US-Iran Thaw: Is it for Real?

R.K. Ramazani writes on the signs of a US-Iran “thaw” and asks ”Is it for Real?” Read the extended essay here.
To get you started, I offer a few personalized accents:

On March 10, the representatives of the United States and Iran faced each other in a regional conference in Baghdad, Iraq. The event has raised crucial questions. Is this a real shift away from the Bush administration’s dogged stance against talking to Iran, allegedly “the world’s greatest sponsor of terrorism”?
Is it a real change in American strategy or is it a tactical gimmick, one of pretending to pursue diplomacy while preparing for confrontation and war?…

The Professor first hones in on problems that I have noted here repeatedly, issues central to my own work:

“The Bush administration has adamantly refused to talk to Iran, claiming that to do so would bestow legitimacy on its revolutionary regime.
Even a novice in world politics would know that a regime’s legitimacy is given or withheld by a combination of international and domestic acceptance. Muhammad Reza Shah’s international legitimacy was in effect bestowed by America rather than by the international community. He lost his throne ignominiously because the Iranian people no longer trusted him.”

One wonders how Secretary Rice will explain that talking to Iran now doesn’t contradict her previous statements.
Ramazani laments that the U.S. blew off a serious offer from Iran in 2003 – the “grand bargain” by which Iran offered concretely to resolve all outstanding issues between the US and Iran, ranging from terrorism to a two-state solution for Palestine to nuclear aspirations. Secretary Rice lately has been less than candid in her own lamely parsed testimony claiming that she doesn’t recall such an offer. Such denials have prompted two former top aides of hers to accuse her of prevaricating.
That “little” matter aside, the fact that US and Iranian officials can admit to talking at all, courtesy the Iraqis, is an important, if precarious development. At least the two sides can belatedly and in the same room admit to having much common ground in Iraq. But Ramazani then warns that

“these expressions of common interest between Iran and the United States may yet founder on shoals of inveterate hostility and mistrust that have developed over the past half a century. It was not always that way.”

Ramazani reminds us that for the century prior to 1953, Iranians generally had a profoundly favorable view towards America. Dating to the first half of the 1800’s,

Continue reading “US-Iran Thaw: Is it for Real?”

Drivers of US policy on Iraq

When I was in the Middle East in February, many of the people I talked to– smart people in Arab countries who realize that the fate of their region depends to a worrying degree on decisions made in distant Washington– were speculating as to whether Condi Rice is up or down, whether Cheney is up or down, etc. It struck me these observers were looking largely at the wrong thing. To me, by far the most interesting rising driver of US policy in Iraq is the uniformed military itself, and in particular the generals in the US Army and Marines.
We have been getting increasingly strong signals from these generals in recent months that they are extremely worried about the effects that George Bush’s imperial over-stretch in Iraq is having on the institutions that they head and from which they gain their own social stature and their lives, their meaning.
Ann Scott Tyson, who covers the uniformed military for the Wapo, has another intriguing piece in today’s paper, that starts out like this:

    Four years after the invasion of Iraq, the high and growing demand for U.S. troops there and in Afghanistan has left ground forces in the United States short of the training, personnel and equipment that would be vital to fight a major ground conflict elsewhere, senior U.S. military and government officials acknowledge.
    More troubling, the officials say, is that it will take years for the Army and Marine Corps to recover from what some officials privately have called a “death spiral,” in which the ever more rapid pace of war-zone rotations has consumed 40 percent of their total gear, wearied troops and left no time to train to fight anything other than the insurgencies now at hand.
    The risk to the nation is serious and deepening, senior officers warn, because the U.S. military now lacks a large strategic reserve of ground troops ready to respond quickly and decisively to potential foreign crises, whether the internal collapse of Pakistan, a conflict with Iran or an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. Air and naval power can only go so far in compensating for infantry, artillery and other land forces, they said.

There are a lot of other interesting details in the article; but the bottom line is that the generals (a) are extremely worried about the US’s level of military readiness, including both its readiness to respond in what they judge an adequate way to any new challenges that may arise in any one of the dozens of spots around the world where they say they would like to ready; (b) want to get this concern onto the public record; so that (c) when– as they may well by now already judge to be nearly inevitable, the US has to draw down its forces in Iraq on unfavorable terms– they will be quite ready to say “We warned you this would not work.”
Of course, you could say that it would have been more helpful all round, for both Americans and Iraqis, if their predecessors in the Joint Chief’s of Staff’s famous ‘Tank’ had actually been a little more forceful about laying out the military realities regarding Iraq invasion scenarios back in 2002, rather than now, five years later…
But better later than never, perhaps??
Anyway, alert JWN readers will no doubt recall that back on March 9 I wrote a little about my earlier conversation with the Crisis Group’s Joost Hiltermann, including his bon mot that though the US and Iran both agree, regarding Iraq, that it should remain united and ruled by majority rule, they disagree on the question of the US troop presence in Iraq– “Because the US basically now wants to be able to withdraw those troops, and Iran wants them to stay!”
I also wrote, “For my part, I am slightly less convinced than [Hiltermann] is that the decisionmakers in the Bush administration at this point are clear that they want the US troops out of Iraq… But I think they are headed toward that conclusion, and that the developments in the region will certainly continue to push them that way.”
A few days later, Joost wrote me to say (and I quote this with his permission):

    On one point I think we are much closer than you suggest. Perhaps I did not express myself sufficiently clearly.
    I, too, think US troops will stay in Iraq. They will have to. But I also think a signficant drawdown from populated areas will take place because the administration does not want to become embroiled in a civil war.
    At this point, US troops still hold together whatever remains of Iraq’s government and security forces. Once they decide to get out from the thick of things, these will fall apart and Iraq will become a failed state. The challenge then will be to contain the civil war within Iraq, and for this the US will need to keep forces in the large camps (for special forces operations against Al-Qaeda and air support) and deploy them along Iraq’s borders.

Actually, when he spells it out this way I find myself obliged to say that I don’t agree with his prognosis completely. Mainly because I don’t think the US will stay in Iraq for very long… And the principal driver behind the decision for a fairly rapid drawdown (or even, perhaps increasingly likely, a complete troop withdrawal) will be precisely that increasingly strong feeling amongst the military brass that the Iraq deployment is threatening to bring infamy, chaos, and ruin to the military institutions that they hold dear. This is a factor to which Joost– a very serious and experienced analyst of matters Middle Eastern– seems in my judgment not to have given adequate weight.
Indeed, it’s worth going back to Ann Scott Tyson’s piece, just to read the concluding paragraph:

    “Boots on the ground matter,” [Army vice chief of staff Gen. Richard A. Cody] said. “If they are tied down, your ability to terminate a conflict on your terms, earlier, may not be there.”

Also worth reading in the article: the description of how Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines the geographic reach of the mission of the US military. Tyson recalls that he told a House committee last month:

    “You take a lap around the globe — you could start any place: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela, Colombia, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, North Korea, back around to Pakistan, and I probably missed a few. There’s no dearth of challenges out there for our armed forces.”

At one level, you could say these guys are, quite simply, stark raving bonkers. The idea that the United States, a country that boasts less than 5 percent of the world’s population, should feel that it has some kind of a “responsibility” to respond to “challenges” (or whatever) right around whole world does have a certain noticeable zaniness to it.
At another level, I find this a deeply, deeply, scary thought.
And at another level still, I do think the world community as a whole– that is, the concerned citizens of all the countries around the world– needs to come together to start thinking about different, more effective structures to help ensure everyone’s security– structures that (1) certainly don’t allow one steroid-fueled hegemon to race around the world acting unilaterally just as and whenever it pleases, while (2) ensuring that vital lines of communication remain open, with their security assured through accountable, multinational mechanisms.
… But back to Iraq. I take seriously the proposition that the leaders of the US military really are very worried about the state and the status of the forces under their command — in addition to whatever political butt-covering they might currently be engaged in. Moreover, at this point they are most likely joined in their Powell-esque embrace of military planners’ realism by that dark-horse political actor, Defense Secretary Robert Gates. So my judgment is that it is this increasingly weighty coalition within the US decisionmaking class that will increasingly be driving policy in the weeks and months ahead… Already, as we can see, they are all working hard to build good links with the leading realist forces in Congress, from both political parties, in what is increasingly looking like a determined political end-run around Dick Cheney…
The consequences for Iraq of a primarily ‘Tank’-driven US withdrawal from the country need to be thought through a whole lot more…
And meanwhile, Bush’s ideological hard-right crony from Texas, Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales, is also running into increasing trouble over the apparently politically motivated firings of eight federal prosecutors.
Very interesting times…

Halliburton’s Move to Dubai: Reasons?

In our capitalist system, Halliburton ostensibly does what’s best for Halliburton. No doubt… Halliburton (aka HAL on Wall Street) has announced it’s moving its corporate headquarters from Houston to Dubai, part of the United Arab Emirates.
This is “richly” ironic on several levels. Halliburton’s current CEO, Dave Lessar, announced in Bahrain that the company wished to be closer to its growing business interests in Asia:

“The eastern hemisphere is a market that is more heavily weighted toward oil exploration and production opportunities and growing our business here will bring more balance to Halliburton’s overall portfolio.”

Balance? As the CNBC talking heads might speculate (for other companies), the statement deserves heavy “discounting.” Halliburton has other reasons for getting out of Dodge.
Remember Halliburton? This is the same oil services giant, ostensibly once run (poorly) by Vice President Dick Cheney. This same Halliburton is widely suspected of underhanded abuse of its connection to Cheney to obtain over $25 billion in lucrative, often no-bid contracts in Iraq.
Ok, sure, 38% of Halliburton’s business now comes from “the eastern hemisphere” – including Iraq… Is this new? Or is something wrong with the airport in Houston?
Just last month, Halliburton was cited by US investigators as responsible for as much as $2.7 billion of an estimated $10 billion in contractor fraud and abuse in Iraq. And last year, Halliburton made $2.3 billion in profits, though profits were down 40% last quarter.
I venture a guess that Halliburton’s reputation with the American people is right down there with Enron.
HAL’s share price is down about 25% off of its highs from last year. To be fair, the Wall Street oil services index is also off about 18% from its high.
Yet shareholder and political heat has been building at HAL. So why not get the exit underway before the party is…voted fully out of office?
On the other side of this intriguing move, remember Dubai? Dubai is the remarkable Arab trading hub that has mushroomed dramatically as a trading portal in all directions, especially to the north with Iran and to the Caspian region beyond.
Dubai is also very tax friendly to foreign corporations. It’s the Delaware of the Arab world.
And remember Dubai Ports World, the international conglomerate that, with Bush family backing, wished to invest heavily in six major American ports? “The Lobby” helped force DPW to agree to sell off those investments last year, on the rather specious argument that DPW, an Arab based company, might not be trustworthy in defending against terrorism. DPW recently threatened to reverse its decision, claiming that the New York Port Authority was trying to blackmail it.
Anybody want to put two and two together here?

Continue reading “Halliburton’s Move to Dubai: Reasons?”

The US and Iran, in Iraq

One week ago today we were sitting in the lobby of our hotel in Amman,
Jordan, talking with the very smart and well-informed Middle East
analyst Joost Hiltermann about the interactions that US power now has
in and over Iraq with Iraq’s much weightier eastern neighbor,
Iran.  (Hiltermann has worked on Iraq-related issues for many
years, including for several years now as the senior Iraq analyst for
the International Crisis Group.)

He said,

Well, the US and Iran agree on two
things inside today’s Iraq– but they disagree on one key thing.

What they agree on, at least until now, is the unity of Iraq, and need
for democracy or at least some form of majority rule there.

What they disagree on is the continued US troop presence there.  Because the US basically now wants
to be able to withdraw those troops, and Iran wants them to stay!

He conjectured that the main reason Iran wants the US troops to stay in
Iraq is because they are deployed there, basically, as sitting ducks
who would be extremely vulnerable to Iranian military retaliation in
the event of any US (or Israeli) military attack on Iran.  They
are, in effect, Iran’s best form of insurance against the launching of
any such attack.

I have entertained that conjecture myself, too, on numerous occasions
in the past.  So I was interested that Hiltermann not only voiced
it, but also framed it in such an elegant way.  (For my part, I am
slightly less convinced than he is that the decisionmakers in the Bush
administration at this point
are clear that they want the US troops out of Iraq… But I think they
are headed toward that conclusion, and that the developments in the
region will certainly continue to push them that way.)

From this point of view, we might conclude that the decisionmakers in
Teheran– some of whom are strategic thinkers with much greater
experience and even technical expertise than anyone in the current Bush
administration– would be seeing the possibility of “allowing” the US
to withdraw its troops from Iraq only within the context of the kind of
“grand bargain” that Teheran seeks.  The first and overwhelmingly
most important item in that “grand bargain” would be that Washington
credibly and irrevocably back off from any thought of pursuing a
strategy of regime change inside Iran or from any threats of military
force against it.

Under this bargain, Washington would need to agree, fundamentally, that
despite serious continuing disagreements in many areas of policy, it
would deal with the regime that exists in Teheran– as in earlier
decades it dealt with the regime that existed in the Soviet Union–
rather than seeking to overthrow it.  Teheran might well also ask
for more than that– including some easing of the US campaign against
it over the nuclear issue, etc.  But I believe there is no way the
mullahs in Teheran could settle for any less than a basic normalization
of working relations with Washington– that would most likely be
exemplified by the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between
the two governments– in return for “allowing” the US troops to
withdraw from Iraq.

There are numerous paradoxes here. Not only has Washington’s wide
distribution of its troops throughout the Iraq has become a strategic
liability, rather than an asset, but now the heirs of the same Iranian
regime that stormed the US Embassy in the 1970s and violated all the
norms of diplomatic protocol by holding scores of diplomats as hostages
there are the ones who are, essentially, clamoring for the restoration
of diplomatic relations with Washington.

… Meantime, however, a great part of the steely, pre-negotiation
dance of these two wilful powers is being played out within the borders
of poor, long-suffering Iraq.  For the sake of the Iraqis, I hope
Washington and Teheran resolve their issues and move to the normal
working relationship of two fully adult powers as soon as possible.

One last footnote here.  I do see some intriguing possibilities
within the Bushites’ repeated use of the mantra that “All options are
still on the table” regarding Iran.  Generally, that has been
understood by most listeners (and most likely intended by its utterers) to mean
that what is “on the table of possibilities” is all military options– up to
and perhaps even including nuclear military options, which the Bushites
have never explicitly taken off the table with regard to Iran.

But why should we not also interpret “all options” to include also all diplomatic options? 
That would certainly be an option worth pursuing.

    (This post has been cross-posted to the Nation’s blog, The Notion.)

Senator Webb’s Leash for the Dog of War

“We have already given… one effectual check to the dog of war, by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.”

–Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 1789

If our new Virginia Senator, Jim Webb, didn’t impress enough yet with his memorable response to the President’s State of the Union address, he’s leading the political troops again with a bold measure to rein in the Imperial Presidency.
While the new Congress muddles gingerly in efforts to restrain the President’s hand in the war already in progress in Iraq, Senator Webb has introduced new legislation intended precisely to prohibit the Bush-Cheney Administration from launching a new war on Iran – without formal Congressional authorization.
Jefferson would approve.
Below I provide the full text of Webb’s floor speech from earlier today (March 5th) introducing his legislation and a few excerpts from his afternoon press conference. It appears the main stream media has barely touched Webb’s bill — so far, even though I anticipate it may yet garner wide, even bipartisan support. (I’ll add more details on the Bill # and actual text, when I get it.) Let’s note reports we see on the bill in the discussion.
Here’s Webb’s Senate speech, with comments inserted:

“Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that will prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran without congressional authorization. The purpose of this legislation is to restore a proper balance between the executive and legislative branches when it comes to the commencement of military activities.
“I have taken great care in the preparation of this bill to ensure that it will not in any way prevent our military forces from carrying out their tactical responsibilities in places such as Iraq and in the international waters off Iran’s coast. The legislation allows American forces to directly respond to attacks or possible attacks that might be initiated from Iran, as well as those that might be begun elsewhere and then carry over into Iranian territory. I have also excluded operations related to intelligence gathering.
“The major function of this legislation is to prevent this Administration from commencing unprovoked military activities against Iran without the approval of the Congress. The legislation accomplishes this goal through the proper constitutional process of prohibiting all funding for such an endeavor. Unlike the current situation in Iraq, where cutting off funds might impede or interrupt ongoing operations, this legislation denies funding that would be necessary to begin such operations against Iran in the first place.

Webb then approvingly notes what may be the Bush Administration’s efforts to head off widespread concerns that it was deliberately seeking a pretext to start a war with Iran:

Continue reading “Senator Webb’s Leash for the Dog of War”

Bushites forced to deal with Syria and Iran

It is excellent news that the Bushites have finally been forced— by their own puppet government in Baghdad, no less– to sit down at the same table with representatives of Iraq and all its neighbors, including Iran and Syria.
That WaPo report says this:

    Rice told the Senate Appropriations Committee,”We hope that all governments will seize this opportunity to improve the relations with Iraq and to work for peace and stability in the region.”
    The first meeting, at the ambassadorial level, will be held next month. Then Rice will sit down at the table with the foreign ministers from Damascus and Tehran at a second meeting in April elsewhere in the region, possibly in Istanbul.
    …Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has long advocated a regional conference, though originally it was meant to include only Iraq’s neighbors. The administration decided in recent weeks to attend the conference, but in an effort to avoid the spotlight it ensured that it will be joined at the table in March by other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, U.S. officials said. The foreign ministers’ meeting in April will be further expanded to include representatives of the Group of Eight industrialized countries.
    It was decided “relatively recently” to include the permanent Security Council members, and the G-8 was invited “as of last night,” a senior administration official said. Rice’s announcement appeared intended to assuage congressional concerns about the administration’s Iraq policy, which have threatened to derail passage of a nearly $100 billion supplemental spending request for Iraq.
    Administration officials noted that then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell attended a regional conference on Iraq in 2004, where at one point he found himself seated next to the Iranian foreign minister and made idle chitchat. But that meeting took place in a different context, before Iran had started uranium enrichment and before Syria was implicated in the killing of a Lebanese political figure — two reasons the administration has frequently cited for limited diplomatic engagement with Tehran and Damascus.

Of course these meetings won’t be the end of the sorry tale of the US’s extremely destructive involvement in Iraq. But they point the way to possible process in which a steady, orderly– and let’s hope complete and speedy!– US withdrawal from Iraq might occur.

Iraq’s Phoenix Rising Again?

(with thanks to Donald A. Weadon, Jr. for his comments – below))
Heeee’s back. No, not Virgil Goode, (!) but Ahmad Chalabi. Friday’s Wall Street Journal cover headline proclaims that the American “Surge” has returned Chalabi to the “Center Stage” of Iraqi politics.
I wonder how many coffee cups spilled over this one.
Chalabi has become so infamous that his very name deserves a Webster’s dictionary entry. Just as one would not want one’s reputation “Borked” or “Swift-boated,” one would not want to have the “Chalabi” pulled over one’s eyes.

If we observe (correctly) that the neocons wish to anoint an Iranian “Chalabi,” it will be understood that we mean a “fraud,” a “slippery character” who speaketh, as one line of my ancestors might say, “with forked tongue.” An Iranian Chalabi would be an Iranian expatriate who will prattle nicely in English about “democracy” and Israel, will prophecy that an American military overthrow of the Iranian government will be easy and popular, and will boast of a huge personal following inside Iran.
An “Iranian Chalabi” would also have influential MSM columnists publishing glowing tributes to his “leadership” credentials. In case anyone is paying attention (as we all should be), the current neocon frontrunner candidate for “liberating” Iran is Amir Abbas Fakhravar.

JWN regulars over the past four years will recall that Chalabi has long been at the top of Helena’s least favored list, and she has appropriately taken apart (in)famous colleagues like Jim Hoagland (“Hoagie”) and Judith Miller for their willing roles in promoting Chalabi’s frauds. (Type in “Chalabi” on the jwn search feature, and you’ll get a feast of Chalabi bad memories.)
Chalabi’s star status in Washington deteriorated along with America’s misadventure in Iraq, as it devolved from “mission accomplished” to “central front in the war on ter-er.” Over the past year or so, key neocons and even intelligence veteran Pat Lang intimated that Chalabi must have been an Iranian double agent all along. After all, the logic went, how could somebody that nefarious, unscrupulous, and prone to dissimulation have been anything but Iranian connected? Besides, he visits Iran. (as if that proves anything – in itself.)
I was never convinced of this argument. That the Iranians might have endeavored to connect to Chalabi is hardly suprising, as the Iranians have every “rational” interest in trying to have ties to as many Iraqi poltiical players as possible, from Talibani to Sadr to Hakim, to Maleki, to yes, Chalabi.
The Iranians, by the way, were similar disposed to assorted Afghan players in the late 1990’s – amid Iran’s severely strained relations with the Taliban. I recall even warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar finding exile in Iran…. even as it was clear Iran was less than thrilled to have him. (He was expelled in early 2003.)
Still, the bizarre, if tantalizing suggestion that Chalabi was a deep cover Iranian agent back when he was being hawked so rapturously by Miller, Hoagland,(Bernard) Lewis, Perle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, etc. is too “good” to be believable…. no? Were Miller & Hoagie that blind? Well, the possibility at least made for delicious irony…. :-}
As the neocons and Chalabi went through bitter reciminations and public mutual finger pointing, Chalabi’s political stature appeared to hit rock bottom when his (American favored) list of candidates failed to win a single seat in the December 2005 elections for Iraq’s Parliament.
Phoenix….
Alas, reports of Chalabi’s political demise were premature.
Today’s Journal reports he’s back at the center stage of Iraqi politics, having been appointed by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to serve as “chairman” of a “popular committee to mobilize public support…” for the surge. Astonishingly, Chalabi has been installed as the top “liaison,” the “indispensable link” between the counter-insurgency and the people.
Excerpts of the WSJ report follow below. Yet first, here’s a brilliantly sardonic take on Chalabi’s rising from the ashes, from Donald A. Weadon, Jr. — a distinguished international lawyer, and friend in Washington. Don first contributed this comment on “peace, harmony, & bunny rabbits” to the closed “Gulf 2000 forum.” I re-post here, with Don’s permission and his edits:

“Like a mischievous cat, Ahmad Chalabi bears close watching as he runs through his nine lives.
After dodging a bullet in Jordan for massive bank fraud, he ran to the United States to parlay his intellect and his guile into a close connection to a band of lost intellectuals with grandiose plans, the neoconservatives.
While it is difficult in retrospect to imagine a University of Chicago professor who, being followed by an InterPol warrant for his arrest, comes to Washington D.C. as the darling of a cabal of folks who want to unleash their mindless vision of harmony by way of the sword in the Middle East and provides them the werewithal to give it a try at the public’s expense — well, that’s what happened.
Feeding the neocon butterflies who hovered about the early Bush 41 White House the nectar of fraudulent defectors with fabulous tales of secret WMD shenanigans, mobile nerve gas vans and the like to bolster their grandiose fantasies, he seduced the Administration and Congress into feeding him tens of millions of dollars a year for his most bogus Iraq National Congress and then even more national treasure into a Defense Department petri dish — a building next to the Pentagon under Wolfowitz’s patronage where AC toiled to create a government in exile, ready to “plug in” the minute Saddam was toppled. No wonder Rumsfeld didn’t want to know about “Day 2” onwards — he, too, had been bamboozled by AC, the celestial fraudster, into believing that all one had to do was to topple Saddam and plug him and his coterie in, and all Americans could just go home, and AC would lead the newest, friendliest client state for America smack dab in the middle of the Middle East. Peace, harmony and bunny rabbits.

Continue reading “Iraq’s Phoenix Rising Again?”

Depends what you mean by ‘Honor’…

Blogger Will Bunch had a good post recently analyzing the statement Unca Dick Cheney made recently, namely that,

    “We want to complete the mission [in Iraq], we want to get it done right, and we want to return with honor.”

Bunch quite appropriately recalls the eerily similar use that Richard Nixon made of the same term “honor” in his presidential nomination acceptance speech in August 1968.
Bunch writes,

    For Richard Nixon, “peace with honor” was not synonymous with “peace.”
    It meant “war.” A lot of war.
    Not long after taking office in 1969, Nixon — without authorization from Congress — initiated a secret air campaign against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia that dropped 2,750,000 short tons of bombs, more than the alllies used during all of World War II. He later undertook a massive bombing campaign of Hanoi and Haiphong, and his efforts didn’t bring much peace on the homefront, culminating in the slaughter of four bystanders during a 1970 protest at Kent State.
    Finally, in January 1973, Nixon declared “peace with honor.”
    There are three things you should know about this.
    1) When Nixon gave that speech at the GOP convention, it had been 1,467 [days] since the alleged incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that triggered the American escalation of the war. When he finally achieved his “peace with honor,” it was another 1,633 days later, so more than half the fighting came after the “peace with honor” promise.
    2) More importantly, from the start of 1969 through the end of the war, some 20,604 American soldiers died in pursuit of “peace with honor,” more than one-third of the total (58,202) for the entire war.
    3) In the end, “peace with honor” didn’t look all that different than “peace” — i.e., if Nixon had merely brought the troops home on Jan. 20, 1969. As we all know, Saigon still fell, in May of 1975.

So I think that a necessary first question should be, what on earth does Cheney mean when he talks about a return with “honor”? Let’s please have no repeat of the same kind of damage, destruction, and dishonor that followed Nixon’s use of that term.
Secondly, long-time JWN readers will be well aware that I’ve always supported the idea that the US troops should be allowed an orderly withdrawal from Iraq– provided a total and speedy withdrawal according to a well-publicized and verifiable timetable is indeed the path ther administration chooses to pursue. To me, it is less important whether the administration chooses to try to describe this withdrawal in some form of slightly sugarcoated terms. (When they withdrew from Beirut in February 1984 they called it a “redeployment offshore.” H’mmm.) The important thing is that it happens, and happens soon.
But please let’s not completely debase (or dishonor) the concept of honor in human affairs by going down the path established in Vietnam by Richard Nixon.
Finally, this time around, given that the Cold War has now completely ended and the world has been moving into a new stage, one of the main things we need to do is ensure that this withdrawal from Iraq is followed by a rational and radical downsizing of the US military and the building of new, much more globally accountable structures of international security in all the various areas of the world through which the Pentagon’s generals still swagger as though they own them.
They don’t.
Any “honor” that I can in US strategic affairs in the coming 20-year period will come from the US realizing it needs to work in good faith with other powers to ensure common security interests around the world, and in working diligently to make that happen.
Otherwise, G-d save us all from the possibility of any further repeat of the crimes of 2003.

Farzaneh Milani: “Iran as Enigma to Americans”

I have the pleasure to highlight an important essay by another leading light here at the University of Virginia – Farzaneh Milani. Professor Milani, a distinguished scholar of Persian literature and women’s studies, focuses attention on the misleading narratives about Iran that provide fertile soil for those bent on provoking a US attack on Iran.
Her timely essay in The Daily Progress urges us to recognize the sources of such myths and cast off the blinders that publishers and our government perpetuate and exploit:

“Although the American public has begun to speak out against a catastrophic attack on Iran, it’s important to remember the quarter-century unpopularity of this previously close ally. At a time when the stories we believe can guide U.S. foreign policy, we cannot afford to suspend critical judgment or accept as facts compelling, but misleading, narratives about Iran.
Despite a long history of friendship and cooperation between the two nations, Iran is now seen as a purveyor of aggression in the United States. What used to be Persia, “the land of the rose and the nightingale,” is now Iran, the vanguard of a terrorist apocalypse.
It is an “axis of evil,” a rogue state, a “greater challenge” than any other country, according to President Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy.”

It didn’t start with Bush II or I.

“The genesis of this hostility can be traced back to Nov. 4, 1979, when a group of militant students stormed the American Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. A sense of anguish etched itself into the collective consciousness of a justifiably outraged nation.
“America in Captivity” was the headline that captured the mood of a country in psychic pain.
“Nuke Iran,” read graffiti and T-shirts and posters.
“The only thing that could ever straighten out this screwed-up country is an atomic bomb! Wipe it off the map and start over,” recommended “Not Without My Daughter,” the most popular book about Iran ever published in the United States.”

Remember that last quote next time you hear reference made to the current Iranian President’s overheated rhetoric about a “map” and “Israel.” As a first step in reducing the temperature between Iran and the US, I propose a mutual moratorium on “map wiping” rhetoric.

Twenty-eight years later, Iranians find themselves hostages of their own hostage-taking.

Continue reading “Farzaneh Milani: “Iran as Enigma to Americans””

Odom: “Victory is Not an Option”

Preface (note – this is Scott writing).
Lest any jwn readers think my satire of CNN’s 3 General Stooges incorrectly reflects a general hostility towards all things military, I note only that my father once dreamed of a military career, and my son is now living that dream (my nightmare) as an officer in the “Virginia” Guard.
Like Helena, I too have closely followed strategic writings of this and that military think tank, sometimes even with great admiration. General William Odom is a case in point. Odom was an upperclassman at West Point when my late father was a plebe there. I think Dad would have admired General Odom’s steely nerve, his Eisenhower-like capacity to speak truth when his colleagues and allies were koolaid-drunk, and best of all, his track record of being right on target, especially when it wasn’t popular with the prevailing winds.
In Sunday’s Post, Odom again is out with an iconoclastic blast that says what many in Washington think, but don’t yet have the courage to say. Helena has already made reference to the essay via the “Delicious” sidebar, so here’s my quick highlighting – for the record!
For Odom, “victory is not an option.”

The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq starkly delineates the gulf that separates President Bush’s illusions from the realities of the war. Victory, as the president sees it, requires a stable liberal democracy in Iraq that is pro-American. The NIE describes a war that has no chance of producing that result. In this critical respect, the NIE, the consensus judgment of all the U.S. intelligence agencies, is a declaration of defeat.

Of course, the Administration lately has been trying to re-define, without admitting, what “victory” means. But Odom is holding up the original standard and pointing out what should have been obvious even before going in — that democracy can’t be imposed at the barrel of a gun, and even it magically does take root, a democratic Iraq will not be predisposed to be pro-American or pro-Israel. These are the two “truths” that American’s need to face:

There never has been any right way to invade and transform Iraq. Most Americans need no further convincing, but two truths ought to put the matter beyond question:
First, the assumption that the United States could create a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq defies just about everything known by professional students of the topic. Of the more than 40 democracies created since World War II, fewer than 10 can be considered truly “constitutional” — meaning that their domestic order is protected by a broadly accepted rule of law, and has survived for at least a generation. None is a country with Arabic and Muslim political cultures. None has deep sectarian and ethnic fissures like those in Iraq.

Strangely, American political scientists whose business it is to know these things have been irresponsibly quiet. In the lead-up to the March 2003 invasion, neoconservative agitators shouted insults at anyone who dared to mention the many findings of academic research on how democracies evolve. They also ignored our own struggles over two centuries to create the democracy Americans enjoy today. Somehow Iraqis are now expected to create a constitutional order in a country with no conditions favoring it….

I beg to quibble with the general on the point about American political scientists being “irresponsibly quiet.” I rather think the problem was with the power of those neoconservative agitators – who pressured producers and opinion page editors (even at the once venerable CSMonitor or the PBS NewsHour) to avoid the contributions of major, non-beltway, think-tank academics. It’s happening again in the madness to the rush to pick a war with Iran!

Second, to expect any Iraqi leader who can hold his country together to be pro-American, or to share American goals, is to abandon common sense. It took the United States more than a century to get over its hostility toward British occupation. (In 1914, a majority of the public favored supporting Germany against Britain.) Every month of the U.S. occupation, polls have recorded Iraqis’ rising animosity toward the United States.

Odom notes that these realities are becoming more widely recognized, even as Congress thus far hasn’t had the courage to act on them for fear of four “pernicious” myths – in need of the dismantling Odom memorably provides:

Continue reading “Odom: “Victory is Not an Option””