The generally very wise Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld has a must-read article in the online edition of New Perspectives Quarterly. It’s titled ” The Fall: Consequences of US Withdrawal From Iraq” and starts thus:
Now that the American people have recognized that the war in Iraq is hopeless, what comes next? The answer is, the US is going to cut its losses and withdraw.
Then, with admirable focus, he gets right into the nitty-gritty of what that will entail:
Withdrawing 140,000 soldiers with all their equipment is a very complex operation. In 1945 and 1973, the US simply evacuated its troops, leaving most of its equipment to its West European and South Vietnamese protégés respectively.
This time, however, things are different. So precious is modern defense equipment that not even the largest power on earth can afford to abandon large quantities of it; in this respect, the model is the First Gulf War, not Vietnam or World War II.
Second, whatever equipment is left in Iraq is very likely to fall into the hands of America’s enemies. Thus the Pentagon will have no choice but to evacuate millions of tons of war materiel the way it came—in other words, back at least as far as Kuwait. Doing so will be time-consuming and enormously expensive. Inevitably, it will also involve casualties as the road-bound convoys making their way south are shot up and bombed.
Van C is completely right both in his assessment that the US will have to withdraw from the melee in Iraq, and in his approach of starting from the “ground truth” of the logistics of any matter.
Longtime JWN readers might recall that back in July 2005, when I started thinking seriously about the modalities and logistics of how the US might withdraw from Iraq, I too noted the huge scale of the logistical challenge involved… I wrote here, for example, “Given the need to muster the necessary sealift, airlift, and other logistics, I think that 4-5 months from the date that Washington makes the total-withdrawal decision to the time the last British squadron follows the last US troops out of the door would be about right.”
However, I disagree with Van Creveld’s forecast that “the road-bound convoys making their way south [would be] shot up and bombed.” Why do I disagree there? Primarily because if there is a chance of serious harrassment of the withdrawal convoys as they head for the exits, then no responsible US commander is going to order such a withdrawal. In other words, the US generals themselves– that is, the men who have accepted responsibility for the lives and welfare of the men and women under their command– are honor bound to insist that the political leadership do everything in its power to create conditions on the ground that will permit a withdrawal that is orderly and as safe as possible.
(I probably don’t need to remind most readers of the horrendous scale of the losses the British– and “British” Indian– forces suffered in Iraq in 1916-1917.)
That was why, back in that July 2005 post on JWN and in all my many writings since then on how the US can plan an orderly withdrawal from Iraq– for which, check out the links at the top of the main page sidebar there– I have simply taken it as given that once the Prez has taken the tough decision that he needs to order a full withdrawal, the first order of business will be to conduct whatever contacts are necessary to create the climate in Iraq and the region within which the US commanders can organize their orderly withdrawal with the absolute minimum level of casualties.
And yes, of course that incoludes contacts with an Iran that strategically dominates the exit routes not only within Iraq but also right along the Gulf to the Straits of Hormuz.
In that July 2005 post, I wrote this:
How can US troops redeploying out of Iraq be assured they won’t be harrassed/attacked along the way?
This is a concern with some validity. The US authorities could negotiate an agreement on this matter with the Jaafari government. Of course, at present, the Jaafari government is not a body viewed as representative by many Iraqis, especially the more nationalistic ones. But if he could say to his compatriots: “Look, here is the plan for the total withdrawal of US troops so let’s all calm things down,” then he actually might suddenly develop nationwide credibility. And even if he didn’t gain that, simply the fact that the US troops are visibly following a well-publicized and timely withdrawal schedule would certainly mean that many other Iraqi leaders at the local level would come forward and say, “Yes, let’s make sure this goes smoothly.”
Of course, the political situation in Iraq has changed (deteriorated) a huge amount since the days of the Jaafari “government”. In the “Three-step program” for a US withdrawal that I laid out just one month ago, I updated that portion of the plan. The first of the three steps I describe there is that the president should make a public announcement of “His firm intention to pull all US troops out of Iraq by a date certain, perhaps 4-6 months ahead.”
Then my description of the second step starts like this:
(2) The clock starts ticking on the timetable announced by the President. That fact and the other new diplomatic realities created by his announcement all act together to start transforming the political dynamics within Iraq, the region, and indeed the US, as well. The Iraqi parties and movements all have a powerful incentive to work with each other and the UN for the speedy success of the negotiation over the post-occupation political order…
Btw, the third step is: “(3) On the date certain the last US troops leave Iraq and there is a handing-over ceremony.”
Anyway, that is one criticism– albeit, one with very significant political/strategic implications– of what Van Creveld wrote in NPQ. I also have some disagreements with his forecast of the kind of political order that will exist inside Iraq after the US withdrawal.
Regarding regional balances after the US withdrawal, he writes that Iran’s regional position has already been significantly strengthened by the US’s actions in Iraq. Then, this:
To make sure some future American president does not get it into his or her head to attack Iran as Iraq was attacked (essentially, for no reason at all), the Iranians are going to press ahead as fast as they can in building nuclear weapons.
A powerful Iran presents a threat to the world’s oil supplies and should therefore worry Washington. To deter Iran, US forces will have to stay in the region for the indefinite future; most probably they will be divided between Kuwait, much of which has already been turned into a vast US base; Oman; and some other Gulf states. One can only hope that the forces in question, and the political will behind them, will be strong enough to deter Iran from engaging in adventures. If not, then God help us all.
Some countries in the Middle East ought to be even more worried about Iran than the US. While turning to the latter for protection, several of them will almost certainly take a second look into the possibility of starting their own nuclear programs. Each time a country proliferates, its neighbors will ask whether they, too, need to do the same. In time, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Syria may all end up with nuclear arsenals. How this will affect the regional balance of power is impossible to say…
For my part, I’m not so sure about this. In the context of a serious retrenchment of US power in the Gulf region, should we not all be redoubling our efforts to negotiate the transformation of the entire Middle East into a zone verifiedly free of all weapons of mass destruction? Surely, for all persons anywhere who are concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, this turning-point in the Gulf towards which we are now approaching should surely give us all new impetus, as well as a new opportunity to work urgently to negotiate an agreement to this end.
Van Creveld seems to be a nuclear-proliferation fatalist. I note, in addition, that he makes no mention of the one indigenous power within the Middle East that already has a robust nuclear arsenal– Israel. And nor does he mention the fact that US Navy ships in the fleets now assembling in the Gulf are also nuclear-armed….
He ends by essaying a look into the global strategic implications of the coming US withdrawal from Iraq:
Before 2003, many people looked at the US as a colossus that was bestriding the earth. Whatever else, the war has left the US with its international position weakened; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice may bark, but she can hardly bite. So shattered and demoralized are the armed forces that they can only fill their ranks by taking in 41-year-old grandmothers. Hence, the first task confronting Robert Gates, nominated to be the new secretary of defense, and his eventual successors must be to rebuild them to the point where they may again be used if necessary.
Above all, the US must take a hard look at its foreign policy. What role should the strongest power on earth play in the international arena, and just what are the limits of that role? How can American power be matched with its finite economic possibilities—the US balance of payment gap and deficit are now huge—and under what circumstances should it be used? If American power is used, what should its objectives be?
He is asking some very important questions here. But I believe that he is far too cautious and indeed, from his perspective, “optimistic” in his assessment of the global strategic effects of the whole US military debacle inside Iraq. He seems to assume that it would easily be possible for the US to effect a complete restoration of the kind of military-based US hegemony over the world that existed prior to 2003. I believe that is unlikely to happen, for a number of reasons. And from my perspective as someone committed to building relations of equality and mutual respect among all the people of the world regardless of citizenship, and who hates all the effects of violence, I truly do not seek the restoration of that hegemony.
Look what that situation of unfettered hegemony allowed the US government to do back in 2003…
Yes, we might now have a Congress in Washington that is more “conservative” than Mr. Bush regarding the idea of launching optional military aggressions overseas… But still, our country needs to use the imminent prospect of retrenchment in Iraq to re-think the entirety of its stance vis-a-vis the other peoples of the world. And I will certainly be making the case that this should be a relationship of equality and non-militarism.
(This discussion about the extent of the US’s retrenchment in world affairs is broadly similar to the one undertaken in Britain after the debacle of the Suez affair in 1956… Too bad that Tony Blair never really learned the lesson of that debacle or shared it with his good friend in the White House, eh?)
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… In the context of this discussion of the prospects regarding a US withdrawal from Iraq, I just want to note, even if somewhat belatedly, the testimony that Zbigniew Brzezinksi gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 1. (PDF original here.)
That was an important statement, from a man who was Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor back in the day and who has certainly retained and honed his powers of analysis and understanding in the decades since then.
Here’s some of what he said:
It is time for the White House to come to terms with two central realities:
1. The war in Iraq is a historic, strategic, and moral calamity. Undertaken under false assumptions, it is undermining America’s global legitimacy. Its collateral civilian casualties as well as some abuses are tarnishing America’s moral credentials. Driven by Manichean impulses and imperial hubris, it is intensifying regional instability.
2. Only a political strategy that is historically relevant rather than reminiscent of colonial tutelage can provide the needed framework for a tolerable resolution of both the war in Iraq and the intensifying regional tensions.
… The quest for a political solution for the growing chaos in Iraq should involve four steps:
1. The United States should reaffirm explicitly and unambiguously its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short period of time.
Ambiguity regarding the duration of the occupation in fact encourages unwillingness to compromise and intensifies the on-going civil strife. Moreover, such a public declaration is needed to allay fears in the Middle East of a new and enduring American imperial hegemony. Right or wrong, many view the establishment of such a hegemony as the primary reason for the American intervention in a region only recently free of colonial domination. That perception should be discredited from the highest U.S. level. Perhaps the U.S. Congress could do so by a joint resolution.
2. The United States should announce that it is undertaking talks with the Iraqi leaders to jointly set with them a date by which U.S. military disengagement should be completed, and the resulting setting of such a date should be announced as a joint decision. In the meantime, the U.S. should avoid military escalation.
It is necessary to engage all Iraqi leaders — including those who do not reside within “the Green Zone” — in a serious discussion regarding the proposed and jointly defined date for U.S. military disengagement because the very dialogue itself will help identify the authentic Iraqi leaders with the self-confidence and capacity to stand on their own legs without U.S. military protection…
3. The United States should issue jointly with appropriate Iraqi leaders, or perhaps let the Iraqi leaders issue, an invitation to all neighbors of Iraq (and perhaps some other Muslim countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan) to engage in a dialogue regarding how best to enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction with U.S. military disengagement and to participate eventually in a conference regarding regional stability.
The United States and the Iraqi leadership need to engage Iraq’s neighbors in serious discussion regarding the region’s security problems, but such discussions cannot be undertaken while the U.S. is perceived as an occupier for an indefinite duration. Iran and Syria have no reason to help the United States consolidate a permanent regional hegemony. It is ironic, however, that both Iran and Syria have lately called for a regional dialogue, exploiting thereby the self-defeating character of the largely passive — and mainly sloganeering — U.S. diplomacy.
A serious regional dialogue, promoted directly or indirectly by the U.S., could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle of consultations involving other powers with a stake in the region’s stability, such as the EU, China, Japan, India, and Russia. Members of this Committee might consider exploring informally with the states mentioned their potential interest in such a wider dialogue.
4. Concurrently, the United States should activate a credible and energetic effort to finally reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace, making it clear in the process as to what the basic parameters of such a final accommodation ought to involve.
The United States needs to convince the region that the U.S. is committed both to Israel’s enduring security and to fairness for the Palestinians who have waited for more than forty years now for their own separate state. Only an external and activist intervention can promote the long-delayed settlement for the record shows that the Israelis and the Palestinians will never do so on their own. Without such a settlement, both nationalist and fundamentalist passions in the region will in the longer run doom any Arab regime which is perceived as supportive of U.S. regional hegemony.
There’s a tremendous amount of good sense there. Let’s hope that all the Senators paid good heed.