Bushists’ Quarantine Wall crumbles further

For the past seven years the Bush administration has pursued an often ruthless campaign to impose and maintain a complete ban on any of its allies having dealings with the states and entities– labeled “terrorist”– that it has sought to quarantine and where possible overthrow.
Last week, we saw many significant fissures in the Quarantine Wall. Longtime US ally Fouad Siniora concluded a (Qatar-mediated) peace agreement with Hizbullah that led to the speedy end of Lebanon’s months-long government/constitutional crisis. The Olmert government in Israel revealed that it was engaged in a Turkey-mediated peace negotiation with Syria. More news emerged of Olmert’s ongoing attempts to conclude an Egypt-mediated ceasefire agreement with Hamas…
And this week, we have news of two additional breaches in the Bushists’ Quarantine Wall:

Oh my goodness, locally generated and (generally) locally mediated peace and reconciliation efforts seem to be breaking out all over!
Hallelujah!
And the US government, which for 35 years maintained a near-total monopoly over all the region’s diplomacy (a) is not involved in these new peace and reconciliation efforts– not surprisingly, since all of them involve serious dealings with movements and governments that Washington has worked to quarantine, crush, or overthrow; and (b) is suddenly incapable of reining in its allies and stopping this crumbling of the Quarantine Wall.
In the case of the emerging Israel-Hizbullah deal, Haaretz reports this:

    Israeli sources on Monday said that Israel and Hezbollah had struck a deal securing the release of two Israeli soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, captured by the Lebanon-based militant group in a July 2006 cross border raid that sparked the Second Lebanon War.
    The sources explained that in exchange for the captives, Israel would release [Samir] Kuntar, a Lebanese militant currently imprisoned in Israel for the 1979 murder of a Nahariyah family, an Israeli citizen jailed for espionage on Hezbollah’s behalf and four other Hezbollah men captured by Israel during the 2006 war. The deal reportedly will also include the return of the remains of ten Lebanese, currently held by Israel, to Hezbollah.
    Earlier on Monday, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah hinted that a prisoner swap would soon be completed, telling supporters in Beirut that Kuntar would soon be freed.

We should note that Hizbullah’s capture of Goldwasser and Regev was the casus belli that PM Olmert used when he launched his infamous, harmful (and very counter-productive) assault on Lebanon in 2006. The negotiated return of these two men– or is there a chance this will only be of their mortal remains? I am not sure if their being-alive has yet been established?– will therefore, when it happens, form an instructive coda to narratives of that tragic and unnecessary war.

Honey, I shrunk the superpower…

Rami Khouri has some excellent commentary today on the currently very evident contraction of US diplomatic power in the Middle East. He surveys the past week’s breakthroughs in intra-Lebanese reconciliation and Israeli-Syrian diplomacy– as I did here, on May 21.
Regarding the intra-Lebanese agreement, he wrote:

    The US was not fully defeated, but it was fought to a draw…
    The US is a slow learner in the Middle East, where the terrain is strange to it, the body language bizarre, the fierce power of historical memory incomprehensible, and the negotiating techniques other-worldly. But the US is not stupid. It learns over time that if you retread a flat tire over and over again, and it keeps going flat on you, perhaps it’s time to buy a new tire if you hope to move forward. Now that we have a draw in the broad ideological confrontation throughout the Middle East that pits Israeli-Americanism against Arab Islamo-nationalism, we should expect the players to reconsider their policies if they wish to make new gains.
    This, however, is not the most significant development this week that reflects the limits of American power in the Middle East. The remarkable manifestation of how the US has marginalized itself is the conduct of the Israeli government. The US has pushed the Israelis hard to do two things in the past two years: to not negotiate with Syria and to not engage Hamas. What has Israel done? It has been wisely negotiating with Syria via Turkey, and engaging Hamas on a truce deal through the mediation of Egypt. Hold on, Condi, this gets even worse.
    It is no big deal in Washington when nearly 500 million Arabs, Iranians and Turks ignore and defy the US. But when Israel – the only democracy in the Middle East, America’s eternal ally, and the bastion of the epic modern struggle against fascism, totalitarianism, Nazism, communism and terrorism – ignores the United States, that is newsworthy.
    So we now have a rare moment in the Middle East: Iran, Turkey, all the Arabs, Hizbullah, Hamas and Israel all share one and only one common trait: They routinely ignore the advice, and the occasional threats, they get from Washington. Condoleezza Rice was correct in summer 2006 when she said we are witnessing the birth pangs of a new Middle East. But the new regional configuration is very different from what she had in mind and tried to bring into being with multiple wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia and Lebanon, and threats against Iran and Syria. The new rules of the political game in the Middle East are now being written by the key players in the Middle East, which should be welcomed.

Rami may, however, be a little too generous when he writes, “the US is not stupid. It learns over time.” Well, I guess it’s a question of over how much time the US government can “learn” what it needs to learn about the realities of the Middle East, and adjust its policies accordingly. As J. M. Keynes so memorably noted, “Over the long run, we’re all dead.”
So how steep can we expect the US government’s learning curve to be? Given the record of the past few years, I am not optimistic– unless the US public and government can both undergo a broad re-assessment of how they see the US’s relationship with the rest of the world, going forward.
Evidence about the slowness of the Middle East-related learning curve here is quite abundant… Back in 2002, just about everyone inside the US who knew much of anything about the strategic realities of the Middle East was warning vociferously that any kind of an essentially unilateral (i.e., not UN-sanctioned) US invasion of Iraq would end up as a disaster. All those voices of wisdom and understanding– which existed within various government bureaucracies and outside them– were systematically marginalized from having any impact, undercut through bureaucratic maneuverings and the wilful manufacturing of false “evidence”, and publicly derided.
Those of us who forecast that the invasion would be a medium- and long-term disaster were, however, right.
Some of us then argued that sufficient attention to running a “successful” post-invasion occupation could at least minimize the negatives arising from the decision to invade.
Due attention was not paid to that vitally important task. Instead, Iraq’s capacities for re-emerging self-governance were systematically ripped apart through Bremer’s wilfully destructive actions. (Bremer was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Wolfowitz got that plus the World Bank.)
Those of us who have argued for broad diplomatic re-engagement with Iran on a basis of mutual respect have been marginalized, undercut and publicly derided.
Those of us who argued against the strong support the Bushites gave Olmert’s disastrous assault against Lebanon in 2006 were marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us who argued that the results of the 2006 elections in Palestine should be respected and the US should explore the many potential ways to deal with the elected government were marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us have argued for robust and fair-minded US re-engagement in the remaining tracks of Israeli-Arab peacemaking have been marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us who have argued that, given its track-record, the US is uniquely ill-suited to bringing internal reconciliation to Iraq, and that therefore it should request the UN to find a way to do so that will allow an orderly withdrawal of US forces from their expensive, vulnerable, and essentially dysfunctional positioning throughout Iraq have been marginalized, undercut, and derided.
Those of us who have argued that the US can and should find a way to include broadly supported popular movements like Hamas and Hizbullah into the diplomacy of the region rather than seeking to subvert and crush such movements have been marginalized and subjected to often withering waves of public derision…
So I’m not exactly holding my breath for “the US learning curve” suddenly to become steeper and to conform to the demands of our still-evolving present era any time soon. The Manichean mindset of “You’re either with us or against us”, the too-ready recourse to the rhetoric of a glibly anti-“terrorist” discourse that obfuscates rather than explains the realities of life in most Middle Eastern societies– these aspects of US public life are still far, far too prevalent.
But perhaps the fact that actors long considered stalwart supporters of the broad “GWOT” campaign in the region– actors like Ehud Olmert and Fouad Siniora– are now quite prepared to go off the GWOT reservation and to act in their own best interests as they perceive them, rather than as Elliott Abrams or other fevered minds in Washington might see them, might give us an opportunity, here in the United States, to start looking at the situation in a much more realistic way? Let’s hope so.
For the facts of the matter are:

    (1) the GWOT hasn’t “worked”, even in its own terms. Worldwide fatalities from terrorism in 2007 were 430 percent the level of fatalities from terrorism in that fateful year 2001– and that’s by the State Department’s own counting system; and
    (2) the US has lost a considerable degree of the ability it once had to assemble and essentially control region-spanning coalitions of its own supporters throughout the Middle East.

Time for a broad conceptual re-tool, I think.
Meanwhile, we can have some fun speculating which of Condi Rice or George W. Bush might turn to the other in the weeks ahead and confess to the truth: “Honey, I shrunk the superpower.”

Oops, George, your time-frame slip is showing!

At the Annapolis summit last November, Pres. Bush pledged that he would work to secure a final-status Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement before his term in office ends. Soon after that, the goal was “clarified”, to spell out that this would only be an uncomfortable type of thing called a “shelf agreement”, that wouldn’t have any operational capacity until a whole host of other conditions had been met.
Today, in his speech in the Knesset, Bush’s timeframe seemed to be slipping even further. Um, by an additional 60 years. The most he could “promise” the non-Israeli majorities in the Middle East was that “60 years from now” the whole region would be peaceful, non-oppressive, etc etc…. And “the Palestinian people will have the homeland they have long dreamed of.”
It doesn’t really seem like a winning argument to me?
Bush also drew a quite ridiculous parallel between pre-1939 Nazi Germany and un-named “terrorists and radicals” in the Middle East today, in what was widely seen as a politicized side-swipe at Barack Obama.

Bush’s conference in Jerusalem

Pres. Bush is scheduled to arrive in Jerusalem on Wednesday. Once there he’ll be the guest of honor at a big international conference that Israeli Pres. (and former war-launcher) Shimon Peres is holding under the blah, catch-all title Facing Tomorrow. (Conference organizers are said to be keeping their fingers crossed that all the unseemly news about the latest probe into PM Olmert’s alleged improprieties doesn’t take the gloss off the conference.)
The conference has its own, extremely lame English-language blog. You can read the schedule either there or in this PDF file, available on the official conference website.
Though the conference is headlined by Peres, I guess his office doesn’t have the budgetary or administrative capability to put on something as big and glitzy as this. So the funding has come from the ever-controversial Sheldon Adelson, who made himself the third-richest man in the US by buying and developing casinos in the USA and worldwide. Adelson is a big financial backer of, among many other organizations, the rabidly pro-war “Freedom’s Watch” organization in the US, and the strongly pro-settler Shalem Center in Israel.
He and his wife have been named as “Honorary Chairs” of the conference.
But they do not, it seems, have the intellectual clout to pull together a world-class set of conferees for this gathering. So that job has been left to– guess who? … None other than our old friend Dennis Ross, who for 12 years there was the chief US official in charge of the Israeli-Arab “peace process.”
But now, Ross has reinvented himself as the head of the Board of Directors of the Jerusalem-based “Jewish People Policy Planning Institute“. And it is JPPPI that has been paid, presumably by Adelson, to provide the “content” for the conference.
On p.6 of that PDF file about the conference, Dennis has a letter in which, on behalf of JPPPI, he “welcomes” all the conference participants to Jerusalem.
Dennis has also been described as a leading foreign policy advisor to both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.
Are you confused enough yet?
Is he a US citizen, or an Israeli, or both at this point? The extremely deep intermingling of the two countries’ political elites continues.
Dennis Ross has always been a bit of a political chameleon. He was secretary of State Baker’s chief implementer when Baker (and Bush I) Organized the Madrid Arab-Israeli peace conference in October 1991. Then in 1992, as Bush’s re-election chances started diving along with the US economy, Bush drafted in Baker– a supremely accomplished political operator– to run his campaign. And Dennis went with him into the GOP campaign. But that one lost to Clinton, as we know. And who should pop up as Clinton’s Arab-Israeli negotiations chief but– Dennis Ross!
Quite a feat. Proving, perhaps (as with all the more recent Obama and Clinton buzz) that in some elite political circles in the US a proven commitment to Israel is more important than, and can sometimes transcend, “mere” party-political differences.
While working for Clinton, Dennis was the strongest advocate of the incrementalist, process-fixated approach that allowed Israel to drag its feet in signing anything at all throughout the whole of the 1990s, while it also stepped up its drive to build Israeli settlements in the West Bank– while incurring no penalty whatsoever for that from its superpower patron. In 2000, he and Clinton, working totally in cahoots with Ehud Barak, inveigled first Pres. Hafez al-Asad then Yasser Arafat into renewed negotiations with Israel under false pretences; and both those coercive, very-last-minute negotiations failed miserably.
So we can certainly expect Dennis Ross to be in the receiving line when Pres. George W. Bush arrives at the conference, Wednesday. “Welcome to Israel, Mr. President!”

Bush heading into ME ‘Cyclone’?

Pres. and Mrs. Bush are headed to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt next Tuesday, on a trip that will run through May 18. They will arrive in Israel on the morning of Wednesday, May 14.
In a press briefing yesterday, national security adviser Steve Hadley spelled out that the trip

    will be an opportunity to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Israel’s founding and to demonstrate our nation’s support for and commitment to the region.
    The President will reaffirm his personal commitment to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and encourage continuing efforts for a two-state solution, a democratic Israel and a democratic Palestine living side by side in peace and security.
    The trip will demonstrate the President’s steadfast opposition to extremists and their state sponsors, Iran and Syria, who are expending enormous energy to thwart opportunities for security, freedom and peace in the region.

So the trip will, in every possible sense, put Israel first. Pres. and Mrs. (Burma mis-step) Laura Bush will spend two full days in Israel before cramming in quick one-day visits to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In Israel, they’ll have separate meetings with PM Olmert and Pres. Shimon Peres. They’ll tour Masada. They’ll hear from the Quartet’s latest colonial administrator of Palestinian affairs, Tony Blair. They’ll host their own reception to celebrate Israel’s Independence Day. They’ll meet Israeli youth, etc etc.
While in the area of Israel/Palestine they won’t be either visiting Ramallah or meeting Pres. Abbas. (They will later meet him, and half a dozen other US proxy leaders from the region in quick back-to-back meetings in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt.)
This is just four months after Bush’s last visit to the Middle East, which was memorable mainly for the way he mocked the hardships inflicted on the Palestinians by Israel’s stifling system of movement controls in the West Bank.
Hadley’s statement continued to use the administration’s lame, content-free narrative about the US’s “struggle” in the Middle East being against “extremists”.
I have a sense of foreboding about this visit. Tensions in Lebanon, Gaza, Sadr City, and Egypt are all currently simmering and mounting toward a possible full boil.
Rami Khouri has an intriguing op-ed in the Beirut Daily Star today. It is titled Mideast change is coming, and may not be pretty. In it, he argues:

    The convergence of six trends in the Middle East – the changing realities of food, energy, water, population, urbanization and security-dominated politics – is likely to create conditions that will be politically challenging, if not destabilizing, in many countries in the years ahead. The confluence of these trends is very similar to what happened in the region in the mid to late 1970s, when the current Islamist wave of social identity and confrontational politics was initiated.
    Things will be much more difficult this time around, and the consequences could be much worse, especially in view of the ripple effect of the war in Iraq, Iran’s growing influence, the continued stalemate in Palestine and the weakening of some Arab governments. It is difficult to predict exactly what will happen in the years ahead, but the stressful factors propelling change are already clear and we would be foolish to ignore them.

I agree with everything Rami writes there. He draws a compelling picture of many of the “deep” structural problems in the Middle East. These problems form the inescapable back-drop to everything that is currently happening in the region.
Germany’s leading Green Party pol and former Foreign Minitser and Vice-chancellor Joschka Fischer also described a largely congruent set of structural threats to the region’s current governance system in this op-ed in the DS, on Monday.
But I also have a strong and disquieting sense that the purview of both of these pieces is too “lofty” and longterm. Throughout the Arab areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, the crises of food and fuel prices, and of the legitimacy of US-backed governments, seem already to be, as I said, near boiling point. I cannot imagine there is anything that Pres. Bush can do, on a journey that is designed first and foremost to demonstrate the very special place that Israel occupies in US foreign policy, that can lessen these tensions. Indeed, his arrival in the region and his performance at all these very pro-Israeli events there may well increase regional tensions even more.
Members of the U.N. Security Council should stand ready to work urgently to contain the regional conflagration that might occur. Actually, they should have done a lot more, long before now, to rein in the unbridled, one-sided, and inflammatory exercise of US-Israeli power in the region.

Iran’s US Policy in a Nutshell

My (Scott) octogenarian mentor and friend, Ruhi Ramazani, took a stab last week at reducing a lifetime of observations about Iranian foreign policy into a 20 minute presentation for an Iran forum convened at our local Mennonite church. Sitting next to him on the platform, I had to contain a wide grin in hearing how he well did it – with many themes we’ve featured previously here at justworldnews.
The Professor one-upped himself in condensing those remarks further into a tight oped for our local newspaper. It deserves wider circulation.
In a nutshell, the “Dean of Iran Foreign Policy Studies” presents two core paradoxes that are fundamental guidelines to understanding Iran’s policies towards the United States.

1. Iranians of all political stripes are proud of their history and culture while being simultaneously and acutely aware of a repeated “victimization” of their lands by foreign powers.
2. Iranian experiences with America are also marked by both hope and despair. Just as Americans once played a prominent early role in helping Iranian efforts to modernize and free themselves from European exploitation, that trust was betrayed by American orchestrated restoration of the Shah to his throne in 1953 – and the overthrow of yet another indigenous democratic experiment in Iran.

Were a future US Administration to grasp these two legacies, to draw more creatively upon an historic reservoir of Iranian hopes for America, while eschewing interference in Iran’s internal political evolution, then the chances for successful dealings, even cooperation with Iran, will increase exponentially.
President George H. W. Bush — the 1st one — had it rhetorically about right. Speaking to Iran in his first inaugural address in 1989, the President observed that “goodwill begets goodwill.” That wisdom still awaits actual implementation.
(Full text of Ramazani’s oped in the extension.)

Continue reading “Iran’s US Policy in a Nutshell”

Who is the greatest strategist of them all?

This week is (once again) going to be Petraeus and Crocker week on Capitol Hill, with the military and civilian heads of the US occupation in regime appearing before a slew of Senate and House committees, starting Tuesday.
When they were last there, last September, the best question of all came from our (very) senior senator here in Virginia, John Warner, who asked Petraeus flat out whether the Iraq war was making America any safer.
Petraeus answered, “Sir, I don’t know exactly.”
All the senators and members of congress should make a point of asking Petraeus– and Crocker– that question once again, and probing their thinking on this issue a bit more deeply than Warner did last Septamber.
Since then, an additional 243 US service-members and thousands of Iraqis have been killed in the war; and somewhere in excess of an additional $84 billion of taxpayers’ money has been poured into the sewer of the war (that is, in good part, into the pockets of the shareholders of Halliburton, etc.)
I was struck by Petraeus’s answer at the time, thinking it seemed to reveal that they guy had some core of professional integrity. Either that, or naivete, inasmuch as he seemed unable to think fast enough to provide a fudged, more “diplomatic”, answer.
Or maybe both.
But the answer was also important because it revealed the degree to which Petraeus was indicating that he judged that the question being asked was ways above his pay-grade.
No particular surprise there, especially given that he had only received a very hastily organized promotion to four-star general just shortly before his appointment as head of the “Multi-National (!) Force– Iraq”. Prior to that, he had co-authored a handbook at the level of operational art, that is, in the waging of a counter-insurgency. But he had not operated at the level of strategic thinking required to consider questions like which counter-insurgency should one seek to win, and on what terms? Or: which counter-insurgencies are worth investing a lot in? Or: on what basis should one make a judgment like this? Or: in a time of scarce resources (such as manpower), how should one prioritize one’s commitments to the fighting of various different battles/counter-insurgencies occurring in different theaters?
(This last one is the Dannatt question, of course.)
So I was reminded of Petraeus’s painfully honest answer of last September when I read this article by Michael Abramowitz in today’s WaPo. Abramowitz was examining the high degree of importance Pres. Bush gives to receiving military advice, on a regular basis, directly from Petraeus.
He writes,

    By all accounts, Petraeus’s view that a “pause” [in the drawdown of troops from Iraq] is needed this summer before troop cuts can continue has prevailed in the White House, trumping concerns by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others that the Army’s long-term health could be threatened by the enduring presence of many combat forces in Iraq.

Abramowitz also notes the degree to which modern technology has allowed Bush to keep in much closer direct contact with Petraeus than any previous war-time president could maintain with any of their field commanders:

    improved videoconferencing technology has allowed the president to communicate to an unprecedented degree with commanders on the battlefield… Bush has also held videoconferences with Casey and other previous Iraq commanders, but after Petraeus and Crocker were appointed last year, the process was institutionalized in a regular Monday morning war council between Washington and Baghdad. (A similar Afghanistan meeting takes place every two to three weeks, a White House spokesman said.)

That last detail is notable: Iraq once a week; Afghanistan, every two to three weeks. H’mmm…
Then this,

    those who have witnessed the Monday videoconferences describe Petraeus as a gifted briefer who moves beyond the dry recitation of the metrics of battle — enemy killed and captured — to describe how military developments interact with political ones…
    Bush, sitting in the White House Situation Room, often takes the lead on political issues, such as dealings with Iran or Iraqi politics. [Ohmigod, I have to say this is a very scary thought…] But officials said he is deferential to Petraeus on military matters. The president “sets the goals,” Gates said. “He expects the military professional to handle the mission.”
    While Bush and Petraeus are said to have bonded over their love of exercise [!], administration officials describe their relationship as more professional than friendly.

So here is my concern– and it is evidently one that has been shared by many other people, including Petraeus’s superiors in the chain of command, as well as, according to Abramowitz, the chair of the senate Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin: If Bush’s main and continuing way of getting military advice about the war in Iraq is from the commander in Iraq, at what point does he get the advice he needs about the overall strategic importance of that battlefield, relative to other calls that may be made on the US military, in Afghanistan or elsewhere?
Abramowitz reports that Carl Levin said, quite correctly, that,

    Bush should rely primarily on the advice of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Not only are they General Petraeus’s superiors,” Levin said, “but they have the broad view of our national security needs, including Afghanistan, and the risks posed by stretching the force too thin.”

He writes that Bush’s insistence on dealing directly with Petraeus, “created friction that helped spur the departure last month of Adm. William J. ‘Fox’ Fallon, who, while Petraeus’s boss as chief of U.S. Central Command, found his voice eclipsed on Iraq.”
He writes that Fallon and Petraeus, “differed over military planning and the scale and pace of the drawdown. Fallon and other top military officials have also voiced their concerns to Congress, in public testimony and behind closed doors.”
He also writes that– just as I would have expected under these circumstances– Fallon’s successor as head of Centcom, JCS Chairman Mullen, and Secdef Gates, all make a point of trying to sit in on Bush’s weekly videoconferences with Petraeus, whenever possible.
Hence, among all the other dysfunctional consequences of this bizarre arrangement, you have the spectacle of all three of these very senior links in the nation’s chain of military command having to invest considerable time and energy simply in trying to keep tabs on whatever it is that Petraeus and the Prez are cooking up between the two of them.
Abramowitz also writes this:

    Some officials said Petraeus is pushing on an open door with Bush. The president has privately expressed impatience with military concerns over the health of the force, telling the Joint Chiefs that if they are worried about breaking the Army, the worst thing would be to lose in Iraq, according to people familiar with the conversations.

Ah, of course, this is why we do not need Gen. Petraeus to be a great strategist at the world level– because we have a president who is making these large-scale judgments on his own… a president who still thinks the US can “win” in Iraq, while also not suffering any catastrophic setbacks anywhere else.
Be scared. Be very scared indeed.

Charlottesville forum: US, Iran, & Hope?

For those near Charlottesville, Virginia Sunday evening, consider joining a forum on US-Iran Relations that convenes at 6:00 p.m. at the Charlottesville Mennonite Church. (corner of Monticello Ave. and Avon Streets)
Hosted by Rev. Roy Hange, (who lived in Iran with his family earlier this decade) the forum features a panel of three Iran observers, Carah Ong, myself (Scott Harrop), and our venerable neighbor R.K. Ramazani.
Long time readers of Just World News will recall we have featured Professor Ramazani’s essays several times. Drawing from his 55 years (and counting) of scholarship and observations on US-Iran relations, I anticipate he will be focusing on the paradox of what divides and yet pulls together Iran and the United States, nearly 3 decades after the Iranian revolution.
Carah Ong is currently the Iran Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. See her solid Iran focused blog, especially her coverage of Iran nuclear issues, Congress, and interesting reports of her recent journey to Iran.
Our prepared comments will consider our working question — what “reasons for hope” can we discern for improving ties between the US and Iran?
As a hook to the evening, see the Thursday night University of Georgia panel of five former American Secretaries of State, Powell, Albright, Kissinger, Baker, and even Christopher, and how they agreed on two points — that Gitmo needs to be shut down and that the US should be talking to Iran.
Fancy that. For the past seven years, the Bush Administration has been trapped by its own novel idea, at least towards Iran, that a state doesn’t talk to other states of which it disapproves, lest it somehow grant them “legitimacy” in the talking. Our current Secretary of State now claims she wishes to talk to Iran, even as she retains conditions widely known to short-circuit the process.
That five former Secretary of States appear to have repudiated that approach, at least to me, provides a significant ray of hope. That said, even If we at least can see the need to talk to Iran, questions remain not just about what to talk about, yet also how we should talk to Iran with any hope of a positive result
Learning “how to talk to Iran” will be the focus of my remarks. Stay tuned. (or better yet, join us live.)
Note: Charlottesville Mennonite Church is located just to the south east of the downtown mall. Here’s conventional directions on how to get to it: 701 Monticello Avenue.

Bush’s inflammatory and inaccurate accusations against Iran

On Wednesday– the same day Dick Cheney was blowing off the recent, much less alarmist National Intelligence Estimate on Iran– our president was making an audiotape to be broadcast into Iran in which he claimed, fallaciously, that Iran has “declared they want a nuclear weapon to destroy people” and that the Islamic Republic could be hiding a secret nuclear weapons program.
McClatchy’s Jonathan Landay has written an excellent short analysis of this issue. Over at the WaPo, Robin Wright notes the escalatory potential of Bush’s utterance. She quotes Iran specialist Suzanne Maloney, who worked at the State Department until recently, as saying that “The bellicose rhetoric from one side only produces the same from the other.” Bush’s rhetorical escalation has also been accompanied by further moves to tighten the sanction against Iranian financial institutions.
Bush seems to be in a strange (and to me very scary) kind of gung-ho-ish mood these days, one that seems far removed from the grim realities of a US military that is tautly over-stretched between Iraq and Afghanistan, a US diplomacy that is facing vast new problems, including crucally from its own NATO allies, and a US economy that is sputtering very seriously and threatened with further, even more explosive breakdown.
I am really wondering what is causing his present mood of apparent elation. Worrying, too, about what disasters it might lead us all into.
By the way, happy Nowruz, happy Easter, and happy Passover– oops, sorry, make that Purim–, everyone. (If you celebrate a feast at this time of year that I haven’t mentioned, happy that, too. As for us Quakers, we don’t have a liturgical calendar so we just get to appreciate the passage of the seasons on this beautiful earth. May we find a way to save it, and ourselves– including from any further terrible wars.)

Kissinger: “Talk to Iran”

Late Thursday night, Henry Kissinger gave an interview with Bloomberg TV, and the 13+ minute segment can be viewed via this link. Kissinger is reputed to be among US Presidential candidate John McCain’s advisers, and he remains an icon among “realist” analytical circles.
I’ll leave it to Helena Cobban or other sharp jwn readers to comment on the rest of his remarks. Kissinger, for example, sticks to the stale, if safe line that Israel cannot negotiate with Hamas until Hamas recognizes Israel’s right to exist. Helena has well articulated a different view here repeatedly.
I am more struck by Kissinger’s apparent “off the reservation” observations and counsel regarding US-Iran relations. His Iran remarks roughly come between minutes 3:30 and 7:30 of the recording. Here’s a quick summary of his points, with my comments:
1. Kissinger sets out his working question, about whether Iran is a “nation” or a “cause.” Presumably, we can deal with the former, but not so well with the latter. Kissinger (HAK) presumably finds Iran today to be more of a “nation,” one with which we can be fellow “realists.”

This is more than mere academic jargon. Neoconservative godfathers, from Bernard Lewis to Norman Podhoretz have been advancing the fallacious argument that Iran remains an irrational “cause.” To Podhoretz (and his source Amir Taheri), never mind what the Islamic Republic says or offers, Iran will be an incorrigible “existential” threat to Israel, even unto “martyrdom.” Kissinger, to his credit, sees other possibilities.
Funny thing, I first wrote about revolutionary Iran adapting to “reasons of state” back in early 1984 — in a grad. school seminar. So glad the Secretary is catching up.
By the way, what is America under Bush – a nation, or a cause?

2. Kissinger supports “direct negotiations” with Iran. Yet he also supports what Secretary Rice thus far has offered, “to meet with Iranians anywhere, anytime.” Kissinger claims that the problem hasn’t been the willingness to talk, but the content, the agenda about which we might talk.

What’s a neoconservative to make of this? On the one hand, Israel is not to talk to Hamas because it doesn’t formally recognize Israel’s right to exist. Yet the US can talk to Iran, never mind the incendiary remarks, shall we say, of its current President about Israel’s legitimacy. Ah, but in Kissingerian realpolitik logic, it “works:” states must talk to each other, but not, apparently, to each others’ internal rebel movements. George III, then and now, logic.
As for Secretary Rice’s offer to “talk,” this is a bit disingenuous, as Rice’s offers thus far come with the precondition that Iran give up uranium enrichment. In that sense, sure, there is a problem about the agenda, whether Iran’s uranium enrichment is to be part of the talks, or something Iran is being expected to give up, as a precondition.

3. In response to question about what person the US should send to talk to Iran, Kissinger remarkably says it’s “generally not a good idea” to start such talks at a high level.

Really? One wonders then just how the Nixon Administration’s famous opening to China was achieved? Was that some low level contact that pulled that off? Perhaps Kissinger is merely recognizing that neither Bush nor Rice are the least bit likely to meet with the Iranians this year, and granting them a (transparent) fig leaf.
Speaking of low level, underneath the radar activity, the US representative to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a Sada Cumber, is being quoted in Iranian sources saying that “the US is prepared to work with Iran…”

4. Other notable HAK quotes: “Regime change cannot be an objective of our foreign policy.” — at least not if we wish to solve regional problems… In contemplating “if” Iran would be willing to address our concerns, Kissinger suggests the US would have an “obligation” to respond.

This hints headlines to come. Never mind Rice’s lame claims to the contrary, Kissinger apparently is aware of the various “grand-bargain” offers from Iran.
As for eschewing “regime change,” did candidate McCain get the memo?

5. Intriguingly, Kissinger suggests that he has been part of “totally private” talks with unspecified Iranians. He claims that “approaches” have been put before these Iranians “which with a little flexibility on their part” would “surely” lead to negotiations.

I’m not sure what to make of this. Might Kissinger be part of the ongoing discrete “private” efforts with the Iranians? I doubt it, but who knows? One wonders too of a rat in the works here, as once could speculate that such a disclosure, that Kissinger himself is involved in private talks with Iran, might be a sure way to wreck them.