A good post on the blog of Conflicts Forum… It’s the contribution that CF co-head Mark Perry made to a debate held in NYC recently on the motion of whether ““A democratically elected Hamas is still a terrorist organization.”
Perry, Mahmoud Mohamedou of Harvard, and defense lawyer Stanley Cohen all spoke against the motion. Israeli Ambassador to the US Daniel Ayalon and two other guys spoke in favor of it.
(Need I note: an all-male line-up there… )
Perry was speaking more to the question of whether the US and Israel should talk to Hamas, rather than whether it is or is not still a “terrorist” organization. Of course, the whole discourse of terrorism is usually invoked– in many current cases in the Middle East, as in the case of the ANC in its day– to claim that on that basis no-one should even talk to the organization(s) in question. But still, it is a slightly different issue.
Anyway, Perry makes an excellent case.
ISG report causing fissures in GOP
Lots happening in the world and I’ve been busy doing (gasp!) non-blog things. So I’ll throw together a couple of shorts here before going to get some rest..
First up: the continuing fallout from the ISG report, inside US politics. John Broder and Robin Toner have a good round-up in Sunday’s NYT of the very divisive effect the report has been having within the GOP:
- A document that many in Washington had hoped would pave the way for a bipartisan compromise on Iraq instead drew sharp condemnation from the right, with hawks saying it was a wasted effort that advocated a shameful American retreat.
The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page described the report as a “strategic muddle,” Richard Perle called it “absurd,” Rush Limbaugh labeled it “stupid,” and The New York Post portrayed the leaders of the group, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, a former Democratic member of Congress, as “surrender monkeys.”
Republican moderates clung to the report, mindful of the drubbing the party received in last month’s midterm elections largely because of Iraq. They said they hoped President Bush would adopt the group’s principal recommendations and begin the process of disengagement from the long and costly war. But White House officials who conducted a preliminary review of the report said they had concluded that many of the proposals were impractical or unrealistic.
The divisions could make it more difficult for Republicans to coalesce on national security policy and avoid a bitter intraparty fight going into the 2008 campaign.
Senator John McCain of Arizona, a leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, rejected the major recommendations of the group because they did not present a formula for victory. Mr. McCain, hoping to claim the Republican mantle on national security issues, has staked out a muscular position on Iraq, calling for an immediate increase in American forces to try to bring order to Baghdad and crush the insurgency.
…[T]he debate will go to the heart of the party’s identity — and its image as the party of strength on national security — after Mr. Bush’s aggressive post-Sept. 11 foreign policy brought electoral successes in 2002 and 2004 but was profoundly challenged by voters this year.
… Republicans are already engaged in soul-searching over the results of the recent election, trying to figure out how the party can regain the faith of the American people on questions of war and peace.
The ambivalence and introspection were summed up by Senator Gordon H. Smith of Oregon, who spoke at length in the Senate this week about the dangers of withdrawing from Iraq but said he could no longer support the status quo.
“I, for one, am at the end of my rope when it comes to supporting a policy that has our soldiers patrolling the same streets in the same way, being blown up by the same bombs day after day,” Mr. Smith said. “That is absurd. It may even be criminal. I cannot support that anymore. I believe we need to figure out how to fight the war on terror and to do it right. So either we clear and hold and build, or let’s go home.”
The frustration was widespread among Congressional Republicans, some of whom were serving their final days in office this week after an election largely influenced by the public’s unhappiness with the war.
Here’s some more about Sen. Smith, from his home-state’s leading paper, The Oregonian: An editorial there commented that in making his statement in the Senate Thursday night, Smith,
- broke ranks with such hawks as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., and the president himself. He placed himself among such colleagues as Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., who have said the United States must withdraw from Iraq as quickly as possible.
While Smith used blunt language — “let’s cut and run, or cut and walk, or let us fight the war on terror more intelligently than we have” — his remarks didn’t signal as abrupt a break as it might have appeared.
He acknowledged Thursday that he had voted to allow the president to invade, that he had hoped U.S. forces would find secret caches of weapons of mass destruction, that he was thrilled by the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein and was heartened by the way Iraqis turned out to vote three times in national elections.
But after he visited Oregon National Guard troops near Kirkuk in March last year, he said, “We can be a counterproductive force for Iraqi democracy if we are there longer than is necessary. My own hunch is somewhere between 18 months to two years, the American presence in Iraq will be much reduced.”
It’s been 18 months and the presence hasn’t been reduced at all. Nor is a functional central government much closer to asserting itself. Nor is the Iraqi economy any stronger. Nor are U.S. troops dying any less frequently. And more Iraqis are being killed each month than ever.
As a partial explanation for why he chose to speak now, Smith harked back to his visit to the Kirkuk region. He said one soldier told him: “Senator, don’t tell me you support the troops and not our mission.” That, the senator said, gave him pause.
But 18 months later, with billions of dollars flushed away, thousands more bodies under the ground and no end in sight, the senator’s pause is over.
His comments strengthen his hand in advance of his 2008 re-election campaign. They would seem to place him closer to the position of voters who kicked his party out of power last month and certainly closer to the sentiments of most of blue-state Oregon.
But personal political calculations aside, the timing of Smith’s remarks helped to increase the pressure on President Bush to break with his policies of the last 18 months. The election results, the ouster of Donald Rumsfeld as defense secretary in favor of a man who says America is not winning in Iraq and the arrival of the Iraq Study Group report make this a propitious moment in our political history.
It is a moment when the president must acknowledge what is obvious even to his former supporters in the U.S. Senate. It is time to reset American policy in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.
There is more virtue in admitting a mistake than there is in repeating it, over and over.
Well said.
Why I welcome the ISG report
The
ISG report,
released yesterday, did not urge two of the key steps that
I consider essential
if the US is to be able to undertake a troop withdrawal from Iraq that
is orderly, speedy, total, and generous. It did not urge that President
Bush publicly specify a deadline or timetable for the completion of the US
withdrawal. And it did not urge giving the key role in sponsoring the diplomacy
required to allow this withdrawal to the U.N…. However what it did recommend
was a quantum-leap improvement over the policies still being publicly stated
by the President (and also, over what many of the congressional democrats
have been advocating.)
I consider it extremely important that this document, endorsed unanimously by
this high-level, bipartisan group, came out openly and made statements as
forthright (and true) as the following:
“The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no
path that can guarantee success… Violence [in Iraq] is increasing in scope
and lethality.”(xiii)“If current trends continue, the potential consequences are severe” (ix)
“If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could
be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government
and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia
clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its
base of operations.” (xiv)“Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and
their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to
engage them constructively.”(xv)“The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it
deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There
must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive
Arab- Israeli peace on all fronts.”(xv)“Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is
rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making
no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost.”(p.38)
The ISG report is not perfect. But in understanding its imperfections
(as well as its achievements) it’s important to understand what it is, and
what it is not. What it is, is primarily a very high-level and serious
intervention inside US politics. From that point of view, it
is barely “about” Iraq at all. It is much more “about” this group of
senior statespeople trying to grab hold of the wheel of the ship of (the American)
state and slowly drag this lumbering great vessel away from a course that
has been– and still is, to this day– most evidently headed towards a disaster.
A disaster for all the parties concerned: Americans, Iraqis,
the neighbors of Iraq… And though I completely understand that it
has always been the Iraqis who have suffered the most from the terrible consequences
of the actions undertaken inside their country by the US military, still, at
this point it is the US government that has the greatest capability to affect
the course of events inside Iraq; so if we want to stop the terrible bloodletting
there the first thing we (US citizens and others) need to do is do
everything in our capacity to change the policies that have until been blindly
pursued by the Bush administration.
Of course, if we had anything like a robust parliamentary system here in
the US, or at the very least a functioning multi-party system, then we could
have expected the kinds of recommendation now being made by the ISG to have
been advocated very forcefully throughout the past 18 months or more by
the opposition party. But we don’t. We have had– and still,
until the inauguration of the new Congress will continue to have– a completely
sclerotic and dysfunctional one-party system. And what’s more,
even once the Democrats come in as the majority party in both Houses of Congress
on January 1, we can know that they won’t be much better than the Republicans
on such key aspects of the policy towards Iraq as the need for diplomacy with powers like Iran and Syria; the need for urgent, even-handed
engagement in Israeli-Arab peacemaking; or even on troop levels, etc… So
this is what we have had instead: a high-level, “senior statespeoples’ group” convened
back in March at the initiative of a generally quiet Republican Conghressman
from Northern Virginia called Frank Wolf, who had been shocked by what he
saw in Iraq when he made his third post-invasion visit to the country in September
2005.
For my part, of course I’m disappointed that the ISG didn’t go that important
bit further and endorse both a much stronger role for the UN, and the announcement
of a fixed timetable for the US troop withdrawal from Iraq.
Interestingly,
this
report in today’s WaPo tells us that the most serious threat to the unanimity
that marked the group’s final position came precisely over the deadline issue.
The WaPo reporters cite unnamed “insiders” as saying that ISG member
Bill Perry– a Clinton-era Defense Secretary– had threatened not to sign off on the final
document unless it specified such a deadline. But–
Former secretary of state James A. Baker III resisted a firm
date, wanting to leave that to the president.“I’m not going to sign anything that is going to paper over the problem,”
Perry said.“Well, if that’s the case, that’s the case,” Baker replied.
In the end, though, Baker and Perry walked off together to settle their
differences rather than let them split the commission. With suggestions from
other members, they crafted careful language that they both could support,
a recommendation to pull out nearly all U.S. combat units by early 2008 —
a goal, not a timetable, but a date nonetheless.
So yes, I’m a bit disappointed. But the much larger point here is
that the ISG has spelled out clearly that there is no possibility of a military
“victory” in Iraq, and that the US’s continued engagement there is inflicting
serious, continuing damage on our citizenry’s interests. (This is, of course,
the classic definition of a “quagmire”.) Therefore, they rightly conclude
that the administration has to find a way to get the US troops out of the
quagmire that Iraq has become. And as cool realists capable of
reading and understanding maps (which perhaps our president is not), they all
understand quite fully that no such withdrawal can be contemplated without also having a plan to win the approval of major Iraqi neighbors as Iran, Turkey, Syria,
and Saudi Arabia to the withdrawal plan.
Hence the need for negotiations…
ISG reaction from Reidar Visser
- Reidar Visser has written some very good analysis of the Baker-Hamilton– Iraq Study group– report. It’s posted here on his historiae.org website. But I’m also going to put it up here so we can then all discuss it. ~HC
The Iraq Study Group: Regionalisation Not Balkanisation
By Reidar Visser (http://historiae.org)
6 December 2006
In a remarkable rejection of partitionist winds that have blown through America over the past year, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) in its report of 6 December 2006 recommended a final big push for the Iraqi national reconciliation process, with the collective effort of regional powers as a potential catalyst.
As far as state structure issues are concerned, partition (or any kind of unconstitutional federalisation, whether “from above” by Iraqi elite politicians or on the basis of foreign advice) was apparently never taken seriously by the ISG. Already prior to the release of the report, a few members of the ISG working groups had complained to the press that they had felt marginalised during the process and that their proposals never truly came on the agenda. The report itself rather brusquely dismisses the prospect of “devolution to three regions” (p. 43), citing arguments that for once are almost identical to those of the Bush administration: practical infeasibility and the dangers of greater regional chaos. Elsewhere, the report mostly shuns the federalisation question, with the implicit message that they envisage this process to stay on track according to the constitution: outside Kurdistan, federal decentralisation is optional not mandatory, and if it is to be done, it will start by initiatives “from below” in the Iraqi governorates, not by Baghdad politicians or by outsiders with “plans” for Iraq.
Instead, the report advocates a serious attempt to get the national reconciliation process back on track, especially as regards re-inclusion of the Sunnis. To facilitate this, it proposes new initiatives on several levels. Perhaps most significantly, there are proposals to work for greater regional momentum that could be conducive to a more peaceful Iraq. The ISG advocates the creation of an “international support group” for Iraq that would include neighbouring states, which in a collective forum might be able to transcend some of their narrow interests linked to their particular protégées inside Iraq. Importantly, active steps to progress in the wider Arab–Israeli conflict and the Palestine issue are recognised as a central pillar for improving the regional atmosphere.
The ISG also suggests that the Iraqi government itself is not doing enough to drive the national reconciliation effort forward. It focuses on the need for rapprochement with the marginalised Sunnis, and introduces several new ideas about how to achieve that. These include a suggestion for United Nations support in the constitutional revision process, a rather outspoken criticism of the current Iraqi constitution’s allotment of undiscovered “future” oil fields to the regions instead of to the central government (apparently the criticism is also directed against regional control of the oil sector as such), international arbitration over Kirkuk, and a delay of the Kirkuk referendum (pp. 65–66.) There is also a more general “talk-to-everyone-but-al-Qaida” attitude throughout the report.
Many of these proposals are quite radical in that they explicitly challenge the current version of the Iraqi constitution. But at the same time they also serve as alternatives that could receive consideration in the constitutional review process. Some of these suggestions have earlier been floated in international NGOs and by figures working in the United Nations system. It is likely that the driving forces behind the 2005 constitution (chiefly the two big Kurdish parties and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI) will feel threatened by some of the recommendations in the report. On the other hand, these suggestions should appeal to a large silent majority of Iraqi nationalists of both Shiite and Sunni backgrounds, as well as to regional powers worried about Iraqi decentralisation spinning out of control.
In the current situation, regionalisation and multilateralism generally come across as good ideas, although the United States should not underestimate the desire of regional powers to keep them engaged, mired down in Iraq. The proposed overtures to regional powers in turn reflect a failure of United States policy in the Middle East in two areas. Firstly, inside Iraq, it relates to a communications problem. The ISG report explicitly acknowledges this (p. 14), asserting that the United States is “unable” to talk to the most important Shiite figure (the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani), and “does not talk” to another important political leader, Muqtada al-Sadr. This has led to sole reliance on the Shiite party that best understands how to deal with Washington – SCIRI – which happens to be the party with the most long-standing and systematic ties to Iran, and which is also the author of the Shiite federalism proposals that most infuriates the Sunnis. But SCIRI account only for some 23% of the deputies within the big pro-Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), and their elevation to a pre-eminent contact point reflects a failure on the part of Washington to engage other partners among the Shiites. This has created some remarkable contradictions in US policy. There was something distinctly Trojan about the way in which pro-Iranian SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim was invited to Washington for high-level talks only days after a leaked memo by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld had advocated a robust strengthening of US forces along the border with Iran to physically protect Iraq against Iranian influences.
The second issue that has precipitated a turn to regional powers relates to overall US policy in the region. Importantly, the ISG recognises the inter-relationships between Iraq and broader regional issues. Until there is a minimum of consistency in the US approach to democracy and human rights issues across different countries in the Middle East, it will remain unable to conduct an ideological foreign policy and will rely on compromises with regional states. This also affects the situation in Iraq, where many parties are reluctant to talk to the United States precisely because they are unconvinced about Washington’s overall vision for the region. Until the US becomes more energetic in solving the Arab–Israeli conflict – chiefly by speeding up the process towards an independent Palestinian state within borders approximating the pre-1967 situation and with an honourable settlement for the 1948 refugees – this problem will remain.
Copyright © 2006 historiae.org
This document may be freely reproduced as long as http://historiae.org is credited as the source.
Annals of the US punishment system: Percy Walton
The (Democratic) governor of our state, Timothy Kaine, today announced that he has delayed for a further 18 months the execution of Mr. Percy Walton, a 28-year-old African-American man. This delay is intended to give the state time to determine whether Walton is mentally fit to be executed.
As Frank Green, the excellent staff writer of the Richmond Times-Dispatch who follows death-penalty affairs in the state, wrote:
- Kaine said, “I am compelled to conclude that Walton is severely mentally impaired and meets the Supreme Court’s definition of mental incompetence.”
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled a person is not competent to be executed if he is unaware of the punishment about to be suffered and why.
Kaine said it was possible, though unlikely, that Walton’s mental impairment is not permanent. So, he said, a commutation of Walton’s sentence was not yet appropriate. He then delayed Walton’s execution until June 10, 2008, to permit fur- ther observation.
Walton is a man who by his own admission has done some very bad things. In 1997, Walton pled guilty to the 1996 murders of his neighbors Jessie Kendrick, 80, Elizabeth Kendrick, 81, and Archie D. Moore Jr., 33.
I find the idea that a state– a state, moreover, that claims to be acting in my name– would set out deliberately to kill one of its citizens to be horrifying, and barbaric. But even within the paradigm of the death penalty being “thinkable”, the Walton case raises some extremely perplexing issues. To be executed, the US Supreme Court has ruled, a person has to be mentally competent enough to understand what is about to happen to him?? How ghoulish is that?
And then, there is a whole series of questions about the responsibilities of mental-health professionals under these circumstances. Should it be the responsibility of a mental-health professional to improve Mr. Walton’s meantal-health status condition sufficiently that he then becomes “fit” to be executed?
According to Frank Green’s article, Walton has been under the care of mental health personnel employed by the Virginia Department of Corrections, and one of Walton’s lawyers has explained that it is these DOC personnel– and not Walton’s lawyers– who have determined the treatment that he should receive.
I wonder if it is mandatory under the law that a prisoner under these circumstances should follow any treatment course prescribed. (What if the prisoner is a Christian Scientist or has other religious-based objections to the procedures of physical medicine?) Generally, when the state forces a person with mental disabilities to follow a certain course of treatment this is justified only on the basis that it is to prevent the person causing harm to her/himself or others… But in this case, any mandating of treatment would be “justified” on the basis that the person should be made “fit” enough to have the state cause fatal harm to him.
The whole business is, of course, unspeakably tragic. If Virginia succeeds in killing Percy Walton, this won’t bring his victims back to life.
If these kind of questions interest you, go read the whole of Frank Green’s piece. You’ll find that the (Republican) Attorney-General of the state expresses impatience with the delays and just wants Kaine to get on with the execution. (I should note, though, that support for the death penalty here in Virginia does not break down along straight party lines. We’ve had at least one prominent Republican state legislator who came out very strongly against the death penalty. And Kaine, though he’s a Catholic, is not a complete opponent of the death penalty, at all…)
At the end of Green’s article is this appeal from a daughter of the elderly couple killed by Walton, that his death sentence simply be commuted– i.e., changed to a lengthy term of imprisonment– rather than having its ‘execution’ endlessly delayed:
- Barbara Case, of Brandon, Miss., daughter of the couple slain by Walton, said last night, “We don’t need another 18 months. It’s been 10 years.”
“How is he going to get any better? Why didn’t he just commute his sentence,” she asked. Some relatives of the Kendricks have said in the past that they believe Walton should be executed.
I’m speaking at USIP on December 11
.. about my atrocities book.
Here‘s the info. It looks like a good event: we’ve got some great people responding to my presentation.
Today, they had SCIRI head Abdul-Aziz Hakim at USIP. Wednesday, they’ll be releasing the Iraq Study Group report. Then next Monday it’s my thing. It’s at 2 p.m. Come if you can– but I think they need an RSVP.
Bush and new buddy Hakim
And yes, when I wrote the last post I was quite aware that SCIRI head Abdul-Aziz Hakim met Bush at the White House today. I just couldn’t figure how to fit that into the rest of the post there.
I am absolutely befuddled as to what the heck Bush thinks he is doing with this meeting. (Probably not as befuddled as Bush himself… “Who is this dude with a turban? Is he from Eye-Ran or where?”)
This BBC report tells us,
- The Associated Press news agency quotes Mr Bush as saying he told Mr Hakim “the US supports his work and the work of the prime minister to unify the country”.
“I told his eminence that I was proud of the courage of the Iraqi people. I told him that we’re not satisfied with the pace of progress in Iraq.”
This is such gobbledygook. Hakim has done very little indeed to “unify the country”– and it is SCIRI’s militia, the Badr Brigades, that has committed the very worst kind of atrocities against Iraqi Sunnis.
As I’ve remarked before, the Bushites (and most of the US media) seem intent on painting Moqtada Sadr as the main sectarian divider in Iraq, while generally overlooking the many ghastly crimes of sectarian hatred committed by the Badr Brigades. But Moqtada has, by all accounts, always been much more intent than anyone in SCIRI/Badr on keeping his lines of communication and dialogue open with Iraqi Sunnis. (Even though on several occasions he has apparently been unable to maintain the requisite level of internal discipline in this regard over all his scores of thousands of followers.)
And now, most recently, we have seen Moqtada working with Saleh al-Mutlak and others to build a new, cross-sectarian, national coalition.
Well anyway, Bush’s Iraq “policy” is in a completely direction-less, flailing-around tailspin. They grasp at straws. I suppose that this particular Hakim-related straw, whenever it was set up, was aimed at “sending a message to Maliki” to the effect that if he wouldn’t shape up then the Bushites had another favored candidate for PM waiting in the wings..
It is all pathetic, all tragic, and signifies nothing. (Except, so long as the US forces remain in Iraq, continued suffering for the Iraqi people and continued losses and traumas for the men and women of the US armed forces…. Regarding which, I have one main comment: “Draft the Bush twins!”)
Cross-sectarian politics inside Iraq today
US pols and the ponderous commentatoriat in this country have become quite fixated on the idea that Iraqis have become unalterably divided into mutually antagonistic blocs of “Kurds”, “Sunnis”, and “Shias”. That is about as far as the analytical capabilities of most of these people go… And you hear all kinds of people arguing earnestly about whether the US ought to “get wholly behind ‘the’ Shia”, or “try to play a balancing game with ‘the’ Soonis”, or whatever. (They can’t even say the words properly; but they try, they try.)
But basically they are parroting and perpetuating a sort of “essentialized” view of Iraq’s 26 million men and women whereby nearly every single Iraqi can be handily put into one of these boxes… Which are always viewed as mutually anatgonistic– and sometimes even genocidally so.
So how come we’ve seen no discussion in the US MSM about reports like this one by As’ad Jemayyel (Jamil?) on the independent Iraqi newswire Aswat al-Iraq yesterday? He wrote– and my translation here is refined from the one that Badger posted yesterday on Missing Links– about an announcement made Sunday by the head of the (majority Sunni) National Dialogue Front, Saleh al-Mutlak, as follows:
- Mutlak said today there will soon be an announcement about establishment of a National Salvation Front in Iraq to include various political and religious figures.
Mutlak explained in a statement given to journalists accompanying his visit to the Jordanian capital Amman that, “The announcement of the formation of this front will lead to the correction of effective political work.”
And he added that, “This Front will unclude, inaddition to the National Dialogue Front, the Iraqi List led by Iyad Allawi, the Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc led by Mashaan Juburi, and the Sadrist movement led by Moqtada al-Sadr.”
He noted that, “There will also be participation by parties and currents that are [currently] outside the political process, among them the Foundation Conference led by Jawad al-Halasi, tribal elements from south and central Iraq, along with representatives of the Yazidis and the Turkmen; Kurdish movements that oppose secession; and Christian blocs; along with the Arabist Shiite current.”
And Mutlak said, “This front will be supported by religious figures of political and social weight, among them al-Baghdadi, al-Yaqubi, al-Muiid, the Sarakhi conference, and the Khalisia school.”
Badger also gave us another report on that post, about a separate coalition-building effort at the local level, in Basra, with some good discussion also contributed there by Reidar Visser.
And today, Badger has a short follow-up on the Saleh al-Mutlak story– this one from Az-Zaman— in which Mutlak is quoted as clarifying that the soon-to-be-announced Front will exclude: SCIRI; the part of the Da’wa Party to which PM Nouri al-Maliki belongs; and the two [big] Kurdish parties.
All this is truly fascinating, cross-sectarian politics. But not a peep about it in the mainstream US discourse.
I mean, what is happening is that apparently Moqtada al-Sadr– who was crudely caricatured on the Newsweek cover this week, and portrayed as some kind of near devil-incarnate– is entering a coalition with Mutlak (a “Sooni”) and Allawi (pretty much of a secularist and a fairly strongly Baath-style enforcer), and between them the three of them are also hoping to split Maliki’s party and lure a sizeable chunk of its members over to their new Front….
Important stuff, don’t you think?
The politics of the new Front haven’t been described in any great detail that I’ve seen. But I’m fairly confident that this group of people would be fairly strongly Iraqi-nationalist and anti-occupation. (Though Iyad Allawi looms like a bit of an outlier in this regard.) They are also determinedly cross-sectarian.
So my question remains: Why don’t we hear anything about this in the MSM?
I mean, I know journalists can tend to get lazy and use handy labels like “Shiite” or “Sooni” in a fairly sloppy way… But doing so at a time like the present seems to run at least two serious risks: (1) Inasmuch as western media people have any effect on attitudes in Iraq, the too-sloppy use of such labels would seem to essentialize and harden the inter-sectarian differences in question; and (2) This sloppiness leaves the average US consumer of media– and the average US policymaker– completely in the dark about what is really going on, while strengthening these people’s beliefs that all Iraqis are simply primitive, unidimensional beings who are “consumed by ancient tribal hatreds”, etc etc (and thus, that they more or less “deserve” whatever horrendous things befall them.)
So amidst all this ignorance, it’s even more notable that we have bloggers like Abu Aardvark and Badger to help get these stories out. Thanks, guys.
Addendum Tuesday morning: I also meant to put in a reminder of the extent to which this tracks with what much of Faiza blogged about, regarding the persistence of cross-sectarian ties, in the posts she wrote after her recent trip back to Baghdad– as I noted here.
Visser on federalism: Iraq and Spain
Reudar Visser has a new article up on his website. It’s titled Federalism from Below in Iraq: Some Historical and Comparative Reflections. It’s a comparison between, mainly, the federalizing process as laid out for Iraq in the “Constitution” rammed through under US pressure in 2005, and the process whereby post-Franco Spain became a federation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
JWN readers know how much I have always admired Visser and his very careful and well-grounded analytical work on Iraq. There’s lots of interesting information in this new article, and a number of potential lessons. However, I must note that I believe that the situation inside Iraq has changed (deteriorated) so much in the past six months that I find it hard to see that the 2005 “Constitution” is going to be a document of much continuing relevance, let alone of any “binding” quality.
Sorry to be so gloomy.
Alert: Childish sexism at work
There is quite enough sexism, demeaning of women, and exclusion of women from the public sphere already without Joshua Landis further contributing to and propagating childish sexist attitudes on what is supposed to be a blog about serious public-policy issues.
What’s more, Landis’s blog is supposed to be about Syria. But so eager was he to jump on the ogling-women bandwagon that he even went leeringly off-topic there to put up that special post about the bodily attributes of female participants in various protests in Lebanon.
Landis lists himself on the blog as “Co-director of the Center for Peace Studies at the University of Oklahoma.” I truly don’t understand what anyone who propagates such crass, good-old-boys-ish material about women is doing anywhere near a “Center for Peace Studies.” Does he propagate this same demeaning, objectifying view of women there, too, I wonder? “Peacemaking through the demeaning and social exclusion of half of humanity”– hey, it could be a major new contribution to the field….
Put away the dirty raincoat, Josh, and try growing up.
(If people are seriously interested in the emerging role of women within Islamist movements like Hizbullah or Hamas, they can go to the kinds of sources cited in this recent JWN post.)