A quick search of Juan Cole’s blog revealed about 20 entries there to the 1920 Revolution Brigades, which is the way Juan (generally) renders the name of the Sunni insurgent group in Iraq that was apparently the one that recently forwarded a pre-negotiation proposal to Bob Fisk. (As I posted about yesterday, here.)
Juan really has done an extraordinarily valuable job of drawing together, and presenting to the English-reading public, nearly all the main news developments out of Iraq, day after day after wearying day since late 2002. What a truly incredible archive that blog now represents!
The earliest of Juan’s references to the 1920RB was, as far as I can figure, this one, from November 15, 2004. Juan wrote there:
The 1920 revolution against the British is key to modern Iraqi history. One of the guerrilla groups taking hostages named itself the “1920 Revolution Brigades.” Western journalists who don’t know Iraqi history have routinely mistranslated the name of this group.
And the most recent was this one– from last Saturday (February 10), in which he wrote:
Al-Hayat also says that the 1920 Revolution Brigades (also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement) refused to join the “Islamic State of Iraq” coalition or “al-Qa’eda and its allies on the other side. The US has called on the group to enter talks with Washington.
This indicates to me that the document passed to Fisk may have been an early 1920RB response to that invitation from the US? Interesting that they should try to communicate a document to and through Bob Fisk, presumably as a way of trying to win it a bigger readership in English-speaking countries than it could expect if it were handed only to Al-Hayat or other Arabic media.
(This, even if Bob Fisk did apparently misunderstand the exact name of the group communicating with him.)
Anyway, as I wrote in my earlier post and was well established by other commenters there, it is evident that this position from the 1920RB, if they are indeed, as I believe, the originators of the “Jeelani-Fisk proposal” is not one that the US can immediately agree to. But, and I can’t stress this enough, it looks like a good, solid pre-negotiation communication; and it should therefore be met with considerable interest by all Americans, as well as with a cautious– and possibly highly circumspect– welcome by our government, and a commitment to actively explore all aspects of the topics raised.
For example, the demand for the release, “as a goodwill gesture” of 5,000 of the more than 11,000 Sunni Iraqis currently being detained in US prisons in Iraq is surely one that could be looked at and responded to in some measure, or perhaps even fully?
Of course there is still massive distrust between these two sides– the Sunni insurgents and the US government– and this is fed by numerous sizeable grievances that are still vividly remembered by each side. No point trying to silver-coat or ignore that… And numerous vast questions still remain, as I noted in my earlier post, about the “shape” of any negotiations for a final peace in Iraq, including the roster of the parties that should be represented at them.
But as I told Juan in a private communication, I tend to go by “the Oliver Tambo rule”– remembering that that great leader of South Africa’s ANC once recalled that, when he was living in exile in Lusaka, the one thing he was terrified of was that he would not understand or correctly interpret the peace overture from the apartheid regime when– as he confidently expected– they finally decided to send it… and that through his inattentiveness on that score he would thereby consign his people to additional decades of quite unnecessary conflict…
When the peace overture did come to Tambo from Pretoria, in 1989, he did correctly interpret it; and it was he and the ANC’s exile-based National Executive that then authorized Nelson Mandela to proceed with the in-prison negotiations that we all know so much about… (Tambo died soon thereafter, RIP.)
Thank God Tambo went by “the Tambo rule” on that occasion, eh?
In this connection, too, I would recall that great quote from T.E. Lawrence that I wrote about back in this post, last month… In 1919-20, when he was considering the challenges of “dis-imperialism”, i.e. extricating a country’s armies and people from distant and damaging imperial entanglements, Lawrence wrote:
In pursuing such courses [getting out of empire] we will find our best helpers not in our former most obedient subjects, but among those now most active in agitating against us, for it will be the intellectual leaders of the people who will serve the purpose, and these are not the philosophers nor the rich, but the demagogues and the politicians.
The alternative is to hold on to them with ever-lessening force, till the anarchy is too expensive, and we let go.
So okay, the 1920RB seems like an organization that still uses violence– perhaps considerable amounts of it.
(So, of course, is the US military, especially in Iraq.)
The 1920RB’s politics seem to be– as Juan Cole described them to me– “murky”. In November 2005, he wrote this about “Iraqi guerrilla groups such as ‘the Islamic Army,’ ‘The Bloc of Holy Warriors,’ and ‘The Revolution of 1920 Brigades’: “Despite the Islamist names of these groups, they are probably mostly neo-Baathist.”
I have no way to judge that claim, for which Juan adduced no further evidence there.
But he also noted there that, at a key Iraqi resistance groups’ conference that was held in Cairo that month, those three groups had,
conveyed their conditions behind the scenes… Among their demands are 1) working to end the foreign occupation, 2) compensation to the Iraqis for the damages arising from the American invasion; 3) the release of prisoners; and 4) building political and military institutions that are not subservient to American and regional influence.
In that post, which was mainly Juan’s rendering of a long Hayat article on the topic, he presented many details about the sharp differences between those three, determinedly Iraqi guerrilla group and Abu Musaeb al-Zarqawi and his Al-Qaeda-affiliated group. Zarqawi has, of course, since then been killed… And that sharp difference of opinion and strategy apparently still continues to the present. In this post from January 8, 2007, Cole writes– again citing Hayat– that,
“al-Qaeda” in Fallujah assassinated Muhammad Mahmud, the head of the 1920 Revolution Brigades in the district of al-Saqlawiya, threatening al-Anbar Province with a feud between the two Sunni guerrilla groups…
All in all, I think the “Jeelani-Fisk proposal” is a pre-peace overture to which all of us who want to see the US get out of Iraq in a way that is orderly, total, and speedy should give serious consideration. Let’s hope the relevant figures in the Bush administration are doing the same.
Is it too much to ask that they follow the “Tambo rule” too?