MP Daraghmeh arrested March 19

When I published my February 22nd interview with Palestinian parliamentarians Ayman Daraghmeh and Mahmoud Musleh here yesterday I failed to note that Daraghmeh was one of the four duly elected Hamas-affiliated legislators who were captured by Israel on March 19. He has since been held in detention someplace, likely in Israel.
Today, one of those legislators, (former) Deputy Prime Minister Nasser Ad-Din Ash-Sha’er was sentenced by a military court in Israel to six months’ “administrative detention”, that is, detention without charge or trial.
Daraghmeh and the other two kidnapped legislators have not yet had any kind of a day in court. There is considerable reason to be worried about what kind of treatment they have been receiving while they have been kept in the post-detention “back hole” of the Israeli prison system.
It is hard to keep track of how many of the Palestinian legislators who were duly elected in the January 2006 election, which was certified by European and US observers as free and fair are currently being held as political prisoners– and also, indeed, as “bargaining chips”– by the Israelis. When I interviewed Daraghmeh and Musleh last month they told me that 41 of the 52 Hamas-affiliated legislators in the west Bank were then in Israeli prisoners. (Musleh had only recently been released from an Israeli prison.)
So I guess now that is 45 Hamas-affiliated legislators being held captive by Israel. That is in addition to a much smaller number of MPs affiliated with Fateh or the PFLP. The PLC has a total of 132 seats.
All democratic forces in the world should strongly protest these detentions.
In a small number of these cases– including those of Fateh’s Marwan Barghouthi and PFLP leader Ahmad Sa’adat– the detainees have been given a formal “trial” in Israel, and received lengthy prison sentences on being found “guilty.” In those two trials, the charges were overtly political, rather than being related to the two men’s actual commission of any violent crime, and both men robustly challenged the right of an Israeli court to have any jurisdiction over them. Hence they mounted no defense; so the state’s “evidence” against them was never tested in any way.
In the case of most of these detentions of duly elected legislators, however, either the men have never had a trial, but simply been consigned to Israel’s draconian system of ever-renewable periods of six months of “administrative” detention, or, when given “trials”, these have been completely political.
For example, MPs Azzam Salhab and Nizar Ramadan from Hebron were both arrested together in late 2005 after they had announced their intention to run for the election on the Hamas-affiliated Change & Reform list. They were “charged” in an Israeli court with membership in a “terrorist” organization– Hamas– but never charged with any specified act of wrongdoing or violence.
(Salhab and Ramadan continued their election campaign from within prison, and won. Sometime this past February, I believe, they were released. But they were picked up again on March 19 and returned to their prison cells in Israel.)
This is all outrageous. The US government and all western governments all strongly supported– indeed pushed for– the holding of the PLC election in January 2006. The election was intended to revive the internal political life of the PA, and it could well have had that effect if the results had been respected by Israel and its western backers.
If there were reasonable grounds to accuse men like Daraghmeh, Salhab, Ramadan, and Ash-Sha’er of actual criminal wrongdoing, that evidence would surely have been produced at that time. It was not– most likely because there was none.
Instead, Israel was simply allowed to “use” the 2006 elections to identify, “flush out”, and detain Hamas’s leading political supporters throughout the West Bank: a perversion of democracy that all true democrats around the world should strongly oppose.
… Ehud Olmert’s last-legs government in Israel apparently decided on last week’s new round-up of Hamas supporters in the West Bank as a way to put added pressure on the Hamas leadership to make further concessions in the negotiation over Israeli POW Gilad Shalit, now held under Hamas’s control somewhere in Gaza. I note that there is a big disparity between the case of Shalit, a young man who was actively engaged in the military when he was captured as a POW, and that of the captured legislators and the many thousands of other Palestinian political prisoners held by Israel.
When Shalit entered the military, whether he did so as a conscript or a volunteer, he knowingly entered the realm of military law, a realm whose participants have the “right” to kill duly identified military targets but who also knowingly undertake the risk that in the course of their duty they might be killed, wounded, or captured. The same is, essentially, true for any Palestinian nationalist who knowingly takes up arms against Israeli targets. But most of the Palestinian prisoners held by Israel– including, I believe, just about all of the imprisoned Hamas legislators– are not “military people” in this sense, at all.
In the case of the legislators, they volunteered to participate peaceably in parliamentary elections, the conduct of which was completely (or almost completely) peaceful. If the west allows Israel to continue claiming that such participation is a “crime”, then the west is in deeper trouble around the world than most westerners realize.

The Jerusalem/Refugee tradeoff

Just a propos of the Jerusalem question and its rising importance, I remembered something Yossi Alpher said when I had lunch with him in Ramot Hasharon three weeks ago…
It was really a crystallization or aide-memoire of something I’d figured out long time ago. Namely that the essential political tradeoff at the heart of the Clinton Parameters, Taba, the Geneva Inititiative etc was always that the Palestinian side would be expected to “give up” just about all its demands on the actual return of 1948 Palestinian refugees to their original homes (though they would get some substantial compensation), and in return Israel would have to “give up” something in terms of its claims to sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem for all time.
Now, I recognize that’s a very Israelo-centric way of looking at things. Most Palestinians would say that with the 1988 Declaration of Independence the PLO already “gave up” its claim to 78% of Mandate Palestine and could not be expected to give up up anything more. However, it remains true that Arafat’s negotiators at Taba, and Yasser Abed Rabboo and Co (with Arafat’s backing) at Geneva, showed themselves very ready indeed to consider the kind of deal that Alpher was talking about.
But if Jerusalem’s new mayor Nir Barkat is– with the expected strong backing of the incoming Netanyahu government– essentially “going for broke” in Jerusalem by trying to break up its remaining centers of Palestinian population once and for all, then what does that do to the “Clinton/Geneva Grand Bargain”?
And that’s just at the political level. If the Netanyahu government goes ahead with backing Barkat in Jerusalem and pushes ahead with the E-1 development that links Jerusalem even more effectively to Maale Adumim, what happens to the territorial basis of a two-state solution, anyway?
Just asking.
(I hope someone in Sen. Mitchell’s office is looking very closely indeed at all these questions.)

Short piece on J’lem on ‘The Nation’ website; DC talks next week

I have a short piece on Jerusalem on The Nation‘s website today. I’ll be working on one more short piece for the website and a couple of longer pieces for the print mag over the month ahead.
Also, in case some of you haven’t looked at the top of JWN’s left sidebar recently, I thought I should tell you about my upcoming stand-alone talk in DC. It’s a sort of trip report– okay, a collection of highlights from my recent trip; and it’ll be at lunch-time on Tuesday, March 31, not April 1, as I’d earlier told some people.
Finally, at the end of next week I’ll be taking part in the G.U Center for Contemporary Arab Studies’ symposium on “Palestine and the Palestinians today”. I’m contributing to the very last of the symposium’s panel discussions, on the Friday afternoon. I’m expecting to have learned a huge amount from the other presenters before then.
The two DC events both require pre-registration.

Bantustan Days, Part 7: Two Hamas parliamentarians

On February 22, I conducted an interview with two parliamentarians from the Hamas-affiliated ‘Change and Reform’ bloc. They were Mahmoud Musleh, elected to one of the five constituency-based seats elected from Ramallah/al-Bireh (where Hamas won four of the five seats), and Dr. Ayman Daraghmeh, who was #20 of the 29 people elected from Change and Reform’s nationwide list.
They told me that of the 52 Hamas parliamentarians based in the West Bank, 41 were in prison in Israel. Indeed, Musleh had only recently been released.
I met them in Daraghmeh’s office in Ramallah. Daraghmeh seems to be in his forties and is, I believe, a medical doctor. Musleh is in his late sixties. It was a cold day, and Musleh was wearing a good warm woolen abaya over his pants-and-jacket outfit, and a traditional-style keffiyeh headscarf. Daraghmeh was in a western-style suit. (Fwiw, I might add that both men reached out their hands to shake mine. When I interviewed two male Hamas MPs in Hebron a few days later, they notably chose not to.)
I started out by asking Musleh quite a lot of questions about the treatment he and the other Palestinian political prisoners had received in prison. He told me first how hard it is whenever the detainees have court hearings: they’re wakened very early, taken in a van with nothing to hang onto– and them with handcuffs and leg-shackles, being thrown around in the back of the van– to a holding center near Ramleh; held there overnight and then taken from there to the courtroom. He said there is a lot of aimless waiting around. After the hearing they are taken back to Ramleh for another night, then back to the prison-camp, and with all the transfers made in the same very uncomfortable and often painful way in the vans.
The prison-camp he was held in was near B’ir Saba. He also talked a bit about the lousy medical treatment the prisoners receive. The ICRC visits the prisoners, he said, “every few months.”
He explained that generally, the political prisoners from all the different Palestinian factions were held together. Their morale was good, he said, and they got along very well together. However, when the Gaza war started, the prison authorities started to separate them according to their affiliation.
I then asked them was about their expectations from the intra-Palestinian dialogue, which was scheduled to start in Cairo three days later. Daraghmeh said that the most important reconciliation to be effected was that between Hamas and Fateh,

and the main two issues we need to agree on are reform of the PLO and reform of the security forces. Forming the new government will not be so hard, compared with those.

He said that reforming the PLO, which is the parent body of the Palestinian Authority and represents all the Palestinians, both inside and outside the occupied territories, would require “a new kind of PNC—one that represents all Palestinians.” The PNC– Palestinian National Council– is the broad, allegedly representative body that makes policy for the PLO’s 18-person Executive Committee.
Daraghmeh spelled out that,

Continue reading “Bantustan Days, Part 7: Two Hamas parliamentarians”

Bantustan Days, Part 6: Mustafa Barghouthi

Mustafa Barghouthi was born in Jerusalem in 1954. He followed his, at the time, better-known cousin Bashir Barghouthi, into the Palestinian Communist Party (which Bashir B. was for a long time the head of), and studied medicine in the USSR. On returning to Palestine he established and for many years ran the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, a non-governmental network that– like the parallel network of Agricultural Relief Committees– provided vital support for the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians during the First Intifada, 1987-93.
In 1991 he was a delegate to the Madrid Peace Conference. In 1996 he ran unsuccessfully in the first elections held for the PA’s legislature. Over the years he became a strong critic of the large amount of corruption within the PLO. In 2002, he left the Communist Party, which remained affiliated with the PLO. (By then, it had been renamed the People’s Party.) Along with Gaza’s much-loved leftist leader Dr Haidar Abdel-Shafei, Edward Said, and Ibrahim Dakkak, Barghouthi founded a completely new nationalist movement called the Al-Mubadara al-Wataniya al-Filastiniya, the Palestinian National Initiative. Abdel-Shafei and Said have since then passed away.
In 2005, Barghouthi ran in the PA’s presidential election, coming in second only to Mahmoud Abbas with 19% of the vote. That was the PNI’s finest moment to date. The following year Barghouthi topped the PNI’s list in the PLC elections. He and Rawia al-Shawwa were both elected from the list. In 2003 and once again during the campaign for the 2006 election Barghoughi made a point of trying to conduct political activities openly in the city of his birth, (East) Jerusalem. But since the Israelis had long since revoked the special “permit” that all Palestinians require if they want to carry on living in– or even just to visit– Jerusalem, on both those occasions he was arrested. During the detention he suffered in 2003, which lasted some days, he was interrogated and beaten with a rifle butt, which left him with a broken knee.
… By a happy chance I met Barghouthi when I went to the fourth-anniversary anti-Wall march in Bil’in, on February 20. He was accompanied there by a spirited group of around 20 PNI activists waving the movement’s large orange flags.
Three days later I went to do a formal interview with him in the new headquarters of the Union of Medical Relief Committees, which were surprisingly opulent-looking.
“I’m very worried because our internal rifts are growing,” he started out saying–

This is due to a number of factors, of which the first is the transformation the PA underwent during the recent conflict[in Gaza]. It came under even more pressure from Israel to become a security sub-agent for Israel here. Why, yesterday the PA’s Interior Ministry even prevented the holding of a civil-society meeting scheduled for Nablus, that had been convened to discuss the role of the PLO. They tried to force the people organizing it to apply for permits to hold this meeting. This is completely new!

Continue reading “Bantustan Days, Part 6: Mustafa Barghouthi”

Bantustan Days, Part 5: A PFLP parliamentarian

Khalida Jarrar is a senior activist in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the longtime Palestinian wing of the Arab Nationalist Movement that was founded by the late Dr. George Habash. She was Number Three on the PFLP’s list in the 2006 parliamentary elections and therefore just squeaked into the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). (Jarrar is also married to someone who’s a cousin of AFSC’s Raed Jarrar, hence the shared family name. Actually, one of the things she achieved during the short time the PLC was still a bit functional was to get legislation enacted that would allow Palestinian women to keep their birth names rather than having to take their husband’s, which is what she still uses.)
On February 21 I found Jarrar in the office she maintains not far from the PLC’s Ramallah building. Her office is on an upper floor of one of those many incongruous large buildings that cluster onto the streets around Manara Square and that, once you go into them, reveal themselves to be large, and really rather unkempt and ugly, indoor shopping malls. The rooms on the upper floors tend to be used by professionals– or unused. From her office there was a fine view out over the hills around but the weather was extremely ugly that day: thunder, lighning, and a massive hailstorm that left marble-sized hailstones in drifts on the streets below.
She started out by defining the five key principles that, she said, informed the work of the PFLP and the other leftist parties inside the PLO/PA:

First, we strongly believe in the need to have dialogue between all the different parties and civil society. We need to develop an effective ‘national front’ in order to meet the challenges that our people faces by being under occupation, rather than using violence amongst palestinians.

Second, we believe strongly in the need for regular elections.

Third, we think the election law should be changed to make it 100% constituency-based, rather than being the mixture of constituency-based seats and national list seats that we currently have. We think that would make the parliamentarians more responsive to their constituencies.

Continue reading “Bantustan Days, Part 5: A PFLP parliamentarian”

Bantustan Days, Part 4: The in-Fateh opposition

To understand some of the internal problems inside Fateh, I found it really helpful to go along and talk to Qaddura Fares, a veteran Fateh activist in his mid-forties who was one of the stalwarts of the First Intifada (1987-93.) Fares grew up in Silwad, the same village in the West Bank north of Ramallah where Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal also grew up– though Fares said that Meshaal was six years older than him and they never met in their youth.
When I interviewed Fares on February 19 I had to go to the headquarters in Ramallah/El-Bireh of the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club, of which he has been Chairman since– and maybe also before?– he lost his parliamentary seat in the elections of 2006. The clubs ground-floor offices are dominated by larger-than-life photos of the “dean” of the many Fateh prisoners still held in Israeli prisons, Marwan Barghouthi. In one of these photos, Barghouthi has been photoshopped into a stance alongside a veteran PFLP prisoner.
It’s a salient political fact that the 11,000 or more Palestinian political prisoners held by Israel have a much more vivid understanding of the need for national unity than many of the political figures living outside those jails. Fares seems closely connected to the prisoners’ zeitgeist.
“Fateh is in a big crisis!” This was one of the first things Fares said to me about the veteran Palestinan movement that has dominated the PLO for 40 years now (and has dominated the PA since its inception at Oslo.)
“Fateh has to hold its general conference!” Fares urged. And indeed, under the bylaws of the 50-year-old organization it is supposed to hold this policy-making gathering every five years. The last one was held in 1989 and, um, quite a few things have happened in Palestinian politics– and on the ground in Palestine– since then.
Later, I asked, somewhat gingerly if he could speak about the “problem” inside Fateh. “No, it’s not a problem, it’s a crisis,” he insisted.
He continued:

Continue reading “Bantustan Days, Part 4: The in-Fateh opposition”

Jewish American opinion evolving on Palestine

The progressive Jewish lobbying group J Street has published the results of a new nationwide poll it conducted of Jewish Americans between February 28 and March 8.
The poll had some encouraging results. J Street’s own press release about it highlighted the following findings:

    * American Jews remain remarkably supportive of assertive American efforts to achieve Middle East peace. The poll finds an extraordinarily strong base of 69 percent of American Jews firmly supporting active American engagement in bringing about Middle East peace, even if it means publicly disagreeing with or exerting pressure on both Arabs and Israelis, compared to 66 percent eight months ago;
    * 69 percent also support the U.S. working with a unified Hamas-Fatah Palestinian Authority government to achieve a peace agreement with Israel, even when informed that the U.S. does not recognize Hamas due to its status as a terrorist organization and its refusal to recognize Israel. Interestingly, a March poll conducted by the Truman Institute at Hebrew University reported that 69 percent of Israelis also think Israel should negotiate with a joint Hamas-Fatah government;
    * By 76-24 percent, American Jews support a two-state, final status deal between Israel and the Palestinians along the lines of the agreement nearly reached eight years ago during the Camp David and Taba talks;
    * On Avigdor Lieberman: When told about Lieberman’s campaign platform requiring Arab citizens of Israel to sign loyalty oaths, as well as his threats against Arab Members of Knesset, American Jews opposed these positions by a 69 to 31 margin. One in three believe their own connection to Israel will be diminished if Lieberman assumes a senior position in the Israeli cabinet.
    * On Gaza: While Jews rallied behind Israel and approved of Israel’s military action by a 3 to 1 margin, 59 percent still felt that the military action had no impact on Israel’s security (41 percent) or made Israel less secure (18 percent), while only 41 percent felt it made Israel more secure.

To me, the second of these findings is the most significant. It means that if Obama and his envoy sen. Mitchell move quickly and surefootedly toward including Hamas in the search for calming, de-escalation, and a speedy final resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, he can expect to rally significant support for this approach from within the US Jewish community.
Of course, an inclusive policy such as this could also be expected to arouse the ire of most of the old hard-line organizations that like to portray themselves as representatives of the “mainstream” US Jewish community. But guess what. The “main” stream has been trickling out of its old tired stream-bed for some time now and carving out its own much more principled and humane way of looking at Middle east peace issues.
Also highly relevant in this context: The notably positive tone of Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal’s recent statements about Pres. Obama— as reported here.
I have the full text of that interview bookmarked someplace. But it is also significant that it’s being featured in that way on the pro-Hamas PIC website today.
In fact Meshaal’s reactions to Obama are much warmer than those of Iranian Supreme Guide Khamene’i.
(Some people believe– and argue– that Meshaal, being based in Damascus, is more hardline than the Hamas leaders on the ground inside Gaza or the West Bank. This is absolutely not true. In some respects he is more ready to be politically flexible than they are. Plus, he is the overall leader and inside the organization his word is the gold standard.)

Bantustan Days, Part 3: Sadness of a peace negotiator

I’m now continuing with my download of some of the notes
I took during my recent time in Palestine/Israel.  Actually, I need to find a new heading for this feature. I
was thinking of “Notes from Bantustine”, which has
certain ring to it. But some of my more interesting notes are from within 1948
Israel where the situation is not that of apartheid/Bantustans as much as of a
fairly settled colonial-settler society– even though it is one that still has major
issues from its colonizing era unresolved.

When
we were writing our 2004 Quaker book on the Palestine-Israel conflict we made a
point of referring to the whole area of Mandate Palestine as either
“Palestine/Israel” or “Israel/Palestine”, alternating between the two forms.
That is one slightly clunky way to proceed. Personally I think the way that
post-1994 South Africa has dealt with some geographic naming issues– by
inventing completely new, culturally neutral or “inclusive” names for places to
replace the sometimes exquisitely culturally specific names used before– has
considerable merit. “The Holy Land” is another way to proceed, though it’s a
little pious-sounding. Also, as a Quaker I totally believe that all portions of
the earth are equally “holy”; and I think that the singling-out of the area of
Mandate Palestine as “the Holy Land” by many parties, including Western
Christians, has led to a world of competitive claims, jealousy, divisiveness,
and general trouble.

… So
anyway, since my note download starts with the week I spent in Ramallah, for now I can still use the “Bantustan days”
rubric. Okay, even recognizing, as I did here already, that Ramallah and other PA enclaves in the West Bank are “Not
exactly Bantustans.”

On February 18, I conducted a good, though short, interview
with Ghassan Khatib.
Khatib is one of the leaders of the Palestinian
People’s Party (PPP), formerly the Palestinian Communist Party, one of
the smaller Palestinian organizations that has been
affiliated with the Fateh-dominated PLO for many
years. Historically, the communists were the earliest supporters within the
Palestinian national movement of the twin ideas of recognizing Israel and
creating a Palestinian state alongside Israel—i.e., the two-state
solution.  I think this was linked
to the PCP’s historic relationship with both the Soviet Union (back in the
day), given the USSR’s strong support for the creation of Israel; and also its
relationship with the Israeli Communist Party, especially since after the creation of the
Jewish state in 1948 the ICP became one of the main vehicles within which the
Palestinians who remained inside 1948 Israel had some ability to
organize their communities and to participate in Israeli politics.

Khatib was born in Nablus in 1954.
He was held in Israel’s system of “administrative” (i.e. no-trial) detention
from 1974 through 1977, a period when the PCP and other pro-PLO organizations
were doing a lot of effective organizing of Palestinian communities on the West
Bank.  Later he went to the UK and got an
economics degree from Manchester University in the UK. I first met him in 1989
when he had just recently emerged from yet another spell of administrative
detention. The PCP/PPP had thrown its considerable organizing and intellectual
skills into the First Intifada, which started in December 1987. In the late 1980s,
the head of the PPP was Bashir al-Barghouthi, an
extremely smart and thoughtful man who suffered a severe stroke in 1997 and
died in 2000.

Khatib was a member of the
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 and of
the Palestinian team that participated in follow-up negotiations with Israel.
In 2002 he was appointed Minister of Labor in the PA, then in 2005-6 he was
Minister of Planning. These days he is a Vice-President at Bir
Zeit University, a little north of Ramallah. He came by to talk to me at the end of one of his
workdays there.

He was pretty pessimistic when we talked about the prospects
of any rapid reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas.
(And I see that in the
latest
of his regular contributions to the “Bitter Lemons” discussion
forum, he still seems pessimistic. Go to that link to read his view of  “the five obstacles” that still stand
in the way of the reconciliation.)

When I talked with Khatib
he—like the always well-informed Ziad Abu Amr, whom I’d talked with earlier in the day—noted
that one other significant problem could well arise from the fact that the head
of the team whom Fateh leader (and the PA’s hanging-on-by-one-thread president) Mahmoud Abbas sent to negotiate
with Hamas in Cairo was none other than the ever-controversial Ahmed Qurei, Abu ‘Ala.

Continue reading “Bantustan Days, Part 3: Sadness of a peace negotiator”

Jerusalem’s Israeli mayor on US fundraising trip

The recently elected Israeli mayor of Jerusalem, Nir Barkat, is heading to the US this week on a fund-raising tour that will bring him to New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Washington, San Francisco and Florida.
That report from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (HT: MondoWeiss) says Barkat:

    hopes to reach out to American Jews and make them partners in revitalizing Jerusalem. To use his language, he sees them as “shareholders” in the city.

I hope that Barkat will receive the welcome that’s deserved by a man who’s at the cutting edge of the currently escalating campaign to ethnically cleanse the whole Eastern half of the city– which was quite illegally Anschlussed by the Israeli government in 1967– of its remaining Palestinian residents.
US citizens of all faith-groups, or none, and of all ethnicities need to understand clearly that:

    1. All of the area of Jerusalem that came under Israeli occupation in 1967 is considered, under international law and also by the US government, to be occupied territory.
    2. Because of this, under the Fourth Geneva Convention, it is quite illegal for Israel to have implanted any of its own citizens as settlers into occupied East Jerusalem.
    3. It is also quite illegal for Israel to have unilaterally declared the annexation (= Anschluss) of East Jerusalem to itself.
    4. Because of all the above, it is quite incorrect for anyone to claim that Jerusalem has been “unified” and that this situation must be “permanent”.
    5. Indeed, the final status of East Jerusalem– and also, under international law dating back to the 1947 Partitition Plan, that of the West of the city– still has to be determined as part of the final status agreement between Israel and Palestine.
    6. Pending the conclusion of that final peace, neither side should take any steps that prejudice the final outcome. And yes, that includes both the implantation of Jewish settlements in the occupied East and its Anschluss to Israel.
    7. Settlements are settlements and are illegal even if they are euphemistically rebranded as “neighborhoods.”
    8. Over and above all the international-law considerations listed above, even from a civil-rights perspective it should be quite unacceptable to Jewish Americans, many of whose families have suffered from residential exclusion in the past, that huge areas of East Jerusalem (and the whole of West Jerusalem) are today completely “out of bounds” to potential Palestinian renters or purchasers.
    9. Barkat has already announced many new rounds of demolitions of Palestinian housing in East Jerusalem that is deemed “illegal.” This great new background resource from Ir Amim describes the whole process whereby the Palestinians’ right to develop even lands that they wholly own in East Jerusalem is severely curtailed by Israel’s planning procedures; why Palestinans are thereby forced to build without the necessary permits in order to accommodate even their own natural growth; and why so many Palestinian families are therefore forced to live in constant dread of the Israeli bulldozers.
    10. The attachment of Jerusalem’s rightful Palestinian residents to the city– both that of those who remain, living under constant threat there, and those hundreds of thousands forced out of the city over the 41 years of occupation by Israel’s many population-depletion ploys– remains strong. Jerusalem also remains at the heart of the nationalist sentiment of all Palestinians.
    11. Jerusalem is also a city and an issue that is of key importance to 1.2 billion Muslims around the world, many of the world’s billion Christians, and just about all ethnic Arabs whether Christian or Muslim.
    12. This year, Jerusalem has been deemed by the Arab League to be “the capital of Arab culture.”
    13. In an ideal future, Jerusalem could be a meeting-point for many different faiths and civilizations from around the world. It certainly does not play that function today. Muslims and Christians who live as close as Bethlehem, Ramallah, al-Bireh, or even areas right up against the Wall that encircles the city to the east are forbidden to enter the city for pilgrimage, regular prayer, or other purposes.

In short, Barkat should be met wherever he goes on his current tour with a series of pointed questions that undermine the kind of propaganda points he will be making (as previewed in the NYT interview with him, which ran today.)