A walk in West Jerusalem

I woke to sun, blue skies, and a light breeze here in Jerusalem today. My first appointment was with Daphna Golan, a veteran leader of the Israeli peace movement who runs human-rights education programs at the Hebrew University. We met in the cafe linked to the Wise auditorium at the university’s Givat Ram campus in West Jerusalem. “Come to where you hear the piano playing,” she said; and indeed I heard the lovely chords of the piano as I approached the building.
What a beautiful idea: a university cafe with a huge grand piano in the middle! Given that the music school is right nearby, Daphna said there’s always someone who wants to sit down and play. As the kippa-ed young guy got his hands around those flowing arpeggios, a security guard by another door was swaying back and forth saying his prayers. The cheerful Palestinian guy behind the counter served me a large cappucino, and Daphna and I sat in a sunny spot and talked.
Like most of the conversations and interviews I’ve conducted since I came here, the tenor of this one was very gloomy. She was reading a couple of Hebrew-language newspapers as I arrived, and informed me that Avigdor Lieberman would almost certainly be in the government, where he was asking for (though might not get) no fewer than five seats… With for himself, either the foreign affairs or finance portfolio.
She talked a little about whether Livni is just hanging tough in the coalition negotiations to try to get a better deal for herself and her part– or whether she would be happy ending up in the opposition, instead.
“Not that it makes much difference,” Daphna said. “Sure, Livni talks about a two-state solution. But what she means by it is not what you or I mean.”
I asked about what had happened to the Israeli left. “There is no Israeli left any more,” she said bluntly.
She noted that Meretz seemed to have shot itself in the foot in the recent elections, in a number of ways. Firstly, it had come out in favor of the war– “So people on the left were asking, ‘So why is Meretz any different from anyone else?” Meretz had also tried to present itself as “new and improved”, but had completely failed to do so. As for the Labour Party, she said that though it still probably has a stronger core of support than Meretz, that support is ageing and is seen as linked to much earlier generations when kibbutzes were still important in Israeli life.
The one good thing about Israeli public life is that people seem to want to vote for women, she said, adding that she thought that was a big reason for the amount of support Tzipi Livni got. “But then, look at Labour and Meretz: no women made it high enough onto those parties’ lists to get elected. What are those parties of the so-called ‘left’ thinking of?”
The only portion of the left that she saw as having much good life left in it is Hadash, the former Communist Party. Though Hadash has been mainly supported by Palestinian Israelis in recent years, she noted that one of their most interesting new MKs will be Dov Chanin, an explicitly anti-Zionist Jewish Israeli who ran for mayor of Tel Aviv last November and amazed everyone by winning one-third of the votes there– more than Meretz.
Golan talked a bit about how isolated she and her pro-peace friends had felt during the Gaza war. She recalled there had been huge pro-war mobilizations on many Israeli campuses. One day during the war she had arrived at the Ramat Gan campus of HU and found large, very belligerent posters calling for the bombing of all of Gaza hung up around the entrance. (She tried to tear them down, herself, right then, and was then threatened by a group of young students who stood around her and called her filthy names. Perhaps some of the same nasty, misogynistic names that get thrown my way from time to time…)
I was deeply moved and personally delighted to catch up with Daphna. She needed to bring the interview to a halt and invited me to walk with her to her home in a leafy nearby neighborhood, where she was engaging in an ingenious bit of civil disobedience. A while ago someone she knows started a project to import organic produce into Jerusalem from the West Bank– defying the whole forest of administrative and financial obstacles with which the Israeli occupation authorities try to prevent or minimize that from happening. So Daphna knows a group of people who form one of the distribution nodes for this cross between a regular veggie coop and a CSA (Community Supported Agriculture) project. When we reached her front yard the friends had nearly finished the sorting. Before us were a dozen produce boxes brimming with beautiful veggies: cabbage, lettuce, green onions, spinach, peppers, tomatoes, etc., all ready to be distributed to the members of this node.
They gave me a crunchy little cucumber to snack on, and I went on my way. I love walking around Jerusalem. My next walk took about 40 minutes: back past the HU campus, up around the new Foreign Ministry building, along Rabin Boulevard to a little park, then up the steep and intimate confines of Bezalel Street, across King George V Blvd, along to the Government Press Office at Beit Agron.
There the cheerful young English-Israeli, ‘Jason’, who’s been sitting on my application for a press card for four days now, told me once again that he’s “on top of it”… But that for some reason The Nation, who have commissioned some of my writings from here, has never applied for a press card here before, so the Israeli consulate in NYC has to do a bit of additional paperwork… Or something. Most strange: I mean, I am in their computer already from the last time I was here, in 2006. On which occasion, yes, they did let me into Gaza.
I asked Jason whether there are any particularly interesting press conferences or other media opportunities coming up. He said no, but tried to sell me on doing a story about the horrors of the “politicization” of many western-based NGOs. I took the brochure he was handing out about this, and proceeded on my way.
I usually enjoy the Jaffa Road/ Ben Yehuda shopping and pedestrian area, but there was ways too much construction there today, so I didn’t linger. I made for Helena Ha-Malkha Street, one of my favorite ways to go– and not only because of the name. (Actually Queen/Saint Helena is a bit of an embarrassment to Quakers and members of other peace churches. It was through her possibly lunatic importunings that her son the Emperor Constantine became a Christian… and a large chunk of Christianity became transformed into the state religion of a huge empire… Among other distortions of the old faith, that whole theory called “Just war” was thereafter introduced. Heck, maybe I should even change my name…)
On the right as you walk along HHM, the ghastly bricked-up windows of the cells in the Moscobiya prison in which the Israelis hold– or certainly have held, in the past– many longterm Palestinian political prisoners. I made a point of singing cheerful songs in English about liberation as I walked past, so maybe people inside those cells could hear me through the few tiny holes they have for ventilation and know that someone was thinking about them.
On the left, the “Sergei Court”, a beautiful large courtyarded structure built by the Russian royal family in the late 19th century to serve as a hostel for high-class Russian pilgrims visiting the city.
After the communist takeover of Russia, the Brits expropriated all the Russian state’s holdings in the city; and after the Brits left the Israelis took them over in their stead. But in recent years the post-Communist Russian state has been working hard to regain control of these lovely pieces of Jerusalem real estate. (Which include, as I’m assuming from the name, the Moscobiya itself?) Anyway, I see from today’s paper that the Israeli government has greed in principle to let the Russian government regain control and ownership of the Sergei Court, though its actual control will start in the first instance with only one wing of the building.
The paper (J. Post? Haaretz? I forget which) said the Israeli government had been reluctant to accede to the Russian demand for its buildings since it was afraid that other countries might also seek the return of city buildings expropriated from them. H’mmm…
Anyway, on down Helena Ha-Malkha to Nevi-im, past the Nablus Road “Arab” bus terminal, and back to my hotel. Made a few calls; and now here I am.
(I have to say I have so much material from the past three weeks that it’ll take some time to sort it all out and write it up. Tuesday I did an interview with Salam Fayad which was pretty interesting. And yes, I’m still hacking away at a broader “mood” piece about Ramallah but it ain’t ready yet… )

M. Totten on Israel junket– and in JWN comments

Interesting to see that the comments board here recently attracted an interesting and well-written comment from emerging young blogger Michael Totten, who’s just completed a short junket to Israel paid for by the American Jewish Committee.
To his credit, Totten– unlike so many earlier beneficiaries of all-expenses-paid junkets provided by pro-Israeli organizations– did at least admit his sponsorship upfront. However, he did not admit in the comment submitted here, if it was indeed he who submitted it, that the whole text of that comment ran on his blog, here, a month ago.
Since I missed it then, I’m interested to see it now, since it not only paints an interesting picture of the views of many members of the Jewish Israeli policy elite but it also conveys pretty clearly to an English-speaking audience the messages those Israelis want to have conveyed.
Overwhelmingly that message is that “There is no fast or easy solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
You could also, certainly, link that argument with description– which by all accounts seems an accurate one– of the degree to which Israelis feel happy or satisfied with the results of the recent Gaza war. As he blogged on January 26, “Most Israelis I spoke to in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem last week feel a tremendous sense of relief and seem more at ease than they have been in years.”
In other words, they feel– or as of January 26, they did feel– under no immediate pressure to change any of their existing practices in the security/strategic field. Those practices include, though Totten makes no mention of these issues, their continued building of additional settlements in the West Bank, the continued maintenance of the ‘movement control’ noose around West Bankers, and most shockingly of all the continuation of the tight siege around Gaza that prevents the delivery of even basic construction materials that are desperately needed to rebuild the thousands of badly damaged and completely destroyed homes, water systems, and other basic infrastructure there.
“Israelis feel okay about themselves– so therefore, there’s no need for anyone to rush hard toward making peace with the Palestinians”: That seems to be the general trend of the extremely self-referential argument that Totten is both describing and subscribing to.
In the blog post “The mother of all quagmires”, which was what was sent here as a comment, Totten adduces several pieces of “evidence” as to why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is currently unsolvable.
The most important of these items of ‘evidence’ is his argument that (1) Hamas doesn’t recognize Israel’s to exist (and by clear implication, that it cannot be made to accept this, even perhaps grudgingly, in the context of a broad peace bargain in which others of its important demands get met); and (2) that this rejection by Hamas of Israel’s “right to exist” and a concomitant rejection of a two-state solution, are widely shared among Palestinians.
Regarding the first part of that argument, of course diplomatic balancing of all the issues is quite possible, in the context of a true, wide-ranging peace negotiation– as Khaled Meshaal and other Hamas leaders have very clearly indicated. (But Hamas, unlike Fateh, is unlikely to give away all its negotiating cards upfront.)
Regarding the second part of the argument, Totten is just plain wrong. He writes,

    Hamas speaks for a genuinely enormous number of Palestinians, and peace is impossible as long as that’s true. An-Najah University conducted a poll of Palestinian public opinion a few months ago and found that 53.4 percent persist in their rejection of a two-state solution.

Where did he get that figure?
You go to any of the series of very professionally conducted polls that have been conducted among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, and you’ll din the picture is almost the direct obverse of what Totten claims.
The PCPSR (Shikaki) poll of early December 2008 found that:

    * 53% accept and 46% reject a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people; 48% think a majority of Palestinians support the mutual recognition while 38% think a majority of Israelis support it.
    * 66% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative that calls for an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967 in return for an Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it.

The JMCC poll of late January 2009 found, in Q.11, that, of a list of different final outcomes suggested (and some not suggested) by the poll-takers, 54.8% of respondents preferred the two-state outcome, as against 18.4% for a “A binational state on all of historic Palestine”, 1.6% for an Islamic state, etc.
These most recent poll results, I should note, are remarkably consistent with findings of polls undertaken by these and other polling organizations for many years past. Back in the early years of this decade, I recall that the level of Palestinian support for a two-state solution was around two-thirds. Yes, it has declined since then; but only slowly. And crucially, even in the context of complete stasis in the negotiations, a continuation/acceleration of Israeli settlement building, and the recent Gaza war, it still remains noticeably above 50%.
That certainly gives peace negotiators a great basis of public support to work on– if they use it swiftly and well.
(Ah, but how about the levels of Israeli support for a robust two-state solution like the one the Saudi/Arab peace initiative calls for? Those figures would be far, far lower, I think… )
So why does Michael Totten distort (or, unquestioningly accept and re-propagate the Israeli distortions of) this part of the Palestinian record?
I guess there are two separate questions there. One is about Totten. In a sense it’s a trivial question. Totten is a journalist-provocateur, on the same order as his friend Chris Hitchens (with whom he got into a little adventure in Beirut last week, after the ever-pugnacious Hitchens decided to deface a mnument of the veteran Lebanese party the SSNP.) Hitchens is so “famous” now that he doesn’t even have to pretend to do real reportorial journalism. Totten is still up-and-coming, however; and he does make some effort to do real reportorial journalism (which also builds up his value to those who want to use him as a journalist-provocateur.) But he does his “journalism” in an unabashedly biased way. He goes to Israel on the dime of the AJC and he makes no attempt whatsoever, while there, to seek out any Palestinians and gain anything even approaching a “balanced”– as between Israelis and Palestinians– view of the conflict between these two peoples. Instead, he just parrots the views and impressions of local anti-Arab propagandists like Martin Kramer.
(I recall that last August, during the Ossetian war, Totten went to Tbilisi and did some blatantly propagandistic flacking for Saakashvili, while there. I’d love to know who picked up those expenses for him… Is it the neocon ideology that drives his work, I wonder; or the taste for “Boys’ Own” adventures of the most laddish kind; or the excitement of getting noticed and adopted by powerful and rich organizations like the AJC? Maybe a bit of all that.)
But a more interesting question is why the influential Israelis with whom he met want to put about the idea that there is “no hope for peace” because “the Palestinians are all hate-filled irredentists who don’t even, really, want the two-state solution they claim is their goal.”
Ah, I guess once I write it down that way, that question looks pretty obvious and trivial, too.

Amnesty’s great campaign for Israel-Hamas arms embargo

Huge kudos to Amnesty International for having pulled together a well-researched and intelligent report on the international arms suppliers who were complicit in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the recent Israel-Gaza war, and for concluding it with a forthright call to all there arms suppliers to cease their arms shipments to the belligerents forthwith.
The news release about the report is here, and the PDF of the report’s full text is here.
(Astute readers of JWN will recall that one of the first things I called for when the recent Gaza war broke out was a complete embargo on all arms shipments to the warring parties.)
Of course, the lethal and destructive capabilities of the arsenals of the two sides are completely asymmetrical. And regarding the shipments of arms to each sides by outside arms suppliers, we can recall Kathy Kelly’s poignant recent speculation regarding the sheer size of the “tunnels” that would be required if all Israel’s arms imports had to be brought in in such a way.
The Amnesty report does three things particularly well:

    1. It pulls together a lot of details about the size, nature, and provenance of the arms transfers made to each side– and, too, of the effects some of these transferred arms had on the communities targeted. And while it is careful to do this for both sides, the report makes quite clear the stark disparity between the level and lethality of the arms level on each side. In particular, though the report is careful to list all the suppliers of significant amounts of arms to srael, the figures it provides show that the overwhelming majority of these outside-supplied arms– $7.9 billion-worth in the four years 2004-2007– came from the United States. The second place was occupied by France, which provided only $59 million-worth.
    2. It provides a very clear explanation (p. 19 of the full report) of the duty all states have under international law to avoid aiding or assisting other states in the commission of unlawful acts. This duty is spelled out in Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), which states: “A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.” After the way the Israelis used their foreign-supplied weapons in and against Lebanon in 2006, surely no state officials elsewhere could thereafter argue that “they did not know” that Israel had a propensity to use such weapons in ways that were grossly disproportionate to the military task at hand and often grossly indiscriminate… Also, in addition to the duties states have under international law, most states– including the US– also have their own domestic legislation governing the end use of weapons it supplies to others. In the case of the US, such arms can be used only for defensive purposes.
    3. Finally, the Amnesty report is quite clear on the policies it advocates. It calls for the immediate imposition of a “comprehensive UN Security Council arms embargo on Israel, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups until effective mechanisms are in place to ensure that weapons or munitions and other military equipment will not be used to commit serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and the establishment of a ” thorough, independent and impartial investigation of violations and abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the Israeli attacks which have been directed at civilians or civilian buildings in the Gaza Strip, or which are disproportionate, and Palestinian armed groups’ indiscriminate rocket attacks against civilian centres in southern Israel.”

So now, let’s see what the AI organization in the US, and the US Campaign to End the Israeli occupation can do with this information and this campaign.
Addendum, at 2:00 p.m., EST:
I see that Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum has “slammed” Amnesty for its report, which he described as “unbalanced and unfair because it equates the criminal with the victim.” Doubtless the government of Israel won’t be far behind in denouncing the report.
Regarding Barhoum’s criticism, I would note that the provisions of international humanitarian law on which Amnesty bases its argument deal overwhelmingly with questions of how belligerent parties fight their wars rather than why they fight them. International law does, certainly, give a general right to people living under foreign military occupation to resist their occupiers, including by using military force to do so. (And also, by inviting other states to come and join them in doing so– as the Kuwaitis did, in 1990-91.) So any actions that Hamas takes that can be seen as constituting direct resistance to Israel’s military occupation of Gaza or the West Bank would be considered legitimate.
Thus, for example, just about all the military operations Hamas and others undertook against IOF forces who invaded Gaza during the war– or any actions they might have taken to defend against air or naval assaults against Gaza– would be completely legal.
You could certainly argue that if, during the recent war or in the immediate and quite evident run-up to it, the Palestinian resistance groups had sent rockets or against valid military targets inside Israel, that would have been legal too. What’s illegal as a way of war-fighting is to send out rockets or other ordnance that is not targeted as carefully as possible onto valid military targets.
One important point is that there is good evidence that in the past Hamas has tried to target military targets– mainly, military bases– inside Israel. But the Israeli censorship system forbids any reporting or mention of that. Another is that the targetability of the rockets used by Hamas and other groups is pretty darn poor in many cases. And another is that groups other than Hamas– including, as the Amnesty report notes, groups affiliated with Fateh– are also militarily active inside Gaza; and they may have targeting philosophies that are different from Hamas’s. (However, Hamas, as the predominant authority in the Gaza Strip, has a responsibility to try to curb the actions of any other groups that are committing war-crimes through the indiscriminate firing of missiles into Israel.)
… All in all, Barhoum has something of an argument, but not I think a 100% watertight argument.
Meanwhile, for myself, as a US citizen, I am most concerned with the involvement of my government in this whole business. If the US government were supplying any weapons to Hamas or other Palestinian factions, I would probably want to examine their practices and targeting philosophies much more rigorously. But it is not. It is massively supplying arms to a country that has used many of them to commit war crimes. I shall therefore focus centrally on the responsibilities that that entails.

The rule of what?

I had an interesting morning. First, it being a normal workday here in Ramallah, I went to conduct a 90-minute interview with two members of the Palestinian Legislative Council which was, you will recall, elected in a free and fair election here in January 2006.
One of these men had recently been released from an Israeli prison where he’s spent nearly the whole of the last 32 months. The only accusation against him was that he’s a member of a parliamentary bloc, ‘Change and Reform’, that, though it ran in the election quite legitimately– and indeed, with the express authorization of both Israel and the US– was suddenly deemed by Israel, five months later, to have an affiliation with “terrorists.”
Back in June-July 2006 a large number of PLC members were rounded up by the Israeli occupation forces. That was shortly after militants in Gaza captured the young, on-active-duty Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit as a POW; and just about everyone said at the time that the PLC members had been captured as additional “bargaining chips” against Shalit’s release. (That, though the taking of hostages for the any purpose, including that of using them as bargaining chips, is quite prohibited by international law.)
41 of those PLC hostages still remain in prison, including PLC speaker Aziz al-Dweik. The PLC, which has 132 members, has been unable to muster a quorum since June 2006 and thus has done no business for this entire time. (George Bush, quite shamefully, uttered not a word of protest against Israel’s cruel and expressly anti-democratic move. Will President Obama change that position? I hope so.)
Both PA president Mahmoud Abbas, whose own elected term ran out on January 9, and the man elected by parliament to be PM back in March 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, took upon themselves the right to name an “emergency government.” The Abbas-designated government, which is based here in Ramallah, has been given very generous financial support (and weapons and many forms of training) by the US-led west, which has meantime worked consistently– ever since January 2006– to support Israel’s extremely harsh, and in many cases actually lethal, siege of Gaza.
Those policies were just two prongs of a wide US-Israeli campaign to oust the duly elected Haniyeh government completely.
So in my meeting with the two parliamentarians here this morning, Mahmoud Musleh, MP, who was the one recently released from jail told me about some of the forms of mistreatment and humiliation to which he and his fellow parliamentarians were subjected while there. He, like several of the others, is a man in his late sixties. On thing he noted was that each time any of the detainees is taken to an Israeli court for a hearing, they are subjected to two days of demeaning and sometimes painful treatment on their way there and back.
More from that interview, later.
… A couple of hours later I had a chance meeting with an American woman who’s here on a two-year contract with USAID to work on “rule of law” issues with the Abbas/Fayyad government’s “Ministry of Justice.”
I was interested to find out what it is, exactly, that she does. The old rubric “capacity building” doesn’t tell you very much, does it? She talked a bit about what she had done on previous contracts, in Bosnia and Afghanistan. One of the things she mentioned specifically was the establishment of regulations for judgment enforcement. This is especially important, she explained, for foreign investors– otherwise, what are their contracts worth, at all?
She said she doesn’t really “do” human rights. But even in what she does do, she said she had run into considerable problems, because any governmental regulations that are drafted in a “rule of aw” situation need to be drafted in line with the enabling legislation— and the legislature hasn’t been able to conduct any business since June 2006…
This professional dilemma of hers is a great illustration of the “cart before the horse” or “Alice Through the Looking Glass” nature of many of the “aid” interventions that western governments have been running in occupied Palestine ever since Oslo. (And that is 16 years now… )
The basic issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty have not even come close to being resolved here yet! Israel’s occupation forces surround this city–and they send snatch-squads in to capture or sometimes kill suspects here with impunity, several times a month. Meantime, all around the extensive fence-and-wall system that surrounds Ramallah, the Israeli settlements expand, expand, expand, gobbling up yet more Palestinian land.
And yet, though the occupation continues– here, as in Gaza– western governments are building “Palestinian” court-houses and prisons and giving numerous “trainings” and other interventions to “teach” these obviously somewhat backward Palestinians (irony alert) all about the “rule of law.”
As if the Palestinians didn’t actually in an earlier era establish nearly all the state administrations for all the little emirates/statelets/former “Trucial states” down in the Gulf– including their judicial systems, penal systems, etc.
And these presumably comfortably compensated US contract workers continue to do this, while day-in-day-out strong US ally Israel gives the Palestinians the exactly opposite lesson about the ascendancy of raw might over any concept of domestic or international law.
Talk about Looking Glass Land.
The rule of law, here in the West Bank and Gaza. Now wouldn’t that be a fine thing?

IPS news analysis on intra-Palestinian, prisoner exchange, and ceasefire issues

My weekly piece on major developments in the peace (or no-peace) diplomacy on Arab-Israeli issues is here.
Also here.
Title: Peace Talks on Hold Amid Dual Power Struggles. Tragic.
News analysis is an interesting hybrid of, um, news reporting and analysis. I think I’m getting the hang of it. Qadoura Fares was really interesting to talk to. was that only yesterday? Seems an age ago, because I’ve been doing so many other interesting things.
(By the way, Twittering the Bil’in activities didn’t work. Maybe I’ll try a third time to link my Jawwal phone to my twitter account…. Anyway, you can find a few after-action reports at my Twitter account.)

In Ramallah

I’ve never stayed for very long in Ramallah before. I generally preferred to stay in East Jerusalem and then as necessary traverse the ghastly Qalandia crossing point between there and Ramallah, sometimes staying with friends here in Ramallah for a night or two. But this time I decided to make Ramallah my first stop, and to stay here for a week or so, so I can catch up with everything that’s been going on here. It is, after all, three years now since I was last in town.
So yesterday morning, I took a car from Amman down to the Allenby/ King Hussein Bridge. There was almost no-one else seeking to cross– almost as bad a sign as if it had been jam-packed, I think. The deal is you do your Jordan-exit business first, east of the bridge, then take a Jordanian-provided and mandatory shuttle bus across the trickle of water known as the River Jordan, to the Israeli side. But it took nearly an hour for them to gather enough people (ten or so) to justify sending the bus across. I got a bit impatient. But in the bus I found that a fellow-traveler who’s a manager with the (Abu Mazen-controlled) Palestine Investment Fund was also hoping to head up to Ramallah, so we shared a taxi and split the cost of some $120.
Getting in to the West Bank through the Israeli-controlled side was the usual, extremely depressing experience. The Israelis have cadres of young women, presumably doing their national service, whom they use as the “front-line” in many border-control jobs. Many of them love to hang around with each other and with the beefy young guys who also work there, to chat on cell-phones, to stand around admiring each other’s make-up and hair-dos, and to really relish the power they have over all these exhausted-looking Palestinian families whom they have to deal with. The main power they have is to harrass and delay, but it’s backed up by other much more intrusive or fearsome powers, too.
When our bus with ten people rolled in, there were around 60-70 people in the passport-control waiting area, so some of them may well have been waiting since early morning. Just about all of them looked to be Palestinians, since of course just about every Palestinian family in the West Bank has half or more of its family members now living in Jordan. And guess what, people in these families like to get together!!! But to do so, they have to pass through these border-controls that are totally controlled by the cohorts of bored and faintly malevolent young Israelis. Well, that gives just a first glimpse of what then continues to happen to Palestinians inside the West Bank, any time they want to travel from one town or city there to another, I guess.
… If all the Palestinian communities in the occupied territories can nowadays be described as “open-air prisons”– and I believe they can– then Ramallah is probably the “Club Fed”, i.e. the top banana, in this extensive system. Provided you don’t actually need to go anywhere else, provided you have plenty of money (yes, this Club Fed ain’t cheap to live in), and provided you’re capable of completely disabling any sense of solidarity or connectedness you might have with family members, friends, or just plain compatriots who happen to live elsewhere, such as Gaza, you could possibly even live a pretty good life here.
Places that most Ramallah people can’t ever get to include even Jerusalem, which used to be just 12 minutes away by car along the hilltop road. Ramallah’s a historically Christian town, and just about everyone here has family members or close business ties with East Jerusalem. Tough luck. The Wall, with its horrendous– and oh so evocatively looming– watch-towers, stands between.
You are reminded nearly everywhere of the tight noose Israel retains around Ramallah. Like the rest of the West Bank, it is literally a captive market for Israeli produce. Many stores are filled with Israeli-produced goods or with other imports that, having come in through Israeli ports and middle-men give them a nice cut of the profits, too. You can get some great Palestinian fresh produce, and a few locally-manufactured products like Taybeh beer, or some Palestinian-processed foods. But even for those Palestinian industries, their scale is small and many or most of their inputs have to brought in from or through Israel.
… But having said all that, I also have to say that, just for now, I’m getting real pleasure from being here. One big part of that is to reconnect with old friends, which has already started to happen. And the other is just to experience the urban environment in this bustling but airy and beautiful Palestinian Arab city.
I’ve taken a couple of walks now, from my fairly central hotel here up to the “Manara” landmark, around some of the back streets there, and along Main Street a bit. For various reasons– including over the years the actual presence of Israeli occupation troops in the streets, the tensions of various intifadas, or the threat of either of them rolling in at any time– I’ve never really experienced Ramallah as a functioning and flourishing city-center before. I never realized there is a pretty sizeable big produce-market tucked in to the east of the Manara, filling up a number of whole streets with with push-carts piled high with riotously colorful fruits, veggies, and greens. Especially, at this time of year, greens. There are side-streets lined with little stores selling traditional (or made-in-China) housewares: brooms, loofas, knitted string back-scratchers, aluminum pots, etc. Between them are little store-fronts in which people make and sell the very best in Arab street food: felafel carefully made with a dusting of sesame seeds atop each one; kibbeh balls staright out of the deep-fryer; tall pillars of succulently rotating meat for shawerma; stacked rows of whole chickens browning slowly on their automated spits; little meat-pies or cheese-pies; kaak; kunefeh…
Oh, to walk down a street drenched in the smells from all these great foods is a pure delight. Or you turn a corner and the sharp tang of cardamom coffee comes in from somewhere. Or the rich, warm smell of thyme-coated mana’eesh…
There are a lot of cars– yellow taxis everywhere!– and quite a lot of honking that reverberates between the mainly solid stone walls of the city center’s buildings. However, one of the things Abu Mazen’s “Palestinian Authority” has done is put on the streets a large number of pretty well trained traffic cops. Their little whistles punctuate the noise in the city center– as do, too, in the most commercial portion of the city, the loudspeakers that many shop-owners have hung outside their stores, blaring repetitive messages about their “special offers” over and over into the street outside.
One of the best things about Ramallah– as was also true of East Jerusalem, back in the day– is that many of the farm-women you see either selling their produce in the streets or walking purposefully through the crowds to do their business are still wearing their traditional, hand-embroidered dresses. It always amazed me how these women, who spend many months sewing vast swathes and plateaus of these intricate, traditional patterns into their dresses before they get married, would thereafter wear these treasured heirlooms day-in-day-out as they proceeded about what was often very dirty work. Many of the younger women in the street are wearing a simpler, non-embroidered form of hijab. (In the whole broader district around Ramallah, Muslim Palestinians have been in a clear majority for some time now.) But you do still see plenty of women in the older embroidered thobes. That certainly brightens my day.
(I was telling my daughter Lorna a few things about my time in Ramallah in an IM exchange yesterday. She urged me to take and post some photos. I’m a bit reluctant. I feel there’s something a bit exploitative or objectivizing about photography of other people unless it’s as part of a pre-agreed or clearly understood transaction between equals… I feel much more confident about the nature of the transaction if I just write about my experiences, instead.)
I guess the other big observation I have is how generally pleasant the medium- and long-range views from and around Ramallah are. The city is built on a series of hills. Like Amman, which is where I came from yesterday, though the hills and valleys here crowd closer together and are even steeper than the ones in Amman. In both places, as you travel around the city you get many opportunities for pleasing, multi-curved vistas or sweeping views. But here in Ramallah there are many more mature trees interspersed between the buildings. And though there are many fairly undistinguished apartment buildings here of seven or eight stories high, there are still also many gracious older stone houses of two stories or so that are topped with the pyramidal red tile roofs that were once common in this city, as in Lebanon.
(Nowadays throughout most of the West Bank, a cluster of red-tiled roofs is a dead giveaway for an Israeli settlement, since the vast majority of the Palestinians towns and villages here are dominated by buildings that have flat roofs.. much more useful, historically, as additional storage space or a good place to dry your peppers or whatever.)
But the trees and the occasional red roofs here in Ramallah and its twin-city, El-Bireh, make many of the accidental vistas you see as you walk or drive around the place very beautiful indeed.
Club Fed, yes.
And then, there’s Gaza….

Israel-Hamas prisoner talks, intra-Palestinian reconciliation, etc

Ha’aretz, Reuters, and others are now reporting that Israel seems close to presenting a prisoner-exchange proposal involving Hamas-held Israeli POW Gideon Shalit and a large number of Palestinian prisoners and detainees that might (imho) win acceptance from Hamas. Conclusion of this prisoner-exchange agreement could then in some way accompany conclusion of the Gaza ceasefire-stabilization agreement between the two parties, the terms of which seem to be just about agreed upon.
Notable among the names mentioned of Palestinians to be released is that of Marwan Barghouthi, a veteran Fateh activist who has often challenged Fateh’s ossified political leadership in the past and who has worked since his imprisonment in an Israeli jail in 2002 to help improve relations between Fateh and Hamas.
Israel’s still-PM Ehud Olmert has insisted that the ceasefire-stabilization agreement can’t be concluded without Hamas freeing Israeli POW Gideon Shalit. Hamas has resisted linking the two issues and has its own very compelling demands for the release of political prisoners and detainees in exchange for Shalit. Indeed, negotiations over that prisoner release have continued, in an on-again-off-again way ever since Shalit, an IDF corporal, was captured by Gaza-based militants back in early summer 2006.
(One further note: Several Hamas leaders have been trying to spread uncertainty about whether Shalit actually survived Israel’s recent assault on Gaza. It is at least possible that he didn’t; but somehow my gut-instinct judgment is that he would have been given as much protection during the war as the top Hamas leaders.)
As I have written before, Egypt, which is now mediating both these parallel negotiations, should be able to find a neat “diplomatic” formula on linking them in an acceptable way, even if only temporally. And indeed, the Haaretz writers write today,

    Egyptian officials are now busy on a formula that would allow both sides to claim that their stance [on linking or not linking the two negotiations] was accepted.

The Haaretz article reports that the “troika” that’s still in charge of Israel’s security policy (Olmert, Barak, and Livni) would present a concrete proposal regarding the prisoner-exchange deal to the full cabinet on Wednesday.
The Haaretz writers report,

    Another key issue is the identity of the Palestinians that each side is willing to see freed. Hamas has demanded a large proportion of the prisoners on its list of 350 to 450 names. Significant progress has been made, and Israel now opposes only several dozen names.
    A spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, Abu Obeida, said Sunday that the group insists on the release of three senior figures: Ibrahim Hamed, the leader of the military wing in the West Bank; Abdullah Barghouti, responsible among others for the bombings at the Sbarro pizzeria and Cafe Moment in Jerusalem; and Abbas al-Sayed, mastermind of the Park Hotel massacre in Netanya.
    On the other hand, there seems to be support in Israel for the release of Marwan Barghouti, the jailed leader of Fatah’s more militant Tanzim faction.
    Hader Shkirat, attorney for Barghouti, told Haaretz on Sunday that there will be no deal for Shalit without the release of Barghouti.

Of course, it is not Shkirat but the Hamas leadership that is responsible for the Palestinian side of the negotiation. But if Shkirat seems to have that degree of confidence that Barghouthi will be involved, he must have gotten it from somewhere.
Many Palestinian analysts believe that a released Barghouthi could help to save the political fortunes of Fateh, which have been extremely badly battered by the recent Gaza war. If the Hamas leadership is indeed insisting that Barghouthi be part of the present prisoner-exchange deal that indicates to me that they actually want to see the emergence within Fateh of a new kind of leadership with which they could have a functional working relationship, and that that is worth more to them now than the possible downside risk that a re-energized Fateh might win back some support from Hamas.
Certainly, Hamas’s relationship with Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), the current head of Fateh, the PA, and the PLO, has been extremely difficult over the past three years.
Meanwhile, moves toward a new reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas are proceeding, albeit still slowly. At the end of last week high-level (but not top-level) delegations from the two parties had preliminary discussions in– again– Egypt; and more formal and substantive reconciliation talks are scheduled to open there February 22.
The participants in last week’s talks were, from Fateh, former PM Ahmed Quei (Abu Alaa’) and Nabil Shaath, and from Hamas Dr. Mahmoud Zahhar and politburo member Mousa Abu Marzook.
That Al-Manar report linked to there said this about the talks:

    Fatah and Hamas sources said that the Egyptians presented the two sides with a plan aimed at ending the power struggle. The plan, the sources added, calls for the formation of a Fatah-Hamas government, the release of all “political” detainees held by the two parties, holding parliamentary and presidential elections, reforming the PLO and reconstructing the Palestinian security forces.
    According to the sources, the two parties have already reached an agreement in principle to form a joint government that would serve for two years. The proposed government, which would be headed by current PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayad and would include several Hamas ministers, would be entrusted with preparing for new elections and solving all problems between the two sides ahead of the vote.

Al-Manar is run by Lebanon’s Hizbullah and can therefore be judged somewhat slanted toward the Hamas side. However, the website also has some very solid news reporting, so this piece may be part of that.
(Update at 12:34 p.m.: I just realized the whole Manar report was lifted verbatim off the Jerusalem Post website— though without attribution. Mnar does often do this with news reports its editors think are valuable. I guess the fact that both they and the J. Post stand behind this report gives it added credibility.)
… As a broader observation, I would simply note that it is possible to view the role Fateh has played in recent years as in many ways equivalent to that played in the dying days of South Africa’s apartheid by Buthelezi’s ethnic-Zulu-based “Inkatha Freedom Party”. During the “last throes” of the apartheid regime, the IFP became majorly co-opted by the state security forces in a campaign to terrorize and oppose the ANC at many levels. Despite the enormous numbers of deaths and the the amount of suffering and pain that the IFP inflicted on ANC supporters– especially, I should note, on those ANC supporters who were closest to it, that is, who were themselves ethnic Zulus– the ANC leadership worked hard to always hold out a hand of friendship to Buthelezi and, while criticizing many of the IFP’s actions, never sought to delegitimize his political role.
Many people have described the role Fateh’s security forces have played in recent years as analogous to that of the Nicaraguan Contras– a force that was almost entirely created from outside through US funding and arming. However, I think that viewing Fateh’s role as closer to that of the IFP is more helpful. Buthelezi did have some indigenous political credibility before he became involved with the apartheid regime’s nefarious anti-ANC campaigns. Plus, at the political level, he played one crucial step that helped to stymie the aparheid regime’s big push to solve its problems through the creation of a string of tightly controlled “Bantustans”, or nominally independent Black African “homelands.”
(We can note that Israel was one of the very, very few governments around the world that ever gave formal recognition to the six or seven Bantustans that were established. No other significant government ever did that.)
But Buthelezi– who had many supporters and admirers in the west, including Margaret Thatcher and Ronald reagan– crucially never gave in to the Pretoria regime’s pressures that he declare Kwa-Zulu to be a Bantustan. That political position that he held to really helped the national struggle.
Within Fateh, we can also see that it has significant, pre-existing political legitimacy. Plus, despite Abu Mazen’s lengthy participation in the never-ending tragicomedy of “peace negotiations” with Israel and the many harsh actions he has taken against Hamas, we can see that thus far he has never signed off on any of the extremely humiliating political deals the Israelis have waved before him (though never even finally offered.) And indeed, on February 7, even his very, very pro-US “prime minister”, Salam Fayyad, said he saw no hope that any Israeli leader could come up with a reasonable peace proposal.
Bottom line: closer to the IFP than to the Contras?