries.
    … Although the Darfur conflict has been marked by gross human rights violations and ethnic cleansing, Olivier Bercault of Human Rights Watch says the forced recruitment of fighters, including children, is a new development.
    …”The war is shifting gear and [the various rebel groups] need more people to fight,” said Bercault. “I’m very concerned about child recruitment. When you start with this, it’s like an addiction. It’s difficult to stop.”

In the United States, meanwhile, President Bush hurried to add his own, US sanctions to those that the UN imposed on four military leaders involved in the fighting in Darfur… And representatives from numerous US organizations have been preparing for Sunday’s rally to “Save Darfur”, though their “Unity Statement” still doesn’t tell us how they propose doing this …
(Oh, and actor George Clooney has gotten into the action, too. In a newsclip he and his father made that I saw tonight, the dad– described as “a journalist”– got some very basic political facts about the situation wrong, referring to the janjaweed as “insurgents”, which is precisely what they are not… Which doesn’t give me much confidence in the quality of the duo’s analysis.)
I hope the peace talks in Abuja can really succeed, and the rebuilding process that they envision can really take hold. That is far and away the best way to end the commission of atrocities in Darfur and start rebuilding a rule-of-law-based society there.
But what about the reports of the recent escalatory acts? Let’s hope they were just one last push that each side was making, trying to win one last spot of negotiating advantage, before they both sign onto the peace deal
Another interesting question: Have the UN’s recent imposition of targeted sanctions and other political pressures from outside helped to nudge the government toward accepting the peace agreement? If so, that’s good.
One last point. If the parties do sign onto the peace, then surely the main impetus in the “international community” has to be towards supporting this peace and giving it the very best possible chance to succeed. Including, obviously, by funding it. But also, by agreeing to be led by the AU negotiators regarding questions of how perpetrators of the conflict-era atrocities should be dealt with.
I certainly hope the AU has been making robust plans for the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration back into their home communities (DDR) of the vast bulk of the former fighters on both sides of the conflict… DDR is by far the best way to help rebuild societies torn apart by civil war.

Iraq: Maliki’s first days

Zal Khalilzad, the US viceroy in Baghdad, has been putting his own spin on his failure to break the unity of the UIA bloc by speaking to the WaPo’s David Ignatius and claiming it was a victory for his diplomacy, after all.
Ignatius wrote that Khalilzad told him that “the Iranians ‘pressured everyone for [former UIA candidate Ibrahim] Jafari to stay'”, whereas the reputation of the now-confirmed UIA candidate for PM, Nouri (formerly Jawad) al-Maliki is of “someone who is independent of Iran.”
Yeah, right. Whatever. But by casting matters in that light, Zal is able to keep alive his reputation in Washington as someone who– to quote Ignatius– “has been a match for the Iraqis in his wily political wrangling.” As opposed to, for example, being seen as someone who tried hard but failed to break the basic unity of the UIA bloc.
David does concede, however, that, “Maliki is a tough Arab nationalist who will work with the United States in the short run but will want the United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq. His authentic Iraqi credentials could help pull the country together.”
Meanwhile, I see that Maliki has faced one challenge already: He had to turn up at a hastily arranged meeting with Condi Rice and Don Rumsfeld who “just happened” to make a swing through Baghdad today.
That report, from AP, notes this:

    Rumsfeld said the United Nations Security Council resolution that forms the legal basis for U.S. operations to stabilize and rebuild Iraq is to expire at the end of the year so there will have to be talks with the Iraqi government on arrangements beyond this year.

Right. Negotiating the terms and timetable of the US withdrawal from their country really is one of the main responsibilities this new Iraqi government will have. The other two are tying down the last unfinished details of the country’s Constitution— and the small matter of governing the country.
First, though, Maliki has to form his government. I imagine that trying to make sure he understands Washington’s views on that topic was the main reason Condi and Rummy rushed over so fast to meet him.

Darfur: peacemaking or partisan finger-pointing?

The NYT reported today that the UN Security Council yesterday voted to impose personalized sanctions on four named individuals suspected of involvement in the atrocities in Darfur.
Interestingly, the four persons sanctioned comprise two leaders affiliated with the Khartoum government: “Maj. Gen. Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, a Sudanese Air Force officer accused of helping the government-backed janjaweed militias commit atrocities; [and] Sheik Musa Hilal, chief of an Arab tribe and a janjaweed leader”– along with two leaders with the anti-government forces: “Adam Yacub Shant, a commander of Sudanese Liberation Army forces that broke a cease-fire to attack government troops; and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri, the commander of another rebel force, which kidnapped and threatened African Union troops.”
Is the Security Council (and perhaps also the ICC, with which it has been working on the Darfur atrocities) perhaps getting something right this time, in terms of the political “balance” of these sanctions?
The Council’s position stands in notable contrast to that adopted by nearly all the mainstream media and political activists here in the US, who have stayed almost completely silent about the atrocities reportedly committed by the anti-government militias– the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement– while hyping up those committed by pro-government forces.
In a report on BBC t.v. the other day, I saw even the estimable Orla Guerin fall into that trap. She spoke breathlessly about refugees “streaming away” from a government-attacked village– while in the frame behind her all you could see was a bedraggled group of around six people making their way mournfully from one side of the screen to the other. She also stated– incorrectly– that the African Union troops in Darfur “have no mandate to protect civilians”. And at a point when a group of armed anti-government fighters were visible in a Jeep quite close behind her she made no mention of their presence or of the well-documented accusations that the anti-government forces are also accused of atrocities.
I note that many Jewish-American organizations are among those that have joined the (increasingly politicized, anti-Khartoum) US campaign to “Save Darfur” that was launched recently by Elie Wiesel and that is organizing a big march in DC this Sunday. If you go to the campaign’s Unity Statement, you will see descriptions of atrocities committed by government and pro-government forces, but no mention at all of violence by anti-government forces.
Here’s what it says:

    The emergency in Sudan’s western region of Darfur presents the starkest challenge to the world since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. A government-backed Arab militia known as Janjaweed has been engaging in campaigns to displace and wipe out communities of African tribal farmers.
    Villages have been razed, women and girls are systematically raped and branded, men and boys murdered, and food and water supplies targeted and destroyed. Government aerial bombardments support the Janjaweed by hurling explosives as well as barrels of nails, car chassis and old appliances from planes to crush people and property. Tens of thousands have died. Well over a million people have been driven from their homes, and only in the past few weeks have humanitarian agencies gained limited access to some of the affected region…

What a problematic statement. Firstly, it completely ignores the horrendous conflict-related suffering in eastern DRC, where more than four million people have already died in the past eight years, as a result of conflict stirred up largely by the Rwandan (post-genocide) government or by the west’s poster-boy in Uganda, Pres. Museveni.
… And the last sentence I quoted from the statement is now quite out of date and should be updated or dropped.
… Note, too, the way in which the “Unity Statement” tries to make the conflict seem quite simply to be one between “Arabs” and “Africans”, and thereby to whip up the anti-Arab sentiment that lies very close to the surface of much US discourse; whereas, as best I understand it, the Darfur conflict is much, much more complex than that.
… And finally, the statement makes no mention at all of what the signatories believe should be done in response to the violence and suffering in Darfur. This is presumably because the signatory groups failed to agree on this? Some people here in the US have been urging the intervention of NATO forces “to save the Darfuris”– a military campaign on the model of Kosovo, which would similarly weaken the central government involved, i.e., Khartoum. Others urge a more pacific, multilateral approach. But by waving the bloodied garments of the victims of pro-government violence, while making no mention of the victims of anti-government violence, this campaign will surely serve only to whip up anti-Khartoum feeling.
My own prescription for what should be done? Support peace efforts in these three troubled provinces of Sudan to the greatest degree possible.
Atrocities like genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes always (or nearly always) occur in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. The situation in Darfur is certainly no exception to that rule.
I share the angst of all those in the global rights community who are appalled at the grotesque, man-inflicted suffering in Darfur. But the way to bring those atrocities to a lasting end is to bring to a lasting end the conflict that has spawned them. By contrast, engaging in a campaign of one-sided, blame-hurling accusations against only one party to the conflict seems like a sure recipe for keeping the situation inflamed.
That’s why I’m really heartened by the even-handed approach adopted by the Security Council.
By the way, the ICC– to which the Security Council last April made a formal referral of the situation in Darfur– has not yet named its own list of indictees, as you can see if you check the documents available through this ICC web portal on the topic. But I wonder if the prosecutor there consulted with the Security Council members on who should be the targets of these sanctions?

Death of world’s foremost nuclear proliferator

Yuval Ne’eman, the nuclear physicist who was the theoretical father of the Israel nuclear weapons program, died in Tel Aviv on Wednesday, aged 81.
(Its political father was none other than Mr. Nobel Peace Laureate Shimon Peres, author of the Qana massacre which occurred almost exactly ten years ago now, in April 1996.)
Ne’eman was also the founder of the viciously territorial maximalist Israeli party Tehiya. He served three terms in Israel’s Knesset for Tehiya, during which time he was a member of three governments, usually having the “Science” portfolio.
And just to demonstrate the connivance with which the US authorities viewed the Israeli nuclear program we can see that in the mid-1970s, Ne’eman was a professor at the University of Texas, which still proudly claims him as an emeritus.
My gosh! Do I smell double standards?

The International Prayer for Peace, 2006

Wednesday and Thursday this week, the Community of Sant’ Egidio, an international Catholic lay organization, will be bringing a wonderful pro-peace event to Washington DC: the International Prayer for Peace: “Religions and Cultures: the Courage of Dialogue”.
I am honored to have been invited by my friend Andrea Bartoli, a Sant’ Egidio representative in New York, to take part in a discussion he’s organizing Thursday morning as part of this, titled “Religious Contribution to Genocide Prevention.”
It should be a weighty discussion. There will be an Armenian bishop, someone from Great Rabbinate of Israel, a Methodist priest from Nigeria, a Muslim representative, and someone from the Swedish Foreign Ministry who works on genocide prevention full-time.
I am excited at the thought of there being a large, Catholic-led peace event right there in Washington DC. In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, I sorely missed the strength, wisdom, and political muscle that US Catholics could and should have brought to antiwar movement… They were consumed at that time with the challenge of dealing with the painful legacies of their years of institutionalized child abuse….
But now, maybe we can see them come more strongly into the field of pro-peace activism, led by the wonderful people of Sant’ Egidio. I was glad to see that the Archbishop of Washington DC will be opening the event. Excellent.

Governance crisis early-warning tools compared

The latest (May/June 2006) issue of Foreign Policy mag– right, the one with the letters and discussion about my recent war-crimes courts article– landed on our front stoop last week. It has a seductively graphicized nine-page layout presenting the results of the 2nd annual “Failed States Index” that FP has produced in cooperation with the (also DC-based) Fund for Peace.
Two of these pages carry a large world map, with “Critical” (i.e., crisis-ridden) states in burgundy; “In danger” states in orange; “Borderline” states in yellow, etc. Well, that’s most of the states in the world they have colored there. “Stable” and “Most stable” states are in shades of grey.
What does it mean, I wonder, to say that (for example) Mexico is a “borderline” state?
Actually, one aspect of this color-coding system really aroused my distrust. There are exactly 20 countries in each color zone… Either this is an amazing coincidence, or the colors are assigned according to purely “batch-processing” (i.e. on-a-curve) criteria, rather than representing some objective judgment made about their degree of criticality.
… So then, you turn the page and discover the impressive array of numbers on which these rankings are based. Here, all 60 states in the “colored” categories are assessed according to 12 “Indicators of instability”. Judged most “unstable” are Sudan (total score for instability = 112.3 out of a possible 120), DRC (110.1), Ivory Coast (109.2), and then Iraq (109.0).
On this scoreboard, US-“liberated” Iraq romps home ahead of (i.e., more unstable than) Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Haiti, etc.
Interesting.
I, however, am equally interested in the methodology used here. At the end of the piece, they say you can find out more about the methodology if you go either to FP’s website, or to that of the Fund for Peace. I totally couldn’t find anything related to the topic at the FP site. (Though they do have a jaunty and engaging new blog over there, written by staffers. Also, now, a clean online version of my recent piece on war-crimes courts.)
But info on the methodology of the “Failed States Index”? Nope.
I went to the FFP site, and found this page, which is apparently about the 2005 Failed States Index… So through that one, you can arrive at this page, which provides a portal to definitions of each of the 12 “indicators of instability” and shows how you aggregate the scores, derive trend-lines over time, etc.
The “next step” after that one is interesting. It declares quite straightforwardly that,

    For sustainable security, a state should have the following Core Five:
    * A competent domestic police force and corrections system
    * An efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy
    * An independent judicial system that works under the rule of law
    * A professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian government
    * A strong executive/legislative leadership capable of national governance

That’s where you can see how present-day Iraq performs so abysmally. I mean, you can have all the elections and referenda and coalitional horsetrading that you want in a country– but if the “government” thus formed is not linked to any actually functioning institutions of governance, then it doesn’t mean very much, does it?
So the FFP’s “methodology” is called “CAST”, for Conflict Assessment System Tool. Over the past few years, I have made quite a lot of use of a “rival” governance-crisis assessment tool– the one that Swisspeace pioneered, which is called “FAST”.
FAST uses a slightly different approach. Swisspeace uses it for only a limited number of countries. But for those, they have tried (not always successfully) to produce a quarterly rating. What they count are just a few broad categories of things, falling into these categories:

    — Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events
    — Conflictive Domestic Non-government and Government Events
    –Country Stability and Cooperative International Events

They provide graphs of the trends for these over time. Equally importantly, they also provide a narrative explanation of what we see on the graph, with a quick interpretation of the main trends in state of the country’s governance. I find this very useful– though I realize that any user is very dependent on the experience, integrity, and analytical skill of the expert who provides the narrative each quarter.
As I remarked here on JWN a while back, the whole current wave of enthusiasm for “political early warning” tools of these kinds dates back to the Rwanda crisis of 1994. The other main one that I know of is the International Crisis Group’s “CrisisWatch“, which is produced monthly. From my perspective, I find that the least useful of the three.
In general, it’s excellent that all that work is being done. We can now know to within a whisker that North Korea is 0.6 degrees more unstable than Burundi… But still, I wonder: once we know all these things, what can we do about them? That is surely the problem! Are we going, for example, to stop exporting arms to these countries? Are we going to invest huge amounts in building in such states decent education and health-care systems? Are we going to change the terms of trade so that farmers and other producers in low-income countries have free and fair access to EU and US markets? Are we going to beat our own swords into plowshares and demonstrate to people that we know that there are better ways to resolve problems than through militarism and violence?
Well, are we?
If we don’t take those further, quite necessary steps, then it strikes me there is a degree almost of self-aggrandizing voyeurism involved if all we are prepared to do is to sit here in the safe, secure west daintily charting how dysfunctional all “those peoples”‘ countries have become…

Reidar Visser’s book on failed south-Iraqi separatism

I wanted to wait till I’d read Reidar Visser’s book on the pursuit and failure of a project for south-Iraqi separatism in the early 1920s, before I posted a short review here of it.
But here I am, stuck in Philadelphia airport in a rainstorm, forced to wait for a flight home tomorrow, work schedule unavoidably postponed… So I thought I’d post the links to the book for y’all here, at least. And then later, after I get reunited with the copy of the book that he sent me, and that’s sitting at my home back in Virginia, and get back into reading it– then, I can write something substantive here about it.
What’s most interesting about the book, from a current-affairs perspective, is that what Reidar’s writing about is an earlier attempt to form a separate, Shiite-dominated, south-Iraqi state– and about its failure.
I am eager to get to the point in his narrative where he describes the denouement there: Why did the attempt fail? But sadly, here I am, stuck in a rainbound airport and separated from the book.
So anyway, go buy your own copy! Here, depending where you live, is how:
American Amazon
British Amazon
German publisher (English-language text)

Iraqi state centralism historically and for Jawad al-Maliki

The excellent and careful Norwegian historian of modern Iraq Reidar Visser has just produced an extremely helpful analysis of the evolution of the concept of the centralized Iraqi state as it developed in the post-Ottoman era… and he continues this analysis right through the the post-2003 era, concluding with some references to the views of PM-designate Jawad al-Maliki on the topic.
In current (post-March 2003) Iraqi politics this issue has assumed particular importance because of the strong preference of the country’s US occupiers (and also the two makor Kurdish parties) for a radical decentralization and geographic devolution of governing authority in Iraq– a project to which many US analysts misleadingly give the name “federalization”.
In support of this decentralization/devolution project, many commentators have alleged that the entire construct of “Iraq” was a purely manufactured creation of the British– and that therefore there is something “natural”, appropriate, and almost inevitable about the deconstruction of that state.
I note that this argument about the “artificiality” of colonial-era boundaries is one that could– potentially– be applied to states in many parts of the world, perhaps nowhere more so than in Africa. (Oh, also the United States and if you think about it, just about every state in the world…) But nowhere else that I know has this argument been used so insistently, as it has with reference to Iraq, to try to justify the radical deconstruction of a central state.
Anyway, into this discussion, Visser is now injecting a much-needed degree of solidly informed historical realism.
He writes:

    anyone who researches primary materials from the early 1900s soon understands that it is impossible to deny the existence of Iraq as a geographical and social–historical category at the time. For “Iraq” is simply omnipresent in those sources. Foreign consuls, be they Persians or British, would write about “Iraq”. Ottoman administrators, from the sultan’s advisors down to office clerks in the central registries for state correspondence, referred to “Iraq” as a familiar category which required no further explanation. Not least, people living on the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris spoke of an area they knew as Iraq. In Basra in 1910, the municipality agreed on a proposal to erect a statue of the Ottoman statesman Midhat Pasha (1822–1883), to keep alive the memory of “his many services to Iraq” in the 1860s and 1870s.
    There is little doubt that some kind of Iraq existed, and that this concept was intelligible to ordinary people. Both Sunnis and Shiite Muslims used it to refer to the combined area of the Ottoman vilayets of Basra and Baghdad, at least north to Samarra. To what extent the popularity of the concept abated further north is a moot point. Some local writers had used expressions like “the Kurdish tribes among the people of Iraq” as early as in the nineteenth century (this would seem to imply that the concept was indeed in use north of Samarra as well); the Ottomans, on the other hand, except for a brief interlude in the early Young Turk period, maintained a distinction between an “Iraq” consisting of Basra and Baghdad and the area to the north which was mostly denoted through its administrative name, the province of Mosul. At any rate it is clear that the standard depiction of Iraq as something that was created by the British from scratch – without any pre-modern roots and essentially forced on the local population – is untenable. The British role was mainly to join Mosul to the two provinces of Basra and Baghdad, whose inhabitants for their part were already familiar with a larger concept of Iraq.
    In its most vulgar form, the “constructivist” interpretation of modern Iraq has become allied to an even more problematic ethno-religious caricature map of the country. Mosul, it is claimed, was “Kurdish”; Baghdad, “Sunni Arab”; Basra, “Shiite Arab” or even “Shiite, with a strong orientation towards Persia”. Such models are another unfortunate side effect of twenty-first–century journalism being projected onto atlases of the past. They overlook the fact that the provincial border between Basra and Baghdad was located far south towards the Gulf (it ran eastwards from Nasiriyya to Amara), so that the majority of Shiite Muslims in the area were in fact residents of the province of Baghdad. Similarly, Mosul was highly complex in terms of ethnicity, with large groups of Sunni Arabs, Turkmens, Yazidis and Christians alongside the Kurds. But if this complexity is overlooked, the “artificiality” thesis perpetuates itself: cross-regional cooperation, if taken note of at all, is dismissed as the result of outsiders employing brute force against a population which for their part are portrayed as being locked in internecine antagonisms, unable to conceive of any sort of shared super-regional identity.

I would argue, moreover, that this tendency by many western writers to think of the different “ethnic” and or religious/denominational groupings within Iraq as being locked into internecine antagonism derives from the west-European experience of states having been generally been either created and conceived of along strictly mono-ethnic lines. People who conceive of states in this way find it hard even to imagine states that are formed on multi-ethnic lines. They tend to essentialize ethnicity as an immutable attribute of human experience/practice and to imagine that the world’s different ethnicities must always be competing against each other in one way o0r another…
Visser writes about the decision of the British colonial administrators, who after WW1 had been “awarded” (or, had grabbed) the area of Iraq and ruled it under a League of Nations “mandate”, to create a single, unitary state comprising the previously existing Ottoman regions of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. He notes– and this is of some wry significance today– that one of the goals of the British administrators in doing this was to dilute the influence that the country’s quietly powerful Shiite clerics could exert over its governance…
He notes the determination with which the British pursued their project of creating a unitary state for the whole area (including Mosul), and also the fact that the British used military force including aerial bombardment in their pursuit of it.
He adds this:

Continue reading “Iraqi state centralism historically and for Jawad al-Maliki”

Fateh’s role after its electoral calamity

On my third and last day in Amman I
had a number of good, quick
meetings…  Including one with Mouin Rabbani, a very smart guy who tracks
Palestinian developments for the International Crisis Group.  He suggested baldly that “some elements in Fateh” might now be
preparing to act as Palestinian “Contras”
….

Well, I suppose I should be neither surprised nor shocked.  Back
when I was in Ramallah in late February, the veteran DFLP leader Abu
Laila (Qays Abdel-Kareem) told me he thought one reaction of the Fateh
leaders to the humiliation of the electoral defeat at the hands of
Hamas– and to the serious factionalizing and backbiting within their
own ranks that caused, accompanied, and followed that defeat– would
likely be to try to whip up an anti-Hamas campaign as a way, as much as
anything, of trying to mobilize their own followers and distract them
from the campaign to do real reform inside Fateh…  And yes,
there certainly are some big external funders and supporters out there
who are poised to support anything that might help to undermine
Hamas.  (Chiefly, the US government.)  So the combination of
those two factors could indeed add up to a Contras-type situation. If
anyone in Fateh is  desperate enough to go that far…

I’ve just been reading this well-reported
article on the post-election developments inside Fateh.  It’s by
Charmaine Seitz, who’s a
freelance journalist based in Jerusalem. She writes that the
series of Fateh leadership meetings held soon after the Hamas victory
identified two key goals for the party/movement: “

first,
to work for early elections that would cut
short the government’s usual four-year term, preferably in a matter of
months, and second, to ensure that Fatah wins the second time
around.” 

(You’ll note that these goals, including the timeline sketched therein,
already fit in with the “strategy” outlined by some pro-Israeli
Americans soon after the Hamas victory was announced.  And indeed,
as Seitz noted, they were predicated on an assumption that the Hamas
government would be met with an international boycott… 
A boycott orchestrated from where, I wonder?)

Seitz writes about the PA president and Fateh leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) that:

Continue reading “Fateh’s role after its electoral calamity”

Daawa wins

So it is Jawad al-Maliki as UIA nominee. He is a Daawa person.
I’ve been traveling and busy for the past 48 hours. I flew back into Philadelphia yesterday, from Amman. I’m here in Philly for a meeting today, then back home to Virginia tonight.
When I posted here Thursday, I wrote, ” if Jaafari does step down (and I think this is a very remote possibility) then his replacement as UIA nominee will still be someone from the Daawa-Sadr bloc who can be expected to follow exactly the same, firmly pro-withdrawal policy.”
Okay, so Jaafari stepping down was not as “remote” a possibility as I had thought… But Daawa has still won the big battle of wills against Talabani and the Americans.
On Juan Cole’s blog today, he has an amazing collection of links, extracts from documents, and fulltext translations of documents related to Maliki’s nomination, and the reaction of various Iraqi parties to it. His putting these materials up into the public blogosphere is a real service to all of us who seek informed discussion of events there.
On another note, I saw before I left Amman yesterday that the “Iraqi religious leaders gathering” they’d been planning there, for today, has been postponed. Understandably, given the close involvement of many of those religious leaders in Iraq’s political affairs.
I gotta run. I do have one more thing I want to post here before I go off to my meetings. I’ll try to write some more commentary on the Maliki nomination a little later over the weekend.